Doubt, Faith, and Certainty

Anthony C. Thiselton

• Éditeur: Eerdmans
• Année: 2017
• ISBN:
  9781467447140
• Sujet: Théologie et religion
• Sous-sujet: Théologie chrétienne

Doubt, faith, certainty. In this book celebrated theologian Anthony Thiselton provides clarity on these complicated, long-misunderstood theological concepts and the practical pastoral problems they raise for Christians. He reminds us that doubt is not always bad, faith can have different meanings in different circumstances, and certainty is fragile. Drawing on his expertise in the fields of exegesis and hermeneutics, biblical studies, and the history of Christian thought, Thiselton works his way through the labyrinth of past definitions while offering better, more nuanced theological understandings of these three interrelated concepts. The result is a book that speaks profoundly to some of our deepest existential concerns.

CHAPTER 1

The Various Meanings of Doubt, Faith, and Certainty

The Various Meanings of Doubt

The different meanings and significances of doubt constitute an immensely practical and potentially liberating pastoral and intellectual issue. It is a practical disaster that in popular thought some view all doubt as a sign of weakness and lack of faith; while others, by contrast, extol doubt as always a sign of mature, sophisticated reflection.

In popular Christian thought many regard doubt simply as lack of faith or lack of trust in God. Those who admit to having doubts are often accused of confusion, irresolution, hesitancy, skepticism, reluctance to take a stand, or endless postponement of bold commitment. Even worse, some regard doubters as disobedient, distrustful, faithless, vacillating, and wavering.

John Suk produced a remarkable and moving book entitled Not Sure: A Pastor’s Journey from Faith to Doubt. He explains: “Doubt has turned me back to theology and Scripture with attention to detail that I haven’t known since studying for seminary exams. Doubt reveals texts I used to skip over because they were obtuse, difficult, or didn’t easily fit the picture I expected to see. . . . Doubt is like a new set of glasses: you see more.”¹ But he also considers the other side of the coin. He writes that doubt “also hurts. . . . Doubt has also put enormous stress on my marriage. . . . How difficult it is to reconsider [comfortable faith] . . . for something new and uncertain.”²

Examples occur in the Bible of both interpretations of doubt, in different circumstances. Jesus certainly laments a divided self. When Peter walked to him over the waves but began to sink when he doubted, Jesus said to him: “You of little faith, why did you doubt [ti edistasas]?” (Matt. 14:31 NIV). The same word is used latter in Matthew: “They worshiped him; but some doubted” (28:17 NIV). The Greek distazō means “to waver, have two minds, be double-minded.” James warns us against double-mindedness, using the Greek word diakrinomenos (“one who doubts”) in 1:6 and dipsychos (“double-minded”) in 4:8. Luke uses dialogismos (“doubting”) in Luke 24:38. Luke and Paul use aporeō (Luke 24:4; Gal. 4:20) to denote “perplexity, confusion, or being at a loss.”³

On the other side, popular thought often neglects the entirely positive meanings of the term “doubt.” A person who never admits any doubt about anything may rightly be regarded as heartless, insensitive, overconfident, or arrogant. Doubt about one’s convictions constitutes the beginning of self-criticism, correction, discovery, and more mature insight. We need not subscribe to his entire philosophy to see the point of Sir William Hamilton’s telling aphorism: “We doubt in order that we may believe.”⁴ Where belief is exposed to be mere opinion or prejudice, doubt may provide a path to authentic belief. In politics an overconfident government may rush headlong with premature decisions without due reflection.

In philosophy Socrates remains the classic case for encouraging doubt as the first step toward knowledge, or toward distinguishing authentic belief from mere opinion. Some regard the doubts of Thomas the apostle as leading toward a more firmly founded faith. In modern times Gregory Boyd attacks the avoidance of all doubt concerning the Christian faith, especially in a Pentecostal context: “This certainty-seeking concept of faith is causing a great deal of harm to the church today.”⁵ He explains: “I once assumed a person’s faith is as strong as that person is certain. And, accordingly, I assumed that doubt is the enemy of faith. That is . . . how Christians generally talk.”⁶

Admittedly in the biblical writings the actual word “doubt” occurs more frequently with negative implications than positive ones. Nevertheless much of the Bible enjoins humility and the limits of knowledge. Moreover the Bible often provides examples of the need for critical reflection. The Old Testament uses ḥîdâ (“to test with hard questions”; 1 Kings 10:1; 2 Chron. 9:1), dāraš (“to question”; 2 Chron. 31:9), or ʾāmar lô (“to think or to say to oneself ”; Esth. 6:6). Like the Hebrew ḥāšab (“to reckon”; Ps. 119:59), all four of these Hebrew terms suggest a period of careful and critical thought before plunging into premature conclusions.⁷ The Piel form of the verb ḥāšab suggests a human capacity to view issues self-critically.⁸

The New Testament also commends “thinking” in the sense of reflecting critically on options. Jesus asks Peter: “What do you think [dokeō], Simon?” (Matt. 17:25 NIV). The verb dokeō forbids glib or premature answers. Thus after a parable, Jesus asks: “What do you think?” (18:12 NIV). The verb dokeō occurs sixty-two times in the New Testament. In Classical Greek it initiates the reflection that distinguishes reality or truth from mere opinion or appearance (e.g., Parmenides 28B.8.50–51, and frequently in Plato).

Ian Ramsey argues that some degree of doubt can deliver us from seeming to be “certain” about every possible aspect of religion. He argues: “The desire to be sure in religion leads, it will be said, to prejudice, bigotry, and fanaticism.”⁹ An orthodox Christian believer who is not skeptical about the core values of Christian faith, Ramsey also insists that if we think that anything at all remains beyond doubt, this might constitute symptoms of arrogance or bumptiousness. He cites Joseph Butler (1692–1752) and F. D. Maurice (1805–72) as admitting to certain doubts about such doctrines as universal final destiny.

Doubt, then, can function either negatively as a term that stands in contrast to trust, faith, or wholeheartedness; or positively as a term to denote self-criticism, humility, and careful reflection. Often only attention to the context of the word “doubt” will indicate the sense in which it is to be understood. I note this in connection with faith and certainty as well. Philosophers and those who specialize in linguistics often use the term “polymorphous” to denote those words that vary their meaning in accordance with their context. This linguistic phenomenon is more widespread than we might at first imagine.

Linguistic philosophers Friedrich Waismann and Ludwig Wittgenstein provide an abundance of illustrations from everyday language. Waismann selects the word “to try” as a significant example that we can all readily understand. On a sleepless night we may “try” to get to sleep. But the meaning of “try” here is quite different from when we “try” to lift a heavy weight, or “try” to play the piano better, or “try” to free ourselves from bonds. “To try,” he observes, “is used in many different and differently related ways.”¹⁰

Wittgenstein also provides a number of examples. Perhaps “playing a game” constitutes the most well known. What playing consists in depends on whether the context is that of card games, board games, athletics, quizzes, and so on. In contrast to expounding the genuinely polymorphous nature of many words, Wittgenstein rightly comments on the root cause of their neglect: “Our craving for generality . . . our pre-occupation with the method of science . . . leads the philosopher into complete darkness. . . . Instead of ‘craving for generality,’ I could also have said ‘the contemptuous attitude towards the particular case.’ ”¹¹ Some concepts are partly polymorphous. Wittgenstein calls these “concepts with blurred edges.”¹²

Philosophical linguist William Alston makes a similar point about the vagueness of many words. He selects the everyday example of being middle aged, to which I refer later. Alston explains: “A term is said to be vague if there are cases in which there is no definite answer as to whether the term applies.”¹³ Thus some people seem middle aged before they reach forty, while many argue that 45–65 seems to offer a more respectable definition. We cannot legislate for a universal definition. Alston concludes: “We need vague terms for situations like this,” that is, in politics, demography, and diplomacy.¹⁴

Paul Tillich provides one example in which doubt would have a necessary place. He insists on the need to search for God beyond the “god” of an inadequate or distorted concept, picture, or understanding. He comments that some may imagine that they are rejecting God when “it is not he whom we reject and forget, but . . . rather some distorted picture of him.”¹⁵ At a popular level this could be a God of mistaken or inadequate elementary Sunday School instruction. At a more sophisticated level, Tillich declares: “The god whom we can easily bear, a god from whom we do not have to hide, a god whom we do not hate in moments . . . is not God at all.”¹⁶ Dietrich Bonhoeffer voices broadly similar concerns. Doubt may sometimes lead to a revised concept of God. He writes: “I either know about the God I seek from my own experience. . . . Or I know about him based on his revelation of his own Word. Either I determine the place in which I will find God, or I allow God to determine the place where he will be found.”¹⁷ Bonhoeffer explains further that to find “the God who in some way corresponds to me . . . fits in with my nature” is a false path: “God is not agreeable to me at all . . . does not fit so well with me. That place is the place of the cr...