The Command And Control Of The Grand Armée: Napoleon As Organizational Designer

Lieut. Norman L. Durham

• Éditeur: Wagram Press
• Année: 2015
• ISBN:
  9781786256324
• Sujet: Storia
• Sous-sujet: Guerre napoleoniche

The purpose of this thesis is to investigate Napoleon Bonaparte's command and control of the Grand Armée through the lens of organizational design. Napoleon's methodology behind the design of the Grand Armée is analyzed using modern principles of organizational design. The structure that Napoleon created within his organizational design was a vast information network that served as the framework for a highly effective command and control system. This command and control network allowed Napoleon to dominate a war with his enemies within the information domain.The Grand Armée transited the European countryside with lightning speed as Napoleon out maneuvered his enemies. Napoleon's dominance was a direct result of his organizational masterpiece that was the Grand Armée. From an organizational design perspective, Napoleon's methodology applied the ideas of others and exploited existing technology to affect his design.The reorganization of the military corps became one of the most important transformations made by Napoleon. The army corps was considered a key component in Napoleon's strategic deployments. The command and control system he engineered for his corps was essential in the Napoleonic philosophy to march divided and fight united.

II. BACKGROUND

This chapter will review important concepts and terminology that are needed to understand the organizational design process with respect to Napoleon’s Grand Armée. Transformations Napoleon made were not typically the result of creation but organization. He applied what are now considered to be modern principles of information systems engineering to the ideas of others. In addition, this chapter will cover key elements of warfare and how they were affected during the time periods of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars (1792-1815).

A. KEY MILITARY CONCEPTS

1. Command and Control (C2)

No single activity in military operations is more important than command and control (DoD, 2006). Without command and control an army would be subject to fighting a battle as a reactionary force unable to effectively maneuver and exploit tactical advantages during an engagement. Command is a function that must be exercised in order for an army to exist and operate. The Joint Pub 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms defines command and control as, the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission (DoD, 2001).

The Napoleonic era ushered in a revolution that necessitated an alteration in military organizations’ command and control. The dramatic expansion of armed forces through national conscription required a more logical and efficient means of controlling armies in the field and on campaign (Bruce et al., 2008). Napoleon Bonaparte had been quick to respond to these revolutionary changes. Napoleon had a heightened sense of awareness to command and control created from his military training and assignments as an artillery officer. He knew that massed artillery during key moments in a battle could very well decide the outcome of that engagement (Clausewitz, 1812/1942). Decisive and effective command and control were paramount in exploiting this tactic on the battlefield. Most Napoleon scholars and historians of the period would agree that Napoleon had a very keen intellect that was considered by some to be border line genius (Rothenberg, 1999). His genius also included a vivid imagination that is present in many of his letters that survive to this day (Van Creveld, 1985). This imagination coupled with his self-proclaimed love of mathematics and science were invaluable to his systematic restructuring of France’s command and control structure.

2. Infrastructure

For the purposes of this thesis infrastructure is defined as the basic organizational structures needed to sustain a society, this includes roads, waterways, and lines of communication. Basic infrastructure throughout France and Europe had made great strides through the eighteenth century (Rothenberg, 1978). Vast amounts of new roads and canals were being built which facilitated travel and trade. A royal mail carrier service established in the sixteenth century had increased exponentially during this time period. Napoleon had estimated this allowed information and news to travel twice as fast as it had during the age of Caesar (Van Creveld, 1985).

In 1793, the Frenchman Claude Chappe had demonstrated a practical use of the semaphore telegraph and had established a line from Paris to Lille (Elting, 1988). This telegraph line covered the 150 mile distance with the use of fifteen stations. In favorable weather, one sign could be sent in five minutes. The time needed to send a message was considerably reduced by encoding it so that each sign represented an entire word or phrase (Elting, 1988). This emerging technology was an area in which Napoleon tried to improve, as it would serve as a faster means to send and receive data throughout his command and control network.

There were also improvements in the field of cartography. Maps were now being created using mathematical triangulation which improved accuracy of the maps (Van Creveld, 1985). For the first time ever maps of all sizes and qualities were made readily available, effectively improving the strategic planning process for commanders in the field.

Logistical support is a significant area that relies heavily on infrastructure. It saw vast improvement with the expanding road and canal systems. A shift in population density increased to the point where most regions could support the foraging of armies. Prior to the 18th century, population density’s tended to orbit around major cities. However, during the 18th century the population density of the countryside increased to the point that many regions could support armies (Van Creveld, 1985).

Foraging was an accepted method Napoleon’s soldiers used to gather food from a surrounding countryside. In contrast, the act of foraging was strictly forbidden in the British army and severely punished by Wellington. However, on occasion necessity forced Wellington and his officers to turn a blind eye to the practice (Rothenberg, 1978). The practice had developed into a highly effective system in the French army, and troops showed considerable ingenuity in finding supplies (Rothenberg, 1978). This decreased an army’s dependency on magazines and convoys which improved the army’s overall mobility (Elting, 1988). The concept of foraging was paramount for Napoleon’s corps as they normally traveled independently, further decreasing the logistics demand from one given area.

3. Army Organization

One of the elements to Napoleon’s success as a military commander was the adaptations he made in the organization of his armies. Armies of the Napoleonic era were roughly organized the same as they are today aside from the weapons and vehicles that modern technology has provided.

Prior to the French Revolution, France’s military was organized much like the modern Army National Guard of the United States. The French military was organized into divisions in 1791. Each division was assigned to a specific region or territory and a general officer assigned to each division. These general officers were responsible for all the troops and fortresses within their divisions and for the preservation of law and order if local civil authorities could not handle the situation (Elting, 1988).

The French Revolution created many social changes within the army. The title and birth right of nobility was forbidden by the National Assembly. The officer corps throughout Europe primarily consisted of nobles or men who had attained noble stature or station (Elting, 1988). The reorganization of the officer corps within France had actually assisted up-and-coming officers such as Napoleon. The chaotic conditions of the revolution had advanced him in rank well beyond his years. In fact, the average age of the first eighteen marshals was only 44 (Horward, 1988). Napoleon’s marshals had risen through the ranks and were not given assignments based on noble birth as was contrary to the European monarchies of the era. This gave Napoleon an edge as he developed his organization. He realized he could appoint marshals who were risk takers and would not shy away from combat. This advantage came at an extremely high cost as Napoleon suffered a higher mortality rate amongst his generals than those of his enemies (Rothenberg, 1999). Eventually, the overall effectiveness of Napoleon’s organization was decreased due to attrition of experienced commanders in the field.

As in today’s military organization the armies of France were organized into regiments, brigades, divisions, and corps. The brigade usually consisted of two or more regiments; a division of two or more brigades (Elting, 1988). The corps became the focal point for Napoleon’s organizational adaptation. The corps system had been previously established by France’s National Assembly in 1794. In 1799, Napoleon consolidated his political power becoming First Consul of France. He began to combine his divisions into army corps, a combination of infantry, artillery, and a brigade of cavalry, plus detachments of engineers, pontoniers(engineers that build pontoon bridges), and a staff (Horward, 1988). Details and breakdown of the corps system will be discussed further in Chapter III.

Another key element of army organization was the general staff corps. In 1792, the French National Assembly starte...