The Making of Eurosceptic Britain

Identity and Economy in a Post-Imperial State

Chris Gifford

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2017
• ISBN:
  9781317024781
• Edition: 2
• Topic: Politique et relations internationales
• Subtopic: Politique européenne

What has been the political impact of the Eurozone Debt Crisis in the UK? To what extent have the bank collapses and bailouts reinforced Britain's Eurosceptic trajectory? In this revised and updated second edition Chris Gifford addresses these key questions reflecting on the Labour government's approach to Europe while exploring the extensive mobilisation of Eurosceptic forces in opposition to the Conservative-led coalition government. The book examines the extent to which Euroscepticism has become dominant within both the Conservative leadership and the bulk of its parliamentary party and how this has affected the relationship of the coalition government with the European Union. By placing current attitudes to Europe in relation to the wider history of Britain's post war interaction with its continental neighbours the author shows how British Euroscepticism is structural in nature and a persistent and institutionalised feature of UK Politics.

Chapter 1
Introduction

Britain's¹ relationship with the European Union² has been a matter of intense political debate since the Macmillan government first proposed British membership in 1961. In the emergent post-imperial context, the issue went to the heart of British political identity and organisation. It encapsulated the extent to which the British political and social order was in transition, and the tensions that arose as a consequence of these changes. Britain's European trajectory seemed to have been secured when Edward Heath signed the Treaty of Rome in 1972 and there was a resounding vote in support of membership in the 1975 referendum. Nevertheless, it has been accompanied by the persistent rise of a domestic Euroscepticism centred on the fundamental belief that the true sentiments and interests of 'the British people'³ are antithetical to European integration. Its impact was demonstrated in 2013. the fortieth anniversary of British accession, when David Cameron committed the Conservative party to holding a second referendum on membership. The decision underlined the extent to which Britain's position in the EU remained highly uncertain and intensely critical.

This book argues that a point has been reached where opposition to European integration can no longer be viewed as a contained or temporary facet of British politics but is both essential and systemic to what Britain has become. Thus it explores the historical unfolding of the institutionalisation of Euroscepticism as part of its post-imperial trajectory. This opening chapter sets out the key debates and the general direction of the book. In so doing it makes the case for shifting our perspective from British Euroscepticism to the making of Eurosceptic Britain.

The Concept of Euroscepticism

The origins of the term Euroscepticism can be traced back to articles in The Times in 1985 and 1986 (Spiering, 2004, p. 127). It was a term used to refer to the emergence of a section of the British right within the Conservative party that was increasingly opposed to the second wave of integration initiated by the Delors Commission.⁴ Over the following decades, the term has morphed from journalese to becoming a distinctive area of academic political research. A pre-existing socially constituted meaning has become subject to investigation in order to deepen, systematise and. ultimately, explain a facet of contemporary political reality.

The maturation of the academic study of Euroscepticism was demonstrated by Mudde's (2012) characterisation of the field as consisting of two distinct Schools: Sussex and North Carolina. The Sussex School stems from the work of Paul Taggart and Aleks Szczerbiak (2008a. 2008b) while the North Carolina School is associated with Lisbet Hooghe. Gary Marks and Leonard Ray (Ray. 1999; Hooghe and Marks. 2005, 2007, 2009). If the Sussex School has focused on detailed national case studies and definitional refinements, the North Carolina School has stressed broad ideological positions and their connection to parties and public opinion across Europe. In their mapping of the configuration of Eurosceptic politics. Szczerbiak and Taggart made their well-known distinction between hard and soft Euroscepticism (2008a. pp. 7-8; 2008b. pp. 247-8). They conceived of hard Euroscepticism as principled opposition to the integrationist project, whether opposed to its institutional and constitutional foundations or to its overarching policy agenda. Soft Euroscepticism. meanwhile, was concerned with a more qualified opposition that rejected and criticised specific policies, or gave prominence to national concerns and interests in opposition to integration (2008a. pp. 7-8). While soft Euroscepticism may include contestation of the EU as an ongoing project of integration, hard Euroscepticism would also include those who may nominally support it but wish to see a fundamental redrawing of the terms of their countiy's membership (p. 8). In contrast, the North Carolina School has focused on ideology and the relationship between party ideology and public opinion. In so doing they highlighted a left/right socio-economic divide on European integration, but this was soon eclipsed by a focus on political identities and their GAL (green/alternative/libertarian) versus TAN (traditionalism/authority/ nationalism) classification (Hooghe and Marks. 2009, p. 16). The two Schools have therefore predominantly focused on mapping Euroscepticism, drawing on teams of national experts to develop in-depth case studies in the case of Sussex, or quantitative surveys and large scale data sets in North Carolina.

The importance of this body of work became apparent when. post-Maastricht, it was clearly evident that Euroscepticism was a significant and persistent feature of the dynamics of European integration. However, this also highlighted weaknesses with the dominant approaches. As Euroscepticism became more ubiquitous, complex and diverse, it was clear that broad comparative maps of the political parties and public attitudes could not do justice to specific contexts and the array of actors involved. In this regard, Usherwood and Startin's (2013) call for more holistic, nuanced and interdisciplinary approaches was an astute and significant contribution. In the British case, an extensive literature had documented the problems Britain's politicians experienced with European integration both before and after membership (see Kaiser. 2002). but these were not explicitly viewed through the lens of Euroscepticism.

At the start of the twenty-first century this began to change when Stephen George (2000) argued that Britain was no longer simply an 'awkward partner' but should be considered as a 'Eurosceptic state', because of the complex and persistent expressions of Euroscepticism within and across a range of domestic actors and institutions. Forster (2002) was more explicit in his criticism of existing approaches, which, he argued, failed to provide a systematic explanation of the role and influence of sceptical groupings on government policy. In a compendious work of contemporary political history, Forster documented the key factors that explained how Eurosceptics were able at certain times to act as a significant force of opposition and influence the direction of European policy. Forster was therefore primarily concerned with the expression of Euroscepticism as a fragmented movement of opposition within mainstream party politics

A central concern is the extent to which Euroscepticism can be explained by the institutions of British representative democracy. The main proposition of the party-based comparative literature is that Euroscepticism can be broadly explained in terms of the organisation of competitive political systems that are characteristic of liberal democratic states. In line with this. Szczerbiak and Taggart summarised two main findings from the research on party-based Euroscepticism:

The first is that opposition to the EU brings together 'strange bedfellows' of some very different ideologies. Opposition extends from new politics, old far left politics through regionalism to new populism and neo-fascism in the far right. The second point is that opposition to the EU seems to be related to the positions of parties in their party systems. It differentiates between parties at the core and those at the periphery in the sense that wholly Eurosceptical parties are at the peripheries of their party systems while parties at the core are generally not Eurosceptical

(2000, p. 5)

In the British case, studies have focused on the factional nature of Euroscepticism within political parties and this has been accounted for in terms of the distinctiveness of British political institutions in structuring opposition (Aspinwall. 2000; Usherwood. 2002). In those countries characterised by power sharing governments, a range of institutional mechanisms enables the 'Eurosceptic social voice' to be 'filtered out' (Aspinwall. 2000. p. 433). In comparison. British governments operating in a system of one party rale have to give greater consideration to backbench Eurosceptic opinion than proportional representation systems that tend to produce broad centrist governments. Governments in this situation have been shown to adopt negative positions towards European integration as a consequence of strong opposition within party ranks, particularly when faced with small majorities (pp. 434-6). A further feature of these institutional dynamics has been the externalisation of Eurosceptic opposition (Usherwood. 2002). The fudging of European policy, the failure to manage powerful Eurosceptic factions and a lack of salience across public opinion results in a radical extra-parliamentary Eurosceptic mobilisation that has major implications for party cohesion. From this perspective, the significance of Euroscepticism is to be found in a specific set of British institutional dynamics that has allowed Eurosceptic factionalism within the main parties to take on a particular significance. In summary, the peculiarities of the British political system creates comparatively more opportunities for Eurosceptics to influence mainstream party positions and government policy, and is that much harder to 'filter out'.

Both Aspinwall and Usherwood downplay explanations of British Euroscepticism in terms of ideological factors; however, their analyses suggest a crisis of political leadership and party cohesion that clearly has a significant ideological dimension. If we address issues of ideology, and of political culture more widely, then the focus on Euroscepticism as the politics of factionalism and opposition becomes problematic. Baker, Gamble and Seawright (2002), for instance, drew attention to the ideological dimensions of Euroscepticism across British Conservatism. On this view, recent Euroscepticism in the Conservative party has been fundamentally driven by a powerful hyperglobalist ideology at the very centre of the party. The key elements of this ideology include national economic and political independence within a global free market that implies a fundamental opposition to European integration. Gamble (2003) expanded on these tensions more broadly in his study of Between Europe and America: the Future of British Politics. In advocating a 'traditional open seas policy of seeking the most rapidly growing markets and the cheapest sources of supply'. Eurosceptics combined nationalism with globalism, reviving powerful 'world island' narratives (Gamble. 2003, p. 130).

The prevalence of a distinctive ideological Euroscepticism within British political parties makes it essential to connect developments in the party system to the wider historical and cultural context. It is the very 'otherness' of a European identity en masse that Spiering argued was so particular to the British case; 'in other European countries such a differentiation makes no sense' (2004, p. 145). What is more the emotiveness of 'Europe' constituted as a national threat meant it easily became a resource for politicians and the press to exploit (p. 145). Spiering pointed to deep cultural antecedents of contemporary British Euroscepticism, which shaped more contingent political forces (p. 146). In a similar vein, from a constructivist approach, Daddow noted that 'Europe has. historically, been heterotypified as a hostile Other in popular discourse of an "exceptional" British identity' (2011. p. 133). His central argument, however, concerned the inability of the preinierships of Blair and Brown to significantly challenge this discursive domain defined by European 'otherness'. Indeed, in adhering to traditional. establishment conceptions of British foreign policy and the national interest they found themselves complicit in its reproduction. The failure of New Labour's Europeanism was indicative of its failure to reinvent a common British identity in the context of an increasingly plural and diverse society and in the face of the forces of separatist nationalism that had come to the fore with devolution. This pointed to the deeper set of cultural dynamics associated with the post-imperial demise of Britishness that Wellings argued was driving Euroscepticism (2012). On this account Euroscepticism emerged from the 1960s onwards as the expression of an English nationalism embedded in the timeless endurance of Anglo sovereignty, ingrained in the deep bonds with the old Commonwealth and. importantly, un-yielding in the face of Nazism. With entry into the EC the old allegiances of the Anglo-sphere were expected to be sacrificed and sovereignty surrendered to an unknown finalit/l=e'/ of European unity. It was the final proof that England may have won the war but it had 'lost the peace' (Wellings, 2010). Thus, imagined as a fundamental threat to the nation. Europe provided the 'other' against which a popular and populist Englishness could be mobilised. For Wellings Euroscepticism enables us to explain English nationalism but it also emerges as a lens through which political cultural change can be viewed.

The literature therefore points to British Euroscepticism as a persistent phenomenon within contemporary British politics: however, its treatment as a cumulative and independent political force, institutionalised over time, remains underdeveloped. While it manifests in a variety of forms across parties, the media, public opinion and civil society, it is not reducible to any particular one or any combination of these, and should therefore be approached systemically. As such, it is the contention of this book that Euroscepticism emerges in the interplay between agency and structure. played out within specific contexts, where its presence becomes embedded over time. From this viewpoint. Eurosceptic outcomes are identified by a historically grounded analysis of political interaction and contextualised struggle. These outcomes in turn determine what is feasible and legitimate action over Europe that ultimately comprises a complex duality of structure and agency (Hay and Wincott. 1998. p. 956). The analysis presented of Britain and Europe identifies both the idealist and materialist tensions that underpin this relationship, and their reproduction and re-articulation by political actors within changing historical circumstances.

Definitions and Explanations

Any workable definition of Euroscepticism has to combine inclusivity with sensitivity to context. While the hard/soft distinction has proved particularly productive, the problem emerges that soft Euroscepticism has, in today's Europe, become so ubiquitous that it becomes too inclusive to shed light on specific contexts (Mudde, 2012, p. 201). One option proposed by de Wilde and Trenz (2012, p. 540), and utilised here, is to define Euroscepticism as polity contestation and not as policy contestation. On this view it is a public discourse, not reducible to political parties, that concerns the legitimacy of European integration. Eurosceptics take issue with the competencies and constitutional architecture of the EU and its underlying integrationist raison d'etre. This definition aligns with Taggart and Szczerbiak's hard Euroscepticism but is located within a broader conception of the de-legitimation of the EU. While this form of Euroscepticism may be comparatively new in many European countries, the point about the British case is that it is well-established and quite nuanced. Political actors, from governing elites to populist outsiders, have consistently contested the legitimacy of an integrating Europe, even when they have recognised the necessity of British membership. Hence, a broad definition of hard Euroscepticism informs the arguments presented in this book. Taking this view more extreme forms of British Euroscepticism may represent a radicalisation of mainstream political ideas and positions, and align with varying degrees to wider attitudes and beliefs. In Mudde's (2010) terms they are not an exception to the normal politics of a contemporary democratic state but part of a 'pathological normalcy'. This is not to exclude the reality and possibility of British Europeanism but, for the most part, political actors occupy an institutionalised Eurosceptic environment that shapes their political positions on the EU. This environment is characterised by three overarching features summarised below, which, when taken together, explain the making of Eurosceptic Britain.

A Eurosceptic Populism

A central proposition of this book is that developments in British politics have embedded a structural susceptibility to populist politics that has taken on a significant Eurosceptic dimension. In a context of imperial decline, political actors have looked to regenerate the 'nation' by identifying 'others' against which a 'new' Britain can be redefined. Recent analyses of populism have shifted the focus on to the autonomous capacity of discursive practices to independently constitute political subjects (Laclau. 2005; Mouffe. 2005). It involves the re-aggregation of differences within a political subject and the construction of an internal frontier with an enemy clearly identified on the other side of that frontier (Laclau, 2005 pp. 37-9). The point here is that populist strategies and movements do not represent any stable or coherent collective actors beyond which they discursively and antagonistically constitute. Once the theoretical core is specified, other characteristics can be identified as potentially part of the general logic of populism (Canovan. 1999. pp. 3-7; Meny and Surel. 2002. pp. 12-13). It has a characteristic mood that sets it apart from everyday, routine politics and adopts a specific style of politics that involves simple and direct language, analyses and solutions to problems. In so doing complex political debates are presented in dichotomous terms: the central opposition of 'the people' and 'the other' give rise to simplistic moral discourses of 'right' and 'wrong' and 'good' and 'bad'. Finally, populist movements structure the political debate, forcing 'more habitual participants into a defensive posture and into changing the way discussion takes place, issues are framed, and constituencies mobilised' (Taggart. 2002, p. 78); hence, they re-imagine political identities in ways that can have a wide significance across political cultures.

A populist and exclusive British Euroscepticism should be situated within a post-imperial context and conceived as a broad-based, albeit fragmented, populist movement mobilising and configuring national and political identities. As such it transcends the mainstream party system to include populist protest and anti-establishment parties; policy, pressure and interest groups; civil society organisations independent of political parties and. importantly, a large segment of the national press. Membership of the EC could not be debated without invoking the nation and 'the people'. Europe was re-imagined by Eurosceptic forces as the 'other' of British political identity and interests. It was symbolically constituted as a threat to Britain's exceptional social and political development. By turning Europe into a fundamental political issue, what we find is that it was no longer contained by the party system and the capacity to establish the kind of political consensus on the issue that was evident in other member-states proved impossible. While Eurosceptic mobilisations and episodes evidently manifest within the established British party system, they are not reducible to it. Instead. Euroscepticism intermeshes with mainstream politics, furthering the crisis of the British party system and the capacity of governing elites to achieve an effective and stable European policy.

The book then discusses three key populist moments in the British politics of Europe. The first period of Eurosceptic mobilisation took place from the 1971 'Great Debate' on membership, to accession and the 1975 referendum. The 1970s signalled the rise of populist Euroscepticism as a political phenomenon that could profoundly determine the structure and direction of mainstream British politics; politicians on both the left and right were prepared to sacrifice party unity for an issue they considered to be fundamental to 'the British people'. The subsequent two Eurosceptic mobilisations discussed in this book focus on the Conservative party but are not limited to the party system. First: the rebellions over the Maastricht Treaty that divided the party and went on to dominate the Major government's period in office. Second: the Eurosceptic opposition to the Coalition government's European policy and the campaign for an IN/OUT referendum. Populist Eurosceptic mobilisations are a defining feature of Eurosceptic Britain, e...