Collective Action

12 Key excerpts on "Collective Action"

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  Modern Developments in Behavioral Economics

  Social Science Perspectives on Choice and Decision Making

  • John Malcolm Dowling, Yap Chin Fang;;;(Authors)
  • 2007(Publication Date)
  • WSPC

    (Publisher)

  Next, we will look at the factors influencing the group’s capacity to collaborate. The later parts of the chapter focus on how Collective Action may or may not work in the best interest of the public, with examples on local and international levels. We also see how Collective Action or the lack of it can result in economic stagnation and environmental depletion. 8.1 Games and Collective Action 8.1.1 Collective Action in clubs Why do some people work together to provide goods and services not provided by the government, while others do not? Why is it that some public goods are provided more than others in some communities? 302 Modern Developments in Behavioral Economics Our answer may come from club theory. Preliminary work on club theory was first done by American economists James Buchanan (1965) and Charles Tiebout (1956), and later developed by econo-mists such as Olson (1965) and Sandler (1993). Clubs are defined as voluntary groups of individuals who derive mutual benefit from sharing the costs of production, other members’ company or some aspects of a public good that is provided by the club to its members. Clubs provide a nongovernment alternative to the provision of wanted goods and services. With fees willingly paid by group members, the club provides members with the desired goods and services that group members share, thereby increasing their over-all welfare. Clubs provide an interesting solution to the allocation of public goods, which are generally nonrival and nonexcludable, and merit goods that are commonly overly demanded within the society. Clubs can also be formed to reduce negative externalities. If clubs could provide the same services as the public sector at lower transac-tion costs, clubs are generally deemed to be a more efficient alterna-tive. Instances of possible club goods include highways, parks, private education, private housing, Internet, etc.

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  Green Issues and Debates

  An A-to-Z Guide

  • Howard S. Schiffman(Author)
  • 2011(Publication Date)
  • SAGE Publications, Inc

    (Publisher)

  305 I I NDIVIDUAL A CTION V ERSUS C OLLECTIVE A CTION The debate concerning individual action versus Collective Action has long been of interest to social science disciplines, including economics, political science, sociology, psychology, philosophy, and anthropology. This interest stems from the belief that certain goals can only be achieved with Collective Action. However, for a number of reasons that will be explained further, it is not always easy or even possible to ensure Collective Action. This entry explains why people, organizations, and nations engage in individual versus collec-tive action, the outcomes of this choice, possible ways to encourage Collective Action, and finally, the role of individual versus Collective Action in greening the society toward a sustainable future. Why Individual Action? Rational choice theory posits that all action is fundamentally rational and that people calculate the likely costs and benefits of any action before deciding how to act. This assumption of economic rationality of the individual that supposes that rational individu-als act to maximize their self-interest lies at the root of the choice between individual versus Collective Action. If the long-held belief that what is best for the individual is also best for the collective was true, individuals pursuing self-interest would not cause any problems in society. Economist Adam Smith argued that in a free, perfectly competitive market, rational decisions made by individuals intended for their own gain would produce the best outcome for the society as whole, as if an invisible hand were guiding them. Since then, this claim has been widely criticized due to the impossibility of fulfilling the assump-tions of the perfectly competitive free market, thus resulting in the failure of the market. Among the notable market failures are the problems resulting from the lack of Collective Action: production of public/collective “goods,” and “bads,” termed externalities .

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  Understanding Policy Change

  How to Apply Political Economy Concepts in Practice

  • Cristina Corduneanu-Huci, Alexander Hamilton, Issel Masses Ferrer(Authors)
  • 2013(Publication Date)
  • World Bank

    (Publisher)

  The immediate implication is that only powerful and cohesive interest groups are successful in achieving favorable policy. Identifying and Evaluating Collective Action Problems When identifying a Collective Action problem in the course of a political- economy analysis, the analyst should do five things: (1) understand the type 92 Understanding Policy Change of public good to be produced or maintained; (2) think analytically about the type of mismatch between individual and collective incentives to cooperate or join forces; (3) carefully examine the factors that led to the dilemma (motivational or informational) in the first place; (4) sift through the poten- tial political-economic roots of these factors (does the motivational problem occur because of rational calculations, community or cultural norms, or discrepancy in resource endowments among individuals or groups?); and (5) consider whether correcting the Collective Action problem might lead to another similar dilemma (for example, will punishing noncompliant mem- bers of the group require a few compliant members to pay the full costs of enforcing the rules, whereas the benefits of enforcement extend to all?). Often, adequate answers to these five questions have major implications for policy solutions. For example, if free riding occurs because of strictly ra- One of the seminal political-economy studies of agricultural policies in Africa found that the dif- ferent potential for Collective Action of various stakeholder groups best explained the rural and urban differences in development (Bates 1981). In East African urban centers, oligopolistic in- dustries and labor unions wanted high con- sumer prices for the manufactured goods they produced but low food prices, since 60 percent of the budget of an average urban dweller was spent on food.

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  Usable Theory

  Analytic Tools for Social and Political Research

  • Dietrich Rueschemeyer(Author)
  • 2009(Publication Date)
  • Princeton University Press

    (Publisher)

  The valua-tion of potential collective goods also constitutes a context that makes different selective incentives—from social persuasion and pressure to con-cealed or outright coercive means—more or less effective. T HE I NHERENT A MBIGUITY OF C OLLECTIVE A CTION Collective Action may not lead to the results expected and hoped for. Bringing about change, or protecting interests, against opposition is diffi-cult and may be less than successful. But a prior question is equally im-portant: what goals will be pursued once a degree of cooperation for col-lective action is secured? 4 Whatever the route by which Collective Action comes about, the goals are not self-evident. There are different interests that have to be consid-ered and combined; priorities have to be set and rankings established; and the ways of best realizing collective goals have to be determined. For example, a union may or may not make higher wages its top priority. Other goals may concern employment security, fringe benefits, social rela-tions at work, or different degrees of sharing authority in production. Political goals may also come into play. Moreover, there is the question of defining the collectivity to be represented: building electricians in a given construction site? all construction workers? all blue-collar workers in a country? white-collar workers too? or even the “Workers of the World”? In unions as well as all other collective representations of inter-ests, shaping the actual goals of Collective Action is inevitably a process of social construction, a process that may—and is likely to—become a matter of conflict and contention. 5 The determination of the goals actually pursued typically takes place in the process of mobilization and organization. A small number of activ-ists will therefore have a strong influence on the choices made. This influ-ence becomes consolidated as the core of the group becomes solidly orga-nized.

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  Reclaiming Individualism

  Perspectives on Public Policy

  • Spicker, Paul, Paul Spicker(Authors)
  • 2013(Publication Date)
  • Policy Press

    (Publisher)

  It can be solidaristic action, where members support each other. Or it can be concerted action taken by the group, such as having a party, attending a meeting or making a decision. In each case, the actions taken by individuals in the group are done, and understood, as actions by the group. When groups act collectively, they can be seen as a unit, just as individual human beings are. Groups have an identity; they are capable of Collective Action. A family can go on holiday; a school can revise its policies; a firm can expand its business. For the purposes of analysis, the social unit, rather than the people in it, becomes the individual decision maker. When a family celebrates, a firm makes a contract, a parliament passes a law, it is not just a matter of individuals doing things together. If a group benefits from Collective Action, it seems plausible to suggest that the individuals in it will benefit, too. There is a danger, however, that too strong a focus on the interests of the group may undermine the interests of the individual within the group. The position of women, the protection of children and the management of industrial relations all depend on the recognition of conflicting interests within groups. An individualist perspective seems to imply that cooperation with a group and participation in Collective Action must be at best conditional; and that in circumstances where the interests of the group and the interests of the individual diverge, the individual should act independently. Collective Action and the individual From the perspective of methodological individualism, there are three main circumstances in which individuals might join in Collective Action. First, there are circumstances where self-interested individuals 149 Part Five: Individuals and Collective Action may determine independently to follow a shared course of action – effectively, the position of the economic market.

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  The Long Process of Development

  Building Markets and States in Pre-industrial England, Spain and their Colonies

  • Jerry F. Hough, Robin Grier(Authors)
  • 2014(Publication Date)
  • Cambridge University Press

    (Publisher)

  He concluded, however, that it is almost never rational for individuals to participate in mass Collective Action – joining interest groups, voting, marching in demonstrations, defending constitutions from usurpers – at least, if the individual’s purpose is simply to achieve a collec- tive goal, even one that he or she strongly desires. Olson began his Collective Action analysis of politics by emphasizing a dif- ference between the economic and political spheres that all economists would recognize – the difference between a private good and a public good. In the economic sphere, people receive a concrete benefit (for example, a product, wages, the prospect of profit) in exchange for a concrete expenditure of time and/or money. They receive the benefit only if they pay the cost. A public good is defined as one whose benefits (or harm) are received by everyone regardless of whether he or she participates in providing it. A national park or museum without an admittance charge is a public good. 54 For a sophisticated discussion of changing the rules of the game, see Kenneth Shepsle, “The Rules of the Game: What Rules? What Games,” in Sebastian Galiani and Itai Sened, eds., Institutions, Property Rights, and Economic Growth: The Legacy of Douglass North (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), especially pp. 69–73. 55 Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965). Collective Action Difficulties 59 So are national defense, election results, and revolutions. All citizens benefit (or suffer) whatever the level of their political participation in trying to create it or block it. Olson emphasized that rational individuals should not decide whether to participate in political action simply because they wanted some outcome.

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  Rational Choice

  • Andrew Hindmoor, Brad Taylor(Authors)
  • 2017(Publication Date)
  • Red Globe Press

    (Publisher)

  Because some groups are more likely to over-come that problem than others, it cannot be assumed that larger and more powerful interest groups necessarily represent people who feel more intensely about some issue. Olson’s The Logic of Collective Action Collective Action is necessary whenever a group of people can or must work together in order to achieve some goal. Olson (1965: 1), who was a professor at the University of Maryland from 1968 until his death in 1998, opens The Logic of Collective Action by observing that ‘it is often taken for granted … that individuals with common interests usually attempt to further those common interests’. Yet, as he shows, this is not always the case. In the case of collective goods, the benefits of which are non-excludable (see Box 6.1), Collective Action is compromised, sometimes fatally, by the existence of a Collective Action problem. Faced with the choice of whether or not to contribute to the provision of a collective good, each individual may well reason that their contribution will make little, if any, difference to the overall Mancur Olson and the Logic of Collective Action 141 Box 6.1 Excludability, rivalry of consumption and types of economic goods Economists often classify goods in terms of (1) their ‘excludability’, and (2) their ‘rivalness’ (Mankiw, 2014: 216–17). A good is excludable if its owner can prevent its consumption benefiting anyone else. To use a standard example, the beam of light emitted by a lighthouse is non- excludable because any passing ship can potentially benefit from it. A good is rivalrous when its consumption by one person reduces the amount available to others. A television signal is non-rivalrous because the quality of the signal one person receives is unaffected by the number of other people receiving it. This two-way classification generates four possible types of goods, as shown below.

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  Globalization: A Threat to International Cooperation and Peace?

  • M. Panic, Mica Pani?(Authors)
  • 2011(Publication Date)
  • Palgrave Macmillan

    (Publisher)

  Part II Nature of the Collective Action and Social Wellbeing 59 2 Organization of Economic Activity at Different Levels of Development * 2.1 Division of labour and the need for Collective Action As economic processes become more and more specialized and divided, people become increasingly separated both geographically and socially – notably in their understanding of each other’s problems, needs, aspira- tions and priorities. It is, therefore, in the very nature of the continuous specialization and segmentation of production and distribution proc- esses that they increase the problem of communication and, thus, the risk of failure. The ability to achieve a particular economic objective depends increasingly on the compatibility and timing of a vast number of seemingly unrelated actions carried out by a large number of people. Yet most of these people have normally no idea that they are working towards the same goal for the very simple reason that they are not even aware of each other’s existence! To complicate matters further, in the absence of coercion no objective can be achieved unless it is, first of all, accepted by those whose participation is essential for its realization. For all these reasons, the division of labour is bound to create a good deal of uncertainty, and under these conditions ‘the actual execution of activity becomes in a real sense a secondary part of life; the primary prob- lem or function is deciding what to do and how to do it’ (Knight 1921, p. 268). In other words, in an uncertain world it becomes essential to find ways of: (a) securing agreement about the type of action required to deal with unanticipated events; and (b) ensuring that those involved in the activities which form part of an integrated chain in the wealth-creating * This chapter was published originally under a different heading and without sub-headings in M.

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  Theories of Political Protest and Social Movements

  A Multidisciplinary Introduction, Critique, and Synthesis

  • Karl-Dieter Opp(Author)
  • 2009(Publication Date)
  • Routledge

    (Publisher)

  free riders .

  Jointness of supply and rivalness of consumption. “Jointness” of supply means that if the good is available to one member of a group, it is available to all members. Nonetheless, the utility of the good for one person may depend on the number of other persons in a group. In this case, there is rivalness of consumption . For example, in a public park the degree to which a person enjoys the park will normally depend on the number of individuals who are in the park. There is thus rivalness of consumption.

  Group specificity. It is important to note that a public good is always group specific. External security is a public good only for a given state. Cleanliness of an apartment is a public good only for the tenants who share the apartment.

  Collective Action. Any contribution to the provision of a public good is, by definition, “Collective Action.” The term “collective” suggests that the action must be carried out by several (i.e. at least two) actors. However, Olson also discusses the special case where only one individual produces the collective good for a group. In the apartment, e.g. only one person may clean it. But this is an extreme case. In general, “collective” refers to contributions of several actors.4

  “Collective Action” is what the theory tries to explain. The question thus is: When do individuals act jointly to contribute to and, thus, provide the public good? Put differently, it is explained when individuals with a common goal act to realize their goal. A group is defined as a collectivity of individuals with a common goal or, equivalently, with a common interest.

  It is important to note that the theory addresses the behavior of individual actors, i.e. their contribution to the provision of the public good. These contributions then add up to the provision of the public good or to a certain quantity of the public good. For example, the fewer individuals refrain from polluting, the more of the public good “clean environment” is produced. There is thus a relationship from the micro level (individual contribution) to the macro level

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  Inequality, Cooperation, and Environmental Sustainability

  • Jean-Marie Baland, Pranab Bardhan, Samuel Bowles, Jean-Marie Baland, Pranab Bardhan, Samuel Bowles(Authors)
  • 2018(Publication Date)
  • Princeton University Press

    (Publisher)

  Measure- ment problems can also arise because the type of Collective Action con- sidered is not the same. Indeed, Collective Action can be reflected in the willingness of group members to voluntarily contribute to the construc- tion of a collective infrastructure, such as a drain in a watershed or a wa- ter control structure in an irrigation scheme (see, e.g., Gaspart et al. 1998), or to the conservation of a resource implying self-restraint behav- ior. Or, alternatively, it can take on the form of people's participation in the setting up of a regulatory agency endowed w i t h powers to collect C O L L E C T I V E A C T I O N O N T H E C O M M O N S 11 fees, impose contributions on members, lay d o w n rules, and punish deviant behavior (see, e.g., McKean 1986 or Edmonds 2000). In the lat- ter case, moreover, Collective Action is sometimes measured by various management actions (existence of management rules, of sanctioning and monitoring activities, incidence of rule-breaking, etc.), sometimes by their impact on efficiency in the use of the managed resource (as measured, for instance, by the rate of deforestation, the progression of sand dunes, the size and maturity of the fish caught), and sometimes by both. A n important source of interpretative ambiguity arises when authors infer that inequality is conducive to Collective Action because they find that richer users bear a larger share of the costs involved. As we shall ar- gue below, while an increase in inequality may well enhance the incen- tives of the rich users to contribute more to Collective Action, such in- crease may simultaneously reduce the incentives of the poor.

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  Social Work and Social Policy under Austerity

  • Bill Jordan, Mark Drakeford(Authors)
  • 2012(Publication Date)
  • Bloomsbury Academic

    (Publisher)

  In an ideological shift sustained by the right-wing press and think tanks, they often succeeded in associat-ing individual freedom with free markets, and much Collective Action with restrictions on such liberty. This view was supported by social scientific theory of Collective Action which argued that individuals would only participate if they were given ‘selective (material) incentives’ as members of exclusive groups, who gained economic and political advantage at the expense of other citizens with no opportunities to join such actions; and that the loyalty and soli-darity of these organisations was maintained by threats of sanctions against defectors (Olson, 1965). In a later text, Olson argued that nations rose to prosperity and power while such interest groups were held in check, and stagnated or declined when they gained a hold over society’s structures (Olson, 1982). This theory was part of a systematic shift in the social sciences, in which free market economic thought replaced both Keynesian economics and sociocultural theory as the basis for all mainstream analysis. This changed approach demanded that all collective phenomena be analysed in terms of the calculative decisions of individuals, in strategic pursuit of their interests. It implied that groups would tend to be homogeneous, in terms of their incomes, ages and tastes, and that for this reason it could be expected that communities would fragment into districts with residents of similar economic profiles, confining the poorest to those neighbour-hoods with the least favourable facilities. The public choice school of thought (Buchanan, 1968, 1976; Buchanan and Tullock, 1962; Starrett, 1988) argued that it was only when individuals were enabled to express their choices over collective goods by ‘voting with their feet’ in these ways that efficiency in public services could be achieved, and unaccepta-ble coercion avoided.

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  Democratic Policymaking

  An Analytic Approach

  • Charles Barrilleaux, Christopher Reenock, Mark Souva(Authors)
  • 2016(Publication Date)
  • Cambridge University Press

    (Publisher)

  This may lead some to wonder, why can individuals not simply come together to solve our social dilemmas collectively? Are individuals uninterested in solving these dilemmas? Or are they simply not equipped to do so? This creates two 2.2 individual action 63 interesting puzzles to answer. First, in the case of social problems, are the individuals who are seemingly unable or unwilling to cooperate with each other to resolve these social ills simply stupid or somehow unequipped intellectually to resolve these prob-lems? On more than one occasion you have probably heard a friend or family member opine that “ if only politicians weren ’ t so corrupt/stupid/self-interested they could solve our society ’ s problems. ” But is this really what is at the core of some of our most nagging social ills? Are the most inept among us truly the most motivated to run for of fi ce? Perhaps. But there may be a more interesting explanation. Second, when collective effort is observed to work, under what conditions does it thrive? How is it that individuals come together to produce some social good? Is this only possible in the presence of deeply held familial bonds? Do individuals require a third party to essentially force them to do what is otherwise not in their immediate interest? 2.3 Cooperation and Collective Action We will see that both of the puzzles outlined above are best understood as cooperative and Collective Action dilemmas. As we note above, we base our understanding of the success or failure of social cooperation (and Collective Action) dilemmas on the assumption that individuals are interested in pursuing their own self-interest. How-ever, under certain speci fi c conditions, the pursuit of self-interest can indeed generate positive outcome for other individuals as well and can contribute to the solution of social problems.

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