Science, Philosophy and Physical Geography

Robert Inkpen, Graham Wilson

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2013
• ISBN:
  9781136654633
• Edition: 2
• Topic: Éducation
• Subtopic: Études supérieures

This accessible and engaging text explores the relationship between philosophy, science and physical geography. It addresses an imbalance that exists in opinion, teaching and to a lesser extent research, between a philosophically enriched human geography and a perceived philosophically empty physical geography.

The text challenges the myth that there is a single self-evident scientific method that can, and is, applied in a straightforward manner by physical geographers. It demonstrates the variety of alternative philosophical perspectives and emphasizes the difference that the real world geographical context and the geographer make to the study of environmental phenomenon. This includes a consideration of the dynamic relationship between human and physical geography. Finally, the text demonstrates the relevance of philosophy for both an understanding of published material and for the design and implementation of studies in physical geography.

This edition has been fully updated with two new chapters on field studies and modelling, as well as greater discussion of ethical issues and forms of explanation. The book explores key themes such as reconstructing environmental change, species interactions and fluvial geomorphology, and is complimented throughout with case studies to illustrate concepts.

Chapter 1

Ideas, change and stability in physical geography

Ideas are central to understanding how physical geographers have observed and analysed the physical world. Ideas are not static. Ideas change over time as well as from place to place. Ideas influence what we believe and how we understand reality. Ideas change internally, through the practice of a discipline, as well as externally through the social contexts within which physical geographers work. Differing ideologies, different philosophical approaches can influence the questions asked as well as the answers sought. Exploring this complex tangle of influences has often involved detailing the history of a subject. By following the ‘great men’ (and it usually was men in nineteenth- century academia) and their works, the key concepts from different periods can be traced and some sort of model of change developed. Often as important is the use of such a history to justify the current set of concepts within a subject.

This chapter briefly explores the history of physical geography to try to determine whether there is a coherent and accepted set of ideas that mould geographic thought. There may be no inevitability about the suite of ideas that form the focus of contemporary work. These ideas do not exist in isolation from particular philosophical approaches that have developed or have been imported into physical geography. Philosophies can hide in the background, directing and constraining the type of questions asked, and the way in which they may be answered. It is important to provide at least some illumination of these philosophical approaches and their relative importance at different times in and for different parts of physical geography.

What are ideas and how do they change?

Ideas and theories are frameworks of thought with which people try to understand physical reality. A more detailed definition of theory will be covered in Chapter 2, but for this chapter an appropriate definition of a theory would be the core ideas or concepts that go unquestioned when a researcher studies the physical environment. From this core, flow all the ideas and hypotheses that a researcher has about reality. The core ideas and the central relations between these and derived ideas form a tight, logical network. The dominance of vertical movement of land surfaces could be seen as an unquestioned assumption about how reality was in geology at the turn of the twentieth century. From this central core idea, other ideas flowed that explained the distribution of species that did not contradict the evidence on species distributions then available. Rapidly rising and submerging land bridges were mentally constructed to explain the range of distributions of fossil creatures between South America and Africa. As this central idea was replaced by the acceptance of horizontal movement, continental drift and plate tectonics were developed as an alternative explanation for these distributions.

A number of authors have tried to generalise how ideas change. Three ‘big’ ideas are: progressive change, paradigms (Kuhn, 1962, 1977) and research programmes (Lakatos, 1970). Progressive change states that ideas in science change incrementally and slowly. Current researchers build upon the work of others, correcting their errors until finally, at some vastly future unknown date, everything is understood and reality, as it really is, is known. Accumulation of establishable facts counts as progress of knowledge. Once a fact has been discovered it remains the same for all time. Current research is just adding to and extending existing knowledge (Figure 1.1). Unfortunately, understanding of reality does not seem to follow a nice, steady and progressive path. There are differences in the rate at which ideas change; some may suddenly appear apparently from nowhere and some seem to disappear, never to be mentioned in polite scientific circles again, such as racial superiority and acclimatisation. The view of progressive change assumes that earlier researchers understood reality and derived the fundamental laws and relationships that later workers have merely embellished.

Kuhnian paradigms were developed to explain how ideas in science appeared to undergo rapid and revolutionary changes. His prime example was the switch from the Greek to the Copernican model of planetary motion with the Sun replacing the Earth as the centre of the universe. Although much criticised, particularly by critical rationalists (such as Lakatos below), the idea of a paradigm has taken hold within geography and has been used to describe various perceived movements, fads or schools of thought. Paradigms, in other words, have been used to describe just about any group that is perceived to have a common and coherent set of ideas about the world, whether that group realises they have these or not. Kuhn never really clarified or defined what a paradigm was and so there has been wide interpretation of what he meant by the term. He did outline what a paradigm consisted of. It was composed of a disciplinary matrix of tangibles and intangibles. Tangibles were examples of good or appropriate practice within a discipline: classic textbooks and classic experiments. These provided concrete illustrations of how to go about research and what was acceptable practice. In addition, tangibles included objects such as test tubes, laboratory benches and the like, which were viewed as essential to the practice of the discipline. Intangibles were the unwritten rules or conduct expected in a discipline, the social norms of behaviour and accepted evidence as dictated by the peer group of the discipline.

Figure 1.1 Science as a progressive pursuit of absolute truth.

Change in this system was brought about not by the progressive and careful alteration of existing ideas in the light of new evidence or new techniques, but by the wholesale overthrow of old ideas by a complete and coherent set of new ideas. Kuhn suggested that most scientists undertake what he described as ‘normal’ science. They work diligently at their benches using standard techniques to prepare standard solutions to undertake standard tests. They ask only questions that they know they can answer using these techniques. There is little to challenge the established view of how reality is. This set of concepts and practices would make up the existing paradigm. Kuhn believed that facts or observations would slowly accumulate, reaching a point at which the existing concepts could not explain them. Eventually, the errors would become so pronounced, and would interfere so greatly with the operation of ‘normal’ science and so restrict the questions that could be answered, that there would be a complete switch from the existing ideas to a new set of ideas that explained the ‘problem’ facts (Figure 1.2).

Figure 1.2 Science as a series of paradigms changing in a revolutionary manner towards a relative, but unknowable ‘truth’ – or at least that is what we would like to believe. In fact the lines could go in any direction relative to the absolute truth.

The paradigm switch was rapid and complete. ‘Seeing’ the world through one set of concepts, the paradigm, meant that you could not see it through the other set. There can only be one paradigm at any one time and seeing the world through that single paradigm excludes the possibility of all other views of the world. As with the gestalt diagrams though there is nothing to guarantee that your particular view of the image is the correct one. This is because switching from one paradigm to another means a complete change in what is viewed as evidence and even what is believed to exist in reality. This means that there can be no argument over the facts because the facts are different in each paradigm; indeed, what is viewed as a valid argument may even differ between paradigms. Paradigms need not operate across time alone. There may also be spatial differences in what is accepted as a valid view of reality.

How can we decide between paradigms? Kuhn argued that although it may be clear with hindsight that paradigm A was a better explanation of reality than paradigm B, at the time the choice could not be made on any rational basis. Instead, Kuhn turned to his set of intangibles and suggested that the choice between paradigms was based on sociology rather than ‘hard’, factual evidence. Peer pressure, rather than facts, decided which paradigm to accept. This was the part of the theory that critical rationalists found particularly hard to stomach. It implied that there was not necessarily any movement of ideas towards a true understanding of reality. If paradigm choice was socially based, then the new paradigm may not get you closer to how reality really is. Despite the new paradigm eliminating some of the errors or unexplained facts under the old paradigm, the improvement has been at the cost of all the concepts and understanding embodied within the old paradigm. There can be no rational discussion about the relative merits of either paradigm as there is no common basis for such a discussion. Kuhn’s vision of science involved young, dynamic researchers overthrowing the old treasured and established views of an old guard. These researchers worked on critical experiments designed to disrupt the basis of the old order. Research into critical questions posed to undermine a paradigm was contrasted with the mundane ‘normal’ science of the established order. But does this romantic view of scientific progress match what actually happens?

Lakatos thought that Kuhn’s ideas did not match his experience of science and how it changes. Lakatos was a strong supporter of a rational basis for choosing between competing sets of ideas and searched for a way to incorporate a critical rationalist approach into this process of choice. Lakatos divided sets of ideas into research programmes. Each programme had a central set of core ideas, the heart and soul of a set of theories. These directed much of the work the researcher undertook, constraining what questions to ask, how to ask them and the techniques and explanations that were valid in any answer (the positive heuristic). In addition, the research programme also identified the questions that researchers should not ask, techniques and modes of explanation that were unacceptable (the negative heuristic). The core theories were never directly tested, they were kept away from direct assessment. Instead, a band of auxiliary hypotheses were the basis of the active use of each research programme. These were testable statements derived from the core theories. These were the elements of the research programme that researchers used in their scientific lives. Disproving one hypothesis did not bring the whole of the research programme into question; instead, that hypothesis was rejected and some other hypothesis constructed using the existing central theories (Figure 1.3).

Figure 1.3 Lakatosian research programmes. A central core of theory (C1 and C2) surrounded by a protective belt of auxiliary hypotheses (AH1 and AH2). C1 and AH1 represent a progressive programme expanding and generating new hypotheses. C2 and AH2 represent a degenerative programme, with a belt of auxiliary hypotheses contracting towards the core. The nodes represent axioms in the core and hypotheses in the outer circle. These nodes are linked by vertices that represent relationships between nodes. The progressive research programme has a rich and internally highly connected core of axioms. These generate a range of hypotheses that can even interact with each other to generate ‘second’-generation hypotheses (or more). The degenerative research programme has a limited set of core axioms that generate few isolated hypotheses.

Lakatos suggested that choosing between different research programmes became a matter of rational choice. Research programmes that continually generated new hypotheses, novel ways of questioning reality and which were generally not disproved were progressive programmes. Research programmes that were stagnant and did not advance new ideas or explanations for reality were seen as degenerative. When there were two competing research programmes researchers switch to the more progressive research programme. Some individuals might take longer than others to see that one programme was more progressive, but eventually all would make the same rational choice. In Lakatos’s view of science there was elimination of errors and change of world view, but each change brought the researcher, or rather the scientific community, closer to the truth, to the way reality really is. Unfortunately, it would never be possible to prove that reality had been captured absolutely by the theory, only that the theories of a particular programme had not been disproved.

A further view of how ideas change is provided by Feyerband (1975, 1978). Feyerband’s argument is that there is no single, scientific method and that in fact science is an anarchistic enterprise. He suggests that the only principle that does not inhibit progress in science is that ‘anything goes’. He points out that even ancient and seemingly absurd ideas can help enhance our knowledge of reality. As with Kuhn he noted that not all facts fit with contemporary theories, but unlike Kuhn he viewed this as illustrating that ‘facts’ were a construct of old ways of thinking and that the clash between fact and theory highlighted the poverty of trying to develop overarching theoretical frameworks or paradigms. But Feyerband also criticises falsification as a basis for a special method in science, as falsifying a theory or idea will result in falsifying away all of scientific thought associated with that theory or idea. Feyerband points out that science is viewed as somehow different from other explanatory frameworks because it appears, through technological success amongst other things, to have a special method for understanding reality. He believes that this is an illusion.

There is no special method that guarantees success or makes it probable. Scientists do not solve problems because they possess a magic wand – methodology, or theory of rationality – but because they have studied a problem for a long time, because they know the situation fairly well, because they are not too dumb …, and because the excesses of one scientific school are almost always balanced by the excesses of some other school.

(Feyerband, 1975, p. 8)

Feyerband’s views, together with those of Kuhn, are useful in identifying the context of scientific discovery and analysis, and in bringing to the fore the importance of sceptical thought even if it is through the use of seemingly absurd ideas. Viewing science as being as much of a fairy tale as any other explanatory framework is, however, a criticism too far for most scientists. Science may be a human construct but the approach scientists have taken is always open to systematic criticism. And, whatever anyone says, success in terms of seeming to explain reality and to manipulate reality using these explanations does imply some coherence between what scientists think and how reality is, even if we can never be sure what that coherence actually is.

Both paradigms and research programmes have been used to describe changing concepts in physical geography. Neither is perfect and each has a number of problems. Adhering to paradigms would imply that at any one time a single, all- embracing set of ideas would direct the researchers in a subject. This is rarely the case. Similarly, adherence to research programmes implies that central sets of concepts are somehow immune from testing and unaffected by the failure of hypotheses derived from them. Such an ivory tower existence for privileged theories is rarely sustained. Some authors, such as Stoddart (1981), have suggested that there are general currents in thought and that theories follow these. Researchers are moved by fads and fashions as much as anyone else and the flavour of the month has as much relevance in describing academic work as any other. Identifying how such fads are translated into theories, or a mechanism by which changing ideas occur within fads, has not really been tackled. A significant problem with both frameworks is that they do not really address how and why certain ideas seem to survive and prevail, whilst other ideas are rejected. The stability of some concepts, the recognised, but malleable nature of others, and the outright rejection of still others, is not addressed.

How ideas change is still open to debate despite the models presented here. One of the important points to bear in mind is how each model views the ultimate goal of research. If you believe that knowledge is progressive and developing towards a final complete understanding of reality as it is, then Kuhn’s paradigms with their sociological basis are unlikely to be attractive. If you believe that all knowledge is relative, then paradigms may be more attractive. Lakatos seems to sit on the fence by accepting that ultimate absolute knowledge is unattainable but then implies that there is a progressive march to this goal that helps to decide between research programmes. This would suggest an underlying belief in the movement of ideas towards representing and explaining reality as it really is, even if you can never be certain that you have arrived.

Johannes Umbgrove and plate tectonics

Johannes Umbgrove (1899–1954) was a Dutch geologist working at the cusp point between belief and disbelief in plate tectonics. Most histories of plate tectonics are written from the viewpoint of the protagonists trying to establish the ‘new’ idea (e.g. Wood, 1985 or Oreskes, 2003) with Alfred Wegner often portrayed as the tragic genius who foresaw the whole theory. Umbgrove is a different character. He represents the geologists trying to grapple with the inconsistencies of the contemporary theories without recourse to the geophysical- inappropriate theories of continental drift. Umbgrove was not a minor figure in geology at the time. He undertook interdisciplinary research into gravitational surveys, palaeontology as well as tectonics and was amongst the first geologists to view the earth as a single dynamic system. Umbgrove, like most geologists at the time, had identified key episodes within different geological periods of simultaneous development of topo-graphic features such as mountain chains across the globe. He referred to these periods of activity as ‘pulses’ and they formed the basis of his 1947 book The Pulse of the Earth. Within this book he correlated episodes of orogenesis (mountain building) with other geologic phenomena such as sea- level changes, magmatic cycles and ice ages. He viewed these ‘pulses’ of activity as interconnected and in search of a common, overarching explanation.

Umbgrove provided a thoughtful consideration of the competing theories for this common cause (Umbgrove, 1946). One theory, for example, put forward the idea of the submergence of large continental blocks as a means of producing the current distribution of continents and oceans, whilst another theory suggested that continental blocks had extended to produce this observed distribution. A more complicated theory viewed all of the crust as having been originally simatic rock (silica- and magnesium-rich) and erosion had removed the basic part of this rock from the continents and so formed a sialic continental crust (silica- and aluminium-rich). These continental crusts are less dense than the oceanic crusts and so, in restoring isostatic balance, these portions of the crust rose and the simatic areas buckled and subsided to form the oceanic basins.

Umbgrove came up with his own alternative explanation. He saw the early Earth as being coated with a sialic layer of rock that slowly solidified and floated on a denser substratum. Convective currents in this denser substratum caused the crust to buckle, fold and drift to produce a pattern of sialic- rich and sialic- poor regions of crust. This convective activity was, however, limited to the pre-Cambrian. After a critical point in this long geological era, horizontal movement ceased as the mantle become too rigid to permit such...