The Extreme Right in France, 1789 to the Present

From de Maistre to Le Pen

Peter Davies

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2002
• eBook ISBN: 9781134552962
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: French History
• Index: History

The Extreme Right in France, 1789 to the Present surveys the history of a fascinating but contentious political and intellectual tradition. Since 1789 the far right has been an important factor in French political life and in different eras has taken on a range of guises including traditionalism, ultra-royalism, radical nationalism, anti-Semitism and fascism.
This book is structured around the five main phases of extreme right activity, and the author explores key questions about each:
* Counter-revolution - what was the legacy of Joseph de Maistre's writings?
* Anti-Third Republic protest - how was the 'new right' of the 1880s and 1890s different from the 'old right' of previous decades?
* Inter-war fascism - how should we characterise the phenomenon of fascisme française?
* Vichy - why did Pétain and Laval collaborate with the Nazis?
* The Post-war far right - what is the relationship between Poujadism, Algérie Française and Le Pen's FN?

1 The extreme right in France
An enduring political tradition?

La politique, ce sont des idées.¹

The far right in France is not the easiest political tradition to pin down and comprehend – if it is in fact one single tradition at all. It is complex in its lineage, chameleon-like in its evolution and often contradictory in its discourse;² Winock argues that the extreme right is ‘a hard political tendency but a soft concept’ (une tendance politique dure mais un concept mou).³ Hainsworth, hinting at the rationale behind the present study, says: ‘France has experienced various cycles of extreme right-wing activity… sparking off much debate about the nature and essence of this political family’.⁴ Thus, we have to be very careful about the terms we use. Throughout this study we will utilise the terms ‘right’ and ‘extreme right’, but we must remember that any attempt to delineate political labels and categories will always be open to criticism.

Defining the right and extreme right

The words ‘left’ and ‘right’ are ‘central to political debate’.⁵ It is customary to begin a study like this with a qualification that indicates both terms are inadequate, but also quite useful in the absence of any better nomenclature.
And it would be sensible to keep faith with tradition, because there are plenty of doubters where conventional political terminology is concerned.
Sirinelli suggests that the left–right cleavage is almost passé, while O’Sullivan says the term ‘right’ is ‘vague’ and ‘unfocused’.⁶ Moreover, O’Sullivan and Winock argue that labels such as ‘the right’ are prone to abuse and misuse, and it is difficult to disagree with this general point. ⁷ Over time, the term has lost much of its value and integrity (in much the same way as ‘fascism’ has), but, having said this, it is clear that the word ‘right’ has come to denote a series of definable political attitudes: realism, conservatism, and the belief in established authority and traditional values such as religion, monarchy and hierarchy.

The language may be problematic – and even flawed – but it still has wide currency. Rémond explains its enduring appeal:

Right, Left… the oscillation of these two terms, indissolubly linked by their opposition, paces by its rhythmic tempo all the political history of contemporary France. Men of the Right, men of the Left, parties of the Right, parties of the Left, Leftist bloc, Rightist coalition, Right-Centre, Left-Centre, the persistent hammering of these twin words punctuates 150 years of political struggles… A fundamental principle of French political life, this traditional division of public opinion into two great contrary points of view today remains the key which opens the door to an understanding of France’s recent history. This history is bewildering and incoherent if left in an arbitrary and fortuitous disorder.⁸

Rémond might have been writing in 1971, but his point retains validity today. How do we even begin to understand the complexities of France’s history – both political and intellectual – without the aid of the ‘right–left’ political spectrum and its accompanying vocabulary?

As regards the present study, we are at something of an advantage because the term ‘right’ (just like the term ‘left’) does have innately French origins. It was during the early years of the Revolution that the distinction emerged, with nobles and clerics sitting on the right-hand side of the National Assembly and representatives of the Third Estate sitting on the left.⁹ Those on ‘the right’ came to be associated with efforts to preserve the King’s authority and the established social order and, in time, with counter-revolution. McClelland says the French right ‘attacked rationality, universality and democracy and in so doing worked out an opposing position of great coherence and force’.¹⁰

Many books have been written about the French right – as distinct from the right in general or the French far right – and it would be fair to say that commentators have identified not just one right-wing tradition in France but many, and the Revolution is invariably the starting point and key reference point. McClelland continues: ‘If, as the right argued, all France’s troubles can be attributed to the Revolution, then it follows that to save the nation, the Revolution and its mythology in the present must be destroyed’.¹¹ From the last years of the nineteenth century to the first years of the twenty-first, this has been a fact of life.

But, what of the extreme right? What does it stand for? Billig outlines the scale of the problem:

The term ‘extreme right’ is a particularly troubling one to use in political analysis. In ordinary speech and in journalistic writing one could use the term without being misunderstood, and intuitively there seems to be a set of political parties, movements and tendencies which ‘go together’, for example all outwardly Nazi parties. However, in an academic context this is not sufficient: one would have to justify why such parties are being called both extreme and right-wing. And it is here that the problems start.¹²

Needless to say, it is the aim of the present study to make sense of these ‘problems’ in the French context. Hainsworth refers to the same issue:

The concept of the right… is elusive and, by extension, so is that of the extreme right. Of course, it would be wonderfully convenient – though academic wishful thinking – if leaders, parties and movements labelled themselves extreme right to make easier the task of comparison and analysis. Instead, organisations studiously avoid and reject extreme right labelling.¹³

Thus, we are left in a difficult situation. We want to attach labels to ‘leaders, parties and movements’, and also to political traditions, in a relative and comparative way, but there is always the danger of being simplistic, subjective and even pejorative.

Anderson suggests that moderates on the right probably have more in common with moderates on the left than they do with extremists on the right and seems to imply that the gap between ‘right’ and ‘extreme right’ is greater than we think.¹⁴ This is interesting but it should not bother us unduly.
We are more interested in the nature of the far right in France rather than its proximity to other traditions, but here we encounter more problems. Is there one extreme right or several? De Maistre, the émigrés, the Vendée rebels, the Ultras, Charles X, Boulanger, Barrès, the Ligue des Patriotes, the Anti- Dreyfusard Movement, the AF (Action Française), the fascist ligues, Vichy, the Paris Nazis, Algérie Française, Poujadism, the FN (Front National). All these individuals and movements have, to a greater or lesser extent, been saddled with the label ‘extreme right’ over the last 200 years. Do they really have anything in common? And if so, what?

On balance, Hainsworth says the extreme right in France is almost indefinable,¹⁵ and given this fact we must take Winock’s advice and not get too hung up on the precise definition of the term. He accepts the term is problematic but says it is still ‘used by everybody’, and as such is an aid to understanding.¹⁶ Another difficulty comes in the fact that the far right in France is consistently stigmatised and demonised by political opponents, historians and social scientists. It is as if ‘extreme’ political traditions are devoid of ideas and theory, and exist only as battering-rams for politically correct observers. This kind of polemic is unhelpful and certainly does not assist our quest for a working definition.¹⁷ McClelland counters this negativity and refers to ‘the intellectual respectability of extreme right-wing thought in France’.¹⁸ This is a significant statement to make and gives our study a clear rationale.

Historians such as Sirinelli and Winock have explored the extreme right tradition in full.¹⁹ There are no easy answers as to what is of the extreme right, and what is not, but it is clear that the far right possesses many characteristics of the right, but to a more intense and radical degree. On the far right there is also an intransigence and a willingness to resort to extra-parliamentary tactics that are not features of the conventional right.

It is difficult, if not impossible, to construct an ‘identikit’ extreme right. In every generation the far right seems to re-emerge, often in a new and totally different guise, but a helpful starting-point is Winock’s assertion that, whatever the overlaps and complexities, there have been continuities in the extreme right over the last two centuries. He alludes to five: the rejection of parliament, the attachment to strong government, the hatred of socialism and communism, the belief in the closure of frontiers, and a consistent desire to ‘rebuild la maison française’.²⁰ We might add others as well: the ability to exploit crisis conditions, the belief in direct action, the use of violence (sometimes), a constant trust in ‘charismatic’ cult leaders, a tendency to communicate in both populist and intellectual terms (occasionally at the same time) and, more often than not, failure. Billig seeks to distinguish the extreme right from the extreme left, the non-extreme right and fascism. However, he acknowledges a clear overlap between the ‘extreme right’ and ‘fascism’ and distinguishes three common features: nationalism/racism, anti- Marxism/communism, and a hostility to democracy.²¹

Anderson, talking about the 1880–1970 period, also moves towards some kind of general characterisation:

The extreme Right has had its own themes expressed continuously but with varying degrees of vociferousness since the end of the nineteenth century. These have related mainly to various conspiratorial views of politics including Jews, Freemasons, foreigners, bankers and the ‘two hundred families’. Anti-Etatisme has been a common platform, at various times, of groups threatened by economic change and the fiscal policy of the State. But all the continuities are vague and tenuous. The content of the common attitudes or traditions has been so ill-defined and so much disputed that they have not provided symbols around which durable political organisations could be built.²²

On the basis of such views, it is possible to argue that there is a single extreme-right tradition in France – in effect, a linear progression, through a variety of movements and ideas, from 1789 to the present day. Winock agrees with this general line of thinking, arguing that even though the extreme-right tradition is a ‘kaleidoscope’, there are important elements of continuity.²³ He says that in each generation the extreme right has a newness about it, but also an element of heritage.²⁴

Today’s FN is a good example of a far-right movement that is both ‘new’ and ‘old’. It has developed distinctive positions on modern issues such as Europe and immigration, embraced twenty-first century technology in the shape of the internet, and adapted seamlessly to the world of 24-hour news. The ultimate in mediatique politicians, Le Pen is in many ways the personification of modernity. That said, it is also true that the FN situates itself in line with tradition. Whether knowingly or unknowingly – and for most of the time it is the former – the movement still honours the memory of Algérie Française, still makes use of Poujadist vocabulary, still emphasises Vichyite themes, still talks a rabble-rousing language reminiscent of the inter-war ligues, still imitates the populism of Boulanger, still apes the ‘rooted’ nationalism of Barrès, and still associates itself with anti-revolutionary and counter-revolutionary politics. The same could be said of Pétain’s wartime regime and the radical right of the late nineteenth century, for they too adapted themselves to a new political context and defined themselves in modern terms, but at the same time were not frightened of drawing on elements of the past to help expand their appeal.

Historians and the French right

In Europe and America Eatwell and O’Sullivan identify five ‘types’ of right: ‘reactionary’, ‘radical’, ‘moderate’, ‘extreme’ and ‘new’, and this typology will be a useful reference point for the duration o...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Preface
• Introduction
• 1. The Extreme Right In France: An Enduring Political Tradition?
• 2. 1789–1830 – The Counter-Revolution: Providence and Plotting
• 3. 1870–1918 – Anti-Third Republic protest: Revanche and the New Nationalism
• 4. 1919–39 – Inter-War Fascism: The Ligues and 6 February
• 5. 1940–4 – Vichy: The National Revolution, Collaboration and Collaborationism
• 6. 1945–Present Day – Ultra-Nationalism and Neo-Fascism: Algérie Française, Poujadism and the Front National
• Evaluation
• Notes
• Bibliography