American Military History

A Survey From Colonial Times to the Present

William Thomas Allison, Jeffrey G. Grey, Janet G. Valentine

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2020
• ISBN:
  9781000059458
• Edition: 3
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Military & Maritime History
• Index: History

Now in its third edition, American Military History examines how a country shaped by race, ethnicity, economy, regionalism, and power has been equally influenced by war and the struggle to define the role of a military in a free and democratic society.

Organized chronologically, the text begins at the point of European conflict with Native Americans and concludes with military affairs in the early 21st century, providing an important overview of the military's role on an international, domestic, social, and symbolic level. The third edition is fully updated to reflect recent developments in military policy and the study of military history and war and society, thus providing students a foundational understanding of the American military experience.

This book will be of interest to students of American history and military history. It is designed to allow instructors flexibility in structuring a course.

1 The First American Way of War

Introduction

When English settlers arrived to colonize the Atlantic seaboard of North America in the early 1600s, they found a most threatening and inhospitable environment against which they would struggle for decades to establish permanent settlements. From the English viewpoint, strange diseases, a dramatically diverse climate, and a primitive indigenous people haunted the shores and estuaries of New England, the Chesapeake Bay region, and the Carolinas. These early colonists arrived with no promise of royal protection from hostile indigenous peoples or encroaching armies of competing European powers. From the standpoint of the English Crown and Parliament, the colonists were on their own and would have to provide for their own defense. These circumstances gave colonists plenty of cause to be conscious of military matters. The warfare that developed in North America was not European in style or purpose, and it forced colonists to move away from military concepts of the Old World and open their minds to new but brutal ideas about warfare and military affairs that suited their unique situation.

The American Colonies and the British Military Tradition

It was only natural that English settlers would bring with them to the New World their ideas and traditions from home. This concept of transplanting one’s customs, beliefs, and traditions is called cultural mimesis. To the American wilderness, English colonists brought their traditional notions on social order, localized representative government, fundamental rights, loyalty to the King, civic obligation, and military affairs. From the time of their initial settlement, English colonists became entangled in a paradoxical trinity of trade, alliance, and warfare that resulted in frequent conflict with Native Americans throughout the seventeenth century. In their adaptation to the unique circumstances of North America, English colonists developed their own attitudes toward military affairs and gradually created their own style of war. It was the beginning of what many argue became the American military tradition. This included an adapted English militia system that grew throughout the colonies and varied widely in form, regulation, and effectiveness compared to its counterpart back in England.

The English had developed two principal values concerning military affairs. First, the idea of a militia had become an English tradition in and of itself. Militia in England had been an institution with which all Anglo colonists would have been familiar. Each county in England was obligated to keep and train militia units, known as trainbands, under the leadership of a lord-lieutenant. Only about one-tenth of Englishmen participated in these local training units, whose discipline and ability varied widely. Rarely called to muster, few militiamen in England expected to be called into service because the very idea of defending England’s shores from an invader seemed so remote despite the Spanish attempt to invade in 1588. Militia service and training also had become a sort of informal social control mechanism that helped regulate class relationships and bonded county to country. In times of war, militia units would not integrate as units with the English army. Instead, recruits who often had militia experience would augment already existing localized army units. Remember that England was principally a naval power, so it invested little of its defense budget into a large professional army.

This leads to the second value—the English looked upon a large professional army with grave suspicion, because many feared such an army might violate fundamental liberties that were guaranteed under Parliament and Crown. Standing armies also cost money, which England could ill afford, especially with so much of the national budget spent on naval power. Militia service in England was also a general obligation with centralized standards that applied equally to all county militia units. But this was on paper, and periodic drill was insufficient to lessen the contempt felt by professional army officers toward county militia.

In England, these values shifted during the 1600s. Numerous conflicts, notably the English Civil War and the Thirty Years’ War, exposed the weaknesses of militia training and the shortcomings of temporary armies. Oliver Cromwell’s New Model Army, officered mainly by Puritans, became a well-trained, well-disciplined force that soundly defeated the armies of Charles I in the English Civil War. Atypically, Cromwell’s army also avoided needless casualties among noncombatants, and rarely employed terror as a tactic or strategy because Cromwell recognized the risks of alienating the population. The large, standing professional armies of the latter years of the devastating Thirty Years’ War also gravitated toward more limited notions of warfare, employing discipline and training while avoiding terrorizing noncombatant populations.

Because of these and other destructive and costly conflicts, by the end of the seventeenth century the scale and risk of war on the imperial stage made a permanent well-maintained armed force a national necessity. National political objectives in war had also become limited because of the expense and risk of state-on-state warfare. The colonies, however, did not reach such conclusions. Largely detached from European conflict and military advancements, the English colonists developed their own security system and concept of warfare based upon their developing traditions, geopolitical circumstances, and brutal attitudes toward indigenous populations.

The wilderness in which the settlers had planted themselves was untamed and felt hostile. The nascent settlements carved out of the forests of Massachusetts and the Chesapeake Bay region were in constant danger of Indian attack and within striking distance of rival French and Spanish colonies in Canada and Florida. For the English colonists, even the Dutch settlement at New Amsterdam was a possible threat. As the decades passed, the settlements grew in population and size, pushing more Native Americans off their lands.

This growth intensified imperial competition. Mercantilism became the path to imperial dominance, which required a strong navy to protect sea lanes between the mother country and colonies scattered literally around the world. French, Spanish, Portuguese, and Dutch fleets battled England’s Royal Navy for maritime supremacy, pouring money into fleets while often neglecting armies at home. Only when war broke out on the European continent did these imperial powers attempt to modernize their armies. Colonies, however, were often left to their own devices, as few regular troops could be spared for colonial service. In North America, England had neither the means nor the money to provide regulars to defend English settlements, thus leaving the colonists to defend themselves for most of the seventeenth century.

Colonial Militia and Military Organization

The colonists proved quick learners and adapted to their surroundings with violent alacrity. They had not come to America wholly unprepared. Quite to the contrary, settlers in Virginia and Puritan colonists in Massachusetts brought with them their preconceived attitudes toward war and defense as well as weapons of war. The Virginia Company hired the English soldier, explorer, and adventurer Captain John Smith to shape a mostly defenseless Jamestown into a militarized outpost and train a militia company for its defense. Miles Standish and John Underhill were among the men with military background and experience who accompanied the Puritan Separatists to Massachusetts, helping them build defensive perimeters and organize militia. This was typical among the early colonizers—to establish a defensive fortification of some sort and organize militia based upon the English tradition while adapting both to the unique circumstances of colonial America.

Early colonial fortifications were rather simple; most consisted of either a stockade fence or a central blockhouse as a defense against Indian raids. In an emergency, a general alarm would gather colonists from surrounding farms into the settlement’s stronghold. Once inside, militiamen and other colonists would take up positions on ramparts and behind loopholes to fend off attackers. This strategy often worked well against small Indian raids, but anything more substantial in size and more prolonged put the settlers at a disadvantage. Scarce arms and valuable supplies had to be centralized at the stronghold. Food and water ran out quickly under any sort of siege, leaving the besieged colonists in dire straits unless relief arrived post-haste. Fortunately, the nature of Indian warfare allowed for few organized, lengthy assaults, much less for any sort of siege. Fleeing to the relative safety of the stronghold, colonists left homes and other property unprotected. Indians contented themselves with ignoring the settlers in the blockhouse to loot and burn homesteads and farms, having little patience or incentive for an organized siege.

Lines of small forts along the frontier did not fare much better. Fortifications were expensive, often making up the largest single expense in a colony’s budget. Construction was costly, especially for the ring of forts that Virginia built along its frontier in the 1600s. Maintenance cost even more, as wood rotted and cannon rusted. Moreover, the men assigned to these outposts faced incredible boredom and idleness, which often led to breakdowns in discipline and poor morale. Forts on the frontier rarely proved useful, as Indians quickly passed between the forts, which were tens of miles apart in many spots and non-existent in most others. Pure chance, more often than not, brought indigenous raiding parties in contact with ranger patrols from the forts. Most of the time, raiding parties avoided the patrols through superior reconnaissance, or both groups simply missed each other unawares. Over time, blockhouses and garrisons in more established settlements fell into disuse and disrepair as the Indian threat moved further inland.

In theory, a well-trained and organized militia would have made this defensive system work against supposedly primitive Indians, but such was not usually the case. In scattered settlements and even more scattered farms across the countryside, gathering militia to respond to a sudden raid or attack was inefficient at best. Nevertheless, the militia was an integral part of early colonial society, though its form and regulation varied from colony to colony. It served three primary purposes: to defend settlements, to act as a police force, and to provide a trained pool from which a colony could draw soldiers for extended campaigns and wars.

Militia units became centralized agents of social cohesion in many settlements, much like the local church or congregation. In fact, in many places, particularly in New England, the two often were tied together. Normally, colonial law obligated all able-bodied males to serve. Age limits varied, usually from 16 or 18 to 45, or even up to 60. Virginia’s militia system required that all members provide their own weapons, which had to be clean and in good working condition. All males in Virginia from age 16 to 60 were required to serve, participate in drill, and, when not in service, protect the property of neighbors who were fulfilling their militia obligation. This system operated under the auspices of the Virginia Company administration in the colony and continued when Virginia became a royal colony. By 1634, due to Virginia’s growth, its militia was organized by county instead of settlement. Although the militia was under the direct control of the royal governor, it also could be called out by local commanders in emergencies. As the colony grew in size and population and the Indian threat lessened, the militia became smaller. Indentured servants were no longer required to serve. Slaves, of course, were exempted. The colony also began to pay militiamen when on active duty. Appointed by the governor, officers came almost exclusively from the gentry class.

Militia in New England was organized along similar lines but had the significant added dimension of religion. Like Virginia, Massachusetts and other New England colonies organized militia at the county level; thus, each county regiment was made up of smaller units from villages and hamlets in the county. All males fulfilled their militia obligation or faced a small fine. Of course, the wealthy could afford the fine and often did not serve. Unlike other English colonies in America, in New England substitutes were illegal. All men, including servants, had to provide for their own weapon, and each village had to keep a store of powder and shot. Each trainband unit consisted of members of the local congregation. Because the local militia unit was so closely tied with the local church, pressure within the congregation to serve and to serve well was indeed great. One did not want to let friends and neighbors, and pastor, down. New England militia developed a deep sense of martial spirit that was often enhanced by inspiring sermons from church ministers. The social contract established by the Mayflower Compact applied equally to militia service in Puritan New England. Such a system was consistent with Puritan ideology. Although Puritan social strictures were often rigid, Puritans valued democratic processes and participation in the congregation at all levels. Since ministers, sheriffs, magistrates, and the like were elected, it should come as no surprise that militia officers were also popularly chosen. Though militia officers were elected locally, a colony’s general court or assembly usually reserved final approval of militia commissions.

This integrated system resulted in a militia with tight local bonds built around religion, choice, and deference, so much so that military organization and social structure were basically one and the same. Such a system valued decentralization and instilled a reluctant attitude toward centralized control. Under such arrangements, then, militias functioned as both an initial reaction force and a social stabilizer. Militia service provided a sense of security, established and maintained social parameters, and satisfied the expectations of civic duty.

Much overshadowed by its defensive purpose was the effective job militia performed as police, functioning as an overseer of internal order in a colony. Troubled times frequently brought riots and, as in the case of Virginia in 1676, occasional rebellion. Theft and violent crime plagued port cities. Economically displaced vagrants passed through towns and villages, rousing the suspicion of residents. Some drifters were actually impressed into militia service. To protect themselves from these threats, many communities recruited small numbers of militia to serve as watch patrols. Like militia, the colonial watch had its origins in England and was also transported to America by English colonists.

In the southern colonies, militias and the watch evolved into slave patrols, which roamed the countryside on the lookout for runaway slaves and signs of slave insurrection, much as the old ranger patrols had done against the Indian threat. Even in New York City, militia helped put down a slave revolt in 1741. In essence, militia came to serve more as a ‘hue and cry’ response force. Occasionally, militia could not be used to quell disorder because militiamen themselves made up much of the disturbing party. Such was the case in the Carolinas when roving militia patrols known as regulators grew into a law unto themselves and had to be reined in by legitimate legal authority. Indeed, the militia came to epitomize the precarious balance between civil order and the abuse of military authority.

Militia also served as a training mechanism and manpower reservoir for colonial expeditionary forces. Training was essential for several reasons, but in the broad context its most important function was to provide a ready pool of citizen-soldiers to fill county quotas for more sizable armies. Because militia units could not serve outside their home colony, colonial governments organized expeditionary forces to fight more serious conflicts, such as Indian wars and wars against other European colonial powers. Under such a system in the 1630s, Virginia could muster about 2,000 decently equipped men for a military expedition while leaving a bare minimum of militia in reserve to defend more populated settlements. In 1690, Massachusetts was able to put together a force of over 700 militiamen under the leadership of the daring Sir William Phips to overwhelm the under-defended French garrison at Port Royal.

Plucking men from local militia units to form a colonial expeditionary force was, however, not a straightforward process. Politics at both the local and colonial levels had to be considered. Additionally, all of the English colonies in America had economically diverse settlements. Port cities often had robust economies and larger populations, while frontier regions were sparsely populated and less economically advanced. Merchants tended to dominate coastal politics while gentlemen farmers exercised greater influence inland. Whenever a colonial governor or assembly needed to organize a military force, these diverse relationships had to be considered.

Moreover, such expeditions were costly. Outfitting expeditions with weapons, powder and shot, and other necessary supplies strained colonial coffers and forced assemblies and governors to raise taxes or risk crippling deficits. These circumstances were not unique to colonial America by any means, but the governmental process of preparing a military force helped establish long-standing principles such as civilian control of the military and power-sharing in American political culture. For example, a colonial governor often acted as commander-in-chief of all militia and military forces of the colony while the assembly exercised exclusive fiscal control over funding these enterprises. As such, the principle of power sharing in military affairs was set long before the Constitution outlined a similar civil–military balance.

Under the expedition...