From Georges Sorel

Essays in Socialism and Philosophy

Georges Sorel

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2018
• eBook ISBN: 9781351310703
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Philosophy History & Theory

The prophet of social decadence, the theorist of violence and advocate of the general strike, the critic who stood Marx on his head, Georges Sorel was one of the foremost writers of this century to write extensively on the great importance of the moral aspects of social movements. His reconstruction of socialist ethics established him as one of the most remarkable critics of Marxist thought, and his writings in many aspects anticipated contemporary interpretations.

From Georges Sorel, the first of two volumes of Sorel's work, presents his major contributions to social thought articles on Marxism, religion, syndicalism, social myths, the philosophy of history and science, as well as a large and newly translated segment of "Reflections on Violence." In his introduction, John Stanley disputes the frequently encountered view of Sorel as a reactionary or extreme rightist, and emphasizes Sorel's attempt to provide Western society with a morality based on labor, struggle, and family life.

CHAPTER 1

from The Trial of Socrates

The Greek Oligarchy¹

I Patriotism of the old democrats. Ancient equality. Influence of the Sophists. Division of classes according to learning. Duties of the privileged. Obligation to revolt.

II The influence of philosophers on revolutions. The oligarchical principle of revolutionaries. The secret political societies. The end of democracy.

III Pride of the ancient democrats. Conservative character of Homer. Scorn of the new men for Homer.

I

... The Athenians of olden times were quite superior to our envious, ignorant and gluttonous bourgeoisie. The Jacobin type did not exist in early Athens. Citizens were not merchants, demanding a guarantee for their trade, protection of their industry and soliciting government favors. They were soldiers whose existence was tied to the greatness of the city. The least weakness would put the state in peril.

We have said that the chief aim of ancient education was the preparation for war: this education was not very complex, and consequently it was accessible to all citizens. Curtius evaluated this ancient Athenian instruction very well.² “This intellectual culture, so simple in appearance and so unified, nonetheless involved the whole man, all the more profoundly and energetically as these young minds, not being distracted by multiple tasks, could more freely profit from what was offered to them as spiritual nourishment. And, on the whole, look what was given to an Athenian child! The Homeric epic, with its magnificent portrayal of the world, which inspires heroic feelings and the passion for lofty deeds; liturgical hymns, with their rich treasure of sacred legends originating in the temples... finally, the elegy in its infinite diversity... which expressed with striking clarity everything that a brave citizen of Athens should know and attempt!... As the young man had happily grown up assimilating the best of the intellectual richness of the people, participation in public life became for him a superior school in which he perfected himself and demonstrated his ability. Each new progress in poetry was at the same time an extension of popular education.”

Here we stop, while regretting that we cannot quote this admirable passage in its entirety.

The men of antiquity did not understand equality in the same way as modern philosophers, or at least as most French writers. Aristotle strongly upheld the principle of equality, but with the reservation that this condition is limited to persons who are capable of being made equal.³ In his ideal republic, he very strictly maintains the principle of class, and today his constitution would appear to many to be not a little feudal.

Fouillée reproaches the Athenians for forming a false democracy and for not giving political equality to the inhabitants of their empire.⁴ One could not be more completely mistaken about the conditions of Hellenic life. Without a doubt such a decree would have resulted in the complete ruination of Greece. The cities, which had accepted the domination of the Persians, and which had long since demonstrated their political impotence, were deservedly transformed into dependency.

The Athenians had proved that they alone had the necessary power to resist the Persians and to conclude great wars successfully. It was necessary and just that leadership devolved on them. Similarly, in the Peripatetic city, power belongs to the warriors who defend the country, govern it and offer sacrifices to the godsl The rest of the inhabitants work to support them.

This privileged position developed in the Athenian plebians a pride which at first glance appears quite misplaced and which comprises the most remarkable trait of the people of this period.

We must not forget that equality is usually an idle word. In order to realize it, and in order for it to be legitimate, one is led to do as Aristotle did—limit it to a small caste. We have seen that in Athens, ancient education had the effect of bringing the citizens very near to this idea of Peripatetic democracy.

The development of Sophist schools completely changed this situation. The question of what bases the existing political inequality rested upon does not seem to have been very carefully examined; rather the Sophists sought to determine on what bases democratic equality could be founded, and it was soon concluded to be absurd in fact and in law.

The ancient uniformity of culture completely disappeared. Society was divided into two distinct categories. The poor generally remained faithful to the old system; few of their children could go near the new schools. The innovators could only ridicule those who were indoctrinated in the old ideas, who mainly admired the old poetic fables and were not up to date on the “correct” ideas.⁵

This aristocracy of intelligence and oratory is often attacked by Aristophanes. The urban Greeks were endowed with such a lively intelligence and such a free spirit that city men were not long in proving to be very superior to country folk. The old soldiers of the Marathon complained of being exposed to ruinous trials, incapable as they were of being able to present their arguments with the finesse of the city dwellers.⁶ From the lowly ranks of the urban plebes arose the skillful orators who governed the city.

The Sophists taught the art of debate: the danger of their doctrine was that it did not propose a moral end but only success. To succeed by demagogic flattery in a democratic society, by the most refined flattery in the court of a tyrant—such was the aim of the students of the Sophists. They were thus completely indifferent to the principles of different governments. They learned how to manage under all sorts of conditions.⁷

From this point of view, Socrates was quite different from the Sophists, because he sought to convince of the truth, but we also know that his disciples did not always follow him in all his teaching. He had marvelous facility in debate. No Sophist could be compared to him either for his dialectical finesse or for the penetrating grace of his language. All witnesses agree that he was irresistible. We need only have a superficial idea of Hellenic culture in order to recognize that his conversation was extraordinarily compelling.

Xenophon tells us that Critias and Alcibiades attached themselves to Socrates in order to become skillful politicians. It is probable that more than one disciple followed their example. We have already pointed out that this opportunism seems to have been shown in a passage of Aristophanes’ Clouds. For many students Socrates was the most admirable of professors and the most convincing of Sophists.

When a society is divided into distinct classes in terms of knowledge, the question of oligarchy is soon posed. We have just said that demagogic rule became a sort of oligarchy of the small shopkeepers and artisans of Athens—proud and cunning, liars and braggarts—who directed the business of the city to their own profit and to the detriment of the countryside....

The metaphysical ideas on which Socratism is based lead to further developing the consequences of this doctrine. We have said that according to Anaxagorism our intelligence produces ideas through participation in a divine soul. This favor is not entirely natural. By exercise, study and dialectic it can be increased considerably. We have said that Socrates was marked by an exceptional sign, but he claimed that equivalent privilege could be acquired by pious and wise men.

Here we have then the city divided into two categories of citizens. Those who participate in a very notable way in the divine intellect, who enjoy a kind of grace, are evidently capable of discovering the truth. Better than others, they can analyze phenomena and formulate the natural laws which the divinity has written into nature.⁸

The customary turn of events does not tend to put the government of cities in the hands of these excellent men who are favored by the gods. Usually those who possess the power of thought and will necessary to the administration of states are set aside.

Here we are raised to a new dialectical level In alienating scholars, democracy committed an “error” which can be measured by economic disorder. In alienating privileged people, it commits a “crime” against divinity. It reverses every law of Providence; it places itself outside the law.

Those who are prevented from action nevertheless have a mission to accomplish, for the favors of the gods cannot be considered as merely creating rights. Genius and talent have, above all, duties to fulfill. They are not allowed to cross their arms and laugh at the stupidities of fools. They are born for action; they must act.

Socrates asks Charmides:⁹ “If someone were capable of winning fourels in the games, of thus bringing glory to himself and to his homeland, and if, however, he refused to fight, how would you judge such a man?’ “He would clearly be an effeminate coward.”

When malevolence and ignorance conspire to prevent the “divine decree” from being put into practice, the following questions are raised: Can a government based on the domination of the uneducated over the educated or the bad over the good call itself legitimate?¹⁰ When the Good has been formulated and defined, is not a government which is opposed to the realization of the Good a social ulcer that must be cured by sword and fire? Is not right superior to a purely formal legality? Are not the good obliged to sacrifice their lives in order to combat evil and reestablish the divine order, when obstacles exist to its peaceful realization?

This list of questions could easily be lengthened; ordinarily, philosophers dislike taking questions to their logical conclusion and refuse to answer them in a manner consistent with their declared principles. But there is no lack of fervent spirits ready to draw all of the consequences from a doctrine.

II

Revolutions are most often explained in terms of economics. We do not wish to deny the importance of this explanatory factor, but it appears to us to be completely inadequate. Certainly the great crisis of the French Revolution would be mysterious if one did not keep well in mind the appetites of the lower third estate and the agrarian movements. Taine has studied the question from this point of view in an authoritative way. He has given us a definitive psychological description of the men of that time.

Before this admirable work, “revolutionary ideas” were about all that were discussed, and everything was reduced to a sort of crisis of metaphysics. All our histories were deceptive because the authors were incapable of defining these ideas. We do not believe that the study of ideas should be neglected. No constitution can be realized, no important movement can arise in society without an idea. We are thus led to demand from the philosophers an account of their doctrines.

Xenophon tells us that Critias had long been at odds with Socrates. That proves that the philosopher did not directly participate in the revolution. It is even probable that no prominent disciples of Socrates were among the leaders.

All the historians¹¹ agree on the harmful influence of the Sophists, although none of them participated much in politics. From their abstention one must not draw the conclusion that they were not implicated in Athens’ troubles.

Rarely do men of science enter active political life. It is worth noting that usually the more bold and radical they are in their doctrines, the more timid they are in practice. In general, men who resort to violence are quite feeble theorists. We have the example of our revolutionary assemblies as proof of this. Taine has acquainted us with fraudulent “great men” who directed the great European upheaval.

One can go even further and say that the philosophers of the eighteenth century would have protested against their disciples if they had lived long enough to see them in action. Rousseau would have tried in vain to prove to his admirers that they were applying his ideas badly. They would have replied that a book is made to be read and criticized, that it was regrettable for the author to explain himself so badly. If he had been too recalcitrant, he would have been proscribed like Con-dorcet.¹² Thus Xenophons argument does not prove much in favor of his master, Socrates, whom, however, we must be careful not to confuse with the oligarchs.

When the vices of democracy had been brought to light, the need for creating something more scientific was felt. It does not seem that the oligarchs ever had very set ideas on the plan of a constitution. Their ideas had only been seen to work during a revolutionary period. One of the traits of revolutions is to create dictatorial powers in the hands of small groups. We have seen this very well in France in 1793. The majority of a country cannot, in general, easily accept great upheavals founded on absolute theories. A society develops historically and the masses cling to their traditions. Innovators can succeed only by boldness. They are a minority, but if they have faith, they can at times triumph by profiting from favorable opportunities.

Today we know that the Jacobins were few in number. Almost everywhere, the Montagnards were elected only by weak minorities or by fraud. Having attained power, they had nothing more urgent to do than to govern without disturbing the majority. They proved to be more violent the more they were isolated. They were perfectly logical. They alone possessed the revolutionary Idea. Right does not reside in numbers.

In Athens, to return to the old aristocracy was unthinkable; such a restoration would have been impossible. The rich classes were largely won over to the innovations. The youth was full of contempt for the heroic era and for the customs of the time of the Golden Age that Aristophanes longed for so ardently.

In his history Curtius has given curious details on the formation of the oligarchic clubs. He has explained very well the fatal influence of the secret societies on politics of this period. We can only refer to his book.

These societies often served to facilitate debauchery, and it appears that they almost always celebrated some illi...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• Acknowledgements
• Introduction to the Transaction Edition
• Introduction
• Chapter 1 from The Trial of Socrates
• Chapter 2 The Socialist Future of the Syndicates
• Chapter 3 The Ethics of Socialism
• Chapter 4 from Critical Essays in Marxism
• Chapter 5 from The Illusions of Progress
• Chapter 6 from Reflections on Violence
• Chapter 7 from Materials for a Theory of the Proletariat
• Chapter 8 from The Utility of Pragmatism
• Notes
• A Sorel Bibliography
• Index