1.1 Introduction
Despite its acceptance as a section in the American Academy of Forensic Sciences over 45 years ago (Thompson, 1982; Ubelaker, 2009), forensic anthropology has continued to be plagued by questions of scientific validity and rigor (Nordby, 2002). The legitimacy of forensic anthropology as a science and as a standâalone discipline has been challenged repeatedly due to its perceived lack of a âgrounding body of theoryâ (Adovasio, 2012). Viewed as a laboratoryâbased applied subfield of biological anthropology, it has been characterized as emphasizing methodology over theory, with a narrow focus on reconstructing the biological profile and establishing human identification (Adovasio, 2012).
The authors of this volume aim to show that this view of forensic anthropology is not only antiquated but also inadequate and inaccurate. This volume is an outgrowth of a symposium entitled âApplication of Theory to Forensic Anthropology,â presented at the 67th annual meeting of the American Academy of Forensic Sciences in 2015, and all of the presenters in this symposium are also chapter authors. As will be seen in the following chapters, forensic anthropology, a discipline that examines various aspects of the physical environment and material remains contained in that environment that are of legal significance, is firmly grounded in wellâestablished scientific, logical theory. The goal of this chapter (and volume) is to explicate the theoretical bases for various specialized fields of inquiry in forensic anthropology and, through this process, define the basic elements of forensic anthropology theories, their interrelationships, and their relation to the logical reasoning process of the legal system in which they interact. The ultimate focus of the volume is to illustrate how these theoretical approaches form the scientific foundation for the discipline and shape the data collected and results obtained in forensic anthropological research.
1.2 A selective history of theory in forensic anthropology
Theories are explanationsâanswers to âwhy?â questions (Howard, 1993:7; Johnson, 1999:2; Hage, 2007:124â127; Boyd and Boyd, 2011). Scientific theories are explanations of observable, quantifiable phenomena (Salmon, 1982:158). They allow the construction of models to better understand dynamic events and their physical material consequences. As Johnson (1999:7) notes, âFacts are important, but without theory they remain utterly silent.â Scientific theories are, importantly, amenable to testing by means of quantification and analysis of new observations.
Because of its strong applied nature, as noted earlier, it may be asked why scientific theories are important for forensic anthropology. As will be seen in the following chapters, theories provide a basis for generating and testing new hypotheses regarding forensic events and the evaluation of their likelihood and probability. They influence and direct every aspect of forensic anthropology, from field search and recovery to laboratory analysis to the courtroom. Clearly stating oneâs theoretical focus and methodology can reduce bias and mitigate unfounded, unsubstantiated statements in legal reports and testimony. Theory consequently strengthens arguments for plausibility, reliability, and relevance of data introduced in the courtroomâwithout it, forensic anthropologists risk having their credibility as expert witnesses dismissed and admissibility of their scientific evidence denied.
In order to fully understand the theoretical underpinnings of forensic anthropology, it is important to briefly review theoretical developments within its parent discipline, anthropology. Anthropologists have attempted to explain all aspects of what it means to be human; their theories have accommodated humans as biocultural creaturesâdependent on behavior and social interactions as much as their biology for their ultimate adaptability and survivability. Any discussion of theory development in forensic anthropology must consider these broader historical influences.
Anthropology began as a recognized discipline in the midâlate nineteenth century, with the writings of Lewis Henry Morgan, Sir Edward Tylor, Herbert Spencer, and Karl Marx (McGee and Warms, 2012), who all expressed, in one form or another, an evolutionary view of human cultural development. These early writers felt that human cultures had evolved over time from primitive to more complex forms, adapting to their environments with new technologies and new forms of social organization.
This early cultural evolutionary view, although discredited due to its simplistic and inherently racist connotations, dovetailed nicely with the contemporaneous theoretical proposal of biological evolution by means of natural selection from Charles Darwin (1859). These evolutionary theories all considered adaptation, reproductive success and consequent population growth, and a progression of change over time as important elements in any explanation of humansâ current social and biological condition.
As the subfield of cultural anthropology developed in the twentieth century, its focus on human social and behavioral characteristics fluctuated between the later evolutionistsâ (e.g., Julian Steward, Leslie White) materialist perspective and that of the idealists. Materialists emphasized the roles of technology, modes of production and trade, and adaptation to the environment, while idealists (mentalists) focused on psychological, linguistic, and mental developments and their resultant influence on perceptions of reality as major theories explaining human behavior.
This theoretical dichotomy was also expressed in archaeology in the second half of the twentieth century. Prior to this, archaeology was initially focused on recovering material remains from impressive ancient sites and civilizations. Theoretical orientation was largely inductive and was primarily focused on descriptive culture historyâdating artifacts, sites, and civilizations and organizing them into a chronology. In America and Britain, this approach began to change in the 1960s and 1970s, with the advent of the âNew Archaeology.â
Theory was at the heart of this revolution. Lewis Binford (1977, 1983), Michael Schiffer (1976), and many others championed this âNew Archaeology,â which explicitly recognized the hidden theoretical basis of archaeology and the building of theory through actualistic (middleârange) studies. These researchers sought to establish a firmer foundation for archaeological theory, with the goal of developing scientificallyâbased broad foundational laws, models, and explanations of human behaviors.
An important publication within archaeology during this time with implications for forensic anthropological theory was Michael Schifferâs (1988) âThe Structure of Archaeological Theory,â which described âthree great realmsâ (Schiffer, 1988:464) of archaeological theory applicable to the study of human behaviorâsocial, reconstruction, and methodological. Within these categories, he also described the presence of three levels of theoryâhigh, middleârange, and low. Schifferâs highâlevel theories were broad and comprehensive, while middleârange theories served to link these highâlevel theories to empirical generalizations (lowâlevel theories). An example of highâlevel social theory would be diffusion theory, as espoused by many anthropologists in the early twentieth century. Independent inventions spread from their centers of origin over a period of time, and this explained culture change and adoption of new traits (Harris, 1968:380â383). Perhaps more obvious is the role of reconstruction theory (often considered âmiddleârangeâ), which attempts to link the static archaeological (or forensic) record to the dynamic forces that produced it. Here, theory is clearly more applied, focusing on the development of observationâbased explanations and improved inferences about events of significance. Schifferâs (1988) discussion of lithic useâwear analysis and its application toward reconstructing stone tool use in the past serves as a good archaeological example. Microscopic useâwear analysis helps to identify the raw materials processed by lithic tools by comparing the edge wear on archaeological specimens to the wear on experimentally produced stone tools used on known, specific raw materials (Vaughan, 1985). Finally, Schiffer (1988) originally defined methodological theory as a separate ârealmâ in his hierarchical model. Within this category, he included what he called recovery theory (e.g., protocols for conducting an archaeological survey or excavating a burial) and analytic theory (methods of analysis); these were considered to be lowâlevel because they are â⊠more empirical in contentâŠâ (Schiffer, 1988:462).
This acknowledgement of a theoretical foundation based on actualistic and experimental studies became a major aspect of archaeological research, leading to the recognition of archaeology as a science (at least as it was practiced by many archaeologists). The âpositivistâ scienceâoriented materialist view of the past became a hallmark of archaeology and related disciplines during this time. However, beginning in the late twentieth century, this positivist (Giddens, 1974; Comte, 1975; Mill, 2009) or (to use an archaeological term) processualist view of science as an objective, unbiased method of study that explains natural phenomena through the careful analysis of material physical objects began to be criticized (Robson, 2002; Wylie, 2002). Postâprocessualist archaeological theorists emphasized a focus on uncovering the mental attributes of past peoples and meanings they assigned to artifacts and features. It was also recognized by postpositive, pos...