Japan's International Relations

Politics, Economics and Security

Glenn D. Hook, Julie Gilson, Christopher W. Hughes, Hugo Dobson

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2011
• ISBN:
  9781136637933
• Edition: 3
• Topic: Historia
• Subtopic: Historia asiática

The latest edition of this comprehensive and user-friendly textbook provides a single volume resource for all those studying Japan's international relations. It offers a clear and concise introduction to the most important aspects of Japan's role in the globalized economy of the twenty-first century. The book has been fully updated and revised to include comprehensive discussions of contemporary key issues for Japan's IR, including:

• 
  
  

• the rise of China;
• reaction to the global economic and financial crisis since 2008;
• Japan's proactive role after 9/11 and the war on terror;
• responses to events on the Korean Peninsula;
• relations with the USA and the Obama administration;
• relations with Russia, Central Asia and the Middle East;
• changing responses to an expanding and deepening European Union.

Extensively illustrated, the text includes statistics, maps, photographs, summaries and suggestions for further reading, making it essential reading for those studying Japanese politics and the international relations of the Asia Pacific.

A note on the cover:

The cover illustration entitled 'Double Standard' is a Japanese manga penned by satirical artist Ichihanahana in November 2010 regarding rising Japanese nationalism, Japan-China tensions over the disputed territory of the Senkaku islands and the US presence in Okinawa. This manga demonstrates many of the key themes in Japan's ties with China and the US, but also a number of other central features of Japan's international relations as explored throughout this text.

Part I Japan’s International Relations

What, why and how

DOI: 10.4324/9780203804056-1

1. The significance of Japan’s international relations
2. Explaining Japan’s international relations

1 The significance of Japan’s International Relations

DOI: 10.4324/9780203804056-2

1.1 Debates on Japan's International Relations

1.1.i Metaphors of Change

Japan seems to be unique among the major industrialized powers in terms of the extent to which its international relations in the post-World War II era (hereafter, post-war era) have been subject to a range of contending interpretations. An examination of the titles of journalistic books and academic tomes, a search through newspaper clippings or a surf on the Internet confirm the complexity of the discourses associated with Japan. This rise to international prominence of an East Asian latecomer has evinced, and continues to evince, metaphors and polemics of change, challenge, contradiction and capriciousness. From the 1960s through to the early 1990s, the metaphor was that of the ‘rising sun’. This implied Japan’s ascent to great power status in the economic, political, and possibly even the security dimension following its economic rehabilitation and re-emergence onto the world stage. In 1962, two years before the government proudly took up its seat in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), a move which signified its entry into the club of major industrialized powers, The Economist tantalizingly invited its readers to ‘Consider Japan’ and its startling economic advances (The Economist, 1 September 1962, 8 September 1962). By 1971, Japan had earned the epithet of an emerging ‘superstate’ (Kahn 1971); by 1976, it had grown to the stature of East Asia’s new economic ‘giant’ (Patrick and Rosovsky 1976); and, by 1979, Japan’s achievement of rapid economic growth, seemingly bereft of the social dislocation which had blighted this process in the other major industrialized powers, was to lead Harvard academic Ezra Vogel to warn the American people that Japan was likely to overtake the United States (US) to become the world’s ‘No. 1’ (Vogel 1979). Japan’s meteoric economic ascendance was declared a ‘miracle’ in 1982 (Johnson 1986); in 1986, Vogel even went so far as to declare that the ‘American Century’ and age of Pax Americana could be replaced in the next century by an era of Pax Nipponica (Vogel 1986); and, by the 1990s, Japan was talked of routinely as an economic ‘superpower’ (Horsley and Buckley 1990; Garby and Brown Bullock 1994).

1.1.ii Metaphors of Challenge

These metaphors and polemics of change were inevitably accompanied by a cacophony of criticisms, which drew attention to the complex nature of the economic challenge posed by Japan. Vogel and other students of the ‘Japanese way’ of management, industrial policy and economic development viewed Japan’s rise in a positive light: on the one hand, it would galvanize US businesses to upgrade their competitiveness and prompt the government to take measures to eradicate the social costs of growth; on the other, it would provide the US with a new partner to share the burden of maintaining the global order. As far as other observers were concerned, Japan’s new international position was seen more darkly as a negative challenge: this time, its economic prowess appeared as a deliberate strategy of mercantilist ‘free riding’ on the back of the established economic, political and security order maintained by the other major industrialized powers, especially the US (Prestowitz 1988). In other cases, the Japanese state and its transnational corporations (TNCs) were viewed as essentially devoid of any clear policy direction as international actors. From this perspective, the new superpower had no aim in the international sphere save the shortsighted and reckless pursuit of market share and the systematic crushing of economic rivals (van Wolferen 1990). In this way, members of the so-called Revisionist school such as Karel van Wolferen viewed Japan as having climbed to prominence, and perhaps even preeminence, on the backs of the other major industrialized powers. At the same time, however, Japan was seen to be courting disaster for itself and other states by undermining, through its lack of reciprocity in trade and refusal to accept international responsibilities commensurate with its economic power, the liberal order upon which the world was perceived to depend for its prosperity. Thus, Japan, at best, evoked images of an economic juggernaut, driverless and careering out of control; at worst, it appeared as a peril and a parasitic threat to the international order. Nevertheless, whatever the specifics, the ‘Japan problem’ rose to international salience during the 1980s (van Wolferen 1986/7).

Such vitriolic criticism of Japan’s international stance peaked during the Gulf crisis and war (1990–91, hereafter, Gulf War). At this time, even though its economic prowess appeared to have reached its zenith and it was talked of as a possible new hegemonic power, its leaders and people proved unable to fashion a consensus on Japan’s global security and military role. Since the end of the Gulf War in 1991, however, as the Japanese state and its people continue to grope for an appropriate international role, the economic slowdown and the relative waning of its economic power, heralded by the collapse of the ‘bubble economy’, the onset of the Heisei recession in 1989 and the rise of China in the first decade of the twenty-first century, have served to provoke a new series of metaphors associated with Japan’s decline.

Consequently, a panoply of journalists and academics, having discovered serious flaws in Japan’s political economy, now desperately sought to breathe new life into the tired ‘sun’ metaphor by announcing that the Japanese sun inevitably ‘also sets’ and is ‘divided’ (Emmott 1989; Callon 1997); that Japan is ‘anything but number one’ (Woronoff 1991); that its economic miracle, and the related miracle that it spurred in East Asia, is over (Katz 1998); or even that, when examined by economist Paul Krugman, Japan is ‘head[ing] for the edge’ (Financial Times, 20 January 1999). At the beginning of the twenty-first century, pundits were even beginning to wonder if the economic giant would ever awaken from its slumber, as China, rather than Japan, now captured global attention. But, again, accompanying these metaphors of change has been a series of perceived challenges for international society. Although certain commentators regard Japan’s sudden fall as bringing just desserts for its apparently overweening economic pride, and some even heave a sigh of relief that the Japanese economic tsunami, or tidal wave, no longer seems to pose a threat to Western industries, Japan’s sluggish economic growth challenges the macro-economic stability of the world. The crisis in the Japanese banking system and widespread economic recession mean that the recent ‘setting’ sun has been viewed by some to be just as problematic for the international order as its earlier ‘rising’ counterpart. What is needed, for many, is a Japan that has pulled itself out of economic stagnation and plays a more proactive role in the complex international order of the early twenty-first century.

Plate 1.1 Business as usual? The Tokyo Stock Exchange in February 1990 soon after the bubble economy burst.

Source: Courtesy of Mainichi Shimbunsha.

1.1.iii Metaphors of Contradiction

Turning next to Japan’s role in international politics and security, colourful metaphors, this time of contrast and cunning, are frequently encountered. To start with, the metaphor of the economic giant is usually contrasted to that of the political pygmy. With the pygmy in the world of power politics conjuring up the image of size, Japan appears as somehow dysfunctional, disproportionately large in terms of its economic, but small in terms of its political, power in the world. Not only does Japan not possess nuclear weapons, but the Preamble and Article 9 of the so-called ‘Peace’ Constitution, which was promulgated in November 1946 and has remained in force without change from May 1947, means that it possesses only the tri-service ‘Self-Defence Forces’ (SDF). These are composed of the Ground Self-Defence Force (GSDF), Maritime Self-Defence Force (MSDF) and Air Self-Defence Force (ASDF), not ‘military forces’ in the form of an army, navy and air force. The existence of the Preamble and Article 9, which in part states that ‘land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained’ (see Appendix 1.1), as well as the tri-service SDF, thus means that respective Japanese governments have been forced to interpret Article 9 as allowing forces for self-defence. This accounts for the euphemistic naming of Japan’s military forces. Whereas this article was once praised as a prescient piece of legislation in the world’s gradual move towards disarmament and non-violent means of solving human problems, it is now often treated as a naive encumbrance preventing Japanese military forces from taking part in collective self-defence and from playing a full role in promoting security in the region and in the world. Thus, Japan appears not as a paid-up member of international society, but as a cunning free rider, deriving the benefits whilst paying few of the costs of maintaining the security of the global and regional orders. Even when Japan does play a new role, as in the first despatch of ground troops in the post-war era to support the US-led operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, the contribution is seen to be unbalanced. For instance, Japanese troops are not sent as combat soldiers, but are engaged in logistical support or as humanitarian envoys, and often remain ensconced in a relatively safe area of the strategic theatre carrying out their support work, whilst American and British troops face bullets and worse elsewhere. In this way, the Japanese state and its people, like no other, have been stamped with a number of extreme and opposing labels to describe the character of their international relations; only Japan, it seems, can move – in a time span of a few decades – from being trumpeted as a potential superpower to being derided as an international weakling; from being an economic juggernaut to being an economic write-off; from being a military cipher to being a uniformed helper.

1.1.iv Metaphors of Capriciousness

Finally, in the latter stages of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) administrations and then with the changeover to the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) in September 2009, the role of Japan in the world is being viewed increasingly as capricious. Prime Minister Koizumi Junichirō’s (2001–6) period in office was marked by an unusual longevity and degree of stability in international relations with his determination to adhere to US–Japan alliance cooperation. However, his period in office was also characterized by a degree of unpredictability, with daring summitry in North Korea, but at the same time a puzzling neglect of relations with the key East Asian partners of China and South Korea. Koizumi’s LDP successors proved less durable, all lasting one year or less. Consequently, they also proved unable to pursue a consistent foreign policy line, wavering between highly ambitious values-oriented diplomacy informed by strong, near neo-conservative sentiment, and reverting to cautious and pragmatic diplomacy. Japan under the latter stages of the LDP administrations also demonstrated an increased propensity to clash with the US, even as the two sides moved closer. Japan made promises on US–Japan alliance restructuring of base dispositions which it found difficult to fulfil to the US’s frustration, whilst Japan became increasingly suspicious that the US would not support it on key issues such as North Korean abductions and dealing with a rising China (Hughes and Krauss 2007).

In turn, the advent of the DPJ has introduced a new element of unpredictability into Japan’s international relations. Not only has the DPJ prime minister quickly changed from HatoyamaYukio to Kan Naoto (see Chapter 2), but the two have also been viewed as unable to chart a clear course in the world for a new administration. The zig-zagging on the agreement to move the Futenma Marine Air Station to Henoko under Hatoyama (see Chapter 6) was followed by dithering over what to do about a Chinese trawler captain who was accused of ramming a Japanese Coast Guard vessel under Kan (see Chapters 9 and 10). Whilst, on the one hand, democratic change in Japan from the long-governing LDP to the DPJ was welcomed both in Japan and overseas, the apparent inability of the DPJ to form a coherent foreign policy left some hankering after the perceived stability of foreign policy under the LDP, despite the change to the DPJ being the will of the Japanese people and that the LDP in its later years was increasingly devoid of a more innovative foreign policy beyond adhering to expanded US–Japan alliance cooperation.

It is tempting to regard such extreme views as belonging to the members of those motley groups who jump on the bandwagon of Japan-‘apologist’ and -‘bashing’ sentiments. Nevertheless, whether Japan-watchers seek to ‘apologize’ for, ‘bash’, or adopt a more balanced approach to investigate the nature of Japan’s international relations, as the present volume seeks to do, the vehemence of the debate and its propensity to swing to extremes cannot be doubted. Even those observers of the late 1990s and early twenty-first century who have dropped the sport of ‘Japan-bashing’ in favour of ‘Japan-passing’ – that is, passing over Japan in favour of China in their analysis of the crucial actors in the international system, as Japan’s economic superpower status is alleged to be on the decline and its new military role lacks commensuration with its economy – may once again be tempted to rejoin the debate on excoriating or defending Japan’s international relations. For even though many observers are now ‘passing’ over Japan in favour of China in their analysis of the key actors in the international system, given that its economic superpower status is now ranked behind China as number three, not as number two in the world, Japan continues to occupy a crucial and important place in the region and the world. Indeed, it appears that even those critics who seek to ignore the presence of Japan are really only again berating it for its perceived shortcomings in contributing to international stability. In this sense, the critics also implicitly recognize Japan’s vital position in the political, economic and security dimensions of the regional and international orders. This is because they are forced to accept, either implicitly or explicitly, that Japan matters greatly in the international system and affects the lives and livelihoods of not just academics and journalists who write about it, but, far more importantly, a vast range of peoples and other international actors across the world (Williams 1994: 3). Despite its clear significance, however, past efforts to construct a comprehensive understanding of Japan’s international relations and their implications for the rest of the world have been frustrated. The reason for this is complex, but in essence derives from the fact that Japan’s international behaviour exhibits a number of characteristics, or even seeming paradoxes, which contrast sharply with those of the other major industrialized powers. As a result, attempts to conveniently categorize Japan in line with traditional interpretations of international relations remain frustrated.

1.2 Why Japan matters: Economics, Politics and Security

1.2.i Economics

Japan’s embarkation upon the process of modernization in the Meiji era (1868–1912) brought with it the national goals of catching up with the West in the military and economic dimensions of power – as embodied in the slogan of the time, fukoku kyōhei (‘rich country, strong army’). Before the Pacific War (1941–45), Japan had made great strides towards the achievement of these twin military and economic objectives. The experience of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima (6 August 1945) and Nagasaki (9 August 1945), followed by the surrender and defeat of 15 August 1945, however, eff...