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Ponderings VIIâXI
Black Notebooks 1938â1939
Martin Heidegger, Richard Rojcewicz
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Ponderings VIIâXI
Black Notebooks 1938â1939
Martin Heidegger, Richard Rojcewicz
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Through these broad and sprawling notebooks, Heidegger offers fascinating opinions on Holderlin, Nietzsche, Wagner, Wittgenstein, Pascal, and many others. The importance of the Black Notebooks transcends Heidegger's relationship with National Socialism. These personal notebooks contain reflections on technology, art, Christianity, the history of philosophy, and Heidegger's attempt to move beyond that history into another beginning.
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Sujet
PhilosophySous-sujet
Phenomenology in PhilosophyPONDERINGS IX
a
1
The Germans have even been torn away from their essential ground, one that has still not ever been discovered, let alone fathomed, and so they totter in the alien essence modernity foisted upon them. Therein lies the danger, namely, that they will fall victim to the exclusive dominance of their own distorted essence. Accordinglyâneed to think ahead into the other beginningâ
But what about the struggle of those who think ahead so as to ground and found?
Being [das Sein] is beyng.
(Cf. gods, p. 45f.1)
b
2
The Western careâonly a few who are knowledgeable will surmise that the question of the truth of beyng is the Western care. No âthouâ and no âIâ count as particular cases of present-at-hand humans, and no âcommunityâ counts as a union of many humansâno mere separate people has, simply from its presence at hand, a claim to historical permanence.
Care is Western careâit draws us into the plight of the truth of beyng, for the concealed intimation of the vocation of the West to ground the space-time of the most noble and most abyssal gods is in danger of being received no longer into the fervor of creative hearts, ones in which a history of the gods can again arise in the sight of an awake humanityâinstead of a historiology of blinded actions through which modern humanity totters up against a sheer self-instituted perishing.â
Where will the gods then summon beyng?
There where beyng has appropriated that clearing (Da-sein) in whose open realm it refuses itself, so that the refusal might once again effectuate the intrinsically vibrant event of a possible rejoinder to that which, through such self-encounter, is found in the essence of God and humanity.
1
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2
If human goallessness has become complete (if only other purposes within beings are posited, and the means of actualization as well as the ways and the undertakings themselves become âtheâ purposes, and consequently their fulfillment ever more easily and definitively bestows the liberation of all claims, whereby the claims themselves seem ever more superficial and âcloser to lifeâ), then the human being is unwittingly and obliviously becoming the beneficiary of a great destruction presenting itself to him as a gigantic buildup. And why should this human being not feel himself to be well, and ever better, in his presumptuous ignorance, which he replaces with prudence and cleverness in exploiting the destruction? (Thus it is a destructionâperhaps one already not worthy of mentionâwhen with the best intention Hölderlinâs poetry is exploited for its proficiency of expression and thereby something of today is described. But what is decisive is not the misuse of Hölderlin, but instead the loss of every possibility of surmising that this poet embodies a | decision of our history and perhaps demands decidedness in favor of renouncing all ink spilling in verseâuntil his words are liberated for the disposition of a joyful seriousness of a Da-sein.)
3
Why do we torment these well-intentioned historiological animals that in the historiology of their own advancements and gratifications become ever more content and jovial with questions that appear to them to be empty, eccentric, and snobbish? Out of the animal rationale has come the historiological animal, i.e., that living thing which pursues the conservation and enhancement of âlifeâ and takes that for a âgoal.â But the pursuit happens âhistoriologicallyââby way of calculating previous ideals and accomplishments (the âgreat pastâ as means of forming public opinionâ) in the planned wishes and claims. The sovereignty of the historiological excludes the existence of any essential opposition; the calculation has overcome all admissions of anything which, as essential resistance, could make constant struggle a necessity with which the decisions might first comply and might replace the historiological animal into the history of Dasein. The more historiological the human being becomes, all the more bestial does the animal become, all the more exclusively does everything revolve around | the conservation and breeding of life as life, and all the more improbable becomes the possibility of a downgoing. All comportment is appraised in terms of accomplishment, which is the expression of life, and life lives for the sake of life. In this way, the encirclement of historiology through the animal presses the historiological animal down beneath the mere animal and altogether beneath all pure growth, indeed even beneath the âgrownâ rock, because here an essence spreads which, belonging to beyng but disloyal to it, sees the goal of its advancement in the abandonment of beings by being. But this applies above all where, in dependence on and in imitation of previous cultural âaccomplishments,â even something quite ârespectableâ is attained, because every decision is avoided and the manufacture of things that can be accounted ânot badâ is held as more important than a renunciation stemming from genuine knowledge and from an originary power of reverence.
4
No one seems to grasp that we are confronting a decisive time whose anteroom must be filled by essential abjurations. No one seems to have an eye and a judgment for what is not done on the basis of a knowledge that thinks in advance, and no longer can be done on that basis, because it is producing only a concealing obstruction of the essential decision. | The half is justified by appealing to the necessity for something to happen; but no one surmises that this âhalfâ only makes the need and the claims more composed and more secure and closes off the possibility that what is beginning a history is not the claim of calculative humanity on beings, but instead is the thrust of beyng on unguarded and unsupported humanity. In the space-time of this history, the gods ariseâe.g., those that uncalculatively let the human being be steadfast in Da-sein, whereby the truth of beyng might announce the uniqueness of this extraordinary circumstance in which gods and humans could come to an encounter and could produce the moment wherein the thatness of beyng gathers itself against the blind inconsequentiality of nothingness.
5
This encounter is no possible goal and does not know any purposes. It essentially occurs as the abyss out of which all grounding draws its freedom. This freedom, whose ever incomparable uncalculability testifies to the essential occurrence of beyng, transposes the human being into the stillness of his most concealed dignity, from which comes to him not satisfaction and enjoyment, but quite to the contrary, that unsettling which raises him up against the intimation of the gods and into his affiliation with such encounter. | Only if the human being in advance and in uncanny inner convulsions endures the decision toward this history of beyng will he find the ground on which arises for him a source of necessary creativity. Within this creativity, every work preserves the truth of beyng in a being and through such preservation first lets beings as beings protrude into the open realm of the space-time of historical Da-sein and protects the moment of beyng as the highest possibility of this work. Out of such protection, beings first again find themselves on the way toward beings, and they thereby world on the basis of world and, as earth, survive their misuse as mere materials and forces.
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6
Yet in order for this world of an ambiguous and variegated transition to exist and to remain luminous for the âtragediesâ and sacrifices of the noiseless questioning, knowing, and deciding demanded by such a world, what is needed is a repose that thinks far in advance. Such repose withholds its knowledge and allows what is withheld to flow only into the disclosive questioning of the initially timid and yet decisive distinctions and separations | the human being must traverse if he is to forsake the historiological animal and be able to prepare historical Dasein.
What we must know about this may be illustrated by an example, if indeed it can at all be termed âexample.â
How far do the horizons of our endeavors and arrangements in fact extend? Through three rubrics: people, culture, Christianity. âPeopleââis not a goal, but only the substructure of a way which never determines itself out of itself. âCultureâ is the affirmation of the modern self-certainty of humanity in the machination of beings; not a goal and not a domain of possible decisions; still only an expedient for the assimilation to previous history. âChristianityââa stopgap without any power of creativity, because it knows and tolerates no question-worthiness and seeks only compromise or at most consolations and vain promises. In no case do these horizons reach into the decisive domains, and yet the sovereignty of such horizons obstructs a sense and will for those domains and denies us any knowledge of them and keeps us in the compulsion of the calculation that still misinterprets itself.
7
Our thinking does not need to be âinternationalâ or even European; but it must indeed be Western and metaphysical if it is to fathom more originarily the ground of our history out of the essence of beyng, i.e., out of the âbetweenâ of the encounter of gods and humans. Incomparable is our care, as the care of Da-sein, wherein the truth of being is to strike roots. This care, in its holding sway, has extensions and proportions which are not at all touched by the superficialâalthough ever so rebellious and afflictingâconfrontations with peoples, cultures, and worldviewsâinsofar as we take these as ultimate and do not surmise that they themselves already stand in the service of a beginning which is coming from afar. This beginning dislodges the human being into the need to come to terms with the very goallessness and superficiality of his most vital exertions and actions and to experience therein the first celebration of Da-sein. The unsettling attunes the celebration and makes us aware that beyng still awaits its grounding and that, out of the dialogue vibrating in beyng, the gods bring to language anew the essence of humanity.
8
People, culture, Christianityâin whichever of their variations and combinationsâare already things of the past, and because in them an originary relation to being and to its question-worthiness in the most manifold forms is in advance, i.e., at all times, closed offâindeed is never known and experiencedâtherefore people, culture, and Christianity possess no originary and essential power for the approaching decisions. Yet these three horizons now explicitly come up for discussion and pursuit, and they precisely cover over what is in truth merely their already severe horizonlessness, all of which indicates the fact that beyng is already driven within the Western forgetfulness of being and casts its still ungrasped signs into the domain of todayâs humanity and already brings up for decision this one single issue: whether now already the few will venture to surmise the signs and from these intimations will let flow (into the forthcoming questioning, knowing, and thus creating) another disposition and destinyâi.e., whether we, whether precisely the Germans, are strong enough to assume this highest and most hidden care, the care for the truth of beyng.
9
For we âareâ kindred | to the Greeks not in that we take them as models and guard them, perhaps especially and otherwise than did mere âhumanismâ and âclassicismââbut rather in that we, like the Greeks, have to venture the first beginning of Western history and carry out the completely other beginning. And to carry this out we have to undertake a possibly very lengthy and downright âfantasticâ preparation that will for a long time be misinterpreted and unrecognized. These preparatory inner decisions are called âinnerâ because they pertain to the concealedness of beyng and can therefore never be taken up in the manner of realizable plans and calculations regarding beings. These inner decisions (cf. Ponderings VIII and VII) must be thought in advance and said in advance by those who already seem to be striving for a sheer negation of everything hitherto and everything of today, as if they took nourishment from the most meager food of the lack of prospects of so-called cultural development and as if they grazed their fill on the âenjoymentâ of the continued establishment of a âdownfallââwhich indeed presupposes the calculation of âascents.â
10
Furthermore, if we count on an obvious doctrine and an assignment to a blessed life, if we expect representations of objects, to which we can flee if necessary, and if we demand to be immediately saved and to be spared every essential worry, then | Hölderlin and Nietzsche, each in his own way, leave us âunsatisfiedââso much so that we do not once manage to recognize what we need in order to grasp their intimating that speaks in advance.
5
More desolate and unfruitful than the crudest...