Introduction
A critical approach to childrenâs rights
Didier Reynaert, Ellen Desmet, Sara Lembrechts and Wouter Vandenhole
Over the last few decades, childrenâs rights have assumed a central position in a wide variety of disciplines and policies. More than 25 years after the adoption of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) in 1989, it is time to take stock of the achievements and challenges.
The volume consists of two parts, a disciplinary and a thematic one. Taken together, both parts seek to further childrenâs rights realization, not by downplaying key challenges, but by addressing them. The first part provides an insight into various (inter)disciplinary approaches to childrenâs rights, with contributions from law, history, social policy, educational sciences, childhood studies, sociology, social work, anthropology, geography, gender studies and citizenship studies. The second part takes a thematic entry point, disentangling a selection of childrenâs rights issues that are of particular relevance from a global perspective. Here, participation, education, health, juvenile justice, alternative care, violence, female genital mutilation, child labour and working children, migration, poverty, indigenous children and natural resource exploitation are addressed. A detailed introduction to each chapter is offered in the final section of this introduction.
This dual entry point of disciplinary approaches and thematic analyses helps to deepen the understanding of childrenâs rights. Both parts mutually enrich and reinforce each other: they are interconnected and complementary. The common thread ensuring coherence throughout the two parts and their respective chapters is the critical approach that is adopted. This critical approach, aspects of which are elaborated on hereinafter and revisited and consolidated in the conclusion, will help childrenâs rights scholarship to mature into critical childrenâs rights studies (see concluding Chapter 23), and to take a distance from childrenâs rights activism when needed.
The Handbook takes issue with the observation that âsomething seems to be going onâ in childrenâs rights scholarship. Several scholars have recently proposed new conceptualizations of childrenâs rights that reflect a shift from a top-down understanding towards a bottom-up approach of childrenâs rights, in parallel with a similar evolution in general human rights scholarship (Merry, 2010; De Feyter, 2007, 2011; de Gaay Fortman, 2011). Reflections on childrenâs rights in terms of âchildrenâs rights from belowâ (Liebel, 2012), âliving rightsâ (Hanson and Nieuwenhuys, 2013), âlocalizing childrenâs rightsâ (Vandenhole, 2012) or a âlifeworld approach in childrenâs rightsâ (Reynaert et al., 2011) are all grounded in a bottom-up approach to childrenâs rights. What unites these perspectives is their âcontextual orientationâ that criticizes dominant paradigms in childrenâs rights research. These dominant paradigms understand childrenâs rights as an objective set of goals applicable for any context, and take the CRC as the key point of reference. Not only is such an approach blind to the social, economic and historical contexts in which children grow up, it also does not sufficiently take account of the diversity of interpretations and meanings that childrenâs rights can have. Nevertheless, the context-oriented approaches raise new questions and dilemmas, while simultaneously re-challenging âoldâ ones. How far can a context-specific interpretation of the CRC go without violating childrenâs rights? How can different interpretations of childrenâs rights coexist, and how do they relate to more âtraditionalâ ideas of social justice and human dignity? And in what sense can the CRC be considered as an instrument for social change to address imbalanced power-relations, both locally and globally?
In what follows, we address four analytical puzzles that are at the core of this Handbook: definitions and understandings of children, childhood and childrenâs rights; a context-specific approach; disciplinary interactions; and an approach of critique. Next, we briefly introduce each chapter by summarizing its key contents and by flagging how it engages with the analytical puzzles developed below.
There are no universally accepted definitions of the concepts of children, childhood and childrenâs rights. In what follows, we explain how these notions have been defined by the editors for the purposes of this volume.
The notion of âchildrenâ is used to refer to a particular group in society, which is distinguished on the basis of its age. Who is considered a âchildâ is not a given; it varies with social, economic and cultural circumstances. Article 1 of the CRC states: âFor the purposes of the present Convention, a child means every human being below the age of eighteen years unless under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier.â The provision explains how the term âchildâ is to be understood for the purposes of that treaty. It does not state that every person below 18 years equals a child as such. This is nonetheless how the concept of âchildrenâ has become commonly defined, namely as all persons below eighteen, leading to an invisibility and even âinfantilisation of adolescentsâ (Abramson, 1996, p. 397; Cantwell, 2011).1 It therefore seems more appropriate to talk about âchildren and young peopleâ when referring to the persons who come within the scope of the CRC. The application of the CRC to âyoung peopleâ or adolescents is moreover challenging. The text of the CRC is not always adapted to the needs and interest of adolescents, and there has been a lack of attention in the implementation of the CRC to this age group as well (Desmet, 2012).
Both the beginning and the end of childhood are contested terrain. Regarding the beginning of childhood, there is a debate on the extent to which childrenâs rights are or should be applicable to the unborn child (Joseph, 2009; Cornock and Montgomery, 2011). As concerns the end of childhood, neuroimaging research has found that the brain is only fully developed at the age of 25 (Johnson, Blum and Giedd, 2009). Although neuroscientists warn against drawing causal conclusions on the relation between neuromaturational processes and real-world behaviour (Johnson, Blum and Giedd, 2009, p. 216), this finding of longer brain immaturity has led to claims to extend the protection of childrenâs rights to the age group of 18- to 25-year-olds (Veerman, 2010). Moreover, the societal context seems characterized by two opposite evolutions: on the one hand, the transition to adulthood is being further postponed, often until far above the age of 18 (Elchardus and Roggemans, 2010); on the other, the age at which one ventures into certain domains is decreasing. For instance, the confrontation with multiple sources of information occurs at an ever lower age, among others through internet and social media (Boonaert and Siongers, 2010).
Within the age group of 0â18, discussions on capacity and (the necessity to establish) age limits abound. When is a child âcapable of forming his or her own viewsâ, so that her or his views are to be given due weight âin accordance with the age and maturity of the childâ (Art. 12 CRC)? The answer to this question is of crucial importance â at least in mainstream thinking â for the participation of children in matters affecting them, such as divorce proceedings or alternative care settings. Another example concerns the minimum age of criminal responsibility (Cipriani, 2009). The recognition of âchildrenâ as fully-fledged persons, as promoted by the childrenâs rights movement, may be â unduly â used as an argument in favour of (further) lowering the minimum age of criminal responsibility.
The observation that defining the notion of âthe childâ or âchildrenâ is not so straightforward builds on the understanding that the way we look at children is determined by the social and cultural context and practices in which children grow up. Because different social and cultural contexts coexist, both within as well as across societies, different understandings are possible on what âthe childâ is. This idea is captured in the notion of âchild imageâ. âChild imageâ refers to the way we look at children, i.e. the often implicit assumptions such as biological or psychological traits that co-design the way we deal with children.
For instance, the most dominant impact on the way we perceive children comes from developmental psychology. The âinventionâ in the seventeenth century â at least in the global North â of different developmental phases in childhood linked to âsensitive periodsâ in a personâs lifetime, is a way to look at children that is still prominently present in child rearing today. In this view, children are considered as objects in need of protection because of their vulnerability. What characterizes them is their position of âadults in waitingâ or their ânot yetâ status, i.e. ânot-yet-fully-developedâ. In terms of childrenâs rights, the focus then is on protection rights of children. Another child image, which has been common in many societies around the world but only gained ground more recently in the global North, is that of the âautonomous childâ (Reynaert et al., 2009). It considers children as active agents and autonomous and independent human beings. The interdisciplinary field of childhood studies has contributed to developing this new child image by recognizing the social and political significance of childrenâs meaning making and ideas. The key thought of this paradigm is the recognition that children are competent human beings. The childrenâs rights movement carried out these ideas in practice and policy by advocating for the recognition of the participation rights of children.
âChildhoodâ refers to the historical and socio-cultural structuring of children and child images in our society. A key characteristic of this structuring is the separation of children from adults based on child-specific traits such as biological and psychological determinants. This structuring has been labelled the âyouth moratoriumâ or the âinstitutionalized youth landâ (Verhellen, 2000; Zinnecker, 2000). The notion of âyouth landâ or âyouth moratoriumâ refers to the institutionalization of childhood into â⊠preparatory arenas that implement a principle of integration by means of separationâ. (Honig, 2008, p. 201). It can be considered as the result of a historical process in which children are gradually separated from the adult world with the aim to prepare them for adult life (Reynaert and Roose, 2014).
With the rise of the childrenâs rights movement and the academic field of childhood studies, questions were raised in relation to an exaggerated institutional paternalism when dealing with children. This stemmed from the critique that children are not merely âpassive receivers of societyâs messagesâ (James and James, 2012). Childrenâs actions and processes of appropriation were recognized to equally contribute to transforming the historical and socio-cultural structuring of childhood in our society (James, 2009). The institutionalized youth land was contested and both the social and legal position of children were challenged. Children, it was said, are not only the future generation; childhood should likewise be considered as an actual part of current society (James and James, 2004). The cover of this Handbook, picturing a girl âinflating the globeâ, represents such an image of children as agents, who give meaning and co-shape the world.
Important to notice is the fact that throughout time, different child images and different social constructions of childhood, coexist. âOldâ child images are not fully replaced by new ones. They continue to exist as part of societyâs view on childhood. As James and Prout (1997) argue, the way we look at children and childhood is anchored in the past and reshaped in the present. Likewise, until today, the institutionalized youth land remains the horizon against which childhood in the Western world is shaped, although the ânatureâ of this youth land has changed over time (Reynaert and Roose, 2014).
This coexistence of different child images and constructions of childhood creates confusion and tensions. Different societal actors may emphasize different characteristics of the same social phenomena, often resulting in the paradox of âthe child in dangerâ versus the âdangerous childâ. In the public sphere for instance, no age group has so much expertise about social media as children and young people have. These so-called âdigital nativesâ are characterized by the integration of digital technology in their daily lives. However, popular discourses on social media and children often focus on phenomena such as cyberbullying or cyberstalking, portraying children as dangerous. At the same time, however, these discourses point at the harms the internet can cause to young people, resulting in the development of new technologies to protect children. Similar observations can be made in relation to the presence of children in the public sphere. Children can participate in public life, as long as they behave. Initiatives such as a curfew or mosquitos2 are meant to protect society against the anti-social behaviour of âdangerousâ children. At the same time, public participation of children is limited due to the risks that go along with, for instance, traffic. Here, children are considered to be âin dangerâ, resulting in âchild-friendlyâ public spaces where children can play and meet. However, these places are often isolated from the broader public life, resulting in a further âislandizationâ of childhood. These diverging views on childhood are all entrenched in the CRC, with the recognition of both protection as well as participation rights.
The CRC (1989) is the key legal instrument on childrenâs rights. This Convention and its three optional protocols codify the human rights of children in international, legally binding instruments. With almost all states in the world being parties to the treaty,3 the CRC offers a set of minimum standards on childrenâs rights for which states can be held accountable. Guided by what has gradually come to be seen as the four underlying general principles â i.e. of (i) non-discrimination, (ii) best interests of the child, (iii) right to life, survival and development, and (iv) participation (Committee on the Rights of the Child, 2003, § 12) â the CRC grants children protection, provision and participation rights. For the first time, civil and political as well as economic, social and cultural rights were put together in a human rights treaty. Holistically addressing children as fully-fledged persons, these rights are inextricably related, with no intrinsic hierarchy between them (KeKi, 2012, pp. 11â12).
Even though the CRC is an essential component in the legal embedding of the rights of children in the wider human right...