Principles of Emergency Management and Emergency Operations Centers (EOC)

Michael J. Fagel, Rick C. Mathews, J. Howard Murphy, Michael J. Fagel, Rick C. Mathews, J. Howard Murphy

• Éditeur: CRC Press
• Année: 2021
• ISBN:
  9781351644624
• Édition: 2
• Sujet: Política y relaciones internacionales
• Sous-sujet: Política

Emergency operations centers (EOCs) are a key component of coordination efforts during incident planning as well as reaction to natural and human-made events. Managers and their staff coordinate incoming information from the field, and the public, to support pre-planned events and field operations as they occur. This book looks at the function and role of EOCs and their organizations.

The highly anticipated second edition of Principles of Emergency Management and Emergency Operations Centers (EOC) provides an updated understanding of the coordination, operation of EOCs at local, regional, state, and federal operations. Contributions from leading experts provide contemporary knowledge and best practice learned through lived experience. The chapters collectively act as a vital training guide, at both a theoretical and practical level, providing detailed guidance on handling each phase and type of emergency. Readers will emerge with a blueprint of how to create effective training and exercise programs, and thereby develop the skills required for successful emergency management.

Along with thoroughly updated and expanded chapters from the first edition, this second edition contains new chapters on:

• The past and future of emergency management, detailing the evolution of emergency management at the federal level, and potential future paths.
• Communicating with the public and media, including establishing relations with, and navigating, the media, and the benefits this can provide if successfully managed.
• In-crisis communications.
• Leadership and decision-making during disaster events.
• Facilitating and managing interagency collaboration, including analysis of joint communications, and effective resource management and deployment when working with multiple agencies.
• Developing and deploying key skills of management, communication, mental resilience.
• Planning for terrorism and responding to complex coordinated terrorist attacks.
• Developing exercises and after-action reports (AARs) for emergency management.

Appendix 1 Pandemic-Ready EOC Design Considerations

Nicholas Staikos

Editor’s Note: Nicholas Staikos AIA is an expert and experienced professional architect with an extensive practice in designing EOCs and public safety-related facilities. Mr Staikos is a co-author of Chapter 12 in this book, entitled “EOC Design,” which provides an excellent resource for EOC design. We asked Mr Staikos, based on his expertise and extensive experience, to discuss how he would recommend modifying the traditional EOC to meet emergency management’s future demands for a highly functional EOC that would operate in a pandemic environment. We realize that during the COVID pandemic, emergency managers adapted quickly and effectively to EOC-related needs, primarily through some level of virtual operations. The request to Mr Staikos was to consider design adaptations that would likely be required to enable the emergency management team’s physical presence at the EOC with less reliance on virtual operations. In the old days, we would call our request of Nicholas a “blue sky” approach to such an operation’s design requirements. The result is as presented here. Mr Staikos did an excellent job of future-thinking. The route he chose to meet our request was to modify the core parts of the co-authored “EOC Design” chapter meaning much of this chapter mirrors the other but with Nicholas’ “blue sky” thoughts about pandemic adaption. The result is a chapter that will cause the reader to think, ponder, and to cuss-and-discuss the future of EOC design and operations. His expert thinking and this chapter were not restricted or molded by the editorial team.

Where We Are

The recent months of the explosive growth of COVID-19 and the potential for subsequent waves have become a real-time reality check for emergency planners, first responders, and other institutions. Critical components of our society, such as the health care system, food supply networks, educational institutions, business, and yes, of course, John Q Public, have all been impacted. First-hand, we have seen what it means to be caught off guard and can’t afford to relive these past mishaps from our first steps.

So what does this mean for Emergency Operations facilities? Traditional Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs) with their operations room, having been developed as a communication hub activated in response to disasters to coordinate resources and provide decision-makers the benefit of subject area experts to formulate a response face a conundrum. The facility could be rendered inoperative due to quarantine or severely restricted as a result of social-distancing measures required due to potential contagion spread from just one individual.

Image A1.1 Modern EOC

Source: Image Provided by Michael J. Fagel

Mitigating Measures

To mitigate this possibility, measures must be implemented, such as a cloud-based data management and communications infrastructure supporting the Emergency Response operation. Currently available and rapidly improved, they offer highly diverse access points through the internet to applications and data. Assuming that reliable data links exist, access can be made available to anyone anywhere with authorization and a quality data connection. With proper end-to-end encryption facilitating cybersecurity, response teams can consult and communicate with jurisdictional leadership as a response is formulated. Remote data linkage from the various EOC team member’s principal home networks or mobile networks would be required for integration into the stand-alone system.

While internally housed systems potentially offer a higher security level, these would require physical access to be utilized and thus become problematic.

The remote locations of participants who connect must be mapped out, ensuring that they and support staff have robust and diverse data communications linkages such as high-capacity fiber connection, wireless reception enhancements, and radio infrastructure to support communications isolation in the event they can’t enter the EOC.

Of course, the cloud facility that houses the servers must also be maintained by staff who can be at risk to the contagion’s effects; however, it can be assumed that fewer people will be needed and thus can be supported with the appropriate PPE should it be necessary. Cloud-based facilities and their applications being somewhat autonomous systems should be designed to push key data collected from responding agencies and push it to responders via dashboards based upon a predetermined priority system utilizing AI algorithms. In this manner, immediate action or high priority data can be distributed. Immediate data updates and situational awareness imagery would be sorted and pushed through the distribution network without massive oversight. In this manner, there will be a reduced reliance on the traditional large format display systems, which provide a broad overview of concurrent activities. With higher and higher screen resolution capabilities, a miniature version of the data wall utilizing this capability can be located at each position. This would be the first step toward practical virtualization of EOC operations and potentially reducing the facility’s scale to support activation.

Additionally, these cloud-based services would be mirrored continuously locally in the event that the data interconnects are cut. Operational and technical support documentation must be immediately remotely available or in hard copy, or removable digital media for the respective Emergency Support Function (ESF) responders should the center need to be shut down because of the internal spread of contagion or physical threat. These features should be part of a biosecurity preparedness plan for the EOC.

Event Complexity

Imagine having a biological event coupled with a widespread natural disaster like a Superstorm Sandy or a spring snowstorm or other such events typical of the geographic area in question. Resultant power outages would affect a county or state’s broad area, thus limiting access to the cloud? Just as diversity in systems increases reliability, the same is true in this scenario; electrical and data systems need to be maintained through portable generation, and alternative communication means. With a virtual network’s capability, you could stand up multiple warm backup centers, which could be silently up and running, ready to become hot. They would be positioned, so if responders can’t get to the primary center, they can function from the alternate sites. While similar approaches are occurring currently, I think it will need to be more robust and better distributed. Further, even though agencies have been using mobile communications vehicles helping to restore connectivity of infrastructure lost or damaged along with some basic support during past events, they can only accommodate a fraction of a large facility’s responders. Use of mobile facilities verses maintenance of warm sites becomes a budgetary issue particularly when this capability is pushed down to smaller jurisdictions.

In the event that should the alternate be unavailable or unable to handle the full contingent, a portion of responders would either connect from their agencies’ home centers or their residence tied into their respective networks. Home deployment would require backup equipment such as portable generators and a means to resupply, reliable communications, data, and voice. The supporting equipment would need to be redeployed when designated personnel are changed. Managing the constant equipment churn would be by the respective agency, whereas communications, whether landline or radio, would be coordinated by the central EOC management.

While it is fairly common to designate certain municipal centers to serve as operational backups to the state/regional center. Most likely the secondary will be constrained having to absorb populations from two sites should the primary be forced to operate at reduced capacity due to social distancing or quarantine. There will be a shortage of space under each scenario that would push some staff/responders to their private residences. These logistics need to be fully worked out in advance. In either case, the potential exists where everyone is confined to private homes, and then all of the communication and power redundancies would be necessary.

Interim Measures

While we all would wish for a speedy return to business as usual, it is fairly clear that the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic will continue to usher in a potentially new normal, specifically in the way that society will be approaching our return to daily activities and a resumption of the affected economies.

In the interim, what does this mean for traditional operations rooms and supporting functions in today’s EOC? First, a decision will have to be made concerning whether external conditions will allow the center to operate and at what capacity. Some concepts discussed include bubbling, wherein responders, once admitted and cleared of the disease, will be able to move about with minimum PPE. On paper, this seems quite doable; however, if receiving multiple agency personnel, the bubble has to extend outward and develop procedures for when personnel are rotated in or out. A more middle-of-the-road approach would be to perform all of the admittance procedures and then practice social distancing measures, which will dictate the maximum percentage of responders that can be admitted. Increasing physical separation at high-density console areas by alternating occupancy and various PPE levels will result in a loss of operational capacity.

The use of transparent guards similar to those seen in supermarkets, pharmacies, and other retail points of sale can be a method to help protect from the airborne spread of the virus by providing a barrier between positions where alternating occupancy is problematic, because too many positions are lost. The science determining the actual effectiveness is still evolving. Installing transparent dividers will allow visual communication between positions to be maintained. When the need for close contact conversation between positions is required, each participant can use face coverings that had been removed to facilitate speaking/hearing comprehension, whether on the telephone, radio, or one-to-one. Of course, participants could choose to wear their face coverings throughout the day only to be removed when eating. The experience will tell us when these coverings will impede communication.

In the OPS room with positions frequently spaced at between 36” and 42” apart, meeting social distancing requirements will typically produce a 50% capacity loss. By performing some functions remotely via group video conferencing such as Zoom, Webex, Skype, etc., would help minimize the impact of a reduction in responder capacity. You could also retask training and breakout rooms to accommodate reductions in positions due to social distancing. Of course, how many EOCs do you know of that have space that is not already used during a major event? These displaced activities would have to be done remotely.

Image A1.2 Commonly Seen COVID Information Signs in Upstate NY

Source: Image and Copyright Rick C. Mathews 2020

Alternatively, suppose good operating practice dictates maintaining maximum occupancy. In that case, the immediate solution depending on the contamination is to require at a minimum a N95-type respirator, face shields or goggles, and perhaps external protective gowning plus partitioning. Certainly, there will be the requirement of identification to not only demark function performed but also the person’s name/picture/organization perhaps pinned on the smock’s front in addition to an ID card on a lanyard. Clarity of voice communication will become an issue and could be addressed by the use of throat mikes. Of course, there will have to be ongoing attention to sanitizing surfaces at the console and at all common high-touch areas such as restrooms, break rooms, supply areas, conference rooms, doorknobs, light switches, etc. Some facilities may choose to invest in localized upgrades for hands-free fittings for the restrooms, occupancy sensors for rooms, and automatic openers for high-traffic doors....