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Kantian Ethics | Definition, Examples & Analysis

Kantian ethics is an ethical theory developed by German philosopher Immanuel Kant, who was a key Enlightenment thinker. In essence, Kant formed the ethical theory that an action’s moral worth is determined entirely by the motivation behind it. It has proven to be of lasting importance, with many contemporary philosophers, such as Christine Korsgaard, following and developing the Kantian school of moral thought.

Kantian ethics is outlined in a number of Kant’s works - but the most influential of these works is Groundwork on the Metaphysics of Morals. In Groundwork, Kant aims to establish the underpinnings of morality, to establish the indisputable existence of a universal moral code, and to explain the contents of this moral code. In particular, one of Kant’s key missions in Groundwork is to establish that moral principles can be determined a priori, from reason alone:

Kant: Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals

All moral concepts have their seat and origin completely a priori in reason, and indeed in the commonest human reason. (Kant in Gregor and Timmermann, 2012)

In The Groundwork, the most famous principles of Kantian Ethics are also outlined. These are:

In this study guide, we will examine how Kant’s ethical theory qualifies as a deontological ethical theory. We’ll then analyse the role of motivation and duty in Kant’s ethics,  and the importance of the categorical imperative, which helps us to discover the content of our duties. Finally, we will consider some key critiques of Kantian ethics.

Deontology: The Idea of Duty-Driven Ethics

Kantian ethics is typically understood as falling under the category of deontological ethics, because it is rule based. A central tenet of the theory is that the morally right action is determined by its conformity with duty, rather than whether it produces ‘good’ consequences. 

There are a set of laws which determine our duty, and an action’s moral worth is determined by whether or not we are acting out of duty. 

This is as opposed to teleological theories, such as utilitarianism, which propose that an action is right or wrong depending on its consequences, rather than adherence to any kind of rules or sense of duty. Teleological theories define morally right actions in terms of an idealised goal - specifically a notion of ‘the good’ (good consequences, or good action).

But for Kant, the consequences of an action are morally irrelevant: it is only an agent’s motivation which can determine whether or not an action is morally right.

To understand Kant’s understanding of duty, it’s important to also comprehend his notion of ‘Good Will’.

It is impossible to think of anything at all in the world, or indeed even beyond it, that could be taken to be good without limitation, except a good will.

For Kant, when somebody has a good will, then whatever action they take will consequently be the morally correct course of action. But what is a good will?

Kant

Such a will manifests itself only in doing one’s duty for its own sake … and since doing duty for its own sake deprives the will of any object of desire as a reason for action, nothing is left as a possible principle of morality “but the conformity of actions as such with universal law. (2014)

So, good will is demonstrated when a person is motivated by their duty. Acting out of duty means that the recognition and adherence to moral principles is sufficient motivation, rather than any inclinations or desires underpinning the motivation.

Kant’s famous illustration in Groundwork is of a merchant who always ensures that they do not shortchange their customers. They do so because they know that if they regularly give out the wrong change, it would be bad for business. They are motivated by their desire to stay in business; it just so happens that their action also conforms with a moral duty - but as the motivation is something other than a sense of duty, their action has no moral worth.

Conversely, a merchant who always gives the correct change, and does so purely because he recognises that he has a duty to do so, is demonstrating a good will. His actions therefore have moral worth.

Having established that duty is the only source of moral motivation - and that a will motivated by duty is a ‘good will’, Kant outlines the content of his ethical theory. 

We have to be motivated by duty to do the right thing - but what, then, are our duties? Their content is determined by what Kant takes to be the principle which underlies morality -  the categorical imperative,

Act only according to that maxim whereby you can, at the same time, will that it should become a universal law. (Kant in Gregor and Timmermann, 2012)

This first formulation of the categorical imperative is usually known as the ‘Formula of Universal Law’. To understand its meaning, it’s important to understand what Kant means by both ‘maxim’ and ‘imperative’.

A maxim is a kind of principle. In the context Kant is using the term, it refers to a principle which underpins action. For instance, “I will never lie” is a maxim, as it’s a principle which provides a guide for future actions. 

An imperative is a command, or order. When an imperative is hypothetical, whether or not it should be obeyed can be contingent on a number of factors. For instance, take the imperative: ‘You should study’. This is an imperative, but it is conditional - because whether or not it’s true that you should study depends on whether or not you wish to pass, whether you value education, etc.

By contrast, a categorical imperative is unconditional. It’s a command that we should always follow. 

But how does this relate to the content of Kant’s moral theory? How does it help us to determine our duties? The Universal Law formulation states that when we act, our actions must follow from maxims which are ‘universalizable’. It helps us to determine our duties, as it dictates the content that our maxims should have.

Kant held that there are four types of duty - perfect duties towards ourselves and others, and imperfect duties toward ourselves and others. In Groundwork, Kant writes that Perfect duties ‘[allow] of no exception to the advantage of inclination’ - so these are duties which must always be followed. Kant does not explicitly state this in Groundwork but the implication is that imperfect duties do occasionally allow for exceptions, and they do not have to be followed in every case.

The universal law formulation helps us to see whether an action is a perfect or imperfect duty.  When deciding which course of action to take, you should imagine that the maxim which guides your action is a universal law, which governs all rational agents. All such agents must act as you do. When attempting to universalise a maxim, and finding that it is inconceivable that it could be a universal law, the result is a perfect duty. 

Kant’s provides two examples of perfect duties in Groundwork: False promises & suicide. We detail each of these in turn below.

1.) False promises: We have a perfect duty to others not to make false promises. Kant gives the example of somebody acting under the following maxim:

When I believe myself to be in need of money I shall borrow money, and promise to repay it, even though I know that it will never happen. (Kant in Gregor and Timmermann, 2012)

This maxim cannot be universalised without a ‘contradiction in conception’. This is because  if everybody were to adhere to this maxim, the institution of promising simply would not exist, as it relies on the presupposition that people at least sometimes keep their promises. Thus it is an inconceivable world - as it references promising, yet promising cannot exist in this world,

It could never hold as a universal law of nature and harmonize with itself, but must necessarily contradict itself. For the universality of a law that everyone, once he believes himself to be in need, could promise whatever he fancies with the intention not to keep it, would make the promise and the end one may pursue with it itself impossible, as no one would believe he was being promised anything, but would laugh about any such utterance, as a vain pretense. (Kant in Gregor and Timmermann, 2012)

2.) Suicide: Kant’s second example of duty is the perfect duty to ourselves to refrain from suicide. Kant describes an individual who is unhappy and wants to end their life. He states in Groundwork that the maxim that they would be acting under would be: “from self-love I make it my principle to shorten my life if, when protracted any longer, it threatens more ill than it promises agreeableness.”

But this maxim, says Kant, cannot become a universal law of nature as it results in a contradiction in conception - as self-love by its nature impels improvement of life. If its aim was self-destruction, it would be contradictory. (A note that this is a slightly tricky and dated example, as the contradiction here hinges on the assumption that suicidality is always driven by self-love - which arguably is often not the case.)

We also have imperfect duties. Imperfect duties involve a contradiction in willing when attempting to universalise a maxim which opposes them. 

3.) Cultivation of Talent: Kant uses the example of the duty to cultivate our talents as an example of an imperfect duty to ourselves. In his illustration, a person doesn’t feel particularly inclined to develop their natural abilities and talents, as they’d prefer to amuse themselves in other ways, and feel comfortable as they are. This individual finds that it’s conceivable that a maxim of neglecting natural talents could be a universal law of nature, but that they can’t rationally will that it becomes a natural law. A rational being would always will that their capacities are developed, as they can serve them and help them in attaining their ends. 

However, as an imperfect duty, the agent is not morally obligated to always develop their talents at all times.

4.) Helping others: Kant provides the example of the duty to help others as an example of an imperfect duty to others. Again, it’s conceivable for there to be a universal law that we never help others. Nothing about this state of affairs is contradictory. But we cannot rationally will that it holds as a law. As rational beings, we have ends - and sometimes, in order to acquire these ends, we need assistance. So we cannot rationally will to potentially obstruct the attaining our ends by willing that nobody ever helps anybody.

The Categorical Imperative: Humanity as an end in itself

As the Groundwork develops, Kant outlines several additional formulations of the categorical imperative.

The second formulation of Kant’s categorical imperative is "The Formula of Humanity":

“So act that you use humanity, in your own person as well as in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means.” (Kant in Gregor and Timmermann, 2012, p. 87)

This formulation tells us that when we act, we must ensure that we are never solely using others as a means to our own end. 

Kant means something quite specific by humanity here. As Christine Korsgaard explains in Creating the Kingdom of Ethics:

Kant interchanges the terms "humanity" and "rational nature". ... Kant takes the characteristic feature of humanity, our rational nature, to be the capacity for setting an end. Ends are "set" by practical reason; human beings are distinguished by the fact that practical reason rather than instinct is the determinant of our actions. ... A rational being, as possessor of a will, acts on maxims of his or her own choosing; but every maxim contains an end. (1996)

So it’s not human beings per se that Kant believes we need to treat as ends in themselves - it’s their humanity, which he equates with their rational nature.

Kant illustrates this formulation with the example of somebody making a promise they have no intention to keep. If I ask someone to lend me their lawnmower, and promise I’ll return it within a week - knowing full well I have no intention to ever give it back - then I am failing to treat that person as an end in themself. Their own ability to pursue their own ends is being obstructed by my dishonesty, as I am not giving them all of the information they need to make an informed choice about their course of action. They further my ends, but I fail to respect their right to make decisions about their own ends.

The Categorical Imperative: Formula of Autonomy

The third of Kant’s formulations of the categorical imperative is the Formula of Autonomy:

From [the first and second formulation] now follows the third practical principle of the will, as the supreme condition of its harmony with universal practical reason, the idea of the will of every rational being as a universally legislating will. (Kant in Gregor and Timmermann, 2012)

This formulation is linked to Kant’s ideas about freedom. Autonomy, for Kant, is “the characteristic of the will by which it is a law to itself (independently of any characteristic of the objects of willing)” (p. 51).

In other words, an autonomous or free will acts only in accordance with laws it has set for itself. This is opposed to a will which is motivated by whims and desires, which are benchmarks of what Kant labels a ‘heteronomous’ will (p. 91). 

If we’re going to treat humanity as an end in itself, that means acting in such a way that our actions could be consistent with a universal legislature, that would ensure that all people were free to pursue their own ends.

The Categorical Imperative: The Kingdom of Ends Formula

Kant’s final formulation of The Categorical Imperative is The Kingdom of Ends Formula, “act according to the maxims of a member universally legislating for a merely possible kingdom of ends” (Kant in Gregor and Timmermann, 2012).

 In his Kant Dictionary Lucas Thorpe summarises this formulation as follows,

The Kant Dictionary

What Kant means by this is that when we formulate and revise our maxims of action we must think of ourselves, and all other human beings, as constituting a single community potentially governed by laws that all could will, and we should ask when formulating our maxims whether they could serve as laws for such a community. Kant identifies the idea of being a member of a realm of ends with the idea of autonomy, for to be autonomous is to be the lawgiver for such a community. (2014)

So the maxims which should guide our actions should be maxims which could be universally accepted by a community of perfectly rational humans. When we act, we should act from maxims which could conceivably legislate within a realm in which all individuals are able to pursue both the ends relating to their desires and inclinations, and the ends which are demanded by their duties.

In order to fully understand Kantian ethics, it’s useful to consider how Kantian principles might be applied to particular situations. A note that these illustrations are based solely on Kant’s own writings. More contemporary Kantian ethicists have further refined Kant’s theory, resulting in slightly different interpretations of applied Kantianism.

The ‘ticking time bomb’ scenario, made famous by Henry Shue (Shue, 1978) is often used in discussions surrounding the moral permissibility or impermissibility of torture. 

In this scenario, a person has knowledge of an impending terrorist attack. The attack will kill many people. This person is being held by the police. If they provide the authorities with information about the attack, it can be prevented, saving lives - but the only way they will divulge the information is if they are tortured.

The question is - should they be tortured?

Typically, for an adherent of consequentialism, the answer is yes - as many lives lost is a quantifiably worse outcome than one individual being tortured. And outcomes are what determine whether an action is morally right or wrong.

But it’s generally understood that Kant would say the answer is no. We have a perfect duty to others which prohibits torture, as to torture somebody to prevent a negative outcome is a paradigmatic instance of treating somebody’s humanity as a means, rather than an end in itself. And as perfect duties are unconditional, to torture the terrorist would be morally wrong - even if it would save lives.

Another area of moral debate which can illustrate the application of Kantian Ethics is assisted suicide.

In ‘Kant and Applied Ethics’, Matthew C. Altman explains that Kant would not permit assisted suicide. Altman suggests that ‘the terminally ill patient who chooses to die tacitly commits himself to the idea that the value of his life depends on how much pain or pleasure he experiences.’ This links back to Kant’s discussion of our perfect duty to ourselves to refrain from suicide, in which he argues that self-love is typically the motive in suicide. Altman writes that, according to Kant,

Kant and Applied Ethics: The Uses and Limits of Kant's Practical Philosophy

In choosing to commit suicide, I am implicitly valuing the capacity to choose, but I also cut off my power to choose by ending my life: “[Suicide] transcends all limits on the use of free choice, for the latter is only possible insofar as the subject exists” (LE 370). From the Kantian deontological standpoint, suicide is morally wrong because the decision to commit suicide (and end my existence as a rational being) is self-contradictory and irrational. (2011)

So, for Kant, assisted suicide is not permissible. It violates a perfect duty to ourselves - as the maxim which would underpin assisted suicide cannot be universalised without a contradiction in conception.

A number of criticisms have been levelled at Kantian ethics. Below are three key critiques.

As Christine Korsgaard explains, Kant equates humanity with ‘rational nature’. His humanity formula demands that we respect each other’s humanity, by treating humanity as an end in itself. But what about cases of cognitive disability?

It seems that for Kant, such individuals are excluded from having moral status. They would lack the capability to legislate in an ideal Kingdom of Ends. So they can be excluded from consideration when we make decisions about the moral course of action.

But the suggestion that some people actually lack humanity because of their cognitive capabilities, and therefore don’t need to be treated with respect (as ‘ends in themselves’), is horrifying, and a serious problem in Kant’s reasoning.

Eva Kittay has written extensively on this matter in her book Cognitive Disability and Its Challenge to Moral Philosophy,

Cognitive Disability and Its Challenge to Moral Philosophy

If we really take [Kant’s] argument seriously it means that human beings who are not self-conscious—because perhaps they are so profoundly [cognitively disabled] that they lack self-consciousness or self-awareness— are also merely means to an end, that end being autonomous or self-conscious beings. (2010)

Kittay explains that we must deny the Kantian view that cognitive capabilities such as rationality are required for moral consideration - as the alternative is morally repugnant. 

Kantian ethics has been criticised for its rigidity, as it seems not to permit exceptions to its rules, even in exceptional circumstances. 

Kant’s own example is typically used to illustrate this critique. In his essay ‘On a Supposed Right to Lie from Benevolent Motives’, Kant describes a scenario in which lying could save a person’s life, but in which lying nevertheless remains the immoral course of action, as it violates a perfect duty to others. 

The scenario Kant describes involves a murderer knocking on your door, and asking after the whereabouts of a friend, who you know to be in your house at that very moment. Kant argues that even in this circumstance, when telling the truth will likely get your friend killed, it remains your moral duty to tell the truth.

This is, of course, an extremely counterintuitive conclusion. Common sense suggests that in extreme circumstances, morality demands that we flout our typical duties, rather than follow them rigidly.

Kant held that our actions have moral worth only if they stem from duty. So as a source of motivation, emotions lack moral worth. But some emotions arguably do have a moral dimension? For example, guilt or compassion might seem to have a moral component.

The ethics of care is a feminist branch of moral Philosophy which in particular can be considered as standing opposed to Kantianism when it comes to the role of emotion in morality. Nel Noddings argues that the ethics of care is a reversal of the Kantian approach, and writes, in her introduction to the book Caring,

Caring

For Kant, acts done out of love or inclination earn no moral credit. To behave morally, the Kantian moral agent must identify and act on the appropriate moral principle. Reason must displace emotion. In care ethics, however, we are not much interested in moral credit. We are, rather, interested in maintaining and enhancing caring relations—attending to those we encounter, listening to their expressed needs, and responding positively if possible. (2013)

In other words, then, actions motivated by care, and associated emotions, may well have a moral dimension which Kant neglects. And it’s easy to imagine examples in which we’d find there to be something morally lacking when an individual acts solely out of duty. For instance, if a friend comforts us, it would be disturbing to discover that they were doing so only out of duty, rather than compassion - and we might think there was something morally lacking in their action or character.

We’ve seen how Kantian Ethics is constructed: Kant argued that for actions to have moral worth, they must be a demonstration of good will - which requires that they are motivated solely by duty. And to understand what our duties are, we must ensure that we always obey the categorical imperative - which can show us whether our actions conform with duty.

As a moral theory, Kantian ethics has a number of advantages. As it is a deontological, or rule-based theory, knowing which action is morally right is relatively clear cut: Kant has provided us with a decision making procedure.

Additionally, Kant’s emphasis on respect for others is an attractive part of the theory, as it captures the common sense view that all humans have moral worth.

However, Kantian ethics does have a number of pitfalls - including those outlined above. It’s emphasis on rules and duty unfortunately can result in excess rigidity, and though it asks that we respect the humanity in others, arguably, its conception of humanity is narrow and exclusionary.

What is Kantian Ethics in simple terms?

Who are the key writers on Kantian Ethics?

 Altman, M. (2011) Kant and Applied Ethics. 1st edn. Wiley. Available at: https://www.perlego.com/book/1013665/kant-and-applied-ethics-the-uses-and-limits-of-kants-practical-philosophy-pdf (Accessed: 23 January 2023).

Gregor, M. and Timmermann, J. (2012) Kant: Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. 2nd edn. Cambridge University Press. Available at: https://www.perlego.com/book/3549190/kant-groundwork-of-the-metaphysics-of-morals-pdf.

Guyer, P. (2014) Kant. 2nd edn. Taylor and Francis. Available at: https://www.perlego.com/book/1615667/kant-pdf.

  Kant, I. (2017) Metaphysics of Morals The Philosophy of Law by Immanuel Kant - Delphi Classics (Illustrated). Delphi Classics (Parts Edition). Available at: https://www.perlego.com/book/1655069/metaphysics-of-morals-the-philosophy-of-law-by-immanuel-kant-delphi-classics-illustrated-pdf (Accessed: 23 January 2023).

Kittay, M. (2010) Cognitive Disability and Its Challenge to Moral Philosophy. 1st edn. Wiley. Available at: https://www.perlego.com/book/2755455/cognitive-disability-and-its-challenge-to-moral-philosophy-pdf.

Korsgaard, C. (1996) Creating the Kingdom of Ends. Cambridge University Press.

Korsgaard, C (2018) Fellow Creatures: Our obligations to other animals. Oxford University Press.

 Noddings, N. (2013) Caring. 2nd edn. University of California Press. Available at: https://www.perlego.com/book/550557/caring-pdf.

Schapiro, T. (2006) ‘Kantian Rigorism and Mitigating Circumstances’. “Ethics”. Vol. 117, No. 1. The University of Chicago Press.

Shue, H.  (1978) ‘Torture’. “Philosophy & Public Affairs” Vol 7, No 2.. Princeton University Press.

Thorpe, L. (2014) The Kant Dictionary. 1st edn. Bloomsbury Publishing. Available at: https://www.perlego.com/book/805997/the-kant-dictionary-pdf.

What is Kantian Ethics?

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What is Empiricism?

What is Moral Anti-Realism? | Definition, Examples & Analysis

Moral anti-realism: an initial definition

Moral anti-realism is a metaethical theory which denies, one way or another, that objective moral properties (such as “good” and “bad”) exist. This is in contrast to moral realism: for a moral realist, when we make a moral judgment, what we are saying can be true or false, and the judgment picks out some moral property which exists.

In order to explain moral anti-realism, this guide will outline some of the major moral anti-realist positions.

Moral non-cognitivism and moral cognitivism

Moral anti-realist theories typically fall into one of two camps: non-cognitivism and cognitivism. So before we consider the specific theories, let’s begin by thinking about what these terms mean.

One way of understanding moral non-cognitivism is as the theory that moral statements do not express beliefs. Beliefs are typically regarded as expressing propositions, which are statements that can be true or false like “dogs are mammals.” In other words, they’re “truth-apt.” An example of a sentence type which is not a proposition is a command like “follow that car!” For the non-cognitivist, moral judgements like “murder is wrong” are more like exclamations or commands than propositions. They don’t express beliefs — they express something “non-cognitive” like an emotion or attitude.

By contrast, moral cognitivism is the position that moral statements do express propositions. In Metaethics, Andrew Fisher defines it as the view that,

Metaethics

When we make a moral judgement we are expressing beliefs that describe the world. For example, when I judge that it is good to give money to charity, I am describing charity as having the property of being good. (2014)

The open question argument and naturalistic fallacy

One argument in metaethics which has contributed to moral anti-realist thought is G.E. Moore’s open question argument (Principia Ethica, 1903, [2016]). Moore himself was a realist: his argument was not against realism but against naturalist theories of morality such as that of J.S. Mill, which sought to define moral properties in terms of natural properties like happiness. 

Moore disputes such theories by pointing out that any definition of good — such as J.S. Mill’s identification of “good” with “happiness” — can generate questions like “is happiness good?” Given any property X, if “good” is defined as X it always remains an open question whether X is good. 

What Moore argues is that “good” is irreducible and indefinable. As Fisher explains,

If [Moore’s] claims are correct then “good” can only have one referent, and that referent cannot be anything but the property of goodness. For instance, good cannot be reduced to pleasure, well-being, happiness and so on. Good, in Moore’s terminology, is a simple quality. Therefore Moore draws two conclusions in Principia Ethica: that “good” the term is indefinable and that good the property is irreducible. (2014)

In Moore’s view, the mistake which most ethical theories make is to try to define goodness; to try to reduce it to some other property. In doing so, they commit “the naturalistic fallacy,” as Moore outlines in Principia Ethica:

Principia Ethica

Far too many philosophers have thought that when they named those other properties they were actually defining good; that these properties, in fact, were simply not ‘other,’ but absolutely and entirely the same with goodness. This view I propose to call the ‘naturalistic fallacy’ and of it I shall now endeavour to dispose. (1903, [2016])

Expressivism is a form of non-cognitivism. In The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics, Elisabeth Camp defines it as,

The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics

the view that certain kinds of language have the function of ­expressing states of mind rather than representing facts. […] More specifically, expressivism holds that words like ‘ought’ or ‘wrong’ conventionally function to express non-cognitive attitudes: attitudes other than straightforward belief, such as emotions or intentions. (Elisabeth Camp, 2017)

An early and particularly well-known expressivist theory is A.J. Ayer’s emotivism. 

A.J. Ayer was writing at a time when logical positivism was gaining influence in the field of analytic philosophy. The logical positivists endorsed “the verification principle.” In Language, Truth and Logic, Ayer defines this principle:

A statement is held to be literally meaningful if and only if it is either analytic or empirically verifiable. (1936, [2001])

By “analytic,” here, Ayer means “true by definition.” If something is analytically true, we can verify its truth simply by understanding the meaning of the words involved (as with “all bachelors are unmarried men”). By applying the verification principle to ethics, Ayer arrived at his theory of emotivism: Ayer argues that moral language is neither empirically verifiable, nor analytically true. Ayer agrees with Moore’s open question argument, and concludes that it can’t be the case that moral judgements describe some natural property.

But then, if moral judgements purport to describe something non-natural, then moral properties, if they existed, would exist outside the realm of the empirically verifiable. Given Ayer’s commitment to the verification principle, he therefore rejects cognitivism: moral statements can’t express propositions, because moral judgements don’t correspond to any empirically verifiable state of affairs that could make them true or false.

So what do moral statements mean, if anything? Ayer writes that,

The presence of an ethical symbol in a proposition adds nothing to its factual content. Thus if I say to someone, "You acted wrongly in stealing that money," I am not stating anything more than if I had simply said, "You stole that money." In adding that this action is wrong I am not making any further statement about it. I am simply evincing my moral disapproval of it. It is as if I had said, "You stole that money," in a peculiar tone of horror. (1936, [2001])

To illustrate: in Ayer’s view, if I state that “helping others is good,” then I’m not stating any sort of belief that could be true or false. Instead, I’m merely expressing approval towards a certain kind of behavior.

Emotivism has faced numerous criticisms. For a start, it doesn’t seem able to adequately capture moral disagreement: Ayer suggested that if we’re in agreement about all the non-moral facts, then, in a moral debate, there’s nothing left to disagree about. Secondly, the verification principle has fallen out of favor — with many philosophers arguing that, because it is itself neither empirically verifiable nor analytic, it is meaningless in its own terms! 

But let’s turn now to a more general problem for expressivism as a whole.

Expressivism faces a number of criticisms. But one of the most discussed and debated is the infamous Frege-Geach problem. It’s a notable problem to outline, as it’s one which more contemporary forms of expressivism strive to tackle from the outset.

Peter Geach, the philosopher behind the Frege-Geach problem, points out that “a proposition may occur in discourse now asserted, now unasserted, and yet be recognizably the same proposition” (“Assertion,” Logic Matters, 1964, [1972]).

An asserted context occurs when a statement is used as an assertion — as with the statement: “murder is wrong.” But statements can also be embedded into unasserted contexts like questions (“is murder wrong?”) and conditionals (“if murder is wrong, then asking your friend to murder is wrong”).

Now let’s think again about emotivism: according to emotivism, the meaning of a moral statement like “stealing is morally wrong” is non-cognitive, and is more similar to an emotional expression like “ugh!” or “boo!” — which is why emotivism is sometimes nicknamed “the boo-hurrah theory.” In an asserted context, then, the meaning of “stealing is wrong” is accounted for: it’s a statement which expresses a negative attitude toward the behavior in question (stealing).

But it’s when we get to moral language used in a non-asserted context that emotivism runs into the Frege-Geach problem. Take a conditional (non-asserted context) claim like “if stealing is wrong, then asking your friend to steal is wrong”: it’s not a statement, and thus it can’t be neatly said to express approval or disapproval. What, then, does the meaning consist in? 

Peter Geach took note of this phenomenon, and then argued that if non-cognitivism is true, it fails to account for the fact that moral language appears to have certain logical properties. Geach used the example of a conditional, and applied it to a logical rule of inference known as modus ponens. With a modus ponens argument, if the premises are true, then the conclusion must automatically be true too, regardless of the argument’s content. Geach’s example is:

If doing a thing is bad, getting your little brother to do it is bad. 

Ergo, getting your little brother to torment the cat is bad. (1964, [1972])

As Fisher points out, what’s important to note about modus ponens is that, 

If anything is valid, then [modus ponens] is. Moreover, logicians tell us that logic is topic-neutral, which means that this form of argument will remain valid whatever we care to substitute for A and B. (2014)

But Geach’s surprising conclusion is that modus ponens isn’t valid in the case of moral language, because the meaning of the terms being used changes between the premises. With the asserted context, the meaning consists in some sort of expression of approval or disapproval; in the unasserted context, it can’t consist in this meaning as nothing definite is plausibly being expressed. The meaning changes between the premises, which means that a fallacy of equivocation is always committed. This renders the argument invalid: the conclusion no longer follows from the premises.

More generally, the Frege-Geach problem attacks non-cognitivist semantics. As Mark Schroeder explains, non-cognitivist semantics seems unable to meet the “compositional constraint” on language which requires that the meaning of complex sentences can be composed of the meaning of simple sentences:

Noncognitivism in Ethics

[I]t is far from clear how to generalize Ayer’s story about the meaning of ‘stealing money is wrong’ to a story about the meaning of bigger, more complex, sentences of which it is a part. But that means that he hasn’t really told us what it means. An adequate account of the meaning of a word must satisfy the compositional constraint, by telling us how, given the meaning of that word and the meanings of other words, to determine the meanings of complex sentences of which they are parts. (2010)

In summary, then, the Frege-Geach problem points out that non-cognitivism can’t explain a key fact about moral language: the fact that it does have logical properties. As is evident from the fact that (for example) a modus ponens argument is valid even when moral language is used, it’s clear that moral language does have these logical properties. Since non-cognitivism doesn’t seem to be able to account for this feature of moral language, then (according to the Frege-Geach problem) it is not an adequate theory of moral language and it has to be rejected.

Though the Frege-Geach problem is damaging for non-cognitivism, it hasn’t signaled the end for this branch of moral anti-realism, which is still a thriving anti-realist position. Simon Blackburn is one contemporary expressivist. His theory is a form of expressivism known as “projectivism,” a philosophy which draws heavily on the work of David Hume. For Blackburn, when we make moral judgements, we’re expressing emotions which we actually project onto the world as if they were a feature of the world — something which Hume noted was a feature of many concepts in A Treatise of Human Nature:

A Treatise of Human Nature

‘Tis a common observation, that the mind has a great propensity to spread itself on external objects, and to conjoin with them any internal impressions, which they occasion, and which always make their appearance at the same time that these objects discover themselves to the senses. (1739, [2021])

Beyond the fact that Blackburn’s theory is an example of contemporary expressivist thought, his work is also notable because, in addition to endorsing expressivism, Blackburn is also a proponent of a research project known as quasi-realism. As Alexander Miller explains in Contemporary Metaethics, quasi-realism is

Contemporary Metaethics

The project of explaining how we can legitimately say things like ‘It’s true that murder is wrong’, ‘It’s false that breaking promises is the right thing to do’, ‘Jones believes that murder is wrong’ and so on […]. It is the project of explaining how we can legitimately talk as if we were entitled to the assumption that there is a distinctively moral reality, even though we are not [...]. (2014)

So Blackburn wants to explain how it is that moral discourse has such a strong and convincing appearance of realism while remaining a committed anti-realist.

In Spreading the Word (1984), Blackburn makes several arguments for adopting expressivism over moral realism. One of these is that projectivism is more economical in the properties it posits than realism, which must posit uniquely moral facts and an epistemic faculty for knowing these facts:

The projective theory intends to ask no more from the world than what we know is there – the ordinary features of things on the basis of which we make decisions about them, like or dislike them, fear them and avoid them, desire them and seek them out. It asks no more than this: a natural world, and patterns of reaction to it. (1984)

Typically, we have reason to prefer any theory which is more economical in its ontological commitments than the alternative.

Given that quasi-realism aims to explain the realist-seeming semantics of moral language, it’s clear that it needs to provide an answer to the Frege-Geach problem, as we’ll see below.

In Ruling Passions, Blackburn asks how unasserted, or “indirect” contexts (such as conditionals or questions) work in non-moral language, which concern facts. He then extends the function he identifies to moral language, which concerns attitudes rather than facts:

If we want to know in other terms what is going on when we so put forward [rather than assert] an attitude, we must look to the function of the indirect contexts in question. The key idea here is one of a functional structure of commitments that is isomorphic with, or mirrored by, the propositional structure we use to express them. Thus someone may be what I call ‘tied to a tree’: in a state in which he or she can only endorse some combination of attitude and belief. (1998)

So let’s take a non-moral case of an indirect context. Miller uses the following example of a non-moral modus ponens:

(A) Jones is in Southwark [an area of London].

(B) If Jones is in Southwark then Jones is in London.

This is a valid argument. And if someone were to endorse the premises but not the conclusion, then Blackburn points out that they’d be tying themselves to an inconsistent combination of “commitments.” In this case, for example, if we accept the premise that Jones is in Southwark we must also accept the conclusion that he is in London. Blackburn suggests that “logic is our way of codifying and keeping track of intelligible combinations of commitment’’ (Blackburn 1984), and that we can see moral language as involving commitments, too. 

How can Blackburn extend this to moral language? Miller explains that, first of all, we need a moral equivalent to belief: acceptance. Just as I cannot consistently be committed to a belief in premises A and B without also being committed to the conclusion C, I can’t claim to accept a series of moral claims which follow the same structure without being accused of inconsistency. And it’s this inconsistency which explains logical properties of moral language such as validity.

This allows us to account for indirect contexts like “if murder is wrong, then getting your friend to murder is wrong,” as ultimately, what we’re doing is entertaining a thought about what the commitments such a conditional would require. And in the case of a moral modus ponens, validity is respected: if we don’t accept the conclusion from the premises, it’s because we’re tying ourselves to inconsistent combinations of commitments. So by explaining how both moral and non-moral language functions in non-asserted contexts, Blackburn has provided an explanation of how the meaning of moral language can stay the same across all contexts. 

What this means, then, is that Blackburn believes he has resolved the Frege-Geach problem because he has explained how moral language can have logical properties even if expressivism is true. These logical properties are the product of the “commitment” function that can appear in both direct and indirect contexts: a function of both moral and non-moral language. 

The debate around the Frege-Geach problem doesn’t end there, and this is merely a brief sketch of Blackburn’s response. But what’s crucial to note is that Blackburn’s quasi-realist approach (and that of other contemporary expressivists) does not take the Frege-Geach problem to be an unsolvable problem for expressivists. So expressivism isn’t dead in the water, despite the lasting impact of the Frege-Geach problem.  

Error theory is a cognitivist anti-realist theory. For error theorists, moral statements can be either true or false. They express beliefs. It just so happens that they are systematically false. Error theory is neatly summarized by Jonas Olson in The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics as follows:

Error theory about some area of thought and discourse, D, is commonly defined as the view that D involves systematically false beliefs and that, as a consequence, all D-judgments, or some significant subset thereof, are false. (2017)

In his work Ethics, J.L. Mackie develops three arguments for error theory, which we’ll consider one by one.

Mackie’s first argument is his argument from relativity. The first premise of this argument points to a fact: that there’s a great deal of moral disagreement in the world; and that moral norms can vary from society to society (and within a society):

The argument from relativity has as its premise the well-known variation in moral codes from one society to another and from one period to another, and also the differences in moral beliefs between different groups and classes within a complex community. (Ethics, 1977)

Mackie argues that the best explanation for this phenomenon is not that certain societies have privileged access to some objective moral truth, which other societies have failed to grasp. Instead, he argues it’s more likely that certain practices happened to emerge in certain societies, and that certain moral views emerged as a result.

Mackie’s next argument is a two-part “argument from queerness.” The first part is a metaphysical claim: 

If there were objective values, then they would be entities or qualities or relations of a very strange sort, utterly different from anything else in the universe. (1977)

And the second part is an epistemic claim: 

Correspondingly, if we were aware of them, it would have to be by some special faculty of moral perception or intuition, utterly different from our ordinary ways of knowing everything else. (1977)

With the metaphysical claim, Mackie notes that moral properties, if they exist, would be entirely different from any other property that exists. Miller explains that what Mackie is identifying as strange about moral properties is that they’d be intrinsically action-guiding:

The obtaining of a moral state of affairs would be the obtaining of a situation ‘with a demand for such and such an action somehow built into it’; the states of affairs which we find in the world do not have such demands built into them, they are ‘normatively inert’, as it were. Thus, the world contains no moral states of affairs, situations which consist in the instantiation of a moral quality. (2014)

And similarly, the empirical claim seems to demand of reality something utterly unlike anything else that we know to exist, a unique faculty for intuiting these strange moral facts. 

Essentially, then, Mackie’s “argument from queerness” points out that moral realism is not economical: it requires the existence of entirely unique entities, and epistemic faculties, unlike any other in existence. If we can explain moral values without having to posit such entities and faculties, then we have a reason for preferring that explanation. And Mackie’s explanation is that while our moral language aims to describe features of the world, we fail in this aim: our statements are systematically false. 

We should note that error theory is a radical theory. Think of any abhorrent act that we’d typically condemn: error theory implies that when we say it’s morally wrong to commit that act, we’re saying something that’s untrue. 

However, error theory doesn’t stop at the claim that moral judgements are systematically false. For many philosophers who accept error theory, the next step is to ask: if all moral talk is incorrect, what are we to do with morality? The position error theorists adopt depends, essentially, on whether or not morality is taken or be useful or not. Abolitionists like Ian Hinckfuss suggest that we should abandon morality altogether because it is not useful: 

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