Chapter 1 God, Freedom, and Necessity: KARL BARTH AND THE CURRENT DISCUSSION
The question of whether creation is necessary to God has long been an issue for Christian theologians in light of the traditional understanding of the creatio ex nihilo. Christian theologians traditionally have rejected the idea that the world is coeternal with God ever since that notion was identified and rejected in Origenâs understanding of Godâs relation with the world.1 Theologians realized that to presume creation is in any sense necessary for God or coeternal with God would blur the distinction between Creator and creature. This, in turn, would obliterate Godâs freedom in such a way that one might then conceptually confuse and reverse the roles of Creator and creature by somehow reducing God to his creative function. According to Thomas F. Torrance, it became increasingly evident in the fourth century that without a clear distinction between the eternal generation of the Son from the being of the Father and the creation of the world by the will of God bringing something into existence from nonexistence, âthe Church would finally lapse back into paganism.â2
In essence, the problem to be considered here concerns the fact that the Christian understanding of creation was, as Georges Florovsky held, âalien and even unintelligible to the Greek mind.â3 The reason for this is that âthe Greek mind was firmly addicted to the conception of an Eternal Cosmos, permanent and immutable in its essential structure and composition. This Cosmos simply existed. Its existence was ânecessary,â it was an ultimate or first datum, beyond which neither thought nor imagination could penetrate.â4 While the shape of the cosmos was in flux, it nonetheless was thought to exist necessarily since âits very existence was perennial.â5 Florovsky went on to explain that for Christians, âthe Creation of the world was conceived as a sovereign and âfreeâ act of God, and not as something which was ânecessarilyâ implied or inherent in Godâs own Being.â6 To make his point, Florovsky cited Gilsonâs well-known remark that âit is quite true that a Creator is an eminently Christian God, but a God whose very essence is to be a creator is not a Christian God at all.â7 His point was simply that âthe very existence of the world was regarded by the Christians as a mystery and miracle of Divine Freedom.â8
If Florovsky is right, and I believe he is, then it is crucial to recognize that whenever the world is thought to be necessary to God, Godâs freedom in himself and his freedom to act effectively as savior and redeemer for us become unrecognizable as acts of God in creation since they cannot be distinguished from creation itself. This chapter will address this theme by focusing on exactly what difficulties arise in the thinking of a number of contemporary theologians who either claim to follow Barthâs thinking or critique it in order to advance views of Godâs relations with us that ascribe both necessity and freedom to God. Relying on Barthâs view that while Godâs eternal being is necessary in that he could not be other than the triune God and still be God, I will argue that he nevertheless rightly held that God does not act out of need just because he is free as the one who loves in himself, and therefore God can and does love us in freedom on that basis.9 Failure to recognize this leads to views that God needs the world and needs to be perfected and such views tend to undermine the freedom of grace with the idea that God is somehow dependent on creation, as we shall see.
Necessity and Divine Freedom
Karl Barth maintains that in connection with the Fatherâs eternal begetting of his Son, God has freedom to will or not to will creation, but that
Nonetheless, Barth insists that Godâs acts of creation and incarnation are not at all demanded by his essence because Godâs actions are free in the sense that God does not even need his being to be who he is since as God, he already and always simply is who he is as the triune God who loves in freedom: âThe freedom in which God exists means that He does not need His own being in order to be who He is: because He already has His own being and is Himself.â11
Having said this, Barth therefore insisted that it is appropriate to consider what God âmight have doneâ when thinking about the fact that God did not and does not need us but nonetheless freely chose to love us. Thus, Barth maintained that
These remarks by Barth rule out any idea that in electing us God could be thought to give himself his being as triune. In fact, they rule out any idea at all that God gives himself his being since, as God, he already and eternally is who he is in the freedom and perfection of his act as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit and thus as the one who loves.13 Accordingly, for Barth,
Importantly, Barth very clearly avoided the error of Origen by asserting that âthe eternal generation of the Son by the Father tells us first and supremely that God is not at all lonely even without the world and us. His love has its object in Himself. And so we cannot say that our existence as that of the recipients of Godâs Word is constitutive for the concept of the Word.â15 This series of statements should not pass without explaining that the position for which I am arguing in this chapter, which takes Barthâs stated position on freedom and necessity seriously, is diametrically opposed to the views of Bruce McCormack and some of his followers who think that God did indeed give himself his eternal being in electing to be God in relationship with us. McCormack claims that there was an important change in Barthâs thinking between CD I/1 and IV/1 such that in CD II/1, for instance, Barth could describe âthe work of reconciliation and redemption as a âfundamentally new workâ â16 while in CD IV/1 Barth rejected this idea.17 Therefore, he alleges that in CD IV/1 Barth does not think of the incarnation as âa new event in God when it happens in time.â18 While it is new to us as the revelation of what had been a hidden mystery up to that point in time, McCormack claims that
However, the text that McCormack cites in support of his view (CD IV/1, 193) does not actually support his claims here since Barth never says that God gives himself his being. In fact, Barth argues that the mystery which is revealed in Jesus is offensive because in Jesus Christ what is revealed is that âfor God it is just as natural to be lowly as it is to be high, to be near as it is to be far, to be little as it is to be great, to be abroad as to be at home.â20 Following this, he holds that because God chooses to become present to us in the world created by him and yet characterized by sin,