Part I
The Analytic-Cognitivist Turn
1The Empire Strikes Back: Critiques of âGrand Theoryâ
2The Rules of the Game: New Ontologies of Film
3Adaptation: Philosophical Approaches to Narrative
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In Part I of this book I introduce some of the new approaches to philosophising on film, which I have dubbed the analytic-cognitivist paradigm, analysing the related strands of its critique of the preceding model of film theorising, so-called âGrand Theoryâ. This approach has produced a host of powerful theories addressing philosophical, psychological and aesthetic aspects of film (see Livingston and Plantinga 2009). In Chapter 1, I examine the influential critique of âGrand Theoryâ developed during the 1990s by David Bordwell, NoĂ«l Carroll, Richard Allen, Murray Smith and a host of other theorists. Underlying this critique is a dispute between competing ways of doing philosophy, associated with the vexed analytic/âContinentalâ philosophy divide (see Critchley 2001; Glendinning 2006; Sinnerbrink 2010). After addressing the critique of âGrand Theoryâ, I examine Carrollâs philosophy of film (his âdialectical cognitivismâ), which argues against âmedium essentialismâ (the idea that film has a definable medium that would determine aesthetic style and value); against interpretation (which conflates film theory with film criticism); and against the âfilm as languageâ thesis (that language provides an appropriate model for theorising film). I also consider Bordwellâs related critique of film hermeneutics and of speculative film theory, suggesting that there are problems with Bordwellâs critique of the hermeneutic (interpretative) approach to film. Although generating a rich array of new theoretical work, the analytic-cognitivist turn can also be challenged for its sometimes âreductionistâ approach to the complex aesthetic, hermeneutic and ideological dimensions of film. In good dialectical fashion, the challenge is to incorporate theoretical innovations in the new approaches, yet retain what remains valuable in the older paradigms. The aim, in short, is to avoid both reductionism and dogmatism (the bugbear of so-called âGrand Theoryâ).
1
The Empire Strikes Back:
Critiques of âGrand Theoryâ
Chapter Outline
The Philosophical Turn in Film Theory
The Critique of âGrand Theoryâ
Criticisms of âGrand Theoryâ
Carrollâs Dialectical Cognitivism
Cognitivism Goes Pluralist
The Philosophical Turn in Film Theory
As Adrian Martin observes (2006), every 15 years or so film studies seem to undergo a distinctive kind of theoretical âturnâ. From the psychoanalytic turn of the 1960s and 1970s through the historiographic turn of the 1980s and 1990s, we now find ourselves, Martin remarks, in the midst of a âphilosophic turnâ that was sparked by Deleuzeâs Cinema books in France and Cavellâs works in the United States (2006: 76). In the 15 years or more since Martinâs observation, we still appear to be working through this philosophical turn (see Elsaesser 2019; Rawls, Neiva and Gouveia 2019). As Martin remarks, the Deleuzian turn was followed by âvarious certified philosophers exploring their passions for cinema â Bernard Stiegler, Alain Badiou, Slavoj ĆœiĆŸek, Giorgio Agamben, and Jacques RanciĂšre, among othersâ (2006: 76). To explain this âphilosophical turnâ in film theory, some philosophers have cited the general cultural popularity of film, its pedagogical potential (particularly for teaching philosophy) and the rise of cognitivist approaches in psychology and philosophy of mind (see Carroll 2008; Gaut 2010; Shaw 2008). Although these are all relevant factors, the most obvious reasons for the turn were institutional and theoretical: the collapse of what Bordwell and Carroll (1996) called âGrand Theoryâ â 1970s and 1980s film theory that combined psychoanalytic, semiotic and ideologico-critical perspectives â and its replacement by historicist, culturalist and media-oriented approaches. In the so-called âtheoretical vacuumâ that followed the demise of âGrand Theoryâ and the cultural-historicist turn, so Carroll claims, philosophy offered the theoretical resources required to renew the âclassicalâ problems of film theory that had been left in abeyance by the previous paradigm (see Carroll 1988a, 1988b).
Whatever their theoretical orientations, the new wave of âpost-Theoryâ philosophers of film defined themselves against the older paradigm of institutionalised film theory of the 1970s and 1980s inspired by psychoanalysis, structuralism, semiotics, cultural theory and various strands of German critical theory and French post-structuralism.1 The title of NoĂ«l Carrollâs 1988 book says it all: Mystifying Movies: Fads and Fallacies in Contemporary Film Theory (1988a).2 The new philosophical film theory challenging the prevailing theoretical models styled itself as analytic rather than âContinentalâ in inspiration; cognitivist rather than psychoanalytic in approach; scientistic rather than hermeneutic in orientation; concerned with drawing upon and applying empirical research rather than engaging in speculation or interpretation. It aimed at a ârationalâ understanding of film rather than at plumbing unconscious desire; and was concerned to use plain language and theoretical arguments rather than what critics derided as metaphysical jargon. With its preference for analytical argument and empirically testable models, analytic-cognitivist film theory has become an increasingly influential approach to the philosophical study of film.
The story becomes intriguing at this point, for the new philosophers of film were challenging a very specific theoretical approach. NoĂ«l Carroll usefully distinguishes between the then âcontemporary film theoryâ (semiological approaches that also drew on psychoanalytical and Marxist theories of ideology) and âclassical film theoryâ, which included earlier theorists (like Arnheim and Bazin) along with more recent ones (such as V. F. Perkins and Stanley Cavell) (1988a: 1).3 According to Carroll, semiological film theory had a first wave (for example, Christian Metz), taking its inspiration from linguist Ferdinand de Saussure; and then a second wave (1970s screen theory), in which this semiological approach was combined with (Lacanian) psychoanalytic and (Althusserian) Marxist theories of ideology. This second wave of film theory also acquired a political inflection during the mid- to late 1970s through the feminist analysis of gender and a critique of the ideological function of Hollywood film.
The Critique of âGrand Theoryâ
NoĂ«l Carrollâs critique of âGrand Theoryâ targets its uncritical commitment to eclectic strains of âContinentalâ philosophy (1996: 37â68). Indeed, Carroll identifies what we might call âfive obstructionsâ, pace Lars von Trier, to what he argued were more rationally defensible ways of theorising on film, difficulties that stem, he claims, from the flawed foundation of âContinentalâ theory:
1)A monolithic conception of film theory, according to which a âfoundationalâ theoretical paradigm is assumed to account for all relevant aspects of film; this is linked with an implausible âmedium essentialismâ, which sought to explain all relevant phenomena in terms of the film medium.
2)The conflation of film theory with film interpretation, according to which film theorists adopt a theoretical framework (Lacanian psychoanalysis, for example), and then âconfirmâ the theory in question by finding its concepts or ideas instantiated in specific film examples, which are interpreted using the adopted theoretical framework in a question-begging, circular manner.
3)Political correctness, âculture warsâ rhetoric aside, this unfortunate term refers to the criticism that the progressive ethico-political claims of film theory were rendered plausible or defensible thanks to their solidarity with emancipatory social-political movements (of the 1960s and 1970s and beyond). More particularly, it refers to the dogmatic defence of theoretical claims, concepts or analyses because of their political value, utility or contribution to emancipatory movements or causes rather than their theoretical cogency, explanatory power or evidentiary basis.
4)Charges of formalism, according to which ways of theorising about film without a âpoliticalâ or ideological focus are dismissed as âformalistâ or as lacking substantive content; or the unwarranted rejection of theoretical claims as ethico-politically vacuous because of their theoretical rather than practical focus.
5)Biases against truth, which refers to the postmodernist dismissal of truth as an ideological construct, a relativist claim that rests on an untenable âargument from absolute truthâ (any truth claim about film presupposes an absolutist concept of truth; there is no such concept; ergo truth claims about film are âideologically suspectâ, hence false or pernicious) (Carroll 1996: 38â56).
Taken together, these five obstructions hampered philosophical theorisation of film, Carroll argued, prompting the need for a âparadigm shiftâ towards more analytic-cognitivist forms of theory that were not beholden to these ethico-political constraints (Carroll 1996: 56â68).
There are two features of so-called âGrand Theoryâ deemed most troubling by analytic-cognitivist critics: 1) the âdecentredâ conception of the human subject whose claims to rational autonomy are undermined by the role of the unconscious in psychic life, and by the shared background structures of language, culture and ideology; and 2) the conviction that film, whether in its popular or modernist forms, is not just an art or popular cultural audiovisual medium but an ideologico-political battleground over forms of social and cultural representation (in particular, of gender, sexuality, class, race and cultural identity). The upshot of these two theses â the challenge to rational autonomy (posited by psychoanalytic theory), and the ideologico-political function of film (posited by Marxist and...