Linguistic ideologies
In his essay on âOratio imago animiâ, the seventeenth-century dramatist Ben Jonson writes of the way that language acts as a marker of a personâs character (Jonson 1947 [1641]: 625):
Language most shewes a man: speake that I may see thee. It springs out of the most retired, and inmost parts of us, and is the Image of the Parent of it, the mind. No glasse renders a mans forme, or likenesse, so true as his speech.
The belief expressed here is that the way a person uses language is an index, or indictor, of his or her character. Jonson is talking of articulate thought (âspeech is the image of the mindâ, as the title of the essay has it), but in expressing oneâs mind the material form this takes â in terms of accent, style, prosody and so forth â is something upon which we make judgments about the social status, moral character and cultural background of the speaker. These judgements are a product of the shared beliefs that circulate within communities, and which interpret linguistic traits as metonymic for statistically co-occurring social attributes and stereotypical social features (related to class, gender, ethnicity and so forth).
These shared beliefs are what are commonly referred to as language ideologies. In his foundational paper on this topic, Silverstein (1979: 193) describes language ideologies as âany sets of beliefs about language articulated by users as a rationalization or justification of perceived language structure or useâ. In other words, they are the embedded beliefs that a group shares about language and language use which structures the way in which language is perceived by a particular group and in which it operates as social practice within that group. These beliefs are occasionally articulated as explicit conceptualisations of language, but they can also implicitly shape the way language is used, or the attitudes and stances people take towards it. It is this structuring that Silverstein calls the âindexicalâ layer of language â the way certain elements of language use point towards embedded beliefs concerning the social, political or cultural nature of acts of speech.
A key point within this theorisation of language and social practice is that language ideologies are never about language alone. Instead, they incorporate the ties between language and other social dynamics such as gender, class and nationality (Woolard 1998). Use of a particular syntactical form, for example, can index a complex of ideological beliefs about class or cultural background, and these then provide a frame in which interaction between participants takes place. Furthermore, syntactical features or particular accents always exist within a wider ecology of linguistic practices wherein diversity is marked differentially, so that a particular feature is given symbolic significance in relation to the other features with which it is contrasted (and particularly âstandardâ concepts of the language).
Another conceptual distinction introduced by Silverstein (1998) is that of the âlanguage communityâ as opposed to the more common sociolinguistic notion of the âspeech communityâ. Whereas a speech community is the grouping who have broadly similar patterns of language use in terms of accent, dialect, pragmatics and so forth, a language community is one which has a shared conception of the language as a named entity, and thus consider the idea of the language as part of their collective identity. An example would be groupings who view English (or a particular variety of it) as in a sense âtheirâ language, and promote this shared commitment as a central part of their communal identity. In other words, beliefs such as the idea that language homogeneity across a nation is a natural state of the world are particular, albeit very deeply embedded, language ideologies about the relationship between societies and linguistic practices (Kroskrity 2000).
Structuring language conceptualisation
As noted above, ideologies are manifest in both discourse and practice â in how people speak about a language, as well as in how they use and relate to it. As such it is a potentially very broad area for investigation, and in this chapter I will therefore narrow the focus to concentrate specifically on the ways in which the concept of English is constructed in discourse.
So how does language conceptualisation take place? There are five key elements to the process, which can offer a useful structure for its analysis. These are the mode, the domain, the function, the context and the means â all of which I will explain in further detail below (and then provide extended examples of in the next section).
First, there are the different modes in which conceptualisation takes place. By this I mean the different semiotic resources â verbal discourse, image, movement â which can be used to communicate ideas. Clearly the most prominent in this respect is verbal discourse â using language itself to talk or write about the nature of language â as this allows for the most flexible and richest way of generating and expressing conceptual meaning. Yet representations can also take place in other modes. There are examples, for instance, of ideas of language being represented visually â either diagrammatically (e.g. family trees of historical language development) or pictorially. In the Middle Ages, for example, there was an established iconography for ideas about grammar (Seargeant 2016), and throughout the history of art the visual trope of the Tower of Babel has been a popular subject.
The second point of note is that conceptualisation occurs in different domains. That is to say, language is the object of study for a wide range of different scientific disciplines, while at the same time featuring as an idea in non-scientific domains such as the arts, humanities and social sciences. While linguistics is, of course, the principal site of study, concepts of language are also commonly constructed in the cognitive sciences and psychology, in politics and educational contexts, and in philosophy, as well as literature and everyday contexts.
Each of these have a different set of concerns and aims, a point which stands as the third element of conceptualisation. A broad division can be made here between those conceptualisations which have as their aim the representation of language as it actually is (in so far as we can determine this), and those which present language as it could or should be (in their opinion). Scientific representations, for example, aim to flesh out a concept of language which fits as closely as possible with the observed phenomena of how language exists and works in the world. This is not necessarily the case in other domains.
A useful way of looking at this divide is by means of the distinction put forward by Searle (1995), building on the work of J. L. Austin and G. E. M. Anscombe, between two âdirections of fitâ. This maps the relationship that a conceptual term has with the phenomenon it is representing. There can be a âword-to-worldâ direction of fit, whereby the term represents the reality of the observed phenomenon, i.e. an utterance is used to describe the way things in the world already are. For example, when I say âI have been to Tokyoâ I am describing an event that has actually occurred in the world. The opposite of this is a âworld-to-wordâ direction of fit, whereby the utterance is used as a declaration of something that is meant to come to pass, and thus provides a structuring device for an action or phenomenon. An example of this would be saying âIâll meet you at half past sevenâ, and in doing so discursively projecting a version of a future reality which then acts as a structure for my upcoming plans.
In scientific discourse, representations are aiming for a âword-to-worldâ direction of fit, whereby the term âlanguageâ or âEnglishâ equates as closely as possible to the actuality of these phenomena, and can function as an accurate conceptual category for analytic purposes. In this context the function of conceptualisation is, on the whole, straightforward, in that it is meant to provide an accurate representation which contributes to linguistic science. As we have seen, however, there are conflicting views of precisely what language or English can mean even in this context, and indeed much of the business of linguistics is concerned with refining this conceptualisation.
The opposite direction of fit also occurs for language conceptualisation in certain domains. Language policy, for example, promotes ideas of language which are then used as a template for regulating actual language use. This is found in particular in education, where choices about which variety or register should act as the standard become a set of norms to which students are then socialised. Similarly, language planning and policy initiatives project ideas about forms of language to which communities are urged or forced to conform. In this case the functions of conceptualisation will be related to purposes of social cohesion or identity, or to other cultural and political ends. When, for example, a national standard is prescribed in the curriculum, and other (local) languages or varieties are discouraged or banned, the political aim is likely to be a means of fostering and enacting an ideology of national unity. In the pure sense, a standard national language is an ideal. There is no direct correspondence between the representation of, say, English that it puts forward, and the real-life diversity and variety in English that is found in even the most homogeneous of communities. Yet within society this concept of the language often underpins policy and pronouncements due to the role that it plays in the belief systems of those with regulatory power.
An even more salient example of the âworld-to-wordâ direction of fit is the case of the inventors of artificial and reduced languages, such as Esperanto or Basic English. In these cases, the aim was to make actual language practice (the âworldâ) adapt to the tenets of their invented or contrived systems (the âwordâ). For those advocating these projects, the concept âlanguageâ was used to refer to a phenomenon which did not actually exist in the world but which they felt could be engineered into existence and become a reality of social practice for the population through promotion and education.
The fourth consideration of language conceptualisation is that it always happens w...