Places of Pain and Shame

Dealing with 'Difficult Heritage'

William Logan, Keir Reeves, William Logan, Keir Reeves

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2008
• eBook ISBN: 9781134051489
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Business
• Subtopic: Museum Administration
• Index: Business

Places of Pain and Shame is a cross-cultural study of sites that represent painful and/or shameful episodes in a national or local community's history, and the ways that government agencies, heritage professionals and the communities themselves seek to remember, commemorate and conserve these cases – or, conversely, choose to forget them.

Such episodes and locations include: massacre and genocide sites, places related to prisoners of war, civil and political prisons, and places of 'benevolent' internment such as leper colonies and lunatic asylums. These sites bring shame upon us now for the cruelty and futility of the events that occurred within them and the ideologies they represented. They are however increasingly being regarded as 'heritage sites', a far cry from the view of heritage that prevailed a generation ago when we were almost entirely concerned with protecting the great and beautiful creations of the past, reflections of the creative genius of humanity rather than the reverse – the destructive and cruel side of history.

Why has this shift occurred, and what implications does it have for professionals practicing in the heritage field? In what ways is this a 'difficult' heritage to deal with? This volume brings together academics and practitioners to explore these questions, covering not only some of the practical matters, but also the theoretical and conceptual issues, and uses case studies of historic places, museums and memorials from around the globe, including the United States, Northern Ireland, Poland, South Africa, China, Japan, Taiwan, Cambodia, Indonesia, Timor and Australia.

Part I
Massacre and genocide sites

Chapter 1
Let the dead be remembered

Interpretation of the Nanjing Massacre Memorial

Qian Fengqi

The ‘Memorial Hall for the Victims of the Nanjing Massacre by Japanese Invaders to China’ (hereafter referred to as the Nanjing Massacre Memorial or the Memorial) is the first memorial in China commemorating Chinese victims of Japanese atrocities during World War II. Since its construction in 1985, this Memorial, designated by Central Government as a national site for patriotic education, has reportedly received over 10 million visitors (Nanjing Massacre Memorial official website).

The massacre remains large in the memory of Nanjing citizens. A negative event tends to impact people in such a way that it leaves a deep ‘scar’ in people’s memory. This is because, psychologically, ‘memory for traumatic and highly emotional negative events tends to be reasonably accurate and better retained over time than is memory for more routine experiences’ (Goodman and Paz-Alonso 2006: 234). Yet in Freud’s view, strong unpleasant emotions might be actively suppressed and inaccessible to consciousness. In his book Justice and Reconciliation: After the Violence, Andrew Rigby (2001: 1) observed that it would seem obvious that most people want to forget past pain and, therefore, opening up the past may not be the best way of healing. So how difficult is it for a society to discard, or to retain past traumas such as the Nanjing Massacre, even some seventy years after its occurrence?

The Nanjing Massacre is known worldwide, having attracted activists and campaigns in the West following the phenomenal sales of Iris Chang’s The Rape of Nanjing: The Forgotten Holocaust of World War II in 1997. It is a core historical issue affecting Sino-Japanese relations, reflected in the controversy over Japanese history textbooks (Askew 2002). In reviewing Masahiro Yamamoto’s 2000 book Nanking: Anatomy of an Atrocity, David P. Barrett (2003) contended that the focal points of dispute regarding this massacre were the number of people killed and the placing of responsibility. Japanese views regarding the scale of the massacre are widely divided. According to historian Hata Ikuhiko of Nihon University, people holding different views on this issue fall into three categories based on political orientation and assessment of the number of Chinese killed: radicals (the ‘massacre faction’); conservatives (the ‘illusion’ faction); and moderates (the ‘in-between’ faction) (Hata 1998). In his analysis of controversies about the Nanjing Massacre, Masahiro Yamamoto tags groups of people in the debate as ‘extreme traditionalists’, ‘moderate traditionalists’, ‘moderate revisionists’, ‘extreme revisionists’ and so forth. His research shows that opinions in Japan about the number of victims vary from 300,000 or more, held by ‘extreme traditionalists’, to 50, held by ‘extreme revisionists’ who deny that the Nanjing Massacre ever happened at all (Yamamoto 2000: 254).

The attempt to deny the Nanjing Massacre by the ‘illusion faction’ caused severe concern in China. This reached a height in 1982 when, following a bill conceived in 1981 to tighten government control over school textbooks, the Japanese Education Ministry screened history textbooks to make sure they played down reference to Japanese aggressive behaviour during the Asia-Pacific War (1934–45) (Yoshida 2000: 84). In response to the textbook controversy, a series of actions were taken on the Chinese side. These included officially protesting against the Japanese Education Ministry’s attempt to water down the content about Japanese aggression and wartime atrocities such as the Nanjing Massacre, publishing research findings on the massacre, introducing an annual commemorative ceremony on the anniversary of the fall of Nanjing, as well as building the Nanjing Massacre Memorial.

This chapter attempts to identify changes of attitude in China towards this atrocity; the identity of the victims; the objectives of the current interpretation of the massacre; and the internal and external factors contributing to the changes. It begins with a review of the way in which memories of the massacre were treated in China before the 1980s. The construction of the Memorial is examined with regard to the internal and external political environments, and the dispute between China and Japan over the textbook controversy. The interpretation of the massacre at the Memorial is then examined by analysing the rationale of the architecture and the exhibitions, and assessment is made regarding the message being communicated.

Discussions in this chapter relate to the status of the Memorial as at June 2006. The current site was erected in 1985 and renovated in 1995 but the site is being extended from mid-2006 and is due to be re-opened in December 2007, marking the 70th anniversary of the fall of Nanjing to the Japanese invaders. At the time of writing, the renovation project is still underway.

Memories of the Nanjing massacre

In July 1937 the Chinese and Japanese troops opened fire on each other at Lu Gou Qiao (Marco Polo Bridge) near Beijing. This event, known internationally as the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, ignited full-scale Japanese aggression in China as well as the all-nation resistance to the aggression, referred to as the Anti-Japanese War, which ended with the Japanese surrender in 1945.

For months after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, the Japanese military thrust southwards to expand its occupation of China. Having taken control of Shanghai, the Japanese troops began pushing towards Nanjing, the Chinese capital at the time. The occupation of Shanghai and the invasion of Nanjing encountered fierce resistance from the Chinese army, but the defence of Nanjing was doomed. On 13 December 1937, Nanjing fell to the Japanese. The following six weeks or so witnessed atrocities that were later known as the Nanjing Massacre or the Rape of Nanjing, conducted under the pretext of searching for and executing Chinese soldiers. During this period of time, hundreds of thousands of Chinese, including civilians, were killed. Properties were looted and destroyed, and women were assaulted.

According to the judgement on the war crime of Tani Hisao by the Nanjing Military Tribunal in 1947, 300,000 people were killed in this massacre (Hu 2006: 389).¹ Mass burials began early in 1938 when the worst of the massacre eased. There were about 13 major mass burial sites, mainly scattered on the western side of Nanijing near the Yangtze River, where many bodies were disposed of.

Joshua Fogel (2000) stated that these atrocities have never been accorded the importance or status they warrant in modern history (Fogel 2000: 1–2). Indeed, over the decades, China, Japan and the international community said little about the Nanjing Massacre, a situation referred to by Caroline Rose (2005: 36) as ‘collective amnesia’. Until the 1980s, memories of the massacre seemed to be buried with the victims. Public commemoration of the event was rare.

It has to be understood that up to the early 1980s, memories of the Anti-Japanese War in China were shaped by the strategic imperatives and official ideology of the time. Bob T. Wakabayashi (2007: 3–4) listed some contributing factors to the amnesia about the Nanjing Massacre until the 1980s: the Nationalist regime’s priority after the war was to eliminate its Communist rivals; the Communist Party, after taking over power in 1949, was preoccupied with consolidating its regime as well as internal and external problems such as the Korean War, famine, the Sino-Soviet split and the traumatic Cultural Revolution. Official propaganda focused on the Chinese people’s fight against the Japanese, and their ultimate victory over Japanese aggression. Discussions about the victimisation of China were discouraged. Records show that in the 1960s when a group of Nanjingbased historians conducted research on this massacre, their work could not be published, one of the historians being accused of stirring up national hatred against the Japanese people (Yang 1999).

There were more intrinsic factors contributing to this lack of attention and public commemoration. National pride and the determined self-reliance policy of the Chinese government during the post-1949 era are counted by researchers as key factors influencing the Chinese government’s position on the past until the 1980s (Eykholt 2000, Fogel 2000). With the founding of the People’s Republic of China, Mao Zedong announced that China would no longer be subject to insult and humiliation. In the early 1950s, China was engaged in building a new national identity, anxious to shake off the image of the ‘sick man of East Asia [dong ya bing fu]’. Ideological campaigns during that period aimed to consolidate the legitimacy of the new regime and to raise the confidence of the nation. The focus of history education at the time was on class struggle, promoting a spirit of nationalism and heroism. This official interpretation of the past was in turn epitomised by numerous memorials to honour revolutionary heroes and martyrs nationwide. The ‘Monument to the People’s Heroes’ in the middle of Tian’anmen Square, for example, was erected in 1958. As the inscription on the structure states, the monument is dedicated to ‘those who gave their lives for the cause of Chinese revolution between 1840 and 1949’. In 1961 the first list of national heritage properties was released by the Central Government, and of 180 listed sites 33 were ‘revolutionary relics’. In Nanjing, until the 1980s the official commemorative site was the ‘Revolutionary Martyrs’ Memorial’ at Yuhuatai (the Rain Flowers Terrace), listed as national heritage in 1988. It is a cemetery for those who died as heroes for the revolution. In contrast, sites of the Nanjing Massacre were not marked until the 1980s, and not until 2006 were they listed as national heritage (Chinese State Administration for Cultural Heritage official website; Jiangsu Province Administration for Cultural Heritage official website).

During the 1950s and 60s, China was also troubled by border conflicts and saw foreign invasion as imminent. People were told to be prepared for war. While monuments to revolutionary heroes could boost national morale, past tragedies such as the Nanjing Massacre might create fear among the public about war. Memories of the past were therefore filtered so that victories were enlarged and highlighted whereas bloodshed and death were played down.

Policies regarding the past, as Caroline Rose observed, ‘are the product of political situations and judgement of the time, and are open to manipulation or bargaining’ (Rose 2005: 47). Revolutionary fever gradually cooled in the 1970s and China began to improve relations with the West as well as Japan. International recognition of Beijing as the sole legitimate government of China was a priority. The re-establishment of the Sino-Japanese relationship and the signing of the Sino-Japan Communiqué in September 1972 were significant diplomatic landmarks. While urging Japan to face up to its war crimes in China during the World War II, China chose to renounce its demand on Japan for war reparation.

The Nanjing Massacre, however, remained a bitter chapter in Nanjing’s history, inflicting painful and shameful memories among its citizens. During this massacre, civilians, particularly women and children, died helplessly, but afterwards, memories were usually suppressed, partly because people preferred not to dwell on the trauma. When mass graves were located at Jiangdongmen, and bone deposits of victims unearthed during a test excavation, site workers were very distressed and felt reluctant to dig further. They decided to seal up the graves because ‘they didn’t want to reopen the scar in their memories’ (personal communication with Director of Public Works, Jianye District, Nanjing, October 2005). As mentioned above, government manipulation of societal memory also discouraged any obsession with past misery. Officials preferred stories of resistance and fighting to those of bitterness and suffering. Alongside the promotion of national pride and revolutionary heroism, personal tragedy appeared pathetic and insignificant, even embarrassing, especially for the female victims who survived atrocities and sexual abuse.

1980s: memories of pain and shame versus the government’s new agenda

Official narratives of the Anti-Japanese War were moderated in the 1980s and became more inclusive and objective. As well as glorious stories of victory, less heroic aspects of the war—including casualties and civilian suffering—were increasingly revealed to the public. Reports and monographs about atrocities by the Japanese troops were released as official documents, literature, arts and mass media. Sites of atrocities were identified and protected, and memorials in honour of victims of Japanese aggression were erected. Apart from the Nanjing Massacre Memorial, a number of other memorials and museums were identified, such as the Memorial Hall of the Chinese People’s Anti-Japanese War at Lu Gou Qiao, and the site of the Japanese Germ Warfare Unit 731 in Harbin.

Such a change in attitude could be seen as a response to the political circumstances at home and abroad. Internally, the Chinese government began to allow China’s victimisation to be discussed more freely, and encouraged research. The public was urged to learn from the past, particularly from tragedies such as the Nanjing Massacre, and to be aware that ‘backwardness invites aggression’. In a sense, national humiliation serves as a catalyst boosting nationalism. In his research paper, William Callahan (2004: 202) noted that self-understanding in China had shifted from communism to nationalism and that Chinese nationalism today is largely based on national insecurity. ‘Chinese nationalism is not just about celebrating the glories of Chinese civilization; it also commemorates China’s Century of National Humiliation. Humiliation has been an integral part of the construction of Chinese nationalism.’ Heroism and victimisation are inseparable antipodes complementing a collective identity. David Lowenthal (1996: 59–74) observes that, while martyrdom unifies a nation, misery forges lasting bonds. Fogel contends that a negative instance links an ethnic group in victimhood and bonds them in a way that cannot be questioned (Fogel 2007). Remembrance of the Nanjing Massacre is parallel to the government’s search for a unifying ideology in the post-reform era: patriotic nationalism helping to achieve the government’s reform and ‘opening up’ agenda. With China opening to the world, the Communist Party’s ideological dogma was for the first time challenged by the influx of liberalism, individualism and consumerism. The rise of a market economy saw the collapse o...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• List of illustrations
• List of contributors
• Ackowledgements
• Introduction: Remembering places of pain and shame
• PART I Massacre and genocide sites
• PART II Wartime internment sites
• PART III Civil and political prisons
• PART IV Places of benevolent internment