Community and Everyday Life

Graham Day

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2006
• Print ISBN: 9780415340748
• eBook ISBN: 9781134327355
• Topic: Social Sciences
• Subtopic: Sociology
• Index: Social Sciences

'Community' continues to be a persistent theme in political, philosophical and policy debates. The idea of community poses fundamental questions about social inclusion and exclusion, particular versus general interests, identity and belonging. As well as extensive theoretical literature in the social sciences, there is a rich body of social research aimed at exploring the nature of community, and evaluating its contribution to people's lives and well-being.

Drawing on a wealth of international empirical examples and illustrations, this book reviews debates surrounding the idea of community. It examines changing patterns of community life and evaluates their importance for society and for individuals. As well as urban, rural and class-based communities, it explores other contemporary forms of community, such as social movements, communes and 'virtual' gatherings in cyberspace.

Truly multidisciplinary, this book will be of interest to students of sociology, geography, political science and social policy and welfare. Grounded in a wide-ranging review of empirical research, it provides an overview of sociological debates surrounding the idea of community and relating them to the part community plays in people's everyday conceptions of identity.

1

THE IDEA OF COMMUNITY

According to the authors of a basic dictionary of sociology, the term ‘community’ is ‘one of the most elusive and vague in sociology and is by now largely without specific meaning’ (Abercrombie et al. 1984: 44). In view of the complexity and slipperiness of so many sociological concepts, this is a notable claim. However, there are many who would agree that ‘community’ is a concept that has been worked to death: its range of meanings is so wide and diverse, its connotations so inconsistent, and at times downright dangerous, that it deserves no place in any serious social analysis. Indeed, for about as long as sociology has existed, critics have poured scorn on the value of the concept and its ability to tell us anything really useful about the nature of society. Yet it remains nevertheless one of the most common points of reference, not only among social scientists, but also for policy makers, politicians and the general public. Precisely because it is so elastic and various in its meanings, the idea of community continues to grip people’s imaginations, and even grow in significance as it takes on new applications.

The essential meaning of community might seem obvious enough. It refers to those things which people have in common, which bind them together, and give them a sense of belonging with one another. Clearly this is a fundamental aspect of society, perhaps its very core. But as soon as one tries to specify more firmly what these common bonds are, how they arise, and how they can be sustained, the problems begin. We would not be social beings if we did not feel some sense of identification and solidarity with the others around us and share in their experiences and expectations; yet there are limits to how far we can empathize with every one of them, or feel obligated towards them, or look to them for succour and support. As humans, we are boundary-drawing animals, and we erect barriers between ourselves and others, quite as much as we identify with them. The idea of community captures these elements of inclusion and exclusion, pointing towards those who belong together, and those who are held apart. This is why some would place it at the heart of social analysis, despite the difficulties it engenders. Nisbet’s description of community as the most fundamental and far-reaching of sociology’s unit ideas (Nisbet 1967: 47) points both to its importance, and to the need to treat it with considerable caution, lest it become too diffuse and all-embracing. The same applies to many popular uses of the term in everyday contexts; all too often ‘community’ signifies something vague and ill-defined, an excuse for not thinking hard enough about what exactly it is that people do have in common. References to the international or world community, the scientific and business communities, or even the human community, are obvious instances, but so are many routine appeals to more particular communities to act, or take a stand, or express an interest of some kind. When one asks to whom precisely this refers, and what exactly they are required to do, answers are frequently lacking. So ‘community’ is a highly problematic term, alluring in its promise but to be approached with extreme care.

CLASSICAL SOCIAL THEORY AND THE IDEA OF COMMUNITY

Ideas of community have been embedded in social theory since its origins, and were absorbed fully into the framework of classical sociology. The formative works of the discipline are pervaded by concerns with the question of how societies were held together, what gave collectivities and groups their unity and distinctiveness, and the extent to which such social ties were being strengthened or undermined by social change and development. ‘Community’ represented one significant way of speaking about group-ness, and distinguishing it from conditions of isolation or individualism. At a minimum, community involved people doing things, and being, together, rather than separate and alone. In the writings of Emile Durkheim, for example, there was a preoccupation with differing forms of social solidarity. Sets of people were united either because they were so alike, a form of solidarity Durkheim called ‘mechanical’, or because although different, in crucial respects they were complementary, and this gave them an ‘organic’ unity (Durkheim 1964). Both types of solidarity could be seen as giving rise to forms of community, centred respectively on similarity or interdependence. In Durkheim’s theory of social change, the worry was that the emergence of organic solidarity might be threatened by excessive individualism, and a loss of readiness to cooperate on behalf of common purposes. Instead of combining their efforts into a collective project, people might allow selfish interests and competitiveness to divide them, so that society would lapse into a condition of disorder and ‘anomie’. Durkheim’s approach encapsulates a number of the major themes associated with discussions of community and its fate, including a contrast between different types of social order, a normative preoccupation with the regulation of society to maintain successful cooperation, and a sense of fear that prevailing social conditions might render this impossible. Not surprisingly, Durkheim provides a fertile source for later reflection on the nature of community.

The context for Durkheim’s arguments, as for the general shaping of the foundations of academic sociology, was the nineteenth-century European experience of industrialization and modernization. His concern with developing the conceptual and analytical underpinnings for sociology is therefore heavily influenced by some of the empirical developments taking place at the time, such as the rise of modern industry and the accompanying growth of towns and cities. For example, he makes connections between evolving forms of social solidarity and the changing ‘moral density’ of society, as measured by patterns of population concentration, migration and geographical mobility. These are seen as exerting a pressure on the social division of labour, which in turn conditions the kinds of communal relations that are likely to develop. Thus the changing nature of community is influenced, or even determined, by a wide range of material and institutional forces. Again, this theoretical framework has exercised a major influence on subsequent explorations of how different sorts of community relate to factors such as the size of a population, the continuity and stability of its social relationships, and its capacity to assimilate new members.

While Durkheim has been one of the most influential of sociology’s forebears, very similar observations and concerns can be found among most of his contemporaries. Setting out his own sociological scaffolding, Max Weber paid a great deal of attention to the nature of the ‘communal’, asserting that it was a characteristic to be found within most social relationships (Weber 1978). It consisted of the mutual orientation of social actors towards one another. That is, they were not solely concerned with their own interests, but almost always paid some heed to the wishes, needs, and behaviours of others. Relationships which were long-lasting, and went beyond the achievement of immediate ends, were especially likely to generate communal sentiments of belonging together. Weber instances associations within military units, school classes, workshops and offices, as well as religious brotherhoods and national communities. The physical proximity of neighbourhoods made them an especially likely source of mutual dependence, so that the neighbour is ‘the typical helper in need’; thus neighbourhoods show a particular tendency to form ‘communities of interest’ (Weber 1978: 41, 361). However, the potential for community can be found wherever people engage in social interactions.

In the preceding generation, Karl Marx had examined ways in which social classes could come to form distinctive kinds of ‘community’, those which were aware of themselves and united around the pursuit of clearly formulated economic interests. The collective organization of classes was seen as owing much to the local and occupational groupings which formed around different industries. Marx also dealt with the shift from localized communal relations towards more universalized relationships which occurred across different historical epochs. In early history, he believed, people were embedded deeply into their communities, and the primitive forms of property were communally owned. History saw the emergence of the individual and private property, the dissolution of communal ties, and the exposure of the worker as a ‘free’ person to the vicissitudes of the market (Marx 1973). Despite their very different theoretical and methodological stances, and political outlooks, there are some interesting convergences between Marx and Durkheim in the way in which they treat the long-term transformation in the significance of community. Both sought to discover and promote ways in which future society could regain the strength and value of communal bonds, Marx through his vision of a communist society, and Durkheim by the revival of guild-like occupational communities.

A special mention must be reserved here for Tonnies (1955, originally published in 1887), if only because customarily he is seen as the theorist with the most direct influence over later sociological work on communities, and as offering the most explicit version of the kinds of theoretical distinctions we have begun to outline. Weber refers to the ‘pioneering’ work done by Tonnies in setting out a specific contrast between ‘community’ (Gemeinschaft) and ‘association’ (Gesellschaft). Unlike Weber, who saw these as intermingled and continuous aspects of social relations, Tonnies is often regarded as setting the precedent for treating them as opposing, mutually exclusive, sides of a dichotomy. Certainly they represent different principles of social organization. For Tonnies, Gemeinschaft involves ‘a lasting and genuine form of living together’ which is oriented towards the achievement of ends, through ‘coordinated action for a common good’. Gesellschaft implies instead an orientation to means, calculated action on the part of individuals who engage in ‘artificial’ relations for what they can get from one another.

This is a fundamental classification which runs through all types of social interaction, corresponding to what Tonnies perceives as the distinction between ‘natural’ (spontaneous, organic) will and ‘rational’ will. As propensities, these are not necessarily exclusive of one another, but should be seen as ‘model qualities’ whose relationship is dynamic and fluctuating. Hence ‘the force of Gemeinschaft persists, although with diminishing strength, even in the period of Gesellschaft, and remains the reality of social life’ (1955: 272).

As handled by Tonnies, therefore, Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft do not designate real social entities or groups, but abstract properties. Nevertheless, Tonnies makes a number of observations which encourage the confusion of such ideal type characteristics with ‘real’ instances. He informs us that the rural village community is ‘an outstanding example’ of Gemeinschaft, and that in general Gemeinschaft signifies the ‘old’ and Gesellschaft the new. Yet he also notes that Gemeinschaft could attain new levels in towns, and in work-based or religious groupings. It was the city which appeared to be the ultimate enemy of Gemeinschaft, although even here it could persist in certain forms within the urban context. The distinction made by Tonnies lends itself to being incorporated into analyses of change which see a general movement taking place from Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft, from community to association. He set an influential precedent himself by researching the disintegrating effects of industrialization and modernization upon community life in his native Schleswig-Holstein.

In the course of constructing his theoretical polarities, Tonnies assimilated into his definitions a number of characteristics which subsequently have been assumed to go together. ‘Community’ stands for real ties of interdependence and emotion between people who form part of an organic, bounded, entity, often linked to place or territory. ‘Association’ refers to exchanges among individuals who engage in essentially boundaryless, contractual relationships; the ties between them are merely convenient. Tonnies suggested that community arose ‘naturally’ on the part of those who encountered shared experiences, for example through common origins and backgrounds. This applied most obviously to relationships within the family. Such an understanding of community encouraged an emphasis on mutual agreement or consensus, and the maintenance of established relations. The exercise of ‘rational’ will on the other hand was directed more towards future-oriented and instrumental objectives, so that association was more temporary, and subject to constant deliberate revision and improvement. Commercial or business transactions might typify Gesellschaft.

The notion of community as natural and ‘organic’ goes along with expectations that it will be valued for its own sake, and represent a situation of at least relative stability and homogeneity (Noble 2000). Understood in this way, community seems inevitably to belong more with the social order of the past, while the features of association fit more closely the world of the present, and its domination by commercial organizations and public bureaucracies. Rightly or wrongly, as Noble comments, the distinction appears to crystallize a lot of things that people feel they encounter in the real world, and a good deal of later research and commentary on community could be summed up as taking the form of a debate with the ghost of Tonnies, and his conceptual apparatus. Among the points at issue is whether the term ‘community’ ought to be equated with a distinct pattern of social relationships that is the outcome only of certain limiting conditions. This is where a concern with the conceptual specification of its meaning blurs into a series of assertions about empirical examples. Locating ‘community’ in the settled social relations of the past, and equating it with situations of stability and persistence, biases the discussion in a predominantly conservative direction, and both Durkheim and Tonnies have been accused of fostering a backward-looking sociology. More practically, Tonnies encouraged the belief that the quintessential expressions of community were to be found in close conjunction with relationships of kinship, or even blood, and proximity, such as were more characteristic of early, and rural settings than they are of modern life. He also asserted that they were closer to the circumstances and inclinations of women, and poor people, than those of men and social elites; hence, he proposed, Gemeinschaft belonged in the realm of ‘nature’, rather than that of reason.

It was in the surroundings of the city, and the modern industrial organization, that the ‘associational’ patterns referred to by Tonnies were most likely to thrive, where the emphasis was on short-term, purposeful exchanges among self-conscious individuals. These could be regarded as being at the opposite end of the spectrum from the types of behaviour and attitude typical of relationships within families and households, or in small, intimate, social groupings. However, simply describing it in this way sets up a whole series of mental oppositions between the settled and the changeable, short-lived and long-term, conscious and unconsidered, things which have an intrinsic worth or meaning and those which are useful only because of what they can bring about. Whereas certain of these features might seem to flourish best within community, the others appear antithetical to it, and show more affinity with the values and ethics of the marketplace, or with the reasoned actions of policy makers and officialdom. In their different ways, the institutions of the market and of the state appear especially distant from the true nature of community as depicted by Tonnies, giving us a sense that community exists somehow outside, or between, the market and the state.

We must remember that Tonnies and Durkheim were writing at a time when the disappearance of a rural peasantry and its semi-feudal conditions of existence was still visibly taking place around them in Europe. They were witnesses to the emergence of modern society, and the associated experiences of industrialization and urbanization were relatively new, and raw. Insofar as either sought to ground their arguments in empirical research, they relied heavily on contemporaneous studies of the decline of traditional social orders by authors such as Maine, Spencer and Gierke, and faithfully reproduced their accounts of the importance of ancient custom, collective regulation, and common ownership. Tonnies relates the existence of Gemeinschaft to the ‘folk cultures’ and customary laws that were to be found among those who enjoyed a longestablished settled relationship with the land and ties of blood. The development of modern social relationships implied the destruction of these kinds of bonds, and with it the threat of a loss of community. Teasing out these conceptual and empirical relationships offers an almost unlimited potential for questions and problems. To what extent, for instance, should we confine the term ‘community’ to situations in which there is no rational deliberation, no calculation of benefit, and no conflict? How common are such situations? If rationality is hostile to community, how can we contemplate the explicit creation, or development, of communities designed to serve particular purposes? Can community ever be planned? A glance at contemporary advertisements for public sector jobs will indicate that there is no shortage of those who believe it is possible to do so. Applicants are invited to join projects which are concerned with such objectives as ‘building communities as well as homes’ (Swan Housing Association) or ‘creating and co-ordinating a thriving community’ (Blackburn with Darwen Borough Council: Guardian newspaper, 21 July 2004). How realistic are these aims, if they involve artificially engineering something as ‘natural’ as community? And what are we to make of enterprises such as ‘community planning’ (Marris 1982), ‘community development’ (Barr 1996), or ‘community architecture’ (Wates and Knevitt 1987)?

THEORY’S TWENTIETH-CENTURY LEGACY

Dichotomous representations of the contrasts between rural and urban, traditional and modern, spontaneous and rational permeated sociology throughout its early development, formed a prominent feature of the works of the Chicago School in particular (Wirth 1927; 1938; Redfield 1947), and persisted well into the 1960s (Frankenberg 1966; Pahl 1966). Whenever theories of historical change were formulated by sociologists, it was apparent that the conditions deemed most favourable to community fell on one side of the divide, and everything that was conducive to development and progress on the other. Hence community became identified with traditional social orders, like those of the feudal and agrarian past, or with ‘less developed’ modern contexts, and change was construed as its enemy. The association is sufficiently strong to make it seem that every concept of community had implicit within it a criticism of urban/industrial society (Ennew 1980: 1). These tendencies arose from the bundling together of several characteristics into a single package, often presented in the guise of an ‘ideal type’, which was acknowledged to exaggerate and simplify what would be found in any actual community, and yet prone to be handled as if it was real. The work of Tonnies was presented in black and white terms by many of his followers, as if it was self-evident that Gemeinschaft referred only to the rural village and/or the extended family, whereas urban living and freely chosen social relations were incompatible with community. Durkheim’s analysis of changing social solidarities underwent a similar process of interpretation and simplification. The result is an inclination to presume that, providing some of the features of community can be detected, then the others must also exist; or, conversely, that if certain dimensions are missing, then what we have is not in any sense a proper community. The temptation to preempt what ought to be matters for empirical investigation is shown in definitions of community such as the following:

a territorial group of people with a common mode of living striving for common objectives.

(Durant 1959)

a specific population living within a specific geographic area with shared institutions and values and significant social interaction.

(Warren 1963: 2).

Nisbet’s (1967: 47) definition of community as encompassing ‘all forms of relationship which are characterized by a high degree of personal intimacy, emotional depth, moral commitment, social cohesion and continuity in time’ is loaded with positivity. Except for the numbers typically involved, this could be an idealized description of marriage, or close friendship. Likewise Lee and Newby (1983: 52) remark on how the term has been used to denote ‘a sense of common identity, enduring ties of affiliation and harmony based upon personal knowledge and face-to- face contact’. These statements seem to settle very tricky questions by fiat, leaving us to determine only how far actual examples measure up to the conceptual purity they provide. Nearly always, this makes real cases appear to fall short of an ideal, because there are bound to be some respects in which the simple correspondences built into the definitions cannot hold. Consequently, community remains an elusive prospect, a goal that is tantalizingly plausible and yet never quite achieved. This leads some to conclude that it is best regarded as an ideal, a philosophical dream, rather than a real phenomenon.

COMMUNITY UNDER THREAT

Classical theories of community were abstract and general; in modern parlance, they were not evidence-based, and their authors carried out no detailed studies to confirm their intuitions. Tonnies has been especially influential in crystallizing a dominant conception of community as a spontaneous outgrowth of close social and geographical relations. His account of Gemeinschaft-type relationships implies that the people involved will share a body of experiences, habits and memories, and display what Durkheim refers to as ‘common ways of thinking and feeling’ (1964: 79). This will happen almost innately, simply by virtue of being members of a community. It is not necessarily the case that the classic sociologists wholeheartedly endorsed community as a value, or an end in itself. On the contrary, it can be argued that in general they welcomed social progress and development, and saw the fading away of strict communal bonds as a price to be paid for the freedoms and opportunities of modern society (Kumar 1978; Little 2002: 18). However, many who followed in their footsteps came to lament the change, and to formulate a zero-sum equation in which ‘association’ could grow only at the expense of, or as a substitute for, community. The ‘loss’ or ‘decline’ of community became a leading theme in sociological writing (Stein 1964; Lee and Newby 1983), and was attributed to many different influences, chief of which included industrialization, rationalization, and urbanization. An entirely typical, early exampl...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Series Editor’s Foreword
• Preface
• 1
• 2
• 3
• 4
• 5
• 6
• 7
• 8
• Bibliography