Cosmopolitanism and the critique of antisemitism: two faces of universality
Robert D. Fine
ABSTRACT
The antisemitic imagination sometimes derides Jews as ârootless cosmopolitansâ, and sometimes as the particularistic enemy of cosmopolitanism. The seemingly contradictory character of these antisemitic representations is not new but needs unpacking. In this article the author argues that Enlightenment cosmopolitanism has shown two faces to Jews: an emancipatory face manifest in movements for legal recognition of Jews as equal citizens and for social recognition of Jews as equal human beings; and a repressive face that has been expressed in the form of the so-called âJewish questionâ. The former holds that Jews are human beings and treats this sense of common humanity as a practical imperative; the latter turns âthe Jewsâ into an imagined collectivity incapable of meeting the universal standards of humankind. The Jewish question is in nuce the question of what is to be done about the harm Jews inflict on humanity at large; it appears and reappears in the modern world in a variety of forms; and it is always at odds with the emancipatory face of cosmopolitanism. The author illustrates this conflict within cosmopolitanism at three key moments of Western European history: the eighteenth-century Enlightenment, nineteenth-century revolutionary thought, and the ânew cosmopolitanismâ of our own time. He addresses in a historical fashion some of the difficulties the ambivalence of cosmopolitanism poses for our understanding of antisemitism and conversely some of the difficulties the study of antisemitism poses for the further development of cosmopolitan ways of thinking.
Prejudices, like odorous bodies, have a double existence both solid and subtle â solid as the pyramids, subtle as the twentieth echo of an echo, or as the memory of hyacinths which once scented the darkness.
â George Eliot, Middlemarch (1874)
Two faces of universalism
Under the register of the ârootless cosmopolitan Jewâ, Jews have been conceived on one hand as lacking in roots in the nations that granted them âhospitalityâ, and on the other as acting as an international network loyal only to themselves. This pejorative reference to Jews, which was favoured by Stalinist regimes after 1945 and paved the way for the trials and tribulations Jews endured in Eastern Europe in the post-war and Cold War periods, had connotations of disloyalty, lack of patriotism, foreignness and worldwide conspiracy. It was first cousin to cognate terms like âenemy of the peopleâ or âenemy of the human speciesâ, which began their modern lives as markers of terror in the French Revolution, and signified what we might call a âbad universalismâ.1 It was contrasted with the âgood universalismâ associated with the idea of a universal nation, a nation whose particular interests corresponded with the interests of humanity as a whole, and more especially with Communist conceptions of âproletarian internationalismâ, which identified Russia as the âuniversal nationâ par excellence.2
Pejorative uses of the term âcosmopolitanismâ endure today within contemporary Sociology, including âMarxistâ Sociology, although with less fateful consequences. Radical critics of cosmopolitanism have lined up to demean it as the âclass consciousness of frequent travellersâ, as the ideology of corporate managers and intergovernmental bureaucrats, tax dodgers and jet-setting academics â anyone with expensive tastes and a globetrotting lifestyle.3 The once noble term âcosmopolitanâ, proudly and at vast personal expense embraced by Jewish writers like Stephan Zweig and Joseph Roth to confront the allure of nationalism and Fascism in the inter-war period, has been decried as the idealized expression of those who renounce the normal obligations of national citizenship, such as paying oneâs share of taxes and contributing to democratic social life. Before one can say Amazon or Starbucks, the cosmopolitan is turned into the âcosmocratâ who runs the City or the âcosmopratâ who floats ethereally above the world with a false sense of moral superiority. These sceptical currents contrast markedly with positive uses of the term âcosmopolitanâ among the classical figures of sociology, including Marx and Durkheim.4
Antisemitism is a versatile beast and Jews have been vilified not only for being ârootless cosmopolitansâ, but also for a failure to be cosmopolitan at all. Kant, one of the âfounding fathersâ of modern cosmopolitan philosophy, echoed a well-established prejudice when he wrote that in the case of the Jews âall estimation of other men, who are not Jews, is totally lost, and goodwill is reduced merely to love of their own tribeâ.5 Kant showed in this passage that it is possible to turn cosmopolitanism into a weapon against Jews, though Kant himself went on in later life to challenge the misuse of cosmopolitanism as a weapon against colonized peoples supposedly less civilized than the Europeans who conquered and occupied their countries. He began to destabilize the racial stereotypes perceptible in his own Anthropology by looking back to the monogenetic origins of the human species and forward to our future moral unity.6 The main point is not how far Kant was able to rid himself of the prejudice that the Jews were in some substantial sense locked in âlove of their own tribeâ and bereft of âall estimation of other menâ, but to acknowledge the possibility that even among the most cosmopolitan of thinkers, universal categories can, if adopted unreflectively, metamorphose into means of reproducing old racial and antisemitic typifications.
The Janus-faced capacity of cosmopolitanism both to pursue a policy of radical inclusion on the basis of common humanity and to pathologize one or other category of people as the enemy of humanity7 has manifested itself in its relation to Jews through a dialectic of emancipation and prejudice â in its emancipatory aspect treating Jews as fellow human beings and drawing practical conclusions from a sense of common humanity, while in its prejudicial aspect deeming Jews incapable of acting as universal human beings â at least as long as they remained Jews. The two faces of cosmopolitanism have not only represented a problem for Jews but for all categories of people to whom the labels ânot-yet humanâ, âinhumanâ or even âanti-humanâ are attached. Yet what is specific to the Jewish experience in Western Europe is the way in which the property of âparticularismâ has been projected onto them. A temptation that long preceded the constitution of antisemitism has been to treat conflicts between Jews and non-Jews not as ordinary human conflicts but as the symbolic expression of a metaphysical conflict between the Particular and the Universal â Judaism on the side of the particular and Christianity on the side of the universal. While Jewish emancipation movements have been oriented to the legal, political and social recognition of Jews, at least in the West, the Jewish question has typically been based on how to understand the harm âthe Jewsâ as a category inflicted on humanity as a whole, what to do about it and how to bring it to an end.
I shall seek to illustrate my argument by addressing the two faces of cosmopolitanism at three pivotal moments in Western history: the eighteenth-century Enlightenment, the revolutionary tradition of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and the ânew cosmopolitanismâ of our own day. I shall argue that at every stage there has been a struggle waged over the spirit of cosmopolitanism between forces of Jewish emancipation and of the âJewish questionâ that are not always easy to distinguish.
I should say as an aside that this task leads me to question some dominant modes of historical consciousness within my own field of Sociology. For example, some of the leading sociological advocates of the ânew cosmopolitanismâ, while acknowledging the dual character of cosmopolitanism, have placed it in a rigid time frame. Thus in Cosmopolitan Vision the sociologist Ulrich Beck wrote that universalism is two-faced, with ârespectâ on one side and âterrorâ on the other.8 Beck argued that Enlightenment universalism was based on the âelimination of pluralityâ and âsacrifice of particularityâ and that it universalized âWesternâ values in order to pathologized the values of others. He maintained that the âhumanist universalismâ of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment was deeply flawed in not recognising rights of particularity, but that at least it put human universality on the agenda. He then maintained that Enlightenment cosmopolitanism was succeeded by the rise of âmethodological nationalismâ in the nineteenth century in which there was no universal moment at all. This appeared to Beck as the age in which nationalism, imperialism and racism became supreme. In the current period, according to Beck, what has finally arisen is âpost-universalismâ that leans toward both a universal conception of humanity and toward the recognition of difference and rejection of all homogenising claims. Situating the cosmopolitan synthesis of the universal and the particular in the here and now has allowed Beck to label as âobsoleteâ both the humanist universalism of the Enlightenment because of its readiness to sacrifice rights of subjective freedom to the universal, and the methodological nationalism of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries that sacrificed any idea of the universal. This enabled Beck to present the new cosmopolitanism of our own age as âpost-universalâ in the sense that it is finally capable of reconciling our universal humanity and our particular differences.
The central problem with this approach to history that I want to consider here is that it rules out the possibility that recognition of difference and suspicion of homogenising claims were already present within the Enlightenment or the alternative possibility that the elimination of plurality and sacrifice of particularity remain temptations within the new cosmopolitanism. I would suggest that it is an illusion of progress to lock the past in the past as if it contained no alternative possibilities, and to idealize the present in the present as if we have definitively learned the lessons of history and now know exactly what is to be done. I would further suggest that we can problematize the limitations of this historical consciousness by reconfiguring cosmopolitanism not so much as a stage of history that renders obsolete the properties of a previous stage, but as a repeated struggle for emancipation that constantly has to confront its own d...