Perspectives in Sociology

E.C. Cuff, W.W. Sharrock, D.W. Framcis, A.J. Dennis, D.W. Francis

• Publisher: Taylor & Francis
• Year: 2015
• eBook ISBN: 9781317644026
• Edition: 6
• Topic: Social Sciences
• Subtopic: Sociology
• Index: Social Sciences

From its first edition in 1979, Perspectives in Sociology has provided generations of undergraduates with a clear, reassuring introduction to the complications of sociological theory. This revised and updated edition features:

• a completely rewritten general introduction and conclusion;
• all-new introductions to each part, clarifying how each one builds on what came before;
• an updated set of formative questions at the end of each chapter;
• a comprehensive glossary of key terms.

While retaining its emphasis and wealth of information on the founding figures of sociology, this sixth edition includes new tools that will allow students from related disciplines to access relevant sociological material quickly.

CHAPTER ONE Introduction

DOI: 10.4324/9781315761053-1

In the nine years since the previous edition of this book was published, much has changed socially but there has been little theoretical movement sociologically. This is, perhaps, a cause for concern. In 2006 we argued that:

There remains a sense of crisis in sociology, and realisation of the grand ambition that it should contribute to (if not play the key role in) a rational reconstruction of society for the benefit of all humanity now seems further away than ever. At the present time, there are even suspicions that the discipline has virtually put itself into liquidation.

This has not changed. Although there have been new developments (such as the growth of ‘network’ approaches, an apparently reinvigorated Marxist tradition, and the development of ‘public sociology’ – all of which are introduced in this new edition), none have successfully re-invigorated the discipline’s core concerns, aims or approaches. There have been no major disputes or crises in the discipline. It remains business as usual.

Viewed another way, however, this lack of movement may be regarded as a fruitful opportunity. As we argue here, the developments in sociological theory that dominated the discipline between the 1980s and 2000s were not without problems. The poststructuralist and postmodernist ‘turns’ came to represent abandonments of sociology’s original rationale: the possibility of progressive social change, the objectivity of social facts, and the orderly nature of social life were all consigned to the scrapheap of ‘grand narratives’. The ‘return’ to social theory offered by Giddens, Bourdieu, Habermas, et al. proved to be problematic in its own terms: attempts to synthesise Parsons and his critics ultimately resulted in social theories that were exposed to the same kinds of criticisms Parsons himself endured. And, finally, while pointing towards sociology’s liberatory and egalitarian heritage, the ‘emancipatory sociologies’ of feminism, queer theory and postcolonialism proved to resurrect the same theoretical problems faced by the symbolic interactionists’ ‘underdog bias’ and the relativist traps of postmodernism.

Social theory, we argue, has not changed much over the last ten years but – given where it was ten years ago – that does not necessarily mean it has stagnated. Empirical work is held in higher esteem, and has reasserted itself as central as the ‘post’ perspectives have declined in influence. Much of this work explicitly locates itself in pre-postmodern positions, such as Duneier’s (2000) superb study of itinerant magazine sellers in New York and (Alice) Goffman’s (2014) bestselling ethnography of young, black men wanted by the police in Philadelphia – both of which are grounded in the tradition identified here as symbolic interactionism. Analyses of the financial crash (Lanchester 2010) and rapidly increasing levels of inequality (Piketty 2014) owe much to organisational sociology and economic sociological theory respectively, and have found a wide general readership. Piketty’s Capital topped the bestseller list in 2014, mirroring the success of Hardt and Negri’s (2001) more explicitly Marxian Empire a decade before. Sociological ideas provide inputs to and controversial foci in a wide range of other disciplines, and to that extent sociology’s influence continues to spread.

In short, there seems to be an increasing hunger for the kinds of analyses sociologists have traditionally produced. The events of the 2000s and 2010s raise questions about the nature of society, social change, social order and organisation, cultural difference and integration, the relationship between economy and society – the core concerns of the discipline since Marx, Weber and Durkheim. That a number of influential writers are now addressing these concerns in a sociological manner (or at least in a manner that owes much to sociology) is cause for celebration. That these writers are not self-defined sociologists is, perhaps, less of a worry than it might be for other disciplines. Sociology has been a hybrid discipline for forty years or more, and its willingness to open up to influences from political theory (Althusser), cultural studies (Foucault), literary theory (Derrida) and elsewhere has nourished the discipline even when its ‘core’ (social theory per se) has seemed impoverished. The lack of significant theoretical development in sociology over the last ten years seems to us to indicate a hunger for genuinely new ideas as much as a gradual disenchantment with the rather stale concerns of the 1980s and 1990s. We hope this will be borne out over the lifetime of this edition.

The sixth edition of this book is, therefore, an updating and revision of the fifth, rather than a fully rewritten text. We have subdivided the text more clearly into thematic units: the founding thinkers, sociology in the English-speaking world, the European tradition, post-sociological perspectives, and contemporary trends. The text has been updated and revised, chapter introductions provided throughout, and key questions rewritten. A glossary of terms has been added, and references have been updated and corrected. New developments such as network approaches to society, autonomist-influenced Marxist trends and public sociology have been incorporated. More than anything else, though, we have retained our sense that there has been little development in sociological theory over the last ten years – but that this may soon change.

This edition is dedicated to the memory of our friend, E.C. (Ted) Cuff, who was the driving force behind Perspectives in Sociology from its first edition in 1979 to his death in October 2014. Our worlds are poorer without him.

Part I Founding thinkers

CHAPTER TWO Karl Marx

DOI: 10.4324/9781315761053-3

Chapter overview

In this chapter, Karl Marx’s ideas about the nature of society will be introduced, starting with the question of whether Marx was a humanist. The roots of his approach in the work of G. W. F. Hegel’s dialectics will be outlined, and his materialist theoretical arguments – centring on work – examined. His key concepts of alienation, class conflict and ideology will be introduced, their implications for the study of history elaborated, and the complex relationship between economic base and cultural superstructure critically examined.

Introduction

The formative, decisively influential figures affecting, first, sociological theory and, now, social theory remain the trio of Karl Marx (1818–83), Max Weber (1864–1920) and Émile Durkheim (1858–1917). Though the first of these three has now – again – apparently fallen into eclipse, none the less Marx has had a decisive and continuing influence upon the development of sociological thought. Moreover, his method, partly derived from G. W. F. Hegel, continues to exercise extensive influence. So does the problematic which he played a main role in forming. Durkheim and Weber also, to different degrees, for different reasons and in varying ways, contribute key ideas to the contemporary configuration of social thought.

We begin with Marx, whose ‘humanism’ has provided, since the 1970s, such a bone of contention.

Was Marx a humanist?

The influence of Marx’s ideas within social theory has been enormous – not just upon avowed Marxists, but much more generally. It has shaped social thinking about fundamental issues to such an extent that the defining issues of contemporary theory are largely of Marxian origin. For example, a common central theme of recent theoretical discussion, which transcends a range of perspectives and approaches, concerns the role of cultural institutions in the analysis of contemporary industrial societies. While concepts and assumptions differ across the theoretical spectrum, there is broad consensus around the idea that cultural institutions – however conceived – have taken over the dominant position in society formerly occupied by strictly economic ones. Loosely speaking, then, the issue concerns the relationship between – using Marx’s terms – the base and the superstructure. While we might now reverse the relationship that Marx posited existed between them, and recognise cultural institutions as being far more significant and powerful in shaping social life than they were in Marx’s day, the fact remains that the problem continues to be defined in its most basic terms by reference to a model of society which originates in Marx, and which is explained below. In this sense, the spectre of Marx continues to haunt social thought, even among those who explicitly reject his theories and claim to have outstripped his influence. Indeed, the base–superstructure model as a method of analysis is as popular and widespread among contemporary social theorists as it has ever been.

Humanism

The concept of humanism refers to the extent to which social theories account for the organised character of social life in terms of the individual: is social order conceived as constructed out of action? How far is structure explained by reference to the creative powers of a society’s members? In this sense, humanism is a theoretical assumption, or, better perhaps, a meta-theoretical stance, i.e. a stance looking at theory from outside.

For our purposes, a central question has dominated debates about and interpretations of Marx’s thought: ‘What does it mean to say that Marx was a humanist?’

The question we are posing, therefore, is whether this stance is correctly attributable to Marx, and if so, what follows from reading him in this way?

In developing this question, we need to begin not with Marx himself, but with G. W. F. Hegel (1770–1831).

Hegel: the dialectic of history

Hegel was the most influential thinker of the first half of the nineteenth century in Germany and, arguably, in Europe as a whole. Hegel’s philosophy aimed to give an account of history-as-a-whole. The history of all humanity can, he argued, be grasped as a single, unified, organised and rational progress. History might look like a mere accidental succession – one thing after another in a rather disorganised, chaotic sequence – but that impression is only superficial. Seen in the right way, history can be recognised as making up a coherent story about development and progress. Progress is not smooth, continuous and cumulative, but, rather, comes through struggle, conflict and discontinuity. Nevertheless, this progress is of an essentially logical kind.

How was Hegel able to make such a counter-intuitive proposal plausible? Surely struggle, conflict and change are inimical to order and logic? Grasping how these apparent opposites are reconciled is the key to Hegel’s thought. The crucial idea is that conflict is itself an orderly process, consisting in the creation and overcoming of oppositions. Compare the history of human beings to the growth of a plant from a seed. The seed contains the plant, and out of the seed grows the plant, destroying the seed. Thus the life of the plant is the development of the seed into what it has the potential to become: first, the shoot, later, the fully-grown plant. In the same way, consider history as the life of humanity, and see, therefore, that history is merely the unfolding of the potential which was present at the earliest stage of its being. History is the natural expression of the essential nature of human beings, just as the plant is the natural expression of the essential nature of the seed. Humanity must itself develop into what it has the potential to become. Note that Hegel takes it for granted that his history is a collective one, i.e. it is a history of humanity as a whole, or of large groups of people, not of particular individuals.

Just as the seed is destined to turn into a plant of a specific kind, human beings – Hegel argues – are destined to develop towards complete freedom. What human beings essentially are will never be fully expressed if their capacity for development is restricted, inhibited by circumstances; the potential of humanity will only be fully developed when they are truly free, which means free of all circumstantial inhibition. Over the course of history, human beings necessarily represent something less than the true or full nature of humanity. For just as the full potential of the seed is only realised when the plant is fully matured, so the full potential of human beings will only be realised after the period of growth – i.e. history – is over. The achievement of complete freedom will be the ‘finished growth’ of human beings. Consequently, there will be an end to history. Since history is a process of change through which humanity develops its full potential, then when that has been realised there can be no further development and therefore no further history. History is directed towards an end in two senses: (1) in the form of a particular result; (2) in being directed towards a literal end or finish.

Teleology

The notion that something is driven or striving towards a particular end is called a teleological conception; therefore Hegel presents a teleological account of human history.

The spirit of the age

In what sense does humanity develop? For Hegel, the primary manifestation of development was the development of the intellectual life, of the mind or spirit; the German term used by Hegel is Zeitgeist (i.e. ‘spirit of the age’). He held it to be plain, if one studied the history of a given people, that their art, religion and philosophy would at any given time have a certain uniformity, a common cast of mind, a shared outlook. This concept reaffirms Hegel’s collectivist aspect, for it was his firm conviction that the commonality across many different thinkers was not a matter of mere coincidence; individuals were driven by larger, widespread influences affecting them all in similar ways. In short, the mind or the spirit that drives the historical process is the mind of humanity, as manifested in particular peoples and periods, not the mind of individual thinkers.

Idealism

Hegel’s study of the mind was the study of the development of ideas, so naturally he concentrated upon those areas of society that were creative or expressive of ideas: art, abstract thought (particularly philosophy) and religion. Hence Hegel is termed an idealist: he thought that the true nature of history and human existence was to be understood in terms of the development of thought, of ideas.

The purpose and logic of history

Since the purpose of thought is to achieve knowledge, the progress of history must be towards knowledge, and the end of history will therefore come with the achievement of full knowledge and full understanding. In other words, history is completed when humanity finally comes fully to understand its own nature. The development of history is humanity’s continuing struggle to understand itself, and Hegel’s philosophy was meant to provide an understanding of humanity’s true nature as a historically, progressively developed thing which consists in self-understanding. Hegel’s philosophy amounts to the self-understanding of humanity. It should, therefore, expose the complete understanding of history and humanity’s nature – they are, after all, the same thing – and therefore comprise the finale to history. History has completed itself when it arrives at Hegel’s conclusions.

What of the nature and role of logic in this process? Since the development of history is a development of thought, and the essential process of thought is logic, it follows, then, that the development of history must be an essentially logical process. If so, Hegel’s initial claim that history-as-a-whole was ...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Half Title Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• 1 Introduction
• PART I Founding thinkers
• 2 Karl Marx
• 3 Max Weber
• 4 Émile Durkheim
• PART II Sociology in the English-speaking world
• 5 Consensus and conflict
• 6 Symbolic interaction
• 7 Ethnomethodology
• PART III The European tradition
• 8 Western Marxism
• 9 Structuralism
• PART IV Post-sociological perspectives?
• 10 Poststructuralism: abandoning the certainties of meaning
• 11 Michel Foucault: abandoning the certainties of reason
• 12 Postmodernity: abandoning grand theory
• PART V Contemporary trends
• 13 Back to sociological theory? Reconciling theoretical oppositions
• 14 From class to culture: do we need new theory for new societies?
• 15 Emancipatory sociology: stratification beyond class?
• 16 Conclusion
• Glossary
• Bibliography
• Index