Singapore: The Japanese Version

Col. Masanobu Tsuji, Margaret E. Lake

• Éditeur: Verdun Press
• Année: 2016
• ISBN:
  9781787200982
• Sujet: Storia
• Sous-sujet: Storia militare e marittima

Originally published in 1960, the author of this book is one of the planners of the Imperial Japanese Army's invasion of Malaya and the capture of Singapore—Colonel Masanobu Tsuji himself. In it, he "unreservedly attributes Japan's victory in Malaya to the patriotic fervour and self-sacrifice of the frontline officers and men of her 25th Army, which, in advancing six hundred miles and capturing Singapore in seventy days, achieved one of the decisive victories of World War II and accomplished a feat unparalleled in military history. […] For the first time in history an army carried out "a blitzkrieg on bicycles", astounding the world by the sureness and rapidity of its advance, and exploding the myth of the impregnability of Singapore—which, as Colonel Tsuji emphasizes, had no rear defences, a fact he states was unknown to Winston Churchill at the time. […] Colonel Tsuji's career proves him a master planner and an outstanding field officer. He now appears as an excellent writer and is to be congratulated upon his book, and also upon the motives which led to his escape from the Allied forces after the national surrender […]."

PART ONE

1. War Without Preparation

IN THE SECOND PARAGRAPH of The Hinge of Fate Mr. Churchill states that “the onslaught of Japan...[which] had been long prepared...fell upon the British and American fronts—if such they could be called—with cruel severity”. Was that really the case?

The fact is that after the Washington Conference{4} the Japanese Navy had exhausted its energies in training in the arts of war and working over secret plans. In so doing it regarded both the British and American navies as potential enemies, and endeavoured to make up for numerical inferiority by the superior quality of its ships and seamen.

However, so far as I know there had been no preparation of military plans against Britain and America by the Military Headquarters General Staff. Following the Russo-Japanese War, the basic policy had been one of preparation for another war against Russia; but after the collapse of Imperial Russia, for a period of several years there was no menace from the Soviet Union, and consequently little military planning of importance in Japan. After the Manchurian Incident{5} we became fully conscious of the Soviet menace to the Far East and our military preparations were expedited. The concern of the Army was directed towards the north.

The capture of Singapore, Hong Kong and the Philippines was discussed, but nothing more than a vague scheme was formulated for naval operations in combination with a few Army divisions.

The feeling that it was necessary to prepare seriously for war against the United States and Britain developed only after economic pressure was exerted against Japan by the United States following upon the movement of Japanese forces into Indo-China; this resulted in the freezing of all Japanese funds in the United States, the annulment of the Commercial Treaty with Japan, and the prohibition of exports of petroleum and scrap iron to Japan. Correctly speaking preparations for war against the United States and Britain date back to 6th September 1940 (14th year of Showa),{6} when the following decision was made in the Imperial Presence: “To complete the necessary preparations for war by about late in October, resolving, as a matter of national preservation, not to avoid war with the United States.”

In the following pages I shall describe how the preparations against the United States and Britain were arranged by Headquarters and on the fighting fronts as well.

2. The Doro Nawa{7} Unit

EVEN IN our summer dress we felt the heat at Taihoku{8} on New Year’s Day in 1941. At a crossroad in the military barracks a brand-new, spick-and-span signboard was hanging that read: “Taiwan Army No. 82 Unit”, another name for which was the “Taiwan Army Research Section”.

The barracks—a small cramped house, formerly a brigade headquarters—were being extended. The fragrance of new wood was still in the air, and from early morning until late at night the sound of hammers and planes could be heard. Only thirty people lived there, and among them, raked together from every quarter of Japan, were officers, non-commissioned officers, servants and typists. Finally we opened up the place.

Under the direction of General Itagaki, Chief of Staff to the Commander-in-Chief of Japanese forces in China, I (who had been driven out of Nanking General Headquarters, and although watched by the authorities from Tokyo, had worked for the East Asia Federation Movement{9} in the central provinces of the Mainland) was appointed officer in charge of the Research Department of the Taiwan Army. When in the New Year I passed through the gate of the small unit of which I was now a member it was the first time in all my eighteen years as a commissioned officer that I had served in such a small force. It was also the last time.

With the sudden change in the bewildering international situation it seemed that the Central Administration in Tokyo had begun to think seriously that preparations should be made for a thrust southward.

Japanese soldiers were familiar only with the intensely cold regions of Manchukuo—now again known as Manchuria. None of them had any understanding of the meaning of the words “squall” or “jungle”, much less any experience of these things. Consequently it was essential to begin to collect fundamental data for military operations in tropical areas.

The Doro Nawa unit was organized with extraordinary urgency and given the name of the Taiwan Army Research Department. This small organization was supplementary to Taiwan Army Headquarters under Uemura, the Army Chief of Staff; in reality, however, Colonel Yoshihide Hayashi shouldered responsibility for the unit.

To this unpretentious and promiscuously chosen household was allotted the task of collecting, in approximately six months, all conceivable data connected with tropical warfare—the organization of Army corps, equipment, campaign direction, management and treatment of weapons, sanitation, supply, administration of occupied territory, and military strategy, tactics, and geography.

It was the duty of the unit to report on all these matters to General Headquarters in Tokyo. Furthermore the scope of research extended over the whole of the Pacific war regions as well as Malaya, the Philippine Islands, Indonesia, and Burma. Funds apportioned to the unit for research totalled barely 20,000 yen.

Even among the commissioned officers chosen for the staff there was not one who had had any real experience of the tropics. What is more, in the eyes of those at General Headquarters nearly all the members of the staff were persons to be ignored, or held in contempt, or kept at a respectful distance. They were regarded as “draught horses” or “sick horses”. The founders of the Taiwan Headquarters were like the new bride who is teased by the mother-in-law—the more she works the more the mother-in-law is burnt up with jealousy.{10} There were many others also whose attitude suggested “the well-fed faces of those in the Yoshizaki Temple”.{11}

For these reasons we could not afford to slacken in our efforts to carry out the duties allotted us. On New Year’s Day we were far from being in the mood for toso [spiced wine], as we had at once to abandon the idea of a one-year plan and arrange for the completion of our work in six months.

The ten research officials to whom were allotted the various items for investigation put heart and soul into their work; but they soon grew impatient, for they had not the faintest idea of where it would be best to turn their attention, and to make matters worse they were completely destitute of data.

There were many questions that had to be determined. For instance, what alterations had to be made in the organization of troops and the type of weapons and equipment used on the Siberian and Manchurian battlefields at twenty degrees below zero to meet requirements for fighting in the dense jungles of the tropics? How should tactics and strategy used against the Soviet Union be revised for action against British and American armies, and what comparisons could be made between the tactics, equipment, and organization of Soviet, British, and American troops? What should be done to cope with supplies and sanitation in tropical areas—and particularly with malaria? What measures should be taken in occupied areas to comply with the traditions and special characteristics of the inhabitants? What could be found out of the military geography of Malaya, the Philippines, Burma, and Indonesia? And so on.

It was first decided to map out the most important objectives on which to work, and then to assign specific tasks of investigation to the ten members of the research staff according to the ability and past experience of each man. My appointed concern was Malaya; I was to study questions of military geography, equipment, tactics, and supplies—the whole organization of a campaign.

Having such a meagre household for carrying out our work, we cast our eyes on the headquarters of the Governor-General of Taiwan, like an old pioneer family trying to make a suitable alliance with a man of wealth. We secured the support of the headquarters, and with humble language and extravagant gratitude we sought assistance from all available men of talent and knowledge from all possible sources. Apart from this help we were undermanned.

The Director of the Southward Association, who had for ten years been engaged on research into trade with tropical countries under the jurisdiction of the Governor-General, was a Mr. En Imagawa, a senior official who had a fairly liberal budget provided. He was of great help, as was also Lieutenant-General Kikuchi, a former instructor on military geography at the War College.

With the assistance of the Southward Association it was possible to obtain information from everyone in Taiwan and Japan who had knowledge and experience of the tropics. From an old sea captain who had voyaged for many years to the south we received instruction in forecasting atmospheric phenomena, in disembarkation methods, and on coastal conditions. From officials of the Ishihara Mining Company we learned useful military facts about Malaya’s geography. Professors of Taiwan University advised us on tropical hygiene and about counter-measures against malaria. The Director of the Taiwan Bank gave us details of banking conditions in the various countries we were studying. In addition we learned a lot from commercial firms and private individuals, and in particular from the Reverend Mr. Kozui Otani immediately after his southern tour. All shared ungrudgingly their profound specialized knowledge with the new household in the barracks building.

This information alone was not genuine strategic material, but it was all useful knowledge about tropical countries from which it was the duty of those of us who wore military uniform to select, adjust, and adapt the points applicable to our purposes. From the total research fund of 20,000 yen given to us by Army Headquarters, a monthly budget of about 2,000 yen was set aside, and the whole of this money was applied to the employment of our informants from outside.

For a period of two months almost every day we pestered specialists from every quarter. We even used our siesta time for lectures, which were always eagerly attended. Soon all the research officers felt they had become no mean specialists of the Southward Road. This unimpressive group was certainly at that time the supreme authority in the Army on tropical warfare.

Taiwan’s intelligentsia did not begrudge assistance for the Research Department, which was forging ahead; but, by contrast, as time went on the jealousy of the Army Operations Section became intense. Even the 20,000-yen research fund allotted by the Central Department in accordance with regulations was grudgingly given, and in one month was cut by nearly 2,000 yen. This is to say that leadership of the Southward Association was kept under the jurisdiction of the Army Operations Section.

An officer from Military Staff Headquarters who was entrusted with an official inspection of the southern areas reported the valuable knowledge he gained, which enhanced the reputation of our unit. Important suggestions also arose from talks with Colonel Tanigawa and Major Kunitake. The most important information gained can be summarized as follows:

1. Singapore Fortress was solid and strong on its sea front, but the rear facing Johore Province was practically defenceless.

2. The British Army was training aerial defence fighter planes in Malaya, but reports in the newspapers of the number of machines were intentional propaganda, exaggerating the real strength.

3. Coastal defence in the neighbourhood...