Maximus the Confessor as a European Philosopher

Mitralexis, Steiris

• Éditeur: Cascade Books
• Année: 2017
• ISBN:
  9781498295598
• Sujet: Philosophy
• Sous-sujet: Philosophers

The study of Maximus the Confessor's thought has flourished in recent years: international conferences, publications and articles, new critical editions and translations mark a torrent of interest in the work and influence of perhaps the most sublime of the Byzantine Church Fathers. It has been repeatedly stated that the Confessor's thought is of eminently philosophical interest. However, no dedicated collective scholarly engagement with Maximus the Confessor as a philosopher has taken place--and this volume attempts to start such a discussion. Apart from Maximus' relevance and importance for philosophy in general, a second question arises: should towering figures of Byzantine philosophy like Maximus the Confessor be included in an overview of the European history of philosophy, or rather excluded from it--as is the case today with most histories of European philosophy? Maximus' philosophy challenges our understanding of what European philosophy is. In this volume, we begin to address these issues and examine numerous aspects of Maximus' philosophy--thereby also stressing the interdisciplinary character of Maximian studies.

Part I

First Philosophy: Ontology/Metaphysics

1

“Eschatological Teleology,” “Free Dialectic,” “Metaphysics of the Resurrection”: The Three Antinomies That Make Maximus an Alternative European Philosopher

Dionysios Skliris

Is Maximus “European”? Is Maximus a “philosopher”? The two questions of the present volume also entail the concomitant questions “What is Maximus’ contribution to Europe?” and “What is his contribution to philosophy?” They might equally presuppose the questions “Is Maximus something else than just a ‘Byzantine’?” and “Is Maximus something else than just a theologian?” These are not new questions, and they have actually mobilized research in the last decades. It is to be remembered that Hans Urs von Balthasar, who is considered to be a sort of “founder” of a new period of interest in Maximian scholarship, regarded Maximus as a great European thinker who struggled against the “asianic” spirit and its despotism. He considered Maximus a precursor of Hegel and linked him to the latter’s dialectical thought.1 Roman Catholic specialists from 1970 onwards have tried to interpret Maximus as a precursor of Thomas Aquinas. They have insisted on Maximus’ sojourn in the province of Africa, that is in the same places where Augustine of Hippo was active, as well as in Rome, and they have highlighted Maximus’ conflict with the Byzantine state. Jean-Miguel Garrigues, in particular, has portrayed Maximus as a fugitive and a “refugee,” who was fleeing Persians and Arabs, but also, in a certain sense, struggling against Byzantines. In the experience of this clash with the world of Late Antiquity, Maximus supposedly discovered historical contingency2 and formulated in his thought what has come to be a major problem of Western modernity. On the contrary, Orthodox scholars often consider Gregory Palamas as Maximus’ true heir.3 But for Orthodox scholars as well, the vindication of Maximus was related with all the important enjeux of European philosophy, both old and new. For example, Maximus’ theories on the person, λόγος and τρόπος were linked to the modernist philosophical program of existentialism, as well as with personalism. The idea was to promote Maximus as an alternative thinker of the person that is not in an occidental modernist sense, but in an alternative version that is nevertheless equally European.4 That was combined with an equal effort to regard Maximus as a more authentic continuator of Aristotle.5 In recent decades, we have witnessed an important turning to Maximus’ “psychology” and a comparison with contemporary psychology and psychoanalysis, for example in its Lacanian version,6 or with other schools.7 All these bold interpretations have of course coexisted with patristic, philological, and historical studies, feeding one another, and reaching the great interest in Maximus that we witness today.

The fact remains that Maximus has not found a prominent place in the history of philosophy—for example, a place alongside Augustine, or the place of an “alternative” Augustine. Maximian scholars have nevertheless pointed to specific philosophical achievements that could justify such a claim: to Maximus’ theory of the will, for example, which is mainly the fact that he conceived of the will as an indispensable faculty of the human soul8 and nature that accompanies intellection as an equally primordial drive. This could arguably be regarded as a sort of “Oriental voluntarism” that is an alternative to the Augustinian one, whence started all the adventure of Western voluntarism. One could also point out Maximus’ treatment of Aristotelian teleology, his theory of time and the eon, his very original philosophy of history, and, in general, a restructuring of Greek metaphysics.

In my paper, I will not endeavor to prove that Maximus deserves such a place—even though I believe that he does indeed deserve it. I will focus on the preliminary questions, “Who is Maximus?” and “What is his philosophical gesture or, more widely, his existential gesture?” That is, I will first try to examine Maximus as a historical subject and to identify his project and only then to estimate his importance for European philosophy or his relevance in a contemporary context. The rich history of Maximian studies provides us with a great number of Maximus’ portraits: A Hegelian Maximus, a Heideggerian Maximus, a Thomist Maximus, a Palamite Maximus, an Aristotelian Maximus, a Freudian, Jungian, or Lacanian Maximus. Maximus the unyielding, Maximus the rebel against imperial power, Maximus the refugee, Maximus who died bearing the stain of the heretic, before he was resurrected as an orthodox authority claimed by East and West alike. In answering the question “Who is Maximus?” I will draw from this great variety of portraits, trying to see them in a fresh manner that is beyond any confessional or traditional vindication.

We will witness a Maximus of the verge, a Maximus of antinomies. One should bear in mind that Maximus lived in the period of the definitive fall of the Roman ecumene under the attacks of the Persians and, finally, the Arabs, in the era when the Mediterranean was divided into a Christian and an Islamic part. He is therefore the last thinker of late antiquity and, at the same time, a voice that echoes through the Middle Ages reaching up to the beginning of Modernity. The political enjeu of his age was to save the multiplicity of cultural centers within the Roman Empire (for example Alexandria, Antioch, and, in general, Egypt, Palestine and Syria). The emperor will attempt this by a politics of compromise, in which differences will be violently silenced due to the need of a consensus that is imposed from the outside. Maximus will react to this imperial priority as a heresy that corrupts the integrity of Christian faith. At the same time, he is trying himself to integrate the polyphony of the late Roman Empire in one open contemplative “system” or rather worldview that would also represent the “lost” voices. Due to this care to save the “defeated” voices, Maximus’ thought will become very synthetic but also eclectic. By the latter, I mean that Maximus often picked heterogeneous elements, without always reaching a definitive synthesis. On the contrary, his thought is characterized by the tension between the former ...