Promoting Democracy Abroad

Policy and Performance

Peter Burnell

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2017
• eBook ISBN: 9781351496322
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Political Ideologies
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Promoting democracy has grown from a small, little- known activity to a high-profile endeavor. It now involves academia, think tanks, and the popular media. The number of countries and organizations, inter-governmental, non-governmental, as well as governmental involved in supporting the spread of democracy is now legion. Countries touched by these efforts include a majority of all the world's states and some independent territories that are not yet fully sovereign. The definitional boundaries between promoting democracy and international advocacy and defense of human rights and "good governance" are not precise. Similarly, the concept of promoting democracy itself is not uniformly accepted. It has become a slogan that attracts both fervent support and grave condemnation. For Burnell, promoting democracy refers to a wide range of non-coercive attempts to spread democracy abroad for whatever reason. At its heart, it is political intervention in the domestic affairs of other countries that seeks to affect the distribution of power, whether by patient and non-violent involvement or more urgent action, democracy assistance projects form a core activity. Burnell holds that participation in the democracy assistance industry will continue to grow. However, the industry's progress up until now has in part been contingent on the progress of democratization itself. The slowdown that is currently happening in the advance of freedom and democracy around the world, and the strength shown by leading authoritarian or semi-authoritarian regimes, must raise questions about the outlook for democracy promotion. If democracy promotion and assistance are to be fit for the future, then the need for a broadly based, appropriately contextualized examination of the policy and the performance is greater now than at any time in the past.

1

Promoting Democracy Abroad: Introduction

In the course of the last twenty five years or so the international promotion of democracy has grown from a small and little known activity to a larger and more high profile endeavor. It now attracts comment from a wide range of international sources that embraces academia, research institutes, think tanks, and more popular media. The number of countries and organizations, inter-governmental and non-governmental as well as governmental involved in providing encouragement and support of one kind or another to the spread of democracy is now legion. The countries that have been touched by this in Europe, Asia, Africa, the Americas and the Pacific comprise a majority of all the world’s states, together with some independent territories that are not full sovereign states, Kososvo and the Palestinian Authority for example. According to at least one academic expert, who went on to become special assistant to United States President Obama for National Security Affairs, democracy promotion has attained the status of a world value, albeit not a universal value (McFaul 2004-5). While a different commentator, this time in Europe, ponders whether it is a new “white man’s burden” (Gerrits 2006), the case for “why we should and how we can” continue to advance democracy abroad has been restated in the United States recently (McFaul 2010).

The definitional boundaries between democracy promotion and the international advocacy and defense of human rights and support for ‘good governance’ are not clear and precise. Similarly, the terminology of democracy promotion itself is not uniformly agreed. Indeed it has become something of slogan that attracts both support and grave condemnation. For the purpose of this book, democracy promotion refers to a wide range of largely non-coercive attempts to spread democracy abroad for whatever reason. At heart it is a kind of political intervention in the domestic affairs of countries that seeks to affect the distribution of power there (Dauderstädt and Lerch 2005), mainly by patient and non-violent involvement, although some commentators, like Palmer (2003) for instance, have argued that in certain situations more forceful and urgent action might be needed.

The motives that ultimately account for the investments of time, resources, and energy in spreading democracy are mixed. In specific cases their precise identity is often the subject of debate. Promoting democracy for its own sake or out of some idealistic commitment could be the least of them. But overall the methods, instruments, or approaches used tend to range widely. At one end lies democracy assistance defined in terms of grant-aided support to consensually agreed projects and programs aimed at building democracy or the conditions for democracy. Then there are diplomatic efforts, attempts at persuasion, and the attachment of overt or implied democratic conditionalities, ex ante or ex post, to offers of trade and foreign investment or to membership of an organization like the European Union (see Vachudova 2005; Kelley 2006) or the Organization of American States (see Legler, Lean and Boniface 2007; Legler and Tieku 2010). The diffusion of democracy through socialization or, expressed differently, socialization into democracy’s habits, norms, and values, represent an alternative possibility for spreading democracy (for example see Acharya 2004; Schmitz 2004; International Organization 2005; Schimmelfennig, Engert and Knobel 2006)—as well as for spreading beliefs that are incompatible with democracy. Sometimes these processes occur spontaneously without having the express support of any government or inter-governmental organizations, although the role played by transnational civil society and social movements can be important.

Leading a certain kind of political regime in the direction of becoming more like a liberal democracy is usually the objective, and not simply a change of government, although in practice one might lead to or be accompanied by the other. In general terms, the use of foreign military force to bring down a government or political regime is not normally considered to be part of democracy promotion, although there are debates about the contribution that coercive imposition might make to democratic reform in the context of foreign military intervention inspired by different ends (see Merkel and Grimm 2008). It should not be confused with the majority of understandings of democracy assistance. Even so, there have been many examples of practical a ssistance given to the opponents of an authoritarian or semi-authoritarian regime that do not have the full blessing of the ruling authorities there and, in extreme cases, these can lead to armed resistance or insurrection by domestic social groups aimed at changing the regime.

The real world of democracy promotion then is not always as clear cut and as transparent as either bookish definitions or the public relations efforts of the democracy assistance organizations might have us believe. A formulation that attempts to avoid some of these issues by stressing the idea of genuine dialogue between the international actors and their partners inside countries and the importance of establishing domestic ownership of democracy as well as democracy-promoting initiatives, is the notion of support for democracy-building. The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA), for instance, clearly deems this to be preferable to the language of democracy promotion. However, even this term lacks coherence while presenting aspirations and ambitions that for the time being probably set the bar too high—a judgment that draws support from International IDEA’s own recent inquiry into what foreign partners of the European Union’s (EU) democracy-building think of the EU’s efforts (International IDEA 2009).

If what promoting democracy abroad means and how it is effected can be given some agreed overall content, even if that means skirting around some perhaps inevitable disagreements, then the shape of the democratic content seems to generate less debate among the policy and practitioner communities than in the surrounding academic literature. As has been noted, liberal democracy seems to be the end, notwithstanding some variety in terms of the choice of institutional architectures that the longer established democracies present to new or would-be democracies. Liberal democracy goes beyond the idea of merely electoral democracy, to include the rule of law (on rule of law assistance see Carothers 2006a; Magen and Morlino 2009) and respect for the rights of individuals and minorities.

Currently there is increasing critical interest in the conceptual politics of democracy promotion, which contrasts the idea and the models that are most conventional—and sometimes accused of being elitist—with competing visions of democracy (see Kurki and Hobson, forthcoming 2011). The alternatives include the concept of deliberative democracy and other strongly participatory ideas, as well as notions of economic and social democracy and theories that given special weight to female empowerment specifically. Robinson (1996) was an early radical critic of the limited kind of democracy and of the reasons for promoting it that he ascribed to the United States. But it is fair to say that in the time that has elapsed since the mid-1990s, it is the policy and performance of democracy promotion as described and discussion of the ultimate foreign policy goals and the conflicts among them that have tended to occupy most of the literature (in respect of the United States, see for example Cox, Ikenberry and Inoguchi 2000, and on Europe, see for example Youngs 2002; Youngs et al. 2006; Jünemann and Knodt 2007; Boonstra et al. 2008). This book on Promoting Democracy Abroad is no exception.

Finally, it is worth noting that although the democracy promotion efforts of the United States together with the European Union have tended to dominate the field, if only by virtue of accounting for the greater part of the worldwide total of $US5-10 billion dollars spent annually on democracy assistance, democracy assistance is a multinational industry spanning many of the well established democracies, Australia, for instance, and some of the newer democracies too. Moreover it is expressed though a large and varied assortment of publicly-funded, voluntary and market based channels or vehicles. Among these, the United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) practical support for democratic governance provides easily one of the largest single commitments. The other ways in which the United Nations system as a whole supports the spread of democracy should not be underestimated either (see Newman and Rich 2004; United Nations Secretary General 2009), even though the UN established a dedicated Democracy Fund of its own only quite late on (2005) and received fairly modest offers of funding and from a limited number of governments—currently around thirty six. Yet, the Community of Democracies, which focuses on the United Nations as a key forum and claims to express the support of over 100 countries for the consolidation and spread of democracy worldwide (Muñoz 2006), has yet to establish a strong reputation. A separate proposal to establish a League of Democracies (see Piccone 2008) that would harness more commitment now seems to have fallen by the wayside

In all probability the democracy assistance industry will continue to grow, at least in respect of the number of actors. The recent statement of commitment by the Council of the European Union (2009) and the pledge of Canada’s government to set up a dedicated Centre for Advancing Democracy (see chapter twelve of this book) are just two developments that support this claim. For this and other reasons to do with the bureaucratic inertia of established international democracy support institutions, plus the continuing relevance of the foreign policy reasons that underpin their existence and a perceived need to respond to democratization’s recent loss of global momentum, the promotion of democracy abroad is here to stay. For this reason it merits close and continuing examination. And as the Conclusion to this book argues, even if—and perhaps, precisely because—the global outlook for democracy does now look less certain than it did a decade or so ago, and because new international competition in the form of autocracy promotion could be emerging, the grounds for subjecting democracy promotion’s performance to close examination are greater than at any time in the past. This point applies even more strongly if we want to refine our understanding of what the future really holds.

Following on from the brief identification of key terms and introduction to the recent history of international democracy promotion contained in the previous section, this chapter turns to explaining the order of contents in the rest of the book. Although written over a number of years, the chapters form a logical sequence.

Chapter two, “The Domestic Political Impact of Foreign aid: Recalibrating the Research Agenda,” situates democracy support within a broader context of international intervention relevant to spreading democracy worldwide. It argues that a comprehensive survey of all the main political consequences of international intervention in the domestic affairs of countries, indirect as well as direct, is required in order to gain a true picture of whether, and how well, the international community supports democratic development in national states. A recent pioneering illustration of this recommended approach is Bermeo’s (2010) investigation of what US military and security assistance mean for weighing up the true commitment of the US government to supporting democracy’s progress around the world.

Chapter three, “Democracy Promotion: The Elusive Quest for Grand Strategies,” examines and compares some of the main means or policy initiatives whereby democracy promotion operates, most notably by referring to different economic, state-centered, and civil society approaches respectively. It argues that each one has limitations. Chapter four, “Political Strategies of External Support for Democratization,” then reviews the importance of strategic considerations when deciding policies towards promoting democracy abroad. In very broad terms the approaches of the United States (US) and European Union (EU) are set alongside one another. The emphasis on strategy in this chapter both harks to a relatively early observation by Carothers (1997), who noted a lack of strategy by the US government, and also points the way forward to a recent and more detailed comparison of US and European approaches (Magen, Risse and McFaul 2009). In the main, the latest comparison argues that while some differences exist they should not be exaggerated: there are notable similarities as well. Of course this leaves open the question of whether growing convergence contributes a weakness or strength.

Chapter five, “Autocratic Opening to Democracy: Why Legitimacy Matters,” argues that if democracy promotion is to hasten the downfall of autocracies in particular then it must not dismiss too lightly the claims they make to their own legitimacy. Instead, democracy promotion should distinguish between the different grounds on which legitimacy is claimed and then pinpoint the specific vulnerabilities to which each of these claims give rise, when devising strategy.

Chapter six, “Does International Democracy Promotion Work?” is the first in a group of chapters that provide an account of problems besetting democracy promotion. The problems—or a growing awareness and a fuller appreciation of their significance—started to emerge as democracy promotion gained more maturity (or, in Carothers 1999 terminology, began to ascend the “learning curve”). They gathered pace as the global context and conditions inside some non-d emocracies began turning less receptive and, in some places, increasingly hostile. Chapter six hones in on the problem of assessment (see also Crawford 2003; Burnell 2007). It explains why the aspirations to make an accurate assessment of the performance of democracy assistance projects and programs are difficult to achieve in practice. It notes some of the findings (see also Finkel, Pérez-Liñán and Seligson 2009). Chapter seven, “From Evaluating Democracy Assistance to Appraising Democracy Promotion,” then follows up with a much closer focus on what could be done better in this regard. It argues for a double shift in assessing the performance of democracy support, from ex post evaluation to ex ante appraisal, and from considering democracy assistance in isolation to appraising it alongside the full range of other approaches, tools, or instruments for promoting democracy abroad. Note, however, that the case as presented in this chapter, while very relevant to questions of strategy, does not engage with the argument made in chapter two—namely that democracy promotion should be compared with all the other ways in which the policies and conduct of rich world democracies impact on the full compass of politics in affected countries, by the provision of economic development aid for instance (on this, see for example Knack 2004; Wright 2009).

Chapter eight, “International Democracy Promotion: A Role for Public Goods Theory?” examines whether recent developments in theorizing about international public goods, which received a boost from a report of the International Task Force on Global Public Goods, “Meeting Global Challenges: International Cooperation in the National Interest” (2006), offers insights into the increasingly troubled state of democracy promotion. More particularly, it examines whether an extend...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• Acknowledgements
• Abbreviations and Currency Values
• 1. Promoting Democracy Abroad: Introduction
• 2. The Domestic Political Impact of Foreign Aid: Recalibrating the Research Agenda
• 3. Democracy Promotion: The Elusive Quest for Grand Strategies
• 4. Political Strategies of External Support for Democratization
• 5. Autocratic Opening to Democracy: Why Legitimacy Matters
• 6. Does International Democracy Promotion Work?
• 7. From Evaluating Democracy Assistance to Appraising Democracy Promotion
• 8. International Democracy Promotion: A Role for Public Goods Theory?
• 9. Legislative Strengthening Meets Party Support in International Assistance: A Closer Relationship?
• 10. Promoting Democracy Backwards?
• 11. Is There a New Autocracy Promotion?
• 12. Promoting Democracy and Promoting Autocracy: Towards a Comparative Evaluation
• 13. Conclusion: The Future of Democracy Promotion
• A Select and Recent Bibliography
• Index