The Israeli Palestinians

An Arab Minority in the Jewish State

Alexander Bligh, Alexander Bligh

• Éditeur: Routledge
• Année: 2004
• ISBN:
  9781135760779
• Édition: 1
• Sujet: Storia
• Sous-sujet: Storia mediorientale

One of the most crucial issues to affect national policy in the state of Israel is that of relations between its Jewish and Arab citizens. This edited collection offers a comprehensive analysis of the most significant factors to have contributed to current conditions.

SOCIAL ISSUES

Fertility Transition in the Middle East: The
Case of the Israeli Arabs

ONN WINCKLER

INTRODUCTION: THE ARAB DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION

During the twentieth century, similar to other developing countries worldwide, Arab populations have moved through three major demographic stages, in line with the ‘demographic transition theory’. The first stage, which lasted until the 1940s, was characterized by high rates of both fertility and mortality, leading to low natural increase rates of less than two per cent.¹ However, during the 1950s, the second stage began, characterized by a rise in the natural increase rates resulting from a steady decline in the crude death rates. This drop in the crude death rate was due to both increasing life expectancy and sharp reductions in infant and child mortality rates. By the mid-1980s, the crude death rate was less than 10 per 1,000 for most Arab countries, except for Yemen and Sudan, as compared with 25–30 per 1,000 during the early 1950s. At the same time, fertility levels continued to be very high, amounting to crude birth rates of more than 40 per 1,000, and in some countries, such as Oman and Saudi Arabia, even close to 50 per 1,000, while the total fertility rates varied between five and seven births per woman.² Thus, during the 1980s, the natural increase rate in the Arab countries skyrocketed to approximately three per cent, and in some countries, mainly those of the rich oil-exporting Persian/Arabian Gulf, even reached four per cent (see Table 6).

However, during the latter part of the 1980s and more so in the 1990s, the third stage began to appear throughout almost all of the Arab countries. This stage was characterized by a steady decline in fertility levels, leading to an overall reduction in the natural increase rates. In Tunisia and Egypt, in particular, the natural increase rate dropped to two per cent during the second half of the 1990s, as a result of the continuing decline in fertility rates.³ In all of the other Arab countries, except for Yemen, fertility levels have considerably declined during the past decade, albeit less than in Egypt and Tunisia (see Table 6).⁴ This transition from one pattern of low natural increase rates due to high values of both crude birth and death rates, to another pattern of lower natural increase rates, but in much lower values, is the outcome of ‘modernization’.⁵ It must be noted, however, that despite the significant decline in fertility levels throughout almost all Arab countries during the past decade, none of these countries, except Tunisia, is even close to the Western modern trend of ‘below replacement-level fertility’.⁶

The aim of this article is to examine the changing fertility trends among the Israeli Arab population. While a considerable number of articles and books on the demographic developments among the Israeli Arab population are available, these are written, in most cases, within the context of the Arab-Jewish comparison and the overall Israeli demographic trends (mainly by Roberto Bachi, Calvin Goldscheider, Dov Friedlander and Uziel Schmelz). This study, on the contrary, concentrates on the examination of Israeli Arab fertility trends within the context of the changing overall fertility patterns among Arab societies during the past two generations.

RELIGIOUS COMPOSITION OF THE ISRAELI ARAB POPULATION

Among the Israeli Arabs, the largest group consists of Muslims, almost all of whom are Sunnis except for a small number of Shi’is in the north of the country and Ahmadis in Kababir near Haifa.⁷ According to the latest available figures, the Muslims numbered 970,000 by the end of 2000, and they constituted 81.8 per cent of the total Israeli Arab population. The second largest group among the Israeli Arabs is comprised of Christians, including mainly the Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholics and Roman Catholics. By the end of 2000, their number was 114,400, constituting 9.4 per cent of the Israeli Arabs.⁸ The third group is that of the Druzes, who numbered 103,800 by the end of 2000, representing 8.8 per cent of the Israeli Arabs. The term ‘Druzes and others’ is sometimes used in official Israeli publications. The term ‘others’ includes mainly the Bahais and the Sameritans, as well as those whose religion is unknown.

POPULATION GROWTH OF THE ISRAELI ARABS

One of the most prominent demographic characteristics of the Palestinians since the late Ottoman period is rapid population growth: from approximately 350,000 at the beginning of the 1870s to 1.294 million in 1947, amounting to an increase of almost fourfold. This growth rate, in comparison to those of other Arab societies, was unique. Although there was a substantial immigration of Arabs to Palestine at that time, the major factor contributing to the rapid growth of the Arab population in Palestine during the late Ottoman period and under the British Mandate was the high natural increase rates.⁹ During the 1948 war, a large-scale exodus of Arabs took place from the areas that later became the state of Israel. While no official statistics of this exodus are available, according to the various estimates, between 630,000 and 670,000 Arabs were uprooted from their place of residence and became refugees during the 1948 war.¹⁰

According to the first Israeli population census, conducted in November 1948, the total Arab population in Israel numbered 156,000.¹¹ By the end of 1949, following the signing of the armistice agreement between Israel and Jordan, which included the absorption of some additional areas with Arab populations to Israel (mainly The Little Triangle’),¹² the total Arab population in Israel numbered 160,000,¹³ constituting 13.6 per cent of the total Israeli population. During the 1950s and until the June 1967 war, the Israeli Arab population increased rapidly, owing to very high natural increase rates, amounting to more than four per cent annually. However, their percentage of the total Israeli population sharply declined to only 11.8 per cent, owing to the massive immigration of Jews to Israel (see Tables 1 and 2).

Following the June 1967 war, 75,000 Arabs were added to the Arab population of Israel, including 68,600 in East Jerusalem and 6,400 in the Golan Heights.¹⁴ By the end of 1967, the total Israeli Arab population numbered 392, 700, constituting 14.1 per cent of the total Israeli population. During the 1970s and 1980s, the percentage of the Israeli Arabs within the total population continued to rise considerably, owing to their much higher natural increase rates than the Jews, on the one hand, and a sharp decline in the immigration of Jews, on the other (see Tables 2 and 3). By the end of 1988, the Israeli Arabs numbered 817, 800, representing 18.3 per cent of Israel’s total population (see Table 1).

In 1989, a massive immigration of Jews to Israel from the republics of the former Soviet Union and later from Ethiopia began. In contrast to the years 1983– 89, when the net migration balance among the Jews was 27,700, this number increased to 709,700 during the period 1990–2000. During these years, the net increase (including the natural increase) of the Jews in Israel was 1.266 million (see Table 2). By the end of 2000, nonJews constituted 22.2 per cent of Israel’s total citizenry (see Table 1). Overall, during the period 1948–2000, while the Israeli-Jewish population increased by 591 per cent, the Israeli Arab population increased by 660 per cent (see Table 1).

THE ISRAELI ARAB FERTILITY TRENDS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Since the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948, the Arab population of Israel has been through tremendous demographic changes. Within a relatively short period of time, this society has achieved some sociodemographic characteristics of a developed society, particularly those of infant and child mortality rates and life expectancy. During the Mandatory period, fertility levels of the Palestinians were very high, as in other Arab societies. However, already during the Mandatory period, there were considerable fertility gaps between the various Arab populations in Palestine, namely, much lower fertility rates among the Christians than among the Muslims and the Druzes. By 1945, while the crude birth rate of Muslims in Palestine was 53.2 per 1,000, it was only 32.7 among the Christians.¹⁵ This dichotomy greatly accelerated following the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948.

Since 1948, the fertility history of the Israeli Arabs can be traced through three major stages. The first stage, lasting until the late 1960s, was characterized by increasing fertility levels among both the Muslims and the Druzes, while the trend of declining fertility among the Christians, which had started during the Mandatory period, continued. During the years 1955–59, the highest crude birth rates in Israel were measured among the Druzes at 48.0 per 1,000, followed by the Muslims at 46.3, and 34.4 among the Christians.¹⁶ During the 1960s, the crude birth and total fertility rates among the Israeli Arabs were even higher than those of the 1950s. During the years 1960–64, the average crude birth rate among the Muslims was 51.5 per 1,000, and was slightly lower among the Druzes at 46. 7 per 1,000. As in the previous decades, the lowest crude birth rate at that time was found among the Christians, at 34.9 (see Table 3).

The fertility rates of the Muslims and the Druzes during the 1950s and 1960s, it must be noted, constituted one of the highest rates not only in comparison with other Arab societies, but worldwide as well. In Jordan, by comparison, according to the 1961 census, the crude birth rate was 47.5 per 1,000 and the total fertility rate was 6.8 births per woman. In Syria and Egypt, in 1960, the crude birth rates were 47.9 and 42.9, respectively (see Table 6). Also in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the crude birth rates were considerably lower than among the Israeli Arabs, amounting to 43.9 and 42.0, respectively, in 1968.¹⁷

In considering the reasons accounting for the increasing fertility levels among the Israeli Arabs during the 1950s and 1960s, it seems that there were four main factors contributing to this trend:

1. The improvement in the standard of living, including increased life expectancy, caused a substantial increase in the probability of pregnancy and an extension of the reproductive period. Thus, the immediate result was higher fertility rates. Overall, the phenomenon of rising fertility levels in the pre-decline period (see below) is not unique to the Israeli Arab society alone, but also prevailed in other developing countries as well, such as in Latin America during the 1960s.¹⁸
2. Although a rapid expansion of the labour force in the Arab villages, as an outcome of the high natural increase rates, took place in parallel to the introduction of advanced agricultural technology, causing a decline in labour demands, this situation did not create an increase in employment pressures. The potential imbalance was offset by the growing work opportunities in the Jewish urban industrial and service sectors.
3. The Israeli pro-natalist policy, particularly the payments of Hamosad Lebituh Leumi (the Institution for Social Security), ...