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Justice And Care
Essential Readings In Feminist Ethics
Virginia Held
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eBook - ePub
Justice And Care
Essential Readings In Feminist Ethics
Virginia Held
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This book, an essential tool for anyone studying the state of feminist thought in particular or ethical theory in general, shows the outlines of an ethic of care in the distinctive practices of African American communities and considers how the values of care and justice can be reformulated.
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Informations
PART ONE
Delineations of Care
1
Caring [1984]
Nel Noddings
Ethics and Caring
It is generally agreed that ethics is the philosophical study of morality, but we also speak of âprofessional ethicsâ and âa personal ethic.â When we speak in the second way, we refer to something explicableâa set of rules, an ideal, a constellation of expressionsâthat guides and justifies our conduct. One can, obviously, behave ethically without engaging in ethics as a philosophical enterprise, and one can even put together an ethic of sortsâthat is, a description of what it means to be moralâwithout seriously questioning what it means to be moral. Such an ethic, it seems to me, may or may not be a guide to moral behavior. It depends, in a fundamental way, on an assessment of the answer to the question: What does it mean to be moral? This question will be central to our investigation. I shall use âethicalâ rather than âmoralâ in most of our discussions but, in doing so, I am assuming that to behave ethically is to behave under the guidance of an acceptable and justifiable account of what it means to be moral. To behave ethically is not to behave in conformity with just any description of morality, and I shall claim that ethical systems are not equivalent simply because they include rules concerning the same matters or categories.
In an argument for the possibility of an objective morality (against relativism), anthropologist Ralph Linton makes two major points that may serve to illuminate the path I am taking. In one argument, he seems to say that ethical relativism is false because it can be shown that all societies lay down rules of some sort for behavior in certain universal categories. All societies, for example, have rules governing sexual behavior. But Linton does not seem to recognize that the content of the rules, and not just their mere existence, is crucial to the discussion of ethicality. He says, for example: â⊠practically all societies recognize adultery as unethical and punish the offenders. The same man who will lend his wife to a friend or brother will be roused to fury if she goes to another man without his permission.â1 But, surely, we would like to know what conception of morality makes adultery âwrongâ and the lending of oneâs wife âright.â Just as surely, an ethical system that renders such decisions cannot be equivalent to one that finds adultery acceptable and wife lending unacceptable.
In his second claim, Linton is joined by a substantial number of anthropologists. Stated simply, the claim is that morality is based on common human characteristics and needs and that, hence, an objective morality is possible. That morality is rooted somehow in common human needs, feelings, and cognitions is agreed. But it is not clear to me that we can move easily or swiftly from that agreement to a claim that objective morality is possible. We may be able to describe the moral impulse as it arises in response to particular needs and feelings, and we may be able to describe the relation of thinking and acting in relation to that impulse; but as we tackle these tasks, we may move farther away from a notion of objective morality and closer to the conviction that an irremovable subjective core, a longing for goodness, provides what universality and stability there is in what it means to be moral.
I want to build an ethic on caring, and I shall claim that there is a form of caring natural and accessible to all human beings. Certain feelings, attitudes, and memories will be claimed as universal. But the ethic itself will not embody a set of universalizable moral judgments. Indeed, moral judgment will not be its central concern. It is very common among philosophers to move from the question: What is morality? to the seemingly more manageable question: What is a moral judgment? Fred Feldman, for example, makes this move early on. He suggests:
Perhaps we can shed some light on the meaning of the noun âmoralityâ by considering the adjective âmoral.â Proceeding in this way will enable us to deal with a less abstract concept, and we may thereby be more successful. So instead of asking âWhat is morality?â let us pick one of the most interesting of these uses of the adjective âmoralâ and ask instead, âWhat is a moral judgment?â2
Now, I am not arguing that this move is completely mistaken or that nothing can be gained through a consideration of moral judgments, but such a move is not the only possibility. We might choose another interesting use of the adjective and ask, instead, about the moral impulse or moral attitude. The choice is important. The long-standing emphasis on the study of moral judgments has led to a serious imbalance in moral discussion. In particular, it is well known that many womenâperhaps most womenâdo not approach moral problems as problems of principle, reasoning, and judgmentâŠ. If a substantial segment of humankind approaches moral problems through a consideration of the concrete elements of situations and a regard for themselves as caring, then perhaps an attempt should be made to enlighten the study of morality in this alternative mode. Further, such a study has significant implications, beyond ethics, for education. If moral education, in a double sense, is guided only by the study of moral principles and judgments, not only are women made to feel inferior to men in the moral realm but also education itself may suffer from impoverished and one-sided moral guidance.
So building an ethic on caring seems both reasonable and important. One may well ask, at this point, whether an ethic so constructed will be a form of âsituation ethics.â It is not, certainly, that form of act-utilitarianism commonly labeled âsituation ethics.â3 Its emphasis is not on the consequences of our acts, although these are not, of course, irrelevant. But an ethic of caring locates morality primarily in the pre-act consciousness of the one-caring. Yet it is not a form of agapism. There is no command to love nor, indeed, any God to make the commandment. Further, I shall reject the notion of universal love, finding it unattainable in any but the most abstract sense and thus a source of distraction. While much of what will be developed in the ethic of caring may be found, also, in Christian ethics, there will be major and irreconcilable differences. Human love, human caring, will be quite enough on which to found an ethic.
We must look even more closely at that love and caring.
An Ethic of Caring
From Natural to Ethical Caring
David Hume long ago contended that morality is founded upon and rooted in feelingâthat the âfinal sentenceâ on matters of morality, âthat which renders morality an active virtueâââ⊠this final sentence depends on some internal sense or feeling, which nature has made universal in the whole species. For what else can have an influence of this nature?â4
What is the nature of this feeling that is âuniversal in the whole speciesâ? I want to suggest that morality as an âactive virtueâ requires two feelings and not just one. The first is the sentiment of natural caring. There can be no ethical sentiment without the initial, enabling sentiment. In situations where we act on behalf of the other because we want to do so, we are acting in accord with natural caring. A motherâs caretaking efforts in behalf of her child are not usually considered ethical but natural. Even maternal animals take care of their offspring, and we do not credit them with ethical behavior.
The second sentiment occurs in response to a remembrance of the first. Nietzsche speaks of love and memory in the context of Christian love and Eros, but what he says may safely be taken out of context to illustrate the point I wish to make here:
There is something so ambiguous and suggestive about the word love, something that speaks to memory and to hope, that even the lowest intelligence and the coldest heart still feel something of the glimmer of this word. The cleverest woman and the most vulgar man recall the relatively least selfish moments of their whole life, even if Eros has taken only a low flight with them.5
This memory of our own best moments of caring and being cared for sweeps over us as a feelingâas an âI mustââin response to the plight of the other and our conflicting desire to serve our own interests. There is a transfer of feeling analogous to transfer of learning. In the intellectual domain, when I read a certain kind of mathematical puzzle, I may react by thinking, âThat is like the sailors, monkey, and coconuts problem,â and then, âDiophantine equationsâ or âmodulo arithmeticâ or âcongruences.â Similarly, when I encounter an other and feel the natural pang conflicted with my own desiresââI mustâI do not want toââI recognize the feeling and remember what has followed it in my own best moments. I have a picture of those moments in which I was cared for and in which I cared, and I may reach toward this memory and guide my conduct by it if I wish to do so.
Recognizing that ethical caring requires an effort that is not needed in natural caring does not commit us to a position that elevates ethical caring over natural caring. Kant has identified the ethical with that which is done out of duty and not out of love, and that distinction in itself seems right. But an ethic built on caring strives to maintain the caring attitude and is thus dependent upon, and not superior to, natural caring. The source of ethical behavior is, then, in twin sentimentsâone that feels directly for the other and one that feels for and with that best self, who may accept and sustain the initial feeling rather than reject it.
We shall discuss the ethical ideal, that vision of best self, in some depth. When we commit ourselves to obey the âI mustâ even at its weakest and most fleeting, we are under the guidance of this ideal. It is not just any picture. Rather, it is our best picture of ourselves caring and being cared for. It may even be colored by acquaintance with one superior to us in caring, but, as I shall describe it, it is both constrained and attainable. It is limited by what we have already done and by what we are capable of, and it does not idealize the impossible so that we may escape into ideal abstraction.
Now, clearly, in pointing to Humeâs âactive virtueâ and to an ethical ideal as the source of ethical behavior, I seem to be advocating an ethic of virtue. This is certainly true in part. Many philosophers recognize the need for a discussion of virtue as the energizing factor in moral behavior, even when they have given their best intellectual effort to a careful explication of their positions on obligation and justification.6 When we discuss the ethical ideal, we shall be talking about âvirtue,â but we shall not let âvirtueâ dissipate into âthe virtuesâ described in abstract categories. The holy man living abstemiously on top of the mountain, praying thrice daily, and denying himself human intercourse may display âvirtues,â but they are not the virtues of one-caring. The virtue described by the ethical ideal of one-caring is built up in relation. It reaches out to the other and grows in response to the other.
Since our discussion of virtue will be embedded in an exploration of moral activity we might do well to start by asking whether or under what circumstances we are obliged to respond to the initial âI must.â Does it make sense to say that I am obliged to heed that which comes to me as obligation?
Obligation
There are moments for all of us when we care quite naturally. We just do care; no ethical effort is required. âWantâ and âoughtâ are indistinguishable in such cases. I want to do what I or others might judge I ought to do. But can there be a âdemandâ to care? There can be, surely, no demand for the initial impulse that arises as a feeling, an inner voice saying âI must do something,â in response to the need of the cared-for. This impulse arises naturally, at least occasionally, in the absence of pathology. We cannot demand that one have this impulse, but we shrink from one who never has it. One who never feels the pain of another, who never confesses the internal âI mustâ that is so familiar to most of us, is beyond our normal pattern of understanding. Her case is pathological, and we avoid her.
But even if I feel the initial âI must,â I may reject it. I may reject it instantaneously by shifting from âI must do somethingâ to âSomething must be done,â and removing myself from the set of possible agents through whom the action should be accomplished. I may reject it because I feel that there is nothing I can do. If I do either of these things without reflection upon what I might do in behalf of the cared-for, then I do not care. Caring requires me to respond to the initial impulse with an act of commitment: I commit myself either to overt action on behalf of the cared-for (I pick up my crying infant) or I commit myself to thinking about what I might do. In the latter case, as we have seen, I may or may not act overtly in behalf of the cared-for. I may abstain from action if I believe that anything I might do would tend to work against the best interests of the cared-for. But the test of my caring is not wholly in how things turn out; the primary test lies in an examination of what I considered, how fully I received the other, and whether the free pursuit of his projects is partly a result of the completion of my caring in him.
But am I obliged to embrace the âI mustâ? In this form, the question is a bit odd, for the âI mustâ carries obligation with it. It comes to us as obligation. But accepting and affirming the âI mustâ are different from feeling it, and these responses are what I am pointing to when I ask whether I am obliged to embrace the âI must.â The question nags at us; it is a question that has been asked, in a variety of forms, over and over by moralists and moral theorists. Usually, the question arises as part of the broader question of justification. We ask something of the sort: Why must I (or should I) do what suggests itself to reason as ârightâ or as needing to be done for the sake of some other? We might prefer to supplement âreasonâ with âand/or feeling.â This question is, of course, not the only thorny question in moral theory, but it is one that has plagued theorists who see clearly that there is no way to derive an âI oughtâ statement from a chain of facts. I may agree readily that âthings would be betterââthat is, that a certain state of affairs commonly agreed to be desirable might be attainedâif a certain chain of events were to take place. But there is still nothing in this intellectual chain that can produce the âI ought.â I may choose to remain an observer on the scene.
Now I am suggesting that the âI mustâ arises directly and prior to consideration of what it is that I might do. The initial feeling is the âI must.â When it comes to me indistinguishable from the âI want,â I proceed easily as one-caring. But often it comes to me conflicted. It may be barely perceptible and it may be followed almost simultaneously by resistance. When someone asks me to get something for him or merely asks for my attention, the âI mustâ may be lost in a clamor of resistance. Now a second sentiment is required if I am to behave as one-caring. I care about myself as one-caring and, although I do not care naturally for the person who has asked something of meâat least not at this momentâI feel the genuine moral sentiment, the âI ought,â that sensibility to which I have committed myself.
Let me try to make plausible my contention that the moral imperative arises directly.7 And, of course, I must try to explain how caring and what I am calling the âmoral imperativeâ are related. When my infant cries in the night, I not only feel that I must do something but I want to do something. Because I love this child, because I am bonded to him, I want to remove his pain as I would want to remove my own. The âI mustâ is not a dutiful imperative but one that accompanies the âI want.â If I were tied to a chair, for example, and wanted desperately to get free, I might say as I struggled, âI must do something; I must get out of these bonds.â But this âmustâ is not yet the moral or ethical âought.â It is a âmustâ born of desire.
The most intimate situations of caring are, thus, natural. I do not feel that taking care of my own child is âmoralâ but, rather, natural. A woman who allows her own child to die of neglect is often considered sick rather than immoral; that is, we feel that either she or the situation into which she has been thrust must be pathological. Otherwise, the impulse to respond, to nurture the living infant, is overwhelming. We share the impulse with other creatures in the animal kingdom. Whether we want to consider this response as âinstinctiveâ is problematic, because certain patterns of response may be implied by the term and because suspension of reflective consciousness seems also to be implied (and I am not suggesting that we have no choice), but I have no difficulty in considering it as innate. Indeed, I am claiming that the impulse to act in behalf of the present other is itself innate. It lies latent in each of us, awaiting gradual development in a succession of caring relations. I am suggesting that our inclination toward and interest in morality derives from caring. In caring, we accept the natural impulse to act on behalf of the present other. We are engrossed in the other. We have received him and feel his pain or happiness, but we are not compelled by this impulse. We have a choice; we may accept what we feel, or we may reject it. If we have a strong desire to be moral, we will not reject it, and this strong desire to be moral is derived, reflectively, from the more fundamental and natural desire to be and to re...
Table des matiĂšres
Normes de citation pour Justice And Care
APA 6 Citation
Held, V. (1995). Justice And Care (1st ed.). Taylor and Francis. Retrieved from https://www.perlego.com/book/1596337/justice-and-care-essential-readings-in-feminist-ethics-pdf (Original work published 1995)
Chicago Citation
Held, Virginia. (1995) 1995. Justice And Care. 1st ed. Taylor and Francis. https://www.perlego.com/book/1596337/justice-and-care-essential-readings-in-feminist-ethics-pdf.
Harvard Citation
Held, V. (1995) Justice And Care. 1st edn. Taylor and Francis. Available at: https://www.perlego.com/book/1596337/justice-and-care-essential-readings-in-feminist-ethics-pdf (Accessed: 14 October 2022).
MLA 7 Citation
Held, Virginia. Justice And Care. 1st ed. Taylor and Francis, 1995. Web. 14 Oct. 2022.