Two birds, paired companions, occupy the same tree.
Of the two, one eats the sweet fig.
The other, not eating, looks on.
(áčgveda I.164.20)
1. Introduction
Thinking about classical Indian philosophy in light of relativism is a challenging hermeneutic task. There are no readymade volumes in the classical literature that we can identify under this category. Siderits argues along these lines that âthe cultural factors that make relativism a pressing issue for us were largely absent from the classical Indian context, so that the various forms of relativism do not receive philosophical scrutiny in the Indian traditionâ (2016, 24). The fundamental problem in thinking about Indian philosophy through relativism is not that there are no readymade texts but that scholars refrain from engaging relativism, as if it is taboo or a disease that philosophers need to stay away from (e.g. Siderits 2016, 31, 35). My own approach to relativism is relativistic, as I believe that endorsing relativism in one respect does not require one to be relativistic in all accounts. Just like any other âism,â relativism should be handled as a device to fathom human nature and to help humanity negotiate a perplexing, complex social reality. When we open ourselves to read classical Indian materials through the lens of relativism, we encounter a wealth of materials. Dialogues recorded in Vedic literature epitomize cultural fluidity, diversity and an openness to perspectives. Traditions have adopted perspectivism to make sense of an otherwise bewildering variety of commentarial literature with conflicting interpretations. The problem then is we encounter a semblance of relativism and can be easily misdirected. Before we assign epistemic relativism in the Jain âmultiperspectivalismâ (anekÄntavÄda) or moral relativism in the MahÄbhÄrata or meaning relativism in Bhartáčhariâs philosophy of language, we need to carefully define the categories and explore the parameters.
Cultural pluralism was a norm in classical India and every region dealt with religious differences. Everyday society also incorporated linguistic differences and grammarians such as Patañjali were keenly aware of dialectical variations even within a single language. Combined with polytheism and panpsychism, India is founded upon the co-existence of different and at times, conflicting viewpoints. Written in this cultural milieu, texts such as BhagavadgÄ«ta endorsed different soteriological approaches by necessity, to combine multiple methods for liberation. It is not possible to address all these issues in a few pages. I therefore limit myself to re-examination of some of NÄgÄrjunaâs claims, keeping in mind both classical and contemporary interpretations. I explore, in particular, the doctrine of âtwo truthsâ and NÄgÄrjunaâs interpretation of the âviewpointsâ (dáčáčŁáčis). In so doing, I am open to drawing parallels and initiating a cross-cultural dialogue on relativism. In conclusion, this conversation boils down to relativism leading to truth skepticism on the one hand and pluralism and hierarchical truth predications on the other.
2. NÄgÄrjuna on viewpoints (dáčáčŁáčis)
NÄgÄrjuna (150â250) is one of the major Buddhist philosophers and the founder of the MÄdhyamika school. Scholars have primarily read his philosophy for its dialectical methods, rejection of substantialism, and interpretation of the doctrine of âemptinessâ (ĆĆ«nyatÄ). Most importantly, he is known for his pioneering doctrine of âtwo truthsâ (dve satye) and deconstruction of âviewpointsâ (dáčáčŁáči). NÄgÄrjuna introduces a unique logical method that reduces the opponentâs viewpoints to absurdity (reductio ad absurdum) to defend his position that there is no inherent nature (svabhÄva), whether by ontological truth claims regarding substance, or epistemic claims regarding reality â including the limits to human rationality. NÄgÄrjuna explores any proposition in terms of fourfold possible extremes (koáči), eventually proving it absurd to adopt any one of those extremes.
Regarding the inherent nature (svabhÄva) of being and things, NÄgÄrjuna posits and then refutes that:
- (1) Things have inherent nature (âisâ thesis).
- (2) Things do not have inherent nature (âis notâ thesis).
- (3) Things simultaneously possess and lack inherent nature (âis and is notâ thesis).
- (4) Things lack both the inherent nature and the lack thereof (not â âis and is notâ thesis).
Regarding causality, he likewise proposes as categories that:
- (1) Things emerge because of the internal factors (âsvataáž„â or âfrom withinâ thesis).
- (2) Things emerge because of the external factors (âparataáž„â or âfrom withoutâ thesis).
- (3) Things emerge due both to the internal as well as the external factors (âdvÄbhyÄmâ or âfrom bothâ thesis).
- (4) Things emerge without any cause (âahetutaáž„â or from âno causeâ thesis).
In rendering this thesis of an âintrinsic natureâ (svabhÄva) absurd, NÄgÄrjuna establishes the doctrine of âemptinessâ (ĆĆ«nyatÄ). Examining this discussion historically, what he says is that, just like aggregates do not have their own intrinsic nature (the position that the Abhidharma school has endorsed), so also do the building blocks of the manifest reality, the so-called dharmas, not have any inherent nature. The tricky part is that he is not advocating this last statement as his thesis. The argument is if the emptiness of inherent nature were a thesis, this would be tantamount to endorsing absolutism by another name. Therefore, the negation of intrinsic nature is just a negation. The problem is that this understanding only partially captures the way NÄgÄrjuna has been historically understood. Reading NÄgÄrjuna is perplexing for both the classical commentators and contemporary scholars alike. The following verse is ground-zero of our investigation:
The teaching of the dharma(s) by the Buddha relies on two truths: the limited conventional truth and the truth as it is.
(MMK XXIV.8)1
There are obviously two different ways to understand this passage. It can mean that phenomenal truth exists and only applies to conventional reality and that absolute truth transcends language and concepts. This understanding of a hierarchy of truth does not reject truth claims, and can be interpreted in two different ways: first, that there are two tiers of truth, or second, that there are different sets of truths. In another possible interpretation of âtwo truths,â this verse can also be explained by truth that is conceived of in the âcoveredâ (saáčváčti) state. For example, a truth such as seeing a sand dune as mirage or a rope as a snake, does not amount to actual truth due to its origination within a state of delusion. As a result, this view asserts that truth only exists corresponding to the way the entities are (parama-artha-taáž„). Therefore, a correspondence theory of truth underlies this interpretation. And if this position is followed, NÄgÄrjuna would not be making any anti-foundational claim in the exalted sense. This reading, however, would contradict NÄgÄrjunaâs own proclamation that there is no âinherent natureâ (svabhÄva), as this would simply be replacing one form of absolutism with another. This would also contradict NÄgÄrjunaâs direct statement that openly rejects absolutism regarding emptiness (ĆĆ«nyatÄ):
It is not our fault that you resort to emptiness. No foundation (sa = adhilaya) can be established on emptiness.
(MMK XXIV.13)
If what is described in terms of [the entities] lacking their inherent nature is the very being of the lack of the inherent nature, this would negate the lack of inherent nature and only the being of inherent nature would be established.
(VV 26, see Bhattacharya et al. 1978)2
Keeping these straightforward stanzas in mind, Siderits argues that the term paramÄrtha or âthe way the things areâ does not confirm any ultimate truth, but on the contrary, âthe ultimate truth is that there is no ultimate truthâ (Siderits 1989, 231). Garfield confirms this same interpretation:
Suppose that we take a conventional entity, such as a table. We analyze it to demonstrate its emptiness, finding that there is no table apart from its parts⊠. So, we conclude that it is empty. But now let us analyze that emptiness⊠. What do we find? Nothing at all but the tableâs lack of inherent existence⊠. To see the table as empty ⊠is to see the table as conventional, as dependent.
(Garfield 2002, 38â39)
There are two possible responses to the preceding statements, and both were historically applied by NÄgÄrjuna. One response is to reject such a claim, demonstrating circularity in its logic, arguing that even this amounts to a truth claim. The other is to apply linguistic or conceptual tactics to interpret negation while keeping open the possibility of speaking about the truth. The current conversation on relativism claims a central place in this shift from a correspondence theory of truth. Whether to understand NÄgÄrjunian claims as metaphysical or semantic is not a new quandary. So far, recent discussions and arguments are a flimsy replica of the debate between the PrÄsaáč
gika and the SvÄtantrika readings sustained over millennia.3 The dilemma though is if this is a rejection of the absolute truth, and the conventional is not the âtruthâ per se, there is no truth to defend. With this view, the category âtruthâ would be fictitious, like rabbit-horn. And if this is only the rejection of absolute truth but not of relative truth and therefore interdependent truth, this would mean that truth is always relative, perspectival, and this position is not a rejection of âtruth.â
3. Truth: metaphysical or semantic
If what NÄgÄrjuna meant is that there are two truths, this would be a metaphysical theory, a theory about the ultimate nature of reality. The semantic interpretation recognizes this proclamation as not about the nature of reality but about the nature of truth. Siderits explains that, âall things are empty [means] that the ultimate truth [has] no ultimate truth â there is only conventional truthâ (Siderits 2003, 11). This would help to separate truth claims from metaphysical reality and we could say, the statement âRÄvaáča had ten headsâ is true based on narratives, irrespective of the possible existence of such a monster. Returning to the position of âtwo truths,â a semantic interpretation claims that no statement can be ultimately true. Siderits argues further, âGiven that dharmas must be things with intrinsic natures, if nothing can bear an intrinsic nature, then there is nothing for ultimately true statements to be about; hence the very notion of ultimate truth is incoherentâ (2003, 11â12). It appears Siderits draws from Hilary Putnam to develop a thesis that requires the rejection of any singular truth regarding the nature of reality that would presuppose a model of metaphysical realism. The target is to reject âemptinessâ (ĆĆ«nyatÄ) itself as a metaphysical claim. And this position omits the demolition of such a premise by the logical fallacy of circularity. To say that âthere is no final truth about realityâ would also apply to the claim that âall things are empty,â which of course one would expect the MÄdhyamika philosophers to reject. And historically some have taken this route. Siderits, however, suggests that even the claim âall things are emptyâ is only conventionally true.
Re-contextualization of the claims is necessary to establish any form of relativism based on the aforementioned position. To say that truth is only conventional, the conclusion derived from Sideritsâ reading, opens up a potential space for multiple perspectives in which all retain a degree of validity. This, however, is not what Siderits proposes and it deviates from NÄgÄrjunaâs position, as it yet again underlies a supposition on the truth per se; specifically that, in an underlying metaphysical claim, even absolute truth can only be relatively revealed. The rejection of absolute truth does not, however, confirm the validity of viewpoints (dáčáčŁáči), as has already been argued. To assume all that can be spoken of truth are just viewpoints does not mean the same judgment canât be true in one perspective while false in another. NÄgÄrjuna is not proposing that the human encounter with reality is mediated by language or culture. But if we were to read that âtwo truthâ theory affirms perspectives, while not discrediting the category truth in the ultimate sense, we can derive that truth is relatively revealed in different modes. We can now engage G. Ferraroâs (2013) arguments with this new accommodation to address relativism.
Ferraro argues against this semantic reading, maintaining that NÄgÄrjunaâs doctrine of âtwo truthsâ upholds âtwo visions of reality on which the Buddhas, for soteriological and pedagogical reasons, build teachings of two typesâ (2013, 563). Emptiness (ĆĆ«nyatÄ), in this reading, is in fact âequivalent to supreme truth.â To make his claim, Ferraro first divides the metaphysical claims into two groups:
- (1) a realistic metaphysical reading that considers âsupreme truth an existing and somehow characterizable dimension,â and
- (2) an anti-realistic metaphysical reading that denies the âexistence of supreme truthâ and affirms âexistence exclusively of ordinary realityâ (2013, 566).
Now the argument is that whatever applies to our pedagogical approach also applies to the use of language: our use of language or words are relational, and while our objective may be to speak the âtruth,â given that there are metaphysical truths to be conveyed by language, our approaches can vary. Consequently, we can derive that the conventional is a necessary step, that we can discuss truth only conventionally. And since it is counterintuitive to conceive of the âconventionalâ as being a single perspective, the discourse on truth automatically becomes perspectival and relational. This claim, therefore, could reject both the metaphysical claim, and the validity of the so-called supreme truth. The fundamental divergence in this interpretation with Siderits and Garfield (2013) arises due to confusion between metaphysical and semantic interpretations. Siderits and Garfield argue that semantic interpretation does not interpret âtwo tru...