Al-Ghazali and the Qur'an

One Book, Many Meanings

Martin Whittingham

• Éditeur: Routledge
• Année: 2007
• ISBN:
  9781134186723
• Édition: 1
• Sujet: Politica e relazioni internazionali
• Sous-sujet: Politica

This book is the first of its kind to focus entirely on the Qur'anic interpretation of Abu Hamid al-Ghazali (1058-1111), a towering figure of Sunni Islam. Martin Whittingham explores both al-Ghazali's hermeneutical methods and his interpretations of particular Quranic texts, and covers al-Ghazali's mystical, legal and theological concerns.

Divided into two parts:

• part one examines al-Ghazali's legal and Sufi theoretical discussions
• part two asks how these theories relate to his practice, analysing the only three of al-Ghazali's works which are centrally concerned with interpreting particular Qur'anic passages: Jawahir al-Qur'an (The Jewels of the Qur'an); Al-Qist as al-mustaqim (The Correct Balance); and Mishkat al-anwar (The Niche for Lights).

Providing a new point of access to the works of al-Ghazali, this book will be welcomed by scholars and students of Islamic studies, religious studies, hermeneutics, and anyone interested in how Muslims understand the Qur'an.

Part I
Al-Ghazālī’s hermeneutical theories

1
‘The activities of this world’ (I)

^Fayṣal al-tafriqa bayna’l-Islām wa’l-zandaqa

Introduction

The work in which al-Ghazālī focuses most consistently on the question of ta’wīl is ^Fayṣal al-tafriqa bayna’l-Islām wa’l-zandaqa (al-Ghazālī 1961). The title of this work can be translated as The Decisive Criterion for Distinguishing Between Islam and Godlessness. Jackson, whose recent translation is used unless otherwise indicated, suggests rendering it as ‘The Decisive Criterion for distinguishing acceptable interpretation from the attempt to conceal unbelief in interpretation’ (Jackson, introduction to his translation: 56). Although the concerns of this work concerning ta’wīl are found in some of al-Ghazālī’s previous writings, notably ^{Faḍā’iḥ, Iqtiṣād} and Tahāfut, as discussed later, ^Fayṣal is unique amongst his works in its persistent focus on the issue. It is therefore a fitting text with which to begin this enquiry into al-Ghazālī’s understandings of Qur’anic interpretation. In the course of discussing hermeneutics, al- Ghazālī raises questions regarding unbelief and apostasy, and makes interesting comments on the status of non-Muslims. Hence this text has at its heart some of the most fundamental questions regarding what constitutes right and wrong belief and how the two are to be distinguished.

Following a preliminary discussion of the text, five questions will be explored. First, what is the significance of al-Ghazālī’s linking unbelief to denial of the words of Muhammad? Second, why does he provide in ^Fayṣal such a particularly sustained treatment of ta’wil? Third, how seriously are the details of the elaborate frameworks in ^Fayṣal to be taken? Fourth, what are the implications of al-Ghazālī’s making the decision to resort to ta’wīl dependent on an understanding of syllogistic logic? Finally, does the term ta’wīl always denote a process of interpretation as is commonly assumed?

Al-Ghazālī’s choice of the term zandaqa (‘godlessness’) in his title needs comment. Jackson argues that for al-Ghazālī this term emphasises not only outright rejection of the existence of God, but concealed unbelief which masquerades as belief (Jackson, introduction to translation: 56). Al-Ghazālī’s main interest in ^Fayṣal is in the second of these, not least because it relates to the use of ta’wīl—it is possible to conceal unbelief beneath the claim that any given view is just a different interpretation of the sources. Al- Ghazālī’s primary target in making this charge is the Islamic philosophers, who believe in God but often use figurative interpretation illegitimately to conceal their actual disbelief in such ideas as the resurrection of the body and God’s knowledge of particulars (Jackson, introduction to translation: 57). So it is the use of ta’wīl to conceal unbelief which is in focus in the use of zandaqa. This is borne out by al-Ghazālī’s discussion of the right understanding of the hadith, ‘My community will divide into over seventy sects; all of them will enter Paradise except the zanādiqa’ (al-Ghazālī 1961:193; tr. 111, retaining zanādiqa here in place of Jackson’s ‘Crypto-infidels’). Al-Ghazālī states that the hadith cannot mean by zanādiqa those who categorically deny the prophethood of Muhammad, the resurrection or God’s existence, since such people would not be part of the Muslim community at all. Instead the reference must be to those who affirm the afterlife but interpret its rewards and punishments entirely metaphorically, and also affirm God’s existence while limiting the scope of his knowledge of particulars. These are two of al-Ghazālī’s three principal criticisms of the philosophers in Tahāfut, the third being their assertion of the pre-eternity of the world (al-Ghazālī 1997:230).

However, as Mustapha notes in the introduction to his French translation of ^Fayṣal, while al-Ghazālī chooses zandaqa for his title, instances of the use of kufr and its derivatives outnumber those of zandaqa in the text by more than 10 to 1 (Mustapha, translator’s introduction: 66, 68). Regarding the attribution of the term kufr, al-Ghazālī writes that ‘Now, there are explicit texts regarding the (status of) Jews and Christians. Deists, Dualists, Crypto-infidels (al-zanādiqa), and Atheists are assigned the same status on a fortiori grounds’ (al-Ghazālī 1961:174; tr. 92). In addition, zandaqa can be equated with kufr. Defaming the Prophet and the trustworthiness of his transmission of God’s revelation is called, ‘pure kufr and zandaqa’ (al-Ghazālī 1961:184; cf. tr. 101). Hence the use of the term zandaqa, as distinct from kufr, appears to be of limited significance.

While the focus of the present work is on Qur’anic hermeneutics, al-Ghazālī’s discussion of ta’wīl in ^Fayṣal draws on both the Qur’an and Hadith, as does his discussion in ^Mustaṣfā, the subject of Chapter 2. Al-Ghazālī’s discussions of particular hadiths can be included in a discussion primarily treating his attitude to ta’wīl of the Qur’an, since he treats both sources comparably in his discussion. Indeed, he makes clear, at the outset of the section of ^Mustaṣfā devoted to the Sunna, that both are part of ^waḥy, or revelation. ‘He [Muhammad] did not speak on caprice. It was but revelation ^(waḥy) revealed to him. But a part of the revelation is recited, and is therefore called the Book, and a part is not recited, and this is the Sunna’ (al-Ghazālī 1322–1324:I:129; tr. 541). The term ‘scriptural hermeneutics’ therefore best describes the focus of this chapter and the next.

No definite date can be given for the composition of ^Faṣyal. The most detailed discussion of the issue is given by Griffel in introducing his German translation of the work (Griffel, translator’s introduction: 43–6). He argues for a date of perhaps 1106– 1109, later than the ascription given by Hourani, who assumes that the work comes from al-Ghazālī’s long period of retirement from 48 8/1095–499/1106 (Hourani 1984:300). ^Fayṣal mentions ^Qisṭās (al-Ghazālī 1961:188; tr. 106) and is mentioned in Munqidh (al-Ghazālī 1959:24; tr. 77), so it must fall between the composition of these two texts.

Al-Ghazālī offers no explicit statement of the overall purpose of ^Fayṣal, but its twin aims are readily apparent. These are, on the one hand, to establish a definition of unbelief (kufr), and second, to determine the extent and limits of acceptable ta’wīl. The issues of kufr and ta’wīl are closely linked for al-Ghazālī since unbelievers are defined in ^Fayṣal as those who go beyond acceptable limits of interpretation. A proper understanding of ta’wīl therefore provides the safety barrier preventing someone straying into downright unbelief. Al-Ghazālī’s principal aim is to argue for liberty in interpretation, and tolerance towards those who interpret, as long as the process follows a clearly defined procedure. ^Fayṣal seeks to outline this procedure.

The dominant approach in ^Fayṣal to these questions of unbelief and ta’wīl, as stated by al-Ghazālī, is legal.

‘Unbelief’ is a legal designation ( ^ḥukm shar‘ī), like slavery and freedom, its implication being the licitness of shedding the blood of one (so designated) and passing a judgement upon him to the effect that he will dwell in the Hellfire forever. And since this is a legal designation, it can only be known on the basis of either an explicit text from scripture ^(naṣṣ) or an analogy (qiyās) drawn from an explicit text.

(al-Ghazālī 1961:134; tr. 92)

Approaching the question of kufr as a legal category, rather than merely listing unacceptable beliefs, is a new departure in the history of Islamic theology (Griffel 2000:307). However it is only new for al-Ghazālī to the extent that he concentrates single-mindedly on the issue, and the concerns of ^Fayṣal can be traced back to three other works. In ^{Fadā'iḥ al-Mustaẓhiriyya} (al-Ghazālī 1383:146–68; tr. 265–74), al- Ghazālī’s polemic against the Ismā’īlīs dating from 487/1094, he distinguishes Ismā‘īlī beliefs which are classed as error from more serious unbelief.¹ Al-Ghazālī states that ‘It would take a volume to treat even summarily what necessitates unbelief and “excommunication”—so let us restrict ourselves in this book to what is important’ (al- Ghazālī 1383:151; tr. 266). ^Fayṣal can be regarded as that volume.

Second, in the conclusion to his famous work Tahāfut al-falāsifa (‘The Incoherence of the Philosophers’) he states that he refrains from going into exactly what constitutes infidelity as this would take him away from his topic (al-Ghazālī 1997:230), although, as already noted, he famously outlines three issues on which the philosophers are to be counted as unbelievers. Third, his work of kalām, ^Iqtiṣād fi’l-I‘tiqād (‘The Golden Mean in Belief’—al-Ghazālī 1962), which can be seen as the sequel to Tahāfut (Marmura 1989:50), fittingly picks up this topic again. Its final section begins to explore the legal positions regarding unbelief (al-Ghazālī 1962:246–56). This discussion also mentions interpretation, stating that errors in ta’wīl should not lead necessarily lead to charging with unbelief (al-Ghazālī 1962:251). Since ^Iqtiṣād dates from 488/1095, it is clear that ^Fayṣal brings into full focus a legal approach to the question of unbelief which had been in al-Ghazālī’s mind for some years.

Brief comment is needed on the occasional use of Sufi language and cosmological terms in ^Fayṣal, particularly as it is introduced in the present work under the category of ‘the activities of this world’. The text is not primarily Sufi in orientation despite the occasional occurrence of Sufi terminology The use of language which lends a Sufi flavour includes the description of the overall topic of the work, the question of the attribution of unbelief, as an aspect of the asrār al-malakūt (‘hidden truths of the immaterial world’ (al-Ghazālī 1961:129; tr. 87). Furthermore, in criticising kalām al- Ghazālī states that, ‘faith in God comes rather of a light which God casts into the hearts of His servants’ (al-Ghazālī 1961:202; tr. 121) and describes true faith as being accompanied by worship and remembrance of God (dhikr) until there are revealed to him the lights of knowledge (ma‘rifa) (al-Ghazālī 1961:204; tr. 124). He also asserts that ‘people of spiritual insight’ (ahl ^{al-baṣā'ir}) have learnt of God’s mercy, ‘through various means and illuminations (asbāb wa mukāshafāt) other than the reports and anecdotes (al-khabār wa’l-athār) which have come into their possession’ (al-Ghazālī 1961:208; tr. 129). There is also a brief parallel in ^Fayṣal to the interpretation of the famous Light Verse of the Qur’an (Q24:35) which al-Ghazālī presents in Mishkāt, discussed in Chapter 6 (al-Ghazālī 1961:129; tr. 87). It is presumably such terminology which leads Jabre to regard ^Fayṣal as sharing the same hermeneutical approach as the more Sufi Ādāb tilāwat, Book VIII of ^Iḥyā’, discussed in Chapter 3 (Jabre 1970:18).

There is, however, good reason to distinguish the hermeneutical foundations of these two works. The Sufi terms do not influence the hermeneutics of ^Fayṣal. Hermeneutically speaking, reason, specifically syllogistic logic, lies at the centre of al- Ghazālī’s arguments in ^Fayṣal. In this context it is interesting to note that Lazarus- Yafeh (1975:362) regards ^Fayṣal as written for a wider audience, while Mishkāt is written for an inner circle, yet Griffel (2000:334) reaches the opposite conclusion. It seems difficult to pin down the intended audience of ^Fayṣal, though more is said on the underlying purpose of the work below. This is a good example of the difficulty of using al-Ghazālī’s discussion of levels of sincerity of texts in Mīzān (al-Ghazālī 1964c:405ff.) as a key to his works. As noted in the Introduction, above, without consensus over which works, if any, reveal al-Ghazālī’s innermost beliefs, the disclosure in Mīzān is of limited value.

Summary

An explanatory summary of the most important arguments of ^Fayṣal will best prepare the way for the ensuing discussion. For the sake of clarity chapter numbers refer to Jackson’s translation, since Dunya’s edition has no such numbers and subdivides the text into several opening sections. ^Fayṣal opens by referring to criticisms of al-Ghazālī. Jackson postulates that this refers to remarks by a student, but it could also indicate other critics, such as those discussed by Krawulsky in her introduction to al-Ghazālī’s letters (al-Ghazālī 1971b:16). After drawing an implicit parallel between his own hardships and Muhammad’s suffering for the truth, al-Ghazālī’s second chapter then stresses that true understanding of what constitutes unbelief is only revealed to those with a pure heart. More is said on the possible defensive role of ^Fayṣal later.

The third chapter concerns false definitions of unbelief based on loyalty to particular schools of thought or individuals. Al-Ghazālī is emphatic that opposition to a figure such as the famous theologian al-Ash‘arī (d. 324/935) on a particular point should not cause the person to be accused of unbelief (kufr). Chapter four offers al-Ghazālī’s own definition of unbelief. ‘Unbelief is to deem anything the Prophet brought to be a lie’ (al- Ghazālī 196...