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Qualitative Research as Craft
Beyond Positivist Traditions and Research Styles
The so-called qualitative turn that has overtaken the social sciences in the last several decades has yielded both a rich body of research using nonstatistical methods and a substantive amount of methodological advice on how to engage in qualitative inquiry. Together, these writings offer a dazzling array of methodological choices to tackle a multitude of research questions and problems. Yet, the task of producing high-quality research outside the positivist tradition can still seem as daunting as ever. One can even speculate that the immense diversity of qualitative options available to researchers can be somewhat overwhelming on occasion.
At the very least, any reference to qualitative research conjures up images of diverse perspectives, techniques, and styles of presentation. Ethnography, narrative analysis, participant observation, deconstruction, and focus group interviews, to name a few, are all subsumed under this label. Does qualitative research imply a state of mind, the use of specific field methods, or the employment of certain data collection and writing conventions? The fact that the answer to all of these questions is âyesâ does not make the practice of qualitative research any easier.
The only certainty to emerge out of the recent proliferation of writings on qualitative research is that it is far from being a uniform set of techniques or procedures for collecting and analyzing data. Diverse strands of qualitative research are influenced by different scholarly disciplines (e.g., literary theory and anthropology), and different ontological and epistemological assumptions (e.g., phenomenology and feminism) that transcend disciplinary boundaries. The result is a complex (and frequently bewildering) amalgamation of metaphors, paradigms, techniques, and procedures that are primarily united by their nonstatistical orientation, all falling under the rubric of qualitative research.
The resulting confusion, especially for the novice qualitative researcher, is not surprising. Not only are clear-cut guidelines hard to come by, but the variation in the usage of specific terms such as ethnography and textual analysis can be considerable. The situation is not helped by the presence of similar-sounding commonly used terms such as structuralism and structuration, or ethnography and ethnomethodology, all of which carry very different connotations for different sets of researchers. For those of us who are interested in applying qualitative methods to study businesses, organizations, consumer research, public policy, and managerial practices, there is also a heightened sense of uncertainty in using methods that seem to âbelongâ to outside disciplines such as sociology, anthropology, and communication studies.
What is needed is an appreciation of the intricate terrain we call qualitative research with all its ambiguities, tensions, and interlinkages without resorting to too many oversimplifications. Also needed is an ability to navigate this terrain in order to generate research that is both relevant and of high scholarly quality. The primary goal of this book is to untangle some of these complex methodological interconnections and to distinguish between different ways of conducting qualitative work from the standpoints of different traditions. The choice of the term tradition is central to this project and will be discussed extensively later in this chapter.
Dilemmas in Conducting Qualitative Research
Qualitative researchers are often pulled in conflicting and less-than-meaningful directions. Strongest of all is the enduring attraction of positivism that continues to influence the assumptions and values of several qualitative researchers even when they are not working with numerical data or statistical procedures. In fact, a substantial body of research in the social sciences, especially in management, organization, and business studies, suffers from various forms of positivist anxiety that is manifested in an eagerness to measure up to conventional positivist standards. Such work is best described as constituting a form of qualitative positivism (Prasad and Prasad, 2002). In brief, qualitative positivism employs nonquantitative methods of data collection such as interviews and observation within conventional positivist assumptions about the nature of social reality and the production of knowledge. For the most part, qualitative positivism adopts a relatively commonsensical and realist approach to ontological and epistemological issues. Reality is assumed to be concrete, separate from the researcher, and understandable through the accurate use of âobjectiveâ methods of data collection. Many conventional case studies (e.g., Burgelman, 1994) are rooted either explicitly or implicitly within the assumptions of qualitative positivism.
Positivism retains its intellectual hold over many qualitative researchers because of its provenance in the models of the natural sciences that are still perceived (in some quarters) as the only legitimate mode of conducting scientific inquiry. However, as Max Weber (1949) observed, it is useful to understand the differences between the natural and the social sciences before firmly concluding how science is to be conducted. The firstâNaturwissenschaft, or the science of the natural worldâemerges out of the traditions of the âhardâ sciences that examine natural or biological phenomena. The secondâGeisteswissenschaftâis the tradition producing knowledge about the cultural/social world. According to Weber (1949), Naturwissenschaft remains the main inspiration for positivism in the social sciences, even though it is Geisteswissenschaft that is the more appropriate tradition in which to locate the study of human action and interaction.
There are several reasons for Weberâs conclusion. First, as Bernstein (1985), Weber (1949), and others argued, the assumptions guiding positivism derive from the study of largely inanimate or biological phenomena that lack the capacity for self-reflection and cultural production. By contrast, the social sciences are inevitably concerned with social, economic, and cultural worlds that are constituted by the human capacity for meaningful understanding and action. According to Flyvbjerg (2001), this human capacity for interpretation incessantly thwarts the social science dream of becoming the mirror image of the natural sciences. Furthermore, such a dream is not merely impossible, it is also pointless inasmuch as positivism is ill-equipped to answer many questions of interest to social science. These include questions such as why organizational reform efforts are frequently met with resistance; which cultural features are most responsible for the collapse of corporate ethics; or how organizations socialize their members. In essence, the Geisteswissenschaft tradition that draws from history, philosophy, jurisprudence, rhetorics, and literary theory may well be far more suited to answering questions that deal with organizations and social processes.
If positivism is unable to offer meaningful guidelines for qualitative researchers, where can they find their methodological inspiration? In their efforts to bypass positivism, some researchers adopt an excessively casual approach to data collection and analysis, arguing that a completely open-ended and open-minded stance is the best way to conduct qualitative inquiry. The primary motto of this group appears to be âanything goes.â Theoretical preconceptions are studiously avoided, and little effort is made to develop a sharp research focus grounded in theory. The implicit assumption here is that sustained encounters with the field will, on their own, guarantee the emergence of sound qualitative findings.
Although some researchers may well serendipitously arrive at this desired place, such a lackadaisical approach is not likely to advance our understanding of social phenomena in meaningful ways. The absence of theoretical grounding, the lack of a theoretically driven focus, the failure to develop careful and well-structured methodologies, and an unawareness of the fundamental assumptions underpinning oneâs fieldwork are more likely to result in a piece of work that is closer to a shabby and pedestrian form of journalism. Such studies can do little more than report and categorize the results of interviewing and observation. They are likely to produce âliteral translationsâ (Stablein, 1996, 513) of empirical situations that are relatively simplistic and unsurprising descriptions of social processes.1
In sum, neither positivism nor an atheoretical version of exploratory research can provide useful guidelines for qualitative researchers. The tenets of positivism are somewhat inadequate for the understanding of complex, nuanced, and context-dependent social processes. A completely open-ended approach, on the other hand, is careless in its neglect of theoretical foundations and in its failure to acknowledge its own meta-theoretical assumptions. In the next section, it is suggested that proficient qualitative research can only develop within reputed and inspiring intellectual craft traditions. Such research is at once theoretically grounded and methodologically rigorous (even if its rigor takes different forms from that which is to be found in positivist research). Before we proceed with examining such work, we need to appreciate what is meant by suggesting that the research process is best understood as a craft.
Qualitative Research as Craft: Research Traditions and Styles
The case for qualitative research being regarded as a form of proficient craft-work has many advocates. Some argue that all genres of scientific inquiry have strong elements of craftwork, whereas others hold that nonpositivist inquiry is more artistic and craftsman-like than scientific on account of its affinities with narrative genres such as history, literature, and philosophy. Both positions possess considerable merit.
The first position attained prominence with the lively debates in the philosophy and sociology of science that were precipitated by Thomas Kuhnâs (1970) fundamental questioning of the notion that scientific knowledge was the result of a slow and steady process of incremental accumulation. Since then, countless commentators have undermined the belief that scientific method strictly follows the logical principles of deduction, induction, and falsification (Feyra-bend, 1987; Lakatos, 1965). A substantial body of work convincingly asserts that the actual mundane practice of science bears little resemblance to the formal models of scientific procedure (Latour, 1987). In particular, increasingly apparent are the messy, random, and creative elements in science, as well as the key role of constructs and interpretive frames in coming up with scientific categories. Stablein (1996) even proposes that many scholars would now conclude that scientists invent rather than discover the empirical world. If this is indeed the case, scientific practice itself (and by extension, the application of positivism in the social sciences) can no longer be understood as a rigid adherence to scientific protocol. Instead, science in practice becomes an inventive form of crafts-manship that is constantly engaged in adjusting and reconfiguring scientific protocols to meet the vagaries of each unique empirical situation.
The second position, best exemplified by Flyvbjerg (2001), relies on Aristotleâs (1976) discussion of intellectual virtues to contend that the qualitative branches of the social sciences are much closer to ideals of craft than to conventional scientific models. Flyvbjerg sees positivism as corresponding to Aristotleâs notion of episteme, which is only one of the intellectual virtues elaborated in his Nicomachean Ethics. Episteme is concerned with the production of knowledge that has universal application and is invariable across time and space. Episteme is guided by analytical rationality and corresponds closely to the modern ideal of science that grew out of Enlightenment thinking. Positivism, which is virtually identical to epistemic thinking, has gradually come to be regarded as the only legitimate way of doing science.
Flyvbjerg (2001), however, also points out that in the Aristotelian mindset, epistemic knowledge production is only one way of doing science. Techne, which is a far more suitable model for qualitative research, is another way and is influenced by notions of artisanship and craftwork. Because qualitative research is more concerned with process, context, and intricate detail, it can draw meaningful inspiration from techne rather than from episteme. Techne is best summarized by Flyvbjerg (2001, 56) himself, who notes that âTechne is thus craft and art, and as an activity it is concrete, variable and context-dependent. The objective of techne is the application of technical knowledge and skills according to a pragmatic instrumental rationality.â
Thus, whether one believes qualitative research belongs to the genre of episteme or techne, there is no getting away from its practice as craft. This entire book is premised on the assumption of qualitative research as craft. Working at a craft requires the development and perfection of skills and expertise that are usually handed down through several generations. Craftwork also involves the disciplined creativity that results in a tangible and well-made productâin this case, the piece of research. Knowledge of methods and theoretical paradigms alone is therefore insufficient for engaging in the craft of research. Of much more value is the notion of an intellectual tradition. Although working within a tradition involves the understanding of oneâs own paradigm and preferred method, it is also much more than paradigm or method.
Different orientations toward research and knowledge have been identified with the help of the term paradigm. First popularized by Thomas Kuhn (1970) and later by Burrell and Morgan (1979), paradigm is often used to designate a shared set of ontological and epistemological assumptions that unites a community of scholars and prescribes specific guidelines for conducting research. Researchers often describe themselves as working in the ethno-graphic paradigm or the radical humanist paradigm. Paradigm, however, can frequently be somewhat misleading, presenting a false sense of commonality among a group of researchers. In the material world of actual research practice, the tidy abstraction of the paradigm as a hermetic domain of shared assumptions and worldviews quickly begins to give way to the messy reality of contested ideas, multiple ongoing influences, and constant experimentation.
The concept of method refers in general to the appropriate use of techniques of data collection and analysis. Discussions of method typically focus on interview protocols, observational formats, and variants of document analyses. For methods to prove insightful, however, more than knowledge of technique is required. Methods themselves are linked to larger paradigmatic issues and are often appropriated in diverse ways within the same and different paradigms.
Traditions, as we have already noted, are somewhat more complex. Traditions govern every sphere of craftworkâin music, art, literature, architecture, and filmmaking. One can work in the baroque, jazz, surrealist, art deco, or film noir traditions. Each tradition develops its own distinct style of producing the novel, film, artwork, or musical score. These styles tend to be influenced by prominent figures, central assumptions, and emergent conventions. Qualitative research is no different and can also be regarded as a craft drawing on a specific intellectual tradition. A research tradition (Hamilton, 1993; Jacob, 1987) is best conceptualized as a complex ensemble of assumptions, world-views, orientations, procedures, and practices. A scholarly or intellectual tradition intimates an entire way of conducting scholarship rather than merely offering a choice of technique or a uniform set of assumptions. Understanding different traditions of scholarship can help researchers identify the match between their own intellectual preferences and a particular mode of inquiry so that they can develop a research style that is personally meaningful and simultaneously meets the standards of a wider academic community.
The idea of an intellectual tradition therefore subsumes both method and paradigm while at the same time offering much more. Traditions are constantly in the process of being created and passed on by communities of practice. They are therefore never as clearly specified or as neat as research methods or paradigms. To Hamilton (1993), traditions resemble âmessy social movementsâ rather than pristine sets of rules handed down from one generation of scholars to another. âTraditions can be invented, established, ransacked, corrupted and eliminated⌠the history of traditions is as much a narrative of diaspora as it is a chronicle of successful parallel cohabitationâ (Hamilton, 1993, 62). Becoming familiar with the different qualitative traditions can give researchers a better understanding of the entire spectrum of choices available to them and a stronger sense of the distinctions between variants of qualitative research. Given the wide range of traditions present in the qualitative terrain (e.g., ethnography, semiotics, critical theory, and symbolic interaction), such an awareness is increasingly becoming more necessary. One of the bookâs goals, therefore, is to highlight the main features of each tradition with detailed implications for the design, conduct, and presentation of research.
The majority of qualitative orientations found in the social sciences and humanities, however, are best described as non-positivistic by inclination. In other words, they tend to approach questions of social reality and knowledge production from a more problematized vantage point, emphasizing the constructed nature of social reality, the constitutive role of language, and the value of research as critique. As stated earlier, non-positivism is far from being a single invariant tradition. Sometimes also referred to as the narrative tradition, it includes (among others) a number of diverse genres such as dramatism, hermeneutics, critical theory, semiotics, and poststructuralismâall of which are primarily united in their rejection of prominent positivist assumptions. At the same time, these traditions develop somewhat unique conventions regarding the conduct of research, despite many interlacing congruencies and influences. The focus of this book is exclusively on the non-positivist traditions rather than on the entire spectrum of qualitative ones.
About the Book
The book provides a detailed overview of the major non-positivist traditions and focuses on four comprehensive meta-traditions (or Traditions with a capital T): (1) interpretive, (2) structuralist, (3) critical, and (4) âpostâ traditions. Within each broad tradition, a number of subtraditions are outlined and described. For example, within the interpretive tradition, it is possible to identify the subtraditions of symbolic interaction, hermeneutics, ethnography, ethnomethodology, and dramatism. Although all of these subtraditions share the fundamental intellectual orientations of interpretive or social constructionist philosophy, they diverge in their empirical preoccupations, the development of certain key concepts, their preferences for some modes of data collection, and their writing and presentation styles. Over time, each of these traditions has produced certain shared (to a large extent) conventions about the conduct and presentation of research, resulting in a distinctive scholarly style that tends to be associated with them. The hermeneutic tradition, for instance, uses the notion of âtextâ to study the social world, whereas dramaturgy employs that of the stage or âtheaterâ for the same purpose. Not surprisingly perhaps, the hermeneutic tradition shows a strong preference for the analysis of documents, whereas researchers in the dramaturgical tradition tend to favor observation. Yet both traditions are committed to similar assumptions about the socially constructed nature of reality that are at the core of the interpretive tradition. Often, owing to unique historical circumstances, each tradition can develop along different lines within the same basic ontological and epistemological parameters.
The book offers a detailed exposition of each tradition ...