Party List Proportional Representation

10 Key excerpts on "Party List Proportional Representation"

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  Comparative Hong Kong Politics

  A Guidebook for Students and Researchers

  • Mathew Y. H. Wong(Author)
  • 2017(Publication Date)
  • Palgrave Macmillan

    (Publisher)

  They would not be deprived of representation or be forced to merge with other groups in order to compete. Recognizing the dangers of the proliferation of extrem- ist views and also the existence of ‘too many’ parties, some proportional systems also implement an ‘electoral threshold’—usually at 5%—under which parties will not get any representation. A party with 4.5% of the votes will not qualify to get any seat in the legislature. This provides a bal- ance between the representativeness of public opinions and the dangers of fragmentation and extremism. As a result, the PR system is credited with the strength of representing public opinions on a more equal basis. For this characteristic, scholars have recommended the adoption of PR elections in divided societies to ensure power sharing and the easing of conflicts (e.g., Norris 2008). The effect of representativeness can also be transmitted through voter participation. PR systems are suggested to have a higher turnout than plurality systems, estimated to be around 9–12% (Blais and Carty 1990; Lijphart 1997). This is likely due to the fact that voters are less likely to feel that their votes are ‘wasted’. Unlike in a plurality system, where it is virtually impossible for any one vote to be decisive, PR systems create the impression that every vote counts toward the final tally of a party, hence their share of seats. In addition, voter turnout might benefit from more available choices in a proportional election (usually with a multi-party sys- tem). As voter participation is an important part of political representa- tion, and because voter participation is found to be biased across social groups (e.g., the poor vote disproportionally less; Lijphart 1997), this further enhances the representativeness of PR systems. The trade-off between representativeness (PR) and accountability (plu- rality) is often referred to as the key difference between the two systems (e.g., Lijphart 1984; Powell 2000).

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  Preferential Voting Systems

  Influence on Intra-Party Competition and Voting Behaviour

  • Gianluca Passarelli(Author)
  • 2019(Publication Date)
  • Palgrave Macmillan

    (Publisher)

  The party intervenes by contributing to the choice of candidate as well as by conveying partisan preferences to voters; nevertheless, the main role in political campaigns is played by the candidates themselves, even though differences arise between countries. In proportional systems, voters vote for a party, and the allocation of seats among candidates is decided in accordance with the rank order of the list. However, there are also PR systems with open lists, in which voters can indicate a preference for a candidate (Marsh 1985 ; Katz 1986). Indeed, the choice and use of PLPR electoral systems have been made and justified in many cases with reference to voters’ power. As Farrell puts it in his analysis of closed PR systems, “individual voters have absolutely no say over who represents them” (2001 : 83). In these cases, the list of candidates is drawn up by the party leadership, and voters can only select one list, that of their “preferred” party. 24 Consequently, the voters have no say in the rank order decided by the party organization and leadership. The only possible action for voters, therefore, is to try to affect the list rank (before the elections) to influence the process of candidate selection (Hazan and Rahat 2010). Electoral systems also have effects on parties: they “can be chosen not only for the inter-party allocations of seats which are the result but also for their consequences on intra-party competition between individual candidates” (Colomer 2004 : 49–50)

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  Political Equality

  An Essay in Democratic Theory

  • Charles R. Beitz(Author)
  • 2020(Publication Date)
  • Princeton University Press

    (Publisher)

  (A minimum share, or threshold, is sometimes imposed, below which a party is denied representation altogether.) The main idea is to transfer the functions of selecting candidates, composing platforms, and forming coalitions from the voters themselves (as under STV) to party organizations. Because voters vote for parties rather than for candidates, it cannot be said that each member has a distinct constituency or that each voter is represented by a member of her own choice. More importantly, per-haps, the party list system reduces the capacity of individual voters 8 Indeed, as a historical matter, it would not be misleading to describe early advo-cates of PR as having been motivated in large part by the desire to reduce, or even to eliminate, the political influence of elite-dominated mass parties. See, for example, Simon Sterne, On Representative Government and Personal Representation (Phila-delphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1871), pp. 58-59; Hoag and Hallett, Proportional Represen-tation, pp. 98-102; and M. Ostrogorski, Democracy and the Organization of Politi-cal Parties, trans. F. Clarke (New York: Macmillan, 1902), vol. 1, pp. 104-13; vol. 2, pp. 536-37, 701-9. Ostrogorski frankly hoped that under PR electors will no longer be forced to choose between the two candidatures, both equally odious and that parties would be reduced to simple political groups within the nation (vol. 2, p. 536). Although experience with STV systems is extremely limited, it does not appear that this hope has been borne out. Vernon Bogdanor, Introduction, in Democracy and Elections: Electoral Systems and Their Political Consequences, ed. Vernon Bog-danor and David Butler (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 10. 128 POLITICAL EQUALITY to employ the ballot to register their views regarding the relative significance of the issues before the legislature; instead, they must choose among the limited range of positions set forth in party pro-grams.

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  New Zealand Adopts Proportional Representation

  Accident? Design? Evolution?

  • Keith Jackson, Alan McRobie(Authors)
  • 2019(Publication Date)
  • Taylor & Francis

    (Publisher)

  3

  Labour Party Policy and Proportional Representation

  All reformism is characterised by Utopian strategy and tactical opportunism. — Graffito written during French student revolt, 1968.

  The Radical Third Party Phase

  Since its invention in the nineteenth century, proportional representation (PR) has come to be the favoured form of electoral system for non-homogeneous societies, particularly those with important social and economic cleavages. In those societies which have continued to maintain the simple plurality or First-past-the-post system (FPP), PR has tended to be favoured by third and minor parties, those parties which are, in effect, discriminated against by FPP. Why this should be so may readily be seen by the fact that under FPP it normally requires between 25–30 per cent of the vote before a third party begins to acquire seats in rough proportion to the votes cast. A party such as the New Zealand Party could win 12.3 per cent of the vote at the 1984 general election and yet fail to win a single seat. With PR, on the other hand, thresholds of 4–5 per cent are often introduced in order to keep smaller parties out.

  In its early years the New Zealand Labour Party was a third party and like most third parties was a strong advocate of the principle of proportional representation. As early as 1905, even before the Labour Party formally came into existence, the Trades Councils were advocating the abolition of the upper house, and the introduction of proportional representation (Brown, 1962: 9–10). For socialist parties, any form of organisation which might be seen as limiting the expression of the people’s will was seen as a form of vested interest, hence upper houses tended to be associated with the preservation of privilege, a hangover from aristocratic government, while PR, with the opportunities provided for upwardly mobile third parties, was viewed as a logical method of providing an alternative, more democratic, form of representation.

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  Voters' Victory

  New Zealand's First Election under Proportional Representation

  • Jack Vowles(Author)
  • 2013(Publication Date)
  • Auckland University Press

    (Publisher)

  As both parties converge toward the median voter, each party begins to resemble its rival. Under a proportional electoral system, where multiple parties have the opportunity to gain representation without appealing to a plurality of voters, the strategy of political parties is likely to differ. Under these rules, parties have less of an incentive to widen their appeal to the largest group of voters, allowing them to maintain ideological purity. 5 Thus, in a multi-party system, rather than converging toward the median voter, parties will strive to distinguish themselves on ideological and policy matters (Downs 1957, 126–7). 6 This strategy will have the effect of appealing to the full spectrum of interests in the electorate rather than simply the median voter. A transition to PR should result in a more diverse offering of parties competing for representation. Because one party is not likely to gain a majority of seats, coalition governments will be necessary under a proportional system. Representation of diffuse interests in decision-making is encouraged through bargaining among elected members, who represent different parties and thus different interests. The coalition is likely to adopt a wider spread of policies to get the support of a majority of voters in spite of the fact that each party stands for a narrower spread of policies (Downs 1957, 156). Additionally, PR systems appear to be better suited to manage conflicts that arise from economic, cultural, religious and ethnic divisions in society. European experience demonstrates that the emergence of new parties may also cause major parties to change positions on issues in order to pre-empt the appeal of new parties (Lijphart, Rogowski & Weaver 1993, 329)

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  Citizenship and Democracy

  A Case for Proportional Representation

  • Nick Leonen(Author)
  • 1997(Publication Date)
  • Dundurn Press

    (Publisher)

  CHAPTER SIXTOWARDS DEMOCRATIC SELF-RULE

  Ultimately any form of democratic government must stand or fall not so much by its perfect subservience to majorities as by its just treatment of minorities — a far more difficult condition to fulfil. That minorities must not rule is only the first canon of good government; the second is that they must not be ignored.1

  PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION

  P roportional representation (PR) is not, as is often thought, a single, particular voting system. PR is the unifying principle among a family of voting systems. The principle is that representation in Parliament and the legislatures of groups of like-minded voters is in proportion to that group’s voting strength. For example, if a party obtains 40 percent of the popular vote, that party obtains 40 percent of the seats. Under proportional represention, votes are translated into seats such that seat-share will equal vote-share. (To see how far our present voting system deviates from the principle of PR, consult Appendix B , Tables 2-5 ). The principle or ideal cannot be attained perfectly, but there are many ways to approximate it. There are many PR systems, and therefore any serious discussion must specify which system is talked about. After noting features common to most PR systems, this chapter discusses one particular type of PR, the single transferable vote (STV).

  In North America and Great Britain, PR is often considered a deviation from the norm - an eccentricity; but in fact, many of the world’s stable democracies use PR, and others, such as Germany, use a mixed-member system to compensate for the inequities the single member plurality (SMP) system produces.2 Among the most stable democratic regimes that use parliamentary systems, Great Britain and Canada may well be the exceptions in their use of SMP. New Zealand’s 1992 referendum to change its SMP voting system carried by 84 percent; and in the 1993 referendum 53.8 percent favoured the mixed-member proportional (MMP) system, which is similar to what (West) Germany has used since 1949. It should be noted that in the US congressional system, because of its two-party system and separation of powers, SMP does not have the negative impact on fair results and the relation of the executive to the legislative that is the subject of this study. The first applications of PR took place in Denmark (1856), Belgium (1899), Switzerland (1901), and during the early decades of this century many other countries adopted PR.3 Furthermore, very few have abandoned it once it was adopted.4

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  Patterns of Democracy

  • Arend Lijphart(Author)
  • 2012(Publication Date)
  • Yale University Press

    (Publisher)

  There are minor variations in list formulas, but they all basically entail that the parties nominate lists of candidates in multimember districts, that the voters cast their ballots for one first majority-runoff election in 1994, Finland also used a presidential electoral college. Both countries abolished their electoral colleges in the 1990s, and the United States is now the only country still using an elec-toral college for electing its presidents. ELECTORAL SYSTEMS 135 party or another (although they are sometimes allowed to split their votes among several lists), and that the seats are allocated to the party lists in proportion to the number of votes they have col-lected. List PR systems may be subdivided further according to the mathematical formula used to translate votes into seats. The most frequently applied method is the d’Hondt formula, which has a slight bias in favor of large parties and against small parties compared with several other methods. 4 The second form of PR is the “mixed member proportional” (MMP) formula—a term coined in New Zealand for its version of the system but now generally applied to the entire category. About half of the legislators in Germany and New Zealand are elected by plurality in single-member districts and the others are elected by list PR. Each voter has two votes, one for a district candidate and one for a party list. The reason why this combination of meth-ods qualifies as a PR system is that the list PR seats compensate for any disproportionality produced by the district seat results. The exact degree of the overall results depends on how many list PR seats are available for the purpose of compensation; the Ital-ian results have been considerably less proportional than those in the other two countries. Alan Siaroff (2009, 180) rightly calls the German and New Zealand MMP systems “fully compensatory” but Italian MMP only “semi-compensatory.” 4. For a more detailed description, see Lijphart 1994, 153–59.

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  Government Failure

  A Primer in Public Choice

  • Gordon Tullock, Gordon L. Brady, Arthur Seldon(Authors)
  • 2002(Publication Date)
  • Cato Institute

    (Publisher)

  Much research has been done about the likelihood that the paradox will occur with any given voting system, but it has not provided reliable results. The opinion of this author, having read most of the research and contributed some of it, is that paradoxes are probably very common, but they most likely cover only a restricted portion of the available alternatives. Out of 10 alternatives, only 3 would be likely to win, but the choice among those 3 would be either random or determined by the order of voting. But this is just my opinion; no one who is familiar with the literature can feel really confident about a right answer.

  Proportional Representation

  Furthermore, the preceding argument assumes we are using only one method of voting. A very large number of different voting systems are in use around the world. The two most common methods of voting are proportional representation on the Continent and single-member constituencies in Britain and some other English-speaking countries (Australia and Ireland are the exceptions). There is an important difference between the English-speaking system of single-member constituencies and systems based on proportional representation that aim at permitting substantially every sizable group in a society to have direct representatives in the legislature.

  For simplicity, let us consider the method of proportional representation used in the Netherlands and in Israel in which the whole legislature is selected from one big national area. The parties nominate a considerable number of candidates. Individual voters simply tick the party they favor. The seats are then divided among the parties according to the number of people who have selected particular parties. Thus, even with a tiny part of the population behind him or her, a candidate can nevertheless sit in the legislature because that portion of the population that backs the party is more than the minimum number required to put a single person in the legislature. In the United States the representation of very small groups is unlikely to happen.2

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  Party Politics in Japan

  Political Chaos and Stalemate in the 21st Century

  • Ronald J. Hrebenar, Akira Nakamura(Authors)
  • 2014(Publication Date)
  • Taylor & Francis

    (Publisher)

  A further appeal of a mixed electoral system is that it gives politicians great flexibility in adjusting the proportionality of the system. Politicians can choose a linked system (Germany and New Zealand) which extends the principle of proportionality to all seats, including single-district seats—a system that ensures that small parties to win their fair share of all the seats in the legislature. They can also choose an unlinked system (e.g., Japan, Russia, and South Korea) that uses proportionality in only the party list seats, giving an advantage to larger parties because they can win most of the single-member districts and also win a large number of the party list seats. Furthermore, in an unlinked system, the average proportionality of the system can be modified by changing the ratio of single-member districts to party list seats; more single-member districts make the entire system less proportional, and fewer single-member districts make the system more proportional. Given these options, it is not surprising that the majority of countries switching to mixed electoral systems have chosen unlinked systems, a choice that gives some representation to smaller parties but also retains an advantage for the larger parties, the parties that are typically writing the election reform legislation. In fact, after the grand compromise that made election reform possible in Japan in 1994, the ruling parties later reduced the number of proportional seats from 200 to 180, a change that slightly increased the advantage that larger parties enjoy under the system. Similarly, most proposals for additional changes to Japan’s electoral system have also included a further reduction in the number of proportional seats, a change that would further increase the advantages of Japan’s two major political parties. The one exception is the 2013 reapportionment law which reduced the number of district seats by five (to 295) without altering the number of proportional seats.

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  Democracy and the Politics of Electoral System Choice

  Engineering Electoral Dominance

  • Amel Ahmed(Author)
  • 2012(Publication Date)
  • Cambridge University Press

    (Publisher)

  In the 26 states in existence in the pre-democratic period, 10 used at-large systems of multi-member plurality and 16 used mixed-member systems combin- ing mostly single-member districts with some multi-member districts. Under limited suffrage, few questioned these mixed systems. However, with the advent of suffrage expansion, they increasingly came under attack. These systems were thought to pose great dangers because of their hyper-majoritarian tendencies, particularly in the multi-member dis- tricts. Because all members within these districts were generally elected as a single slate, a party with even a slight plurality of the votes could sweep the 66 Single member plurality (SMP) vs. proportional representation (PR) entire district taking all contested seats. What further exacerbated the danger was that in most countries it was urban districts with large work- ing-class electorates in which these multi-member districts were usually found. Once workers had reached their full potential as an electoral majority, it was feared that workers’ parties would easily sweep these districts. In anticipation of this, right parties set out to find alternative electoral configurations that would allow for “minority representation” and help them to compete more effectively with rising workers’ parties. SMP and PR as electoral safeguards Minority representation would become the pet cause of elite reformers throughout the nineteenth century. Reform societies were set up in almost every democratizing country, establishing a transnational net- work of expertise and advocacy. Coalitions of politicians, academics, and activists championed the cause of electoral reform, maintaining that electoral safeguards were needed to accompany suffrage expan- sion. To this end, a number of electoral innovations were introduced during this period. These included the limited vote, the cumulative vote, preferential voting, and the Hare system, among others.

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