US Foreign Policy in the Middle East

The Roots of Anti-Americanism

Kylie Baxter, Shahram Akbarzadeh

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2012
• ISBN:
  9781134128976
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Diplomacy & Treaties
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Over the last sixty years, Washington has been a major player in the politics of the Middle East. From Iran in the 1950s, to the Gulf War of 1991, to the devastation of contemporary Iraq, US policy has had a profound impact on the domestic affairs of the region. Anti-Americanism is a pervasive feature of modern Middle East public opinion. But far from being intrinsic to 'Muslim political culture', scepticism of the US agenda is directly linked to the regional policies pursued by Washington.

By exploring critical points of regional crisis, Kylie Baxter and Shahram Akbarzadeh elaborate on the links between US policy and popular distrust of the United States. The book also examines the interconnected nature of events in this geo-strategically vital region. Accessible and easy to follow, it is designed to provide a clear and concise overview of complex historical and political material. Key features include:

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• maps illustrating key events and areas of discontent
• text boxes on topics of interest related to the Arab/Israeli Wars, Iranian politics, foreign interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, the wars of the Persian Gulf, September 11 and the rise of Islamist movements
• further reading lists and a selection of suggested study questions at the end of each chapter.

CHAPTER 1

The Middle East in the Colonial Period

INTRODUCTION

The early twentieth century was a time of unparalleled change in the Middle East. The fall of the Ottoman Empire and the establishment of a system of distinct nation-states signalled a new phase in regional history. Over the first half of the twentieth century, the emergent state-based nationalisms interacted with pre-existing loyalties based along sectarian, ethnic and tribal lines. The Western imposition of territorial boundaries irrevocably changed the Middle East. It provided a stable system of states that were plagued by endemic political instabilities. This new political configuration simultaneously provided the opportunity for the consolidation of regional alliances and, often ineffectually, submerged ethnic and sectarian tensions. The political machinations of the colonial powers of France and, particularly, Britain and the emergent role of the United States are the topic of many excellent historical texts. As a brief introduction to the colonial period and its impact on the politics of the Middle East, this chapter will explore three major documents: the Husayn–McMahon Correspondence, the Sykes–Picot Agreement and the Balfour Declaration. These three seemingly contradictory British foreign policy initiatives were designed to consolidate the United Kingdom’s regional alliances and influence in the region. From the perspective of the Arab world, they set the scene for a history of Western influence and intervention that spanned the twentieth century.

The contemporary geo-political landscape of the Middle East is the product of direct colonial administration, client protectorate systems of governance and the Mandate system set up by the League of Nations. With the notable exception of Saudi Arabia, the fledgling states of the Middle East all experienced various degrees of colonial administration, with the most intense periods of control during the First and Second World Wars. Colonial administration was a significant impediment to the region’s political development within the international system. The preference for direct administration by colonial powers created a situation in which the local leaderships were limited in their exposure to the international stage. Moreover, long after the period of formal colonial rule had ended, Britain and France continued to manipulate key aspects of state sovereignty, such as trade and security issues.

This is the vital historical background against which contemporary Western involvement in this region must be analysed. In Western discourse, the colonial period has been largely relegated to history. In the Middle East, however, the situation is different. The colonial period fundamentally shaped the political system of the region, and many of the regional delineations created in this period continue to cause instability. Consequently, history and the West’s role within it are given much greater prominence in contemporary debates within Middle Eastern circles. The role of the colonial powers had significant influence on the ways in which Middle Easterners came to understand and respond to external political involvement. The United States, a predominantly isolationist power in the early twentieth century, was not a major player in the colonial divisions and machinations of the era. Indeed, during the colonial period the role of the United States in the Middle East was premised on Wilsonian idealism favouring self-determination of colonized peoples. Over time, however, this idealistic approach was increasingly tempered by Cold War pragmatism and self-interest and, finally, supplanted by policies of direct intervention.

BOX 1.1

The Ottoman Empire spanned six centuries and was centred in Anatolia, in modern Turkey. At its peak in the 1500s the Ottoman Empire controlled swaths of land throughout the Middle East and Europe. The Empire’s decline began in the late sixteenth century and its territory steadily decreased until the nineteenth century. Geopolitics forced Constantinople to ally itself with Germany in the First World War (1914–18), and post-war treaties divided up the Ottoman lands. The last vestiges of Ottoman rule were abolished in the early 1920s, when Mustafa Kemal Ataturk established the Republic of Turkey.

THE FALL OF THE OTTOMANS AND THE HASHEMITE DYNASTY

Ottoman rulers, buoyed by the merging of temporal and Islamic authority in the structure of the Caliphate, had maintained centralized control of the entire Middle East for hundreds of years. However, in the first two decades of the twentieth century, the Ottoman Empire became increasingly vulnerable to internal tensions and external pressures. In October 1914 the Ottoman Empire concluded a treaty with Germany that led to its entering the First World War against Russia and, by extension, the United Kingdom. Traditional Ottoman fear of imperial Russia’s regional agenda clearly influenced this fateful decision. Indeed, had the Ottomans elected to remain neutral in this conflict, regional history might have taken a very different course. However, geo-political considerations at the time pushed the Ottomans into action, and the commitment to the German alliance set in motion a chain of events that led to the eventual downfall of their system of centralized governance and the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire into a series of distinct nation-states.

London was well aware of the geographical and historical importance of the Middle East, and the German–Ottoman alliance only solidified a determined and sustained British interest in the region. As the war developed, British military and political leaders sought opportunities to weaken and destabilize Germany’s Ottoman ally. In small pockets of the Arab world, this new alignment of forces was also seen as an opportunity. For some regional leaders, Ottoman rule, although imbued with Islamic legitimacy, was increasingly perceived as domination by non-Arab forces. Encouraged by this predisposition towards anti-Ottoman rebellion, Britain began to look for allies within the Arab world. It was in this climate that a handful of Arab tribal leaders began to view their own interests and those of the British state as aligned. The Hashemite family emerged as the major player in this delicate and complex political scene. Descended from the Prophet Muhammad, this central Arabian tribal family had both historical legitimacy and political ambitions. The family was headed by Husayn ibn Ali, who had been appointed by the Ottomans as the Sharif of Mecca in 1908. Emboldened by the war, the Hashemite clan, in league with the British, made its play for regional influence and prestige, advancing its aims with the language of Arab nationalism and self-determination. In the first decades of the twentieth century, the Hashemite dynasty became a major political player in the Middle East. The Hashemites occupied key positions in the politics of Syria until 1920, Saudi Arabia until 1924 and Iraq until the 1950s, and they remain the royal family of Jordan.

BOX 1.2

The Caliphate was the political-religious entity that emerged after the death of the Prophet Muhammad in AD 632. The role of the Caliph (successor) was ostensibly endowed with full political and religious authority, but throughout history the position of Caliph often functioned as the titular or symbolic head of the Muslim community. Tensions over the process of succession to the Prophet Muhammad led to the entrenchment of the Sunni–Shia division within Islam. The most powerful of the Caliphs, the Abbasid dynasty (750–1258), fell to Mongol forces in 1258. The position was revived sporadically and then institutionalized in Constantinople in 1517 as part of the legitimization of the Ottoman Empire. The position was consigned to history with the abolition of the Ottoman Empire and the establishment of modern Turkey in 1924.

The first major international involvement of the Hashemites occurred in the context of Ottoman entry into the First World War. The Husayn–McMahon Correspondence was a series of letters exchanged between Sharif Husayn of Mecca and the United Kingdom’s High Commissioner in Egypt, Henry McMahon. Aware of Britain’s interest in destabilizing the Ottoman Empire from the east, Husayn approached the British authorities with an outline of the conditions under which he would lead an Arab revolt against Ottoman rule in the Hijaz. In return, Husayn aimed to secure land for Arab, or more correctly Hashemite, self-rule.

In many ways, the Hashemite proposal reflected the broader international system of the time. Recourse to Great Power patronage became a key theme of international relations in this period as nationalist movements sought to better their positions within a fluid international environment. Seen in the context of local political realities, the Hashemite determination to secure British support becomes even more understandable. The balance of power on the Arabian Peninsula was unsettled, and the Hashemites were competing for authority against other tribal groups. Husayn viewed a relationship with the United Kingdom as a way to buttress his leadership claim in the face of both Ottoman opposition and competition from other Arabs. However, his negotiations with the British were far from clear-cut, and the exact tract of land slated for Arab self-rule in the Husayn–McMahon Correspondence has long been the subject of academic and political conjecture. At the centre of this debate is the future of the land known as Palestine. As will be discussed, the disposition of Palestine in the Husayn–McMahon deliberations became an issue of increasing importance to all actors, particularly as Zionist settlement in the region intensified. Despite the ambiguity of his arrangement with the British, Husayn initiated a rebellion in the Hijaz, and the British aided it significantly. This became known as the Arab Revolt of 1916.

BOX 1.3

The League of Nations was an international body that emerged at the close of the First World War. It was officially formed at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919–20 and essentially represented the political will of the Allied victors of the war. The governing principle of the organization was to negotiate the peaceful settlement of international tensions. The League of Nations did not have its own military force and was dependent upon the Great Powers to enforce its decisions. The League dissolved as a result of the outbreak of the Second World War and was replaced by the United Nations.

As Matthew Hughes points out, it was a ‘great coup for the British to have the Hashemites, descendants of the Prophet Muhammad and guardians of Mecca and Medina, on their side’, yet Husayn’s revolt was heavily dependent on British supplies to sustain it (Hughes 1999: 74). The combination of British support and an implicit lack of popular legitimacy was to plague the Hashemites in the post-war period. This aside, as a result of the uprising against Ottoman rule and the concurrent British endorsement of the Hashemite claim, as the First World War came to a close many in the Arab world expected that a new era in Arab history, marked by some form of political self-determination, was at hand.

The Arab nationalist movement has sparked much controversy among modern academics. The role played by political beliefs in academic inquiry is evident in an analysis of the various positions taken regarding the nature of the Hashemite movement. Among others, the Israeli historians Ephraim and Inari Karsh assert that Husayn ‘was not an Arab nationalist but an aspiring imperialist bent on empire-building’ (Karsh and Karsh 1999: 232). The tribal and dynastic intentions of the Hashemite family are indeed evident. However, in the all-important popular historiography of the region, the Hashemite movement is often presented as an Arab nationalist uprising against Ottoman rule. Mary C. Wilson argues that Arab nationalism ‘was spawned in the cities of the Fertile Crescent among a class of provincial notables that had lost power because of changes in Istanbul between 1908 and 1914’ (1991: 189). The most constructive interpretation may well be that the Arab Revolt of 1916 was caused by a blend of political opportunism, nationalist inclinations, financial incentive (which was provided by the British) and dynastic ambition. The degree to which the broader Arab world embraced nationalist self-determination became a matter of lively political and academic debate largely because of the significant implications the question has had in the Arab–Israeli battle for historical legitimacy.

Considering the political ramifications of this period, it could be argued that the nationalist versus dynastic credentials of the Arab Revolt are not as important as the generic British endorsement of Arab self-determination. It is important to remember that at this point the entire region was still under Ottoman rule; therefore, McMahon’s letters constitute nothing more than a vague statement of future British intent. The British framers of the correspondence allowed themselves significant room to manoeuvre. Nevertheless, the letters also constitute – and more importantly were perceived by future observers to have constituted – a promise, made explicit in the text: ‘Great Britain is prepared to recognize and uphold the independence of the Arabs’ (‘McMahon–Hussein Correspondence’). Yet the wording of the documents is careful not to specify precisely what regions along the Mediterranean coastal plain were considered ‘not purely Arab’ and thus excluded from support for Arab self-rule. The Syrian coastal plain was an area long coveted by the French because of the presence of their regional allies the Maronite Christians. Seen in this light, the wording of the McMahon letters appears to relate less to the ethnic composition of the region than it does to the British desire to keep their wartime allies on their side. Such motives were typical of the colonial powers’ decisions regarding the Middle East. In any case, in the post-war period the lack of a clearly defined fate for Palestine became one of the central points of contention arising from the correspondence, as from 1920 the British held that Palestine was excluded from the area intended for Arab independence. This position was hotly, if, as some argue, retrospectively, contested. Various interpretations of the British ‘promise’ circulated the Middle East, and the United Kingdom became increasingly viewed as perfidious.

The various interpretations of the Husayn–McMahon Correspondence tend to hinge on the wording of the correspondence itself. At its core, the correspondence can be seen as deliberately ambiguous and designed to allow the British room to manoeuvre as the fortunes of war changed. As the fall of the Ottoman Empire loomed, regional and international interest in the fate of Palestine began to assume ever greater proportions.

THE SYKES–PICOT AGREEMENT OF 1916 AND THE BALFOUR DECLARATION OF 1917

The Husayn–McMahon Correspondence was not the only negotiation conducted by Britain during this period. Concurrent plans were afoot among the wartime allies. The Sykes–Picot Agreement of February 1916 effectively subdivided the defunct Ottoman Empire. The plan received Russian endorsement in late 1916, and became public when it was revealed by the anti-imperialist Bolsheviks after the 1917 Revolution. The agreement carved up the Middle East on the basis of the economic and geo-strategic interests of France and the United Kingdom. The two colonial powers sought to assure their maritime access to and political domination of the areas of the Middle East already under their influence. The Sykes–Picot Agreement is usually understood by pro-Arab historians as a contradiction of the spirit, if not the letter, of the Husayn–McMahon Correspondence, which at a minimum provided a generalized endorsement of Arab self-determination.

The Sykes–Picot Agreement restricted the area reserved for absolute Arab sovereignty to the Arabian Peninsula. Ephraim and Inari Karsh remind us that the Husayn–McMahon Correspondence never led to ‘an official and legally binding agreement’ (Karsh and Karsh 1999: 235). They also argue that the two documents are not contradictory, as both agreements allow for a tract of land for Arab self-rule. In this view, regional politics of this period were simply a long process of manipulation and double-dealing in which all actors attempted to maximize their post-war positions. This appears a valid point, particularly when one acknowledges the dynastic ambitions of the Hashemite family. However, it is clear that the objective informing the Hashemites’ dealings with the British in 1915 was to attain a more extensive outcome than Arab self-rule in the Arabian Peninsula. Moreover, with regard to McMahon’s letters, it is evident that the British too were referring to a greater swath of the Middle East.

The 1915 correspondence did not figure in the construction of the Sykes–Picot Agreement. Indeed, the Middle East envisaged in this agreement was a markedly different geo-political entity and was premised on the solidification of external influence. The rationale for Russia’s endorsement is evident: imperial Russian interests were served by the acquisition of land in Anatolia. French and British regions were clearly delineated. In contrast to, or perhaps because of, the ambiguous treatment of Palestine in the Husayn–McMahon Correspondence, this area was clearly marked for joint administration by the allies. This demonstrates an increasing awareness of the region’s controversial status and an acknowledgement of the Russian Orthodox Church’s interest in the cities of the Holy Land. Once Britain had secured its own interests and appeased its wartime allies, the amount of land left with which to honour the Husayn–McMahon Correspondence was severely curtailed and basically limited to the Arabian Peninsula.

Both the Husayn–McMahon and Sykes–Picot negotiations were conducted by a handful of local and international power-brokers. This reality supports the depiction of the Arab nationalist movement as a limited elitis...