Policing Public Disorder

David Waddington

• Publisher: Taylor & Francis
• Year: 2013
• Print ISBN: 9781843922346
• eBook ISBN: 9781134020300
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Sozialwissenschaften
• Subtopic: Kriminologie

This book draws on a wide range of studies of collective conflict and the policing of crowds and social movements to provide an understanding of the causes and management of public disorder. It seeks to describe and explain the processes by which the police interpret and respond to instances of public disorder, to account for variations in their strategies and tactics, and to identify the conditions in which police interventions (or inaction) may serve to enhance or reduce the potential for wider confrontation.

In addition to providing a penetrating review and critique of relevant theory, the author employs a combination of existing studies and first-hand research to explore the lessons, both practical and theoretical, of recent examples of British and American urban disorders, the policing of worldwide anti-globalisation protests (such as the British G8 protests of 2005), and the activities of British football fans abroad between 1990 and 2006. These case studies are brought together to provide an engaging and sharply focused explanation and evaluation of contemporary police methods for avoiding or controlling public disorder.

Policing Public Disorder will be essential reading for anyone with an interest in policing, crowd behaviour and issues around public order and disorder.

Chapter 1

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Public order policing: theoretical approaches

Introduction

Despite obvious signs of a growing commitment by public order police in Western societies to softening both their methods and the image they try to project of themselves to the public, conspicuous examples sporadically emerge of their unfailing determination to contain and, if necessary, confront disaffected and dissenting sections of society (della Porta et al. 2006; Earl 2006). This chapter sets out a number of theoretical bases for interpreting consistencies and discrepancies in styles of public order policing, for explaining police choices of strategy and tactics, and for understanding the nature and consequences of police conduct in potentially conflictual situations.

The chapter begins by outlining and explaining the late-twentieth-century shift in dominant Western public order policing styles towards negotiation and restraint. A second, supplementary section then describes the repertoire of preventative measures used by police to offset possible confrontation and reinforce their perceived legitimacy. The third section of the chapter identifies some of the main political, institutional, cultural and pragmatic determinants of coercive police strategies and tactics that deviate from the contemporary norm. The fourth section looks at possible reasons for, and consequences of, aggressive police conduct while ‘out in the field’. This is followed by a brief discussion of the argument that paramilitaristic police methods are the best means of ensuring that police officers exercise requisite standards of discipline and restraint. The final section of the chapter outlines a model of public order policing that usefully draws together elements of the preceding discussion, as well as highlighting other relevant factors considered necessary to explaining tactical and strategic variations and their implications for possible conflict.

From escalated force to negotiated management

There is widespread agreement among American and European scholars that the last three decades have seen a major transformation in the dominant style of public order policing (e.g. della Porta and Filliuelle 2004; McPhail et al. 1998; Noakes and Gillham 2006; P. A. J. Waddington 2000a, 2003). The seminal study on this subject is that of McPhail et al. (op. cit.) who identify and explain the way in which American public order policing has departed from the uncompromising ‘escalated force’ model of the 1960s, towards a softer and more tolerant ‘negotiated management’ approach of the 1970s and after. This shift has involved a greater respect for the ‘rights’ of protesters, a more tolerant approach to community disruption, closer communication and co-operation with the public, a reduced tendency to make arrests (particularly as a tactic of first resort), and application of only the minimum force required in order to control a situation.

McPhail et al. attribute this transformation to the criticism and de-legitimisation of the escalated force approach by several government-sponsored commissions set up to look into the urban unrest of the 1960s and the university campus and anti-war dissent of the late 1960s and early 1970s. Concerned by their own apparent capacity to inflame crowds, provoke disorder and attract criticism, the police were particularly receptive at this stage to the possibility of using alternatives to the principle of overwhelming force. Senior officers now considered it sensible to slacken their authority so as to increase the predictability of protest events and minimise the risk of violence. Thus, as Noakes et al. (2005: 239) point out,

Police would under-enforce the law and negotiate with protest groups prior to a demonstration in an effort to establish mutually agreeable terms and conditions under which the demonstrations would be held. To reach such an agreement, police would help protest groups cut through legal red tape, protect permit-holding protest groups from counter-demonstrators and ignore minor violations of the law during demonstrations in exchange for compromises from protesters on the route of a protest march or the location of a rally.

European academics have commented on parallel trends in their countries towards softer policing styles. In the Old World, ‘During the decades from the 1950s to the 1990s, protest control evolved towards more flexible forms based on a more liberal understanding of demonstration rights’ (della Porta and Fillieulle 2004: 220). Change was slow-moving in the United Kingdom where, only after bitter industrial conflict, notably with the miners (in 1984–5), and the anti-poll tax débâcle (of 1990), did the policing of dissent settle into a more conciliatory groove (D. Waddington 1998). King and Brearley (1996) attribute the ‘drift’ to a more paramilitaristic style of policing in Britain in the period from 1970 to 1990 to the accumulated ‘lessons’ learned as a consequence of key ‘watershed’ events. Thus, for example, the police decision to strengthen their ‘mutual aid’ capacity and create their central co-ordinating agency, the National Reporting Centre in Scotland Yard, was a consequence of their officers being outnumbered by thousands of ‘flying pickets’ during the 1972 miners' strike. Similarly, the Bristol riot of 1980 and the ‘wave’ of urban disorders in 1981 led, not only to improvements in protective equipment, but also the publication of a secret ACPO (Association of Chief Police Officers) manual on riot-control techniques.

King and Brearley's explanation of the subsequent reversal of this dominant orientation of the British police back towards a more negotiated form of management has much in common with conclusions drawn by their American counterparts. Among the lessons drawn on the basis of (say) the set-piece confrontations of the miners' strike and the poll tax riot was that escalated disorder resulting from uncompromising police tactics not only endangered human lives, but was also uneconomical in terms of police resources and damaging to police legitimacy. For such reasons, the 1990s saw a ‘move within public order policing towards pre-emptive and proactive investigation and prediction, whilst at the same time developing a more flexible (in terms of different levels of response), highly trained and mobile public order force’ (ibid.: 100). As one of King and Brearley's respondents put it, ‘The image is now of a more caring cop on the street in view of the public, with reserves all tooled up and ready to go in the backstreets’ (quoted in ibid.: 78).

European and American scholars now agree that this drive to restore, maintain or, preferably, enhance the legitimacy, of police and state alike, lies at the root of more benign control tactics and strategies (della Porta and Fillieule, op. cit.; D. Waddington op. cit.). The following section gives close consideration to the variegated (and sometimes controversial) types of preventative measures used by the police both to achieve this primary objective and to offset the likelihood of confrontation.

Preventative police policies

An overview of preventative measures

The British academic, Peter Waddington, makes the point that, despite the fact that the Public Order Act 1986 greatly expanded the police powers to ban marches and impose conditions on marches and assemblies, constabularies throughout the United Kingdom have seldom resorted to this legislation. Waddington attributes this widespread reluctance to the determination of senior officers to avoid encountering two highly undesirable forms of ‘trouble’ (1998: 119).

On the job trouble refers to such potential problems as injury, violence, injury and damage to property, all of which may arise as a consequence of doing police work. In the job trouble alludes to the possible criticism (‘flak’ or ‘fallout’) consequent on controversial police action. This may take the form of internal criticism by superior officers or external criticism (e.g. from the media, courts, politicians or a public inquiry). Generally speaking, ‘Confrontation is, therefore, a “recipe for trouble”: an arrest for a minor offence could spark off a riot in which damage and injury result and an inquiry that threatens careers. Hence, confrontation is avoided’ (ibid.: 120).

Police reluctance to invoke public order legislation (see also Burke and James 1998) reflects a number of pragmatic calculations, such as the unavailability of sufficient officers and the possibility that resulting court cases might generate precedents to prevent its future application (P. A. J. Waddington 2003: 409). Another major reason is that police know that to invoke various statutes would be to run the risk of trouble:

Whereas the law is conceived by legislators as a means of resolving problems, its enforcement can actually create greater problems for the police. The police regard it as far easier to have a crowd assemble at a known venue and time, even if it is predicted to be hostile and unruly, than to have the same people, or even a significant minority of them, dispersed throughout central London creating havoc. Banning a march is a recipe for creating confrontation and being seen to do so. If the crowd become disorderly, the police want sufficient ‘insurance’ to deal with it adequately, but they seek to avoid allegations of provocation. The crowd must be seen to relinquish public sympathy by their actions before the police can afford to take forceful action. (P. A. J. Waddington 1994a: 381, emphasis added)

This overwhelming police desire to avoid ‘trouble’ also helps to explain why they are staunchly committed to pre-event negotiation with representatives of protest groups (P. A. J. Waddington 1994b, 1998). As a rule, the police tend to assert control, not by invoking legal powers and resorting to coercion, but ‘by mobilizing their social and organizational resources' (1998: 120). Waddington explains how senior police deploy all manner of ‘interactional practices and ploys’, and use their ‘home ground advantage’ and ‘monopoly of expertise’ regarding, for example, the most ‘suitable’ route for a march, to secure the compliance of the event organisers. This procedure is by no means automatically or universally applied: the police will consider long and hard whether organisers are suitably sincere and capable of delivering their parts of any bargain. Where police perceptions of organisers are negative, the former will resort to hard-faced ‘insurance’ tactics — i.e. having adequate numbers of well-equipped officers in reserve.

Assuming that negotiations proceed in good faith, the police will persevere with the application of other preventative measures:

Attempts subtly to extend maximum control over protest do not cease once prior arrangements have been made. On the day of any demonstration, senior officers seek to perpetuate a nonconfrontational style by overtly displaying bonhomie toward the organizer and the protesters generally, keeping the police out of view of the protesters, and controlling the progress of the march by the careful orchestration of traffic flow around it. Senior officers commanding the operation often greet the organizer of the march in full view of other protesters: hand outstretched, they address the organizer by his or her first name from some distance away, advance smiling broadly, and warmly shake the organizer's hand. They eagerly accept any invitation to brief marshals, not only to explain the respective responsibilities of marshals and police, but also to emphasize the collaborative relationship they want to exist between them. Any action that threatens to disrupt the appearance of amicable relations is stoutly rebuffed. (ibid.: 122)

Correspondingly, senior officers strive to offset the likelihood of confrontational behaviour stemming from their own ranks. One common strategy they use is to ensure the appointment of suitably reliable intermediate commanding officers. Much attention is then devoted to guaranteeing that all sectoral commanders share a common perspective regarding the management of the event in question. A similar amount of effort is devoted to ensuring that constables and sergeants are thoroughly briefed in terms of what is expected of them. Senior officers will candidly concede that part of the function of such ritual is to enable them to ‘cover their backs’ in the event of any confrontation and ensuing inquiry (ibid.: 123).

Waddington concedes that, in the final analysis, preventative strategies are less concerned with achieving a genuine process of ‘give and take’ than with ensuring that the police achieve their objectives via the least confrontational means at their disposal. Accordingly,

On the face of it, public order policing in contemporary Britain remains a triumph of ‘policing by consent’. However, political protest is still largely conducted on terms determined by the police. In other words, their interests are served and in doing so the interests of protesters are, at least, compromised. Protest is emasculated and induced to conform to the avoidance of trouble. In police argot, protest organisers are ‘had over’. (P. A. J. Waddington 1994b: 197–8)

Interviews carried out by King and Brearley (1996) with specialist police public order officers confirm that this emphasis on preventative police measures had become widespread by the mid-1990s. Their respondents acknowledge the importance of direct communication with protest organisers, intelligence and evidence gathering, and relevant training methods as ways of avoiding confrontation during demonstrations. For example, pre-event training ensures that officers are aware of a ‘sliding scale’ of possible responses to incipient or ongoing disorder as an alternative to ‘panicky overkill tactics’ (ibid., 83). Effective pre-event intelligence gathering can also help senior officers to gauge an appropriate (and cost-effective) level of response. Finally, evidence gathering (e.g. the use of video surveillance teams) means that officers do not feel obliged to respond to every incident occurring around them. They have the option to follow up an incident afterwards, rather than attempting an arrest that could prove escalatory (ibid.: 81–83).

At the community level, police have been increasingly concerned with the routine monitoring of ‘tension indicators’ as a way of anticipating and offsetting disorder before its actual occurrence (ibid.: 87–92). The concept was imported from America in the 1980s, where organisations like the National Institute of Justice maintained that certain ‘early warning signs’ often gave notice of impending disorder. Among such indicators were: increased intergroup conflict; the physical and verbal abuse of police officers; attacks on police or fire vehicles; increased media coverage of police-related incidents; and a decline in public co-operation towards the police (Field and Southgate 1982: 25). In the British context, this has involved the routine monitoring and processing of any social, economic, political and environmental signs of impending disorder. These are passed on to ‘intelligence officers’ by such diverse sources as colleagues on the beat, neighbourhood watch schemes, the media and pressure groups.

The Association of Chief Police Officers is officially committed to maintaining the use of tension indicators (ACPO 2000: 20). Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) have expressed enthusiasm for such schemes without necessarily being impressed by the current state of the art:

Effective tension indicator systems are essential in predicting the possibility of disorder. They allow forces time to work with their partners to minimise and manage the risk of disorder. The Inspection saw a number of examples of tension indicators in forces, but each had its limitations and as such no one model can be confidently recommended to forces. Her Majesty's Inspector urges the ACPO, through the Public Order Sub Committee, to continue to work in this area to develop a tension indicator system that is up to date, and informs decision making. (HMIC 1999: 62)

Controversial preventative measures

The impression just given of senior police working in benign fashion to prevent possible confrontations with sections of the public is counterbalanced b...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Full Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of figures and tables
• Acknowledgements
• Introduction
• 1 Public order policing: theoretical approaches
• 2 Theories of public disorder
• 3 The American urban riots, 1991–2001
• 4 The British urban riots, 1991–2001
• 5 Worldwide ‘anti-globalisation’ protest, post-Seattle
• 6 The G8 Justice and Home Affairs Ministers' meeting in Sheffield, June 2005
• 7 English football fans abroad, 1990–2006
• 8 Conclusions
• References
• Index