Law
Rule in Rylands v Fletcher
The Rule in Rylands v Fletcher is a legal principle that holds a person liable for any damage caused by the escape of something from their land that they have brought onto the land or kept there, if it is something likely to do mischief if it escapes. This strict liability rule applies even if the person has taken all reasonable care to prevent the escape.
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11 Key excerpts on "Rule in Rylands v Fletcher"
- eBook - ePub
- Chris Turner(Author)
- 2013(Publication Date)
- Taylor & Francis(Publisher)
6 Strict liability6.1.1 The definition, purpose, and character of the rule6.1 The rule in Rylands v Fletcher1 First defined by Blackburn J in Court of Exchequer Chamber in the case: ‘the person who, for purposes of his own, brings on his land, and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it in at his peril, and, if he does not do so, he is prima facie answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape.’2 Lord Cairns in HL added requirement of non-natural use of land.3 The tort is said to be one of strict liability, but it is possible to argue it as a type of nuisance used to cover isolated escapes.There are many defences available, so it is strict liability only in the sense that the claimant need not prove fault.If the use of land is natural an action will fail.It was previously distinguished from nuisance which required foreseeability, where Rylands v Fletcher did not.Now Cambridge Water Co v Eastern Counties Leather plc (1994) suggests that foreseeability is required. This is confirmed in Transco plc v Stockport Metropolitan Borough Council - eBook - ePub
Questions of Liability
Essays on the Law of Tort
- Donal Nolan(Author)
- 2023(Publication Date)
- Hart Publishing(Publisher)
68[432] In practical terms, the significance of Rylands v Fletcher was twofold:69 first, Blackburn J took a liability rule previously applied to specifics, such as cattle and filth, and extended it to mischievous things generally;70 and, secondly, the liability in question was imposed not only for the acts of oneself and one’s servants but for the acts of anyone not classified as a stranger. (This explains why the defendants in Rylands were liable for the acts of their independent contractors a full ten years before such liability was imposed in nuisance.71 ) The broader significance of the case lay in the fact that it represented a victory for judicial opponents of the fault principle, but this is precisely why the rule so rapidly came to appear anomalous. Within a short time, the fault principle was ascendant, and only a few years later the facts of the case might well have been dealt with solely from the standpoint of negligence.B.There Are Well-Established Distinctions Between the Rule in Rylands v Fletcher and Private NuisanceThere are a number of well-established distinctions between the rule in Rylands v Fletcher and private nuisance. Perhaps the two most obvious of these derive from the fact that while private nuisance is a tort against land the Rylands rule overcame its origins in the real property context and developed into a cause of action of more general application. As was made clear in Hunter v Canary Wharf Ltd,72 if a wrong is characterised as one against land, then it follows that claims cannot be brought for personal injury, and that only those with an interest in the land affected have standing. Historically, neither restriction applied to actions brought under the rule. Before the Cambridge Water case, the only clear-cut judicial support for the analysis of Rylands v Fletcher as a tort limited to the protection of real property interests was to be found in Read v Lyons,73 a case concerning a munitions inspector injured when an explosion took place in the factory where she was working. The House of Lords held that the inspector was not entitled to recover damages from the factory’s owners under the strict liability rule because there had been no escape of a dangerous thing from their premises, but Lord Macmillan added that the case also fell outside the ambit of the rule because Rylands v Fletcher [433] concerned ‘the mutual duties of adjoining or neighbouring landowners’, and had ‘nothing to do with personal injuries’,74 recovery for which required proof of negligence.75 Lord Uthwatt likewise said that the principle applied only to interference with land,76 and, while Lords Porter and Simonds left open the question of recovery for personal injury, the latter inclined towards Lord Macmillan’s position.77 - eBook - PDF
- Rachael Mulheron(Author)
- 2020(Publication Date)
- Cambridge University Press(Publisher)
Blackburn J’s statement was approved by the House of Lords. The bracketed text was added by Lord Cairns (at 339), and later accepted as correctly part of the rule: (1868) LR 3 HL 330. 916 The Rule in Rylands v Fletcher 2 [2009] EWCA Civ 64, [27] (Longmore LJ) (emphasis added). Before considering the issues outlined in the framework, it is useful to consider briefly the history of the rule and the reasons for its emergence, and its coalescence with other causes of action. PUTTING THE RULE INTO CONTEXT A Strict Liability Tort – but in a Limited Sense Only §17.2 Liability under Rylands v Fletcher can arise, even if D has committed no negligence, and has exercised the greatest of care to prevent the thing from escaping. However, the rule does not give rise to automatic liability for all damage caused by ultra-hazardous activities or opera-tions on D’s land. C does not need to prove any culpability or wrongdoing on the part of D to prove the tort. In that sense, it is a strict liability tort. As the Court of Appeal stated in Bedfordshire Police Authy v Constable , 2 ‘[t]orts of strict liabil-ity are based on the concept of responsibility … the land owner in Rylands v Fletcher … is to be strictly answerable because of the responsibility inherent in [his] position’ (i.e., he deliberately accumulated something that was likely to do mischief if it escaped). In Rylands v Fletcher , Mr Rylands, D, a mill-owner in Lancashire, employed a contractor to build a reservoir to supply water to the mill. The contractor failed to take care to block up five disused shafts under the site of the reservoir, which led to old coal mines below the land. On adjoining land was an operating colliery, owned and operated by Mr Fletcher, C. Unknown to D and the contractor, those shafts and tunnels connected the disused coal mines under the reservoir to C’s colliery. It was neg-ligent of the contractor not to ascertain the position of the shafts. - Anne Galbraith, Michael Stockdale, Steve Wilson, Simon Spurgeon, Mick Woodley, Alan Davenport, Carrie de Silva, Jennifer Charlson, Carrie de Silva, Jennifer Charlson(Authors)
- 2020(Publication Date)
- Routledge(Publisher)
This tort is known by the name of the case which gave rise to its particular form. An occupier who engages in potentially hazardous activities on his or her property will be liable where those activities cause injury or damage on neighbouring property. The same set of facts may also, but not necessarily, give rise to an action in negligence. The importance of the Rylands v Fletcher rule was that it pre-dated the general development of negligence principles. Nowadays, it is often suggested that the rule is of diminished significance, and certainly its technical requirements mean that it is difficult to prove. In addition, many of the hazardous activities it may have covered in earlier times are now governed by statutory frameworks (e.g. the Reservoirs Act 1975, as amended; the Animals Act 1971 and the Nuclear Installations Act 1965, as amended). The rule is usually stated as follows: Where a person, for his or her own purposes, brings on to his or her land, and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, he or she must keep it at their peril, and if not doing so, is liable for all the damage which is a natural consequence of the escape. The use of the word ‘escape’ is naturally suggestive of animals, which could come within the rule. But liability in respect of animals may also exist under the Animals Act 1971 and the torts of negligence and nuisance. The rule involves a number of points: The dangerous ‘thing’ must be brought by the defendant on to his or her land. It follows that no liability can arise from an escape of something which is naturally on the land, e.g. weeds or rocks. The ‘thing’ must be likely to cause harm if it ‘escapes’. The rule has been applied to a wide range of substances and items from oil, gas and explosives to flagpoles and fairground equipment. There is no requirement that the ‘thing’ must be intrinsically dangerous. There must be an escape, i.e- eBook - ePub
- Sanmeet Kaur Dua, Chris Turner(Authors)
- 2019(Publication Date)
- Routledge(Publisher)
It has its roots in nuisance and in reality most claimants are likely to plead nuisance as an alternative to Rylands v Fletcher. For many years it has been argued that Rylands v Fletcher is a tort of strict liability. It is questionable whether this has been an accurate view since the early part of the twentieth century. From that time, as will be seen, the judges have gradually changed the rules so that it has long been a favourite question of examiners – ‘To what extent can the tort of Rylands v Fletcher be truly described as a tort of strict liability?’ The issue will be returned to later in this chapter. 10.2 Definition The definition most commonly used is found in the judgment of Mr Justice Blackburn in Rylands v Fletcher as modified in the House of Lords judgment in the same case by Lord Cairns LC [1868] LR 3 HL 330: JUDGMENT ‘A person who for his own purpose brings onto his land and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it in at his peril, and if he does not do so, is … answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape.’ It was later added in the House of Lords in the case by Lord Cairns that the use of the land must amount to a non-natural use. So even at the very start the scope of the tort was being limited. On the face of it, there is no requirement of fault on the part of the person who accumulates the thing, nor need the escape or the likelihood of damage be foreseeable. It is these facts which for many years led lawyers to argue that the tort imposed strict liability. As we shall see, the judges have refined these basic principles over the years - Roger ter Haar, Anna Laney, Marshall Levine(Authors)
- 2016(Publication Date)
- Informa Law from Routledge(Publisher)
125 the House of Lords held that the rule is still firmly embedded in the common law.3.91 That said, there will be relatively few cases in which the rule will be applied – firstly there must be a “non-natural user of land”. In a modern and technologically complex world, few activities are now regarded as “non-natural users”.126 Secondly, there must be an “escape”, despite attempts in one case to persuade the House of Lords to expand the ambit of the principle.127 Thirdly, the right to recover may be precluded on grounds of remoteness: see Cambridge Water Co v Eastern Counties Leather plc 128 and Transco plc v Stockport Metropolitan Borough Council .129 Nor can a claim for personal injuries be brought.130Liability
Who is liable under the rule?
3.92 Potential defendants include not only those persons who keep or accumulate dangerous things on land but also the owners or controllers of such things. The occupier of land may also be liable if dangerous things are brought or collected on land for his purposes, with his permission.Who may claim?
3.93 This may be the adjacent owner into whose land materials escape.Possible defences
3.94 Act of God, act or default of the claimant, the independent act of a third party, and acting under statutory authority are all potential defences to a claim brought under the rule in Rylands v Fletcher .131- Anthony Gray(Author)
- 2021(Publication Date)
- Hart Publishing(Publisher)
98Further dissatisfaction with the Rylands doctrine appeared in the judgment of Megaw LJ in Leakey v National Trust for Places of Historic Interest or Natural Beauty.99 The Law Commission investigated, and rejected, a suggestion that English law should adopt a general principle of strict liability for the consequences of activities considered to be ‘dangerous’ or ‘ultra-hazardous’. It described the existing state of the law in this area in unflattering terms.100Then came the important House of Lords decision in Cambridge Water Co v Eastern Counties Leather Co.101 In that case a chemical used by the defendant in the course of treating leather seeped into the ground beneath. It was not known at the time that this chemical was dangerous to the environment. Further, unknown to anyone, it seeped into an aquifer beneath the defendant’s premises. Eventually, it infected the water from which the plaintiff drew water through a bore almost two kilometres away. The plaintiff brought legal action against the defendant, making, among other claims, a claim based on Rylands v Fletcher. The claim succeeded in the Court of Appeal but was rejected by all members of the House of Lords.102 Most importantly, in doing so the House reformulated the rule in Rylands v Fletcher as a sub-species of the tort of nuisance.103 As such, it found that it was necessary for a plaintiff to succeed on this basis to demonstrate that the injury they suffered was of a kind that was reasonably foreseeable.104 This would also have the effect of harmonising common law principle in this area. The court noted that this sentiment was apparent in the judgment of Blackburn J in that case.105 Because in the view of the House the plaintiff’s loss here was not of a kind that was reasonably foreseeable by someone in the position of the defendant, the plaintiff’s claim on this basis failed. Lord Goff attempted to justify his assimilation of Rylands v Fletcher into the tort of private nuisance by arguing that the concepts of ‘non-natural’ user, in the context of Rylands, and the concept of ‘reasonable user’, in the context of private nuisance, shared a ‘similarity of function’.106- eBook - PDF
Architect's Legal Handbook
The Law for Architects
- Anthony Speaight, Gregory Stone(Authors)
- 2014(Publication Date)
- Butterworth-Heinemann(Publisher)
The most obvious defence would be if the plaintiff had consented to your keeping the escaping materials on your land. Such consent can be express or implied by conduct, and its existence or not will depend entirely on the circumstances of each individual case. Secondly, there is the defence of common benefit. This is arguably the same as consent, but is usually treated separately. In a block of flats there is often one central tank to contain hot water. It is for the benefit of every person occupying the flats, and if it leaks it would be a defence to the application of Rylands v Fletcher to plead common benefit. 3.05 If the escape is caused by the acts of two particular people then the rule will not apply. The first is God. An act of God is a complete defence and Rylands v Fletcher will not apply. The second is an independent and unforeseeable stranger. The onus, of course, is on the defendant to establish the intervention of the stranger and also that he (the defendant) was in no way negligent in his protection of the goods or his anticipation of the acts of the stranger. 3.06 There are also statutory exceptions to the rule in order to excuse bodies such as the water board from strict liability under the rule in the event of leak from any of their reservoirs. 4 Breach of statutory duty 4.01 Where a statute imposes a duty on a certain person or group of persons there is obviously a liability on those persons for breach of that duty up to whatever penalty is prescribed by statute. There is also a liability in tort to those persons injured by the breach provided that certain requirements are met. The rules as to liability are strict and the statutes are construed tightly; there are at least four aspects which must be considered. The duty must be owed to the plaintiff 4.02 Various statutes limit the classes of person to whom the duty is owed because the statute is enacted for the purpose of protecting and benefiting those people only. - eBook - PDF
- Arthur Ripstein(Author)
- 2016(Publication Date)
- Harvard University Press(Publisher)
So understood, Rylands is no more about “strict liability” or “pay-as-you-go” than any other nuisance case is. It is simply about the entitlement of landowners to have their lands secure against the effects of other people’s use of their land. Landowners have the liberty to use their land in ways that will affect their neighbors, but only up to a point. If they ex-ceed their rightful use of their means, they are answerable for the damage that ensues. The scope of the defendant’s liberty is measured by the in-creased likelihood of damage to others, not by the ease or diffi culty of moderating that danger; the extent of the liability is measured by the damage done. The court’s rejection of the defendant’s claims that the res-ervoir could not be made any safer echoes other nuisance judgments of the same era. 37 The early exemplars of strict liability were wild animals and water, which have been, since Roman law, paradigmatic examples of things that could be possessed only if properly captured. 38 In Read v. J. Lyons, 39 Viscount Simon emphasized the analytical significance of the tendency to escape. These historical examples do not show that this is always the best way of thinking about animals or water, and on at least some occa-sions broad classifications may seem silly. 40 But anything that cannot be Donal Nolan argues that both of these cases read more like negligence cases; see Nolan, “The Distinctiveness of Rylands v Fletcher, ” Law Quarterly Review 121 (2005): 421–451. 36. Shelfer v. City of London Electrical Lighting Co., [1895] 1 Ch. 287 (CA). 37. Including the example of the Liverpool alkali works on which Blackburn J. expressly relies. 38. Percolating waters are described as farae naturae. See Chasemore v. Richards, 7 HL Cas. 349; Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175, 2 Am. Dec. 264 (NY 1805). Percolating water is described in similar terms by Henshaw J. - Michael Stockdale, Rebecca Mitchell, Stephen Wilson, Simon Spurgeon, Russell Hewitson, Mick Woodley(Authors)
- 2010(Publication Date)
- Routledge(Publisher)
Rylands v Fletcher should involve establishing that the use of the land was extraordinary and unusual rather than non-natural. Lord Bingham also said that the same use of land might amount to being extraordinary and unusual in some circumstances but not others. In the same case, Lord Hoffman thought that a useful guide to determine whether there has been a ‘non-natural’ use of land is to consider whether the damage caused was ‘something against which the occupier could reasonably be expected to have insured himself’.Although liability is said to be strict, i.e. not dependent on whether the defendant took reasonable care, a number of defences may be available to the defendant. These include:1 Fault of the claimant – if the damage is caused by the claimant’s own wrongful act, he or she cannot recover.2 Consent by the claimant – presumably tenants on different floors of a building impliedly consent to the presence of a water supply running through the building. If flooding occurs on an upper floor causing damage to a lower floor there will be no liability.3 Statutory authority – a defendant may be able to point to an Act of Parliament which excuses his or her behaviour which would otherwise be tortious.Finally, it must be remembered that the same set of facts could give rise to liability in both nuisance and Rylands v. Fletcher .Negligence
Negligence as a tort is not confined to protecting an interest in land or concerning liability arising out of the use of land, but can compensate for harm caused in a wide range of circumstances.Negligence as a tort consists of the breach of a duty owed to the claimant to take reasonable care, which results in damage of the right type which is not too remote. Many more people are injured by careless acts than by acts which are intentional. As the law of tort developed, a number of specific situations in which liability would be imposed on a person for negligent behaviour were recognized by the law (e.g. where an employer fails to take reasonable care to ensure the safety of employees, or where an occupier fails to take reasonable care to ensure the safety of visitors), but there was no general principle established which could be applied to any and every set of circumstances.- eBook - ePub
- Timon Hughes-Davies, Nathan Tamblyn(Authors)
- 2019(Publication Date)
- Routledge(Publisher)
Chapter 12Interference with Land
This chapter discusses trespass to land, private nuisance and the tort in Rylands v Fletcher.If a defendant takes a shortcut by walking across their neighbour’s garden, they may be liable in trespass. If a defendant hosts loud parties late into the night every Sunday, they may be liable to their neighbour in nuisance. If a defendant stores barrels of dangerous chemicals in their garage, and the chemicals leak onto their neighbour’s property, they might be liable under the tort in Rylands v Fletcher. Thus, in this chapter, we consider three torts which respond to interference with another’s land. The chapter proceeds as follows. First, we shall consider trespass to land. Second, we will discuss private nuisance. Third, we will explore the tort in Rylands v Fletcher.____________As you read
- Identify the core or characteristic situation addressed by each tort in this chapter.
- Be aware that a given set of facts might lead to overlapping torts.
- Consider which of several overlapping torts might be the most suitable to govern the particular facts.
- Consider how the law might be improved or developed.
12.1 Trespass to land
Key learning point
Trespass to land is an act which directly interferes, unlawfully, with land in another’s possession.In this section, we shall consider each of these topics in turn: what constitutes possession; what it means for interference to be direct; whether interference must be intentional; how interference must be unlawful; how trespass still applies, not just on the surface of land, but also in the air above land, and underground; finally, what defences and remedies might be available.Possession
It is the person in possession of the land who can sue in trespass. In J A Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham,1
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