CHAPTER ONE
Introduction: The Nature of Rhetoric
The English word ârhetoricâ is derived from Greek
rhtorik, which apparently came into use in the circle of Socrates in the fifth century and first appears in Platoâs dialogue
Gorgias, probably written about 385
B.C. but set dramatically a generation earlier.
Rhtorik in Greek specifically denotes the civic art of public speaking as it developed in deliberative assemblies, law courts, and other formal occasions under constitutional government in the Greek cities, especially the Athenian democracy. As such, it is a specific cultural subset of a more general concept of the power of words and their potential to affect a situation in which they are used or received. Ultimately, what we call ârhetoricâ can be traced back to the natural instinct to survive and to control our environment and influence the actions of others in what seems the best interest of ourselves, our families, our social and political groups, and our descendants. This can be done by direct actionâforce, threats, bribes, for exampleâor it can be done by the use of âsigns,â of which the most important are words in speech or writing. Some concept of rhetoric, under different names, can be found in many ancient societies. In Egypt and China, for example, as in Greece, practical handbooks were written to advise the reader how to become an effective speaker.
Classical writers regarded rhetoric as having been âinvented,â or more accurately, âdiscovered,â in the fifth century B.C. in the democracies of Syracuse and Athens. What they mean by this is that then, for the first time in Europe, attempts were made to describe the features of an effective speech and to teach someone how to plan and deliver one. Under democracies citizens were expected to participate in political debate, and they were expected to speak on their own behalf in courts of law. A theory of public speaking evolved, which developed an extensive technical vocabulary to describe features of argument, arrangement, style, and delivery. In recent years, the term âmetarhetoricâ has been coined to describe a theory or art of rhetoric in contrast to the practice or application of the art in a particular discourse. The first teachers of rhetoric were the itinerent lecturers of fifth-century Greece known as âsophists,â to be discussed in the next chapter; beginning with Isocrates in the fourth century, regular schools of rhetoric became common, and throughout the Greco-Roman period the study of rhetoric was a regular part of the formal education of young men.
Classical rhetoriciansâthat is, teachers of rhetoricârecognized that many features of their subject could be found in Greek literature before the âinventionâ of rhetoric as an academic discipline, and they frequently used rhetorical concepts in literary criticism. Conversely, the teaching of rhetoric in the schools, ostensibly concerned primarily with training in public address, had a significant effect on written composition, and thus on literature. All literature is ârhetoricalâ in the sense that its function is to affect a reader in some wayââto teach and to please,â as the Roman poet Horace and many other critics put itâbut beginning in the last three centuries B.C., much Greek and Latin literature is overtly rhetorical in that it was composed with a knowledge of classical rhetorical theory and shows its influence.
In the third chapter of his lectures On Rhetoric, Aristotle distinguished three âspeciesâ of rhetoric. An audience, he says, is either a judge or not a judge of what is being said. By this he means that an audience either is or is not being asked to make a specific decision on an issue presented to it. If the audience is a judge, it is either judging events of the past, as in a court of law, in which case the speech is classified as âjudicial,â or it is judging what action to take in the future, in which case the speech is âdeliberative.â If the audience is not being asked to take a specific action, Aristotle calls the speech âepideicticâ (i.e., âdemonstrativeâ). What he has in mind are speeches on ceremonial occasions, such as public festivals or funerals, which speeches he characterizes as aimed at praise or blame. These three categoriesâjudicial, deliberative, epideicticâremained fundamental throughout the history of classical rhetoric and are still useful in categorizing forms of discourse today. The concept of epideictic rhetoric, however, needs to be broadened beyond Aristotleâs definition. In later antiquity, some rhetoricians included within it all poetry and prose. Perhaps epideictic rhetoric is best regarded as any discourse that does not aim at a specific action but is intended to influence the values and beliefs of the audience.
In its fully developed form, as seen for example in writings of Cicero in the first century B.C. and of Quintilian a century later, classical rhetorical teaching consisted of five parts that parallel the act of planning and delivering a speech. Since a knowledge of how to speak in a law court was probably the skill most needed by most students, classical rhetorical theory primarily focused on judicial rhetoric. Rhetoricians, however, usually also gave some attention to deliberative and epideictic forms, and from the time of the Roman Empire some treatises describe epideictic forms in considerable detail.
The first of the five parts of classical rhetoric is âinventionâ (Gk.
heuresis, Lat.
inventio). This is concerned with thinking out the subject matter: with identifying the question at issue, which is called the
stasis of the speech, and the available means of persuading the audience to accept the speakerâs position. The means of persuasion include, first, direct evidence, such as witnesses and contracts, which the speaker âusesâ but does not âinventâ; second, âartisticâ means of persuasion, which include presentation of the speakerâs character (
thos) as trustworthy, logical argument (
logos) that may convince the audience, and the
pathos or emotion that the speaker can awaken in the audience. The artistic means of persuasion utilize âtopicsâ (Gk.
topoi, Lat.
loci), which are ethical or political premises on which an argument can be built or are logical strategies, such as arguing from cause to effect. A speaker can also use topics, many of which became traditional, to gain the trust or the interest of the audience. The importance of the case can be stressed, not only for the speaker, but as a precedent for future decisions or for its effect on society.
The second part of classical rhetoric is âarrangementâ (Gk.
taxis, Lat.
dispositio). âArrangementâ means the organization of a speech into parts, though the order in which arguments are presented, whether the strongest first or toward a climax, is sometimes discussed. Rhetoricians found it difficult to separate discussion of arrangement from discussion of invention and often merged the two into an account of the inventional features of each part of a speech. The basic divisions recognized by the handbooks and applying best to judicial oratory are (1) introduction, or prooemium, (Gk.
prooimion, Lat.
exordium); (2) narration (Gk.
digsis, Lat.
narratio), the exposition of the background and factual details; (3) proof (Gk.
pistis, Lat.
probatio); and (4) conclusion, or epilogue, (Gk.
epilogos, Lat.
peroratio). Each part has its own function and characteristics: the prooemium, for example, aims at securing the interest and good will of the audience; the narration should be clear, brief, and persuasive; the proof supplies logical arguments in support of the speakerâs position and also seeks to refute objections that might be made against it; the epilogue is often divided into a recapitulation and an emotional appeal to the audience. Some rhetoricians added other parts. At the beginning of the proof often a âpropositionâ and a âdistributionâ of headings is discussed. Sometimes there is what is called a âdigressionâ or âexcursus,â which is not so much a true digression as a discussion of some related matter that may affect the outcome or a description of the moral character, whether favorable or unfavorable, of those involved in the case. Deliberative speeches usually have a prooemium, proof, and epilogue and can often omit a narration. Epideictic speeches have a structure of their own; for example a speech in praise of someone may take up the âtopicsâ of his or her country, ancestry, education, character, and conduct.
Once the speaker has planned âwhatâ to say and the order in which to say it, the third task is to decide âhowâ to say it, that is how to embody it in words and sentences. This is âstyleâ (Gk. lexis, Lat. elocutio). It is characteristic of classical rhetoric to regard style as a deliberate process of casting subject into language; the same ideas can be expressed in different words with different effect. There are two parts to style: âdiction,â or the choice of words; and âcomposition,â the putting of words together into sentences, which includes periodic structure, prose rhythm, and figures of speech. Discussion of style is usually organized around the concept of four âvirtuesâ (aretai) that were first defined by Aristotleâs student Theophrastus: correctness (of grammar and usage), clarity, ornamentation, and propriety. Ornamentation includes âtropes,â literally âturningsâ or substitutions of one term for another as in metaphor; figures of speech, or changes in the sound or arrangement of a sequence of words, such as anaphora or asyndeton; and figures of thought, in which a statement is recast to stress it or achieve audience contact, as in the rhetorical question. Styles were often classified into types or âcharacters,â of which the best known categorization is the threefold division into âgrand,â âmiddle,â and âplain.â
Invention, arrangement, and style are the three most important parts of classical rhetoric, applicable equally to public speaking and written composition. The earliest recognition of them as three separate actions seems to be in Isocratesâ speech Against the Sophists (section 16), written about 390 B.C. Aristotle discusses all three subjects in his lectures On Rhetoric, which in its present form dates from around 335 B.C., but in the first chapter of book 3 he suggests that a fourth part might be added, âdelivery.â By the first century B.C. in fact two more parts had been added. Fourth in the usual sequence comes âmemory.â Once a speech was planned and written out, the student of rhetoric was expected to memorize it word for word for oral delivery. A mnemonic system of backgrounds and images had been developed for this purpose.1 The best ancient discussion is found in the third book of the Rhetoric for Herennius, written in the early first century B.C. Fifth and last came âdelivery,â as Aristotle had proposed. This is divided into control of the voiceâvolume, pitch, and so onâand gesture, which includes effective control of the eyes and limbs. The best ancient discussion is found in Quintilianâs Education of the Orator, book 11.
Classical metarhetoric, as set out in Greek and Latin handbooks from the fourth century B.C. to the end of antiquity, was a standard body of knowledge. Once fully developed, it remained unaltered in its essential features, though constantly revised and often made more detailed by teachers who sought some originality. Was the teaching of rhetoric ever called into question in antiquity? The answer is âyes.â Just as today ârhetoricâ in popular usage can have negative connotations as deceitful or empty, so it was viewed with hostility or suspicion by some in classical times.
The earliest context in which this criticism explicitly appears is the Clouds of Aristophanes, a comic play originally staged in 423 B.C. at the height of the activity of the older sophists.2 The play includes a debate (lines 889â1104) between âJust Speechâ and âInjust Speech,â in which injustice acknowledges itself the âweakerâ but triumphs by verbal trickery over justice, the âstronger.â In Platoâs Apology (18b8) Socrates, imagined as speaking at his trial in 399 B.C., says he is accused of âmaking the weaker argument the stronger.â Aristotle (On Rhetoric 2.24.11) identifies âmaking the weaker cause the strongerâ with the use of argument from probability as described in fifth-century rhetorical handbooks and says the phrase was used against the sophist Protagoras. The phrase reflects the frustration of those unskilled in the new techniques of debate when traditional ideas of morality and truth were undermined by verbal argument and paradoxical views that seemed wrong to common sense were seemingly demonstrated. Examples might include not only the comic debate in the Clouds but Zenoâs argument that Achilles could never overtak...