1 Reframing curriculum, pedagogy and research
Alan Ovens, Tim Hopper and Joy Butler
This book is based on the premise that physical education phenomena are inherently complex and explores the possible relevancies that complexity thinking may have for the field of physical education. In one sense, complexity has always confronted those working in physical education. The issue is not that educational phenomena are complex, but about the appropriateness of the frameworks we use to make sense of the âmessinessâ that is inherent in complex educational settings. As the subheading of this book indicates, complexity offers the opportunity to question how we frame the issues central to curriculum, pedagogy and research in physical education. The idea of frame draws attention to the interpretative process involved in constructing meaning or making sense of the world. Frames are tacit perceptual mechanisms that transform the unfamiliar into meaningful and normative categories (Lawson, 1984) that are, in turn, central to the construction of shared meanings typifying particular discursive fields (Bernstein, 2000). Our objective in supporting the possibility of reframing the field is not one linked to a representational epistemology of changing perspective to gain a more accurate understanding of reality. Rather, the meaning of the term âreframeâ that we hope to invoke is linked to a quest of finding more complex and creative ways of interacting with our reality, which we can then use to interact in yet more complex and creative ways (Osberg, Biesta, & Cilliers, 2008). From a complexity perspective, reframing implies there are no final solutions, only new ways to interact that lead to new emergent possibilities. This sort of project is anything but straightforward, particularly given the lack of clarity around the concept and the relative ânewnessâ that complexity has in physical education literature. But it is one in which we collectively hope to âexpand the space of the possibleâ (Davis & Sumara, 1997).
At the outset it is important to address two potential misconceptions that may arise for readers when presented with the claims that complexity offers something new to physical education scholarship. Firstly, it is important to state that complexity does not constitute a single body of thought or unified theory, either in the natural or social sciences. Despite the use of terms such as âcomplexity scienceâ and âcomplexity theoryâ, there is no consensus around matters of research approach or agreed body of knowledge (Alhadeff-Jones, 2008; Richardson & Cilliers, 2001). As noted by Mason (2008), ideas about complexity derive from disciplinary fields as diverse as physics, biology, economics, sociology and law. What complexivists do have in common is a broad agreement on what constitutes a complex phenomenon or entity. Consequently, rather than defining it by its modes of inquiry, complexity is âmore appropriately characterized in terms of its objects of studyâ (Davis & Sumara, 2006, p. 5). Most commonly, the objects of study are modelled as a âsystemâ of interacting entities in which the âsystemâ is perpetually constructing its own future as continuity and transformation (Stacey, 2001). The critical aspect is not to focus on the system, but on the process of interaction between the elements that enables the emergent properties and forms that is the focus of our inquiry (Byrne, 2005). The potential of complexity for physical education, then, is not as some explanatory system or meta-discourse that provides a more complete or superior set of explanations, but rather in the way it presents as a source domain that is rich with possible analogies for understanding human action, knowledge, identity and learning (Stacey, 2001).
Secondly, it is important to dispel the notion that complexity represents either a regression to some form of naĂŻve scientism or the importing of models and methods from the natural sciences that are inappropriate for educational inquiry. On the contrary, the perspective complexity represents is consistent with the evolution of post-enlightenment thought and emerges from the collective efforts of those philosophers and scientists working within both the natural and social sciences who are attempting to challenge a mechanistic, reductionist view of the world (Gare, 2000, p. 335). For example, postmodernism and complexity share a similar sense of the implausibility of grand narratives and the impossibility of independent objective observation (Kuhn, 2008). Complexity thinking pays attention to diverse disciplinary sensibilities while acknowledging the multidimensionality, non-linearity, interconnectedness and unpredictability encountered in human activity. It arises among rather than over other discourses and is oriented by the realization that the act of comparing diverse and seemingly unconnected phenomena is both profoundly human and, at times, tremendously fecund (Davis & Sumara, 2006, p. 8).
Our aim in this book is to promote discussion and reflection by both engaging scholars already employing complexity in their work and readers who are unfamiliar with it and still uncertain of its value. The aim of this initial chapter is to provide an overview of complexity and reflect on its possible value to physical education. It begins by providing an overview of what we mean by complexity thinking and it focuses on some of the themes that have been most used in education. This provides an introduction to complexity for the nonspecialist audience from which the following chapters may build. We also address the question of what complexity thinking may contribute to physical education scholarship by considering the discursive tensions in areas central to the field such as research, curriculum, learning, teaching and embodiment.
What is complexity?
The task of trying to understand complexity is itself complex. Definitions, by their very nature, seek certainty and stability of meaning and the irony is that these are the very qualities that complexity seeks to challenge. Complexity is also not a field of study easily defined by its constituent concepts or contributing disciplines. Alhadeff-Jones (2008) suggests that disorder has often shaped the evolution of research focused on complexity, which has given rise to different generational forms and the heterogeneity of meaning and multiplicity of definitions and trends that currently exist. In their attempt to make sense of the field, Richardson and Cilliers (2001) define three different themes or communities: hard complexity science, which aims to uncover and understand the nature of reality; soft complexity science, which makes use of complexity as a metaphorical tool to understand and interpret the world; and complexity thinking, which adopts a philosophical approach to considering the implications of assuming a complex world. In a similar manner, Byrne (2005) explores some of the philosophical variations in the way that complexity is used and distinguishes between simplistic complexity, which has a focus on the general set of rules from which emergent complexity flows, and complex complexity that has a focus on the contingent and contextual nature of complex forms. Such classifications, while somewhat artificial, point to the way the varied discourses, histories and concepts that represent complexity are highly nuanced, intertwined and potentially inconsistent.
Our own preference lies with the idea of complexity thinking and the way it foregrounds this form of inquiry as an attitude which is potentially generative of, and pays attention to, diverse sensibilities without making claims to or being trapped by, universals or absolutes. It is a view that argues that, while complexity may not provide us with the conceptual tools to solve our complex problems, it âshows us (in a rigorous way) why these problems are so difficultâ (Cilliers, 2005, p. 257). Complexity thinking, as Davis and Sumara (2006) point out, prompts a kind of âlevel jumping between and among different layers of organisation enabling attention to be oriented towards other dynamic, co-implicated and integrated levels, including neurological, the experiential, the contextual/material, the symbolic, the cultural, and the ecologicalâ (p. 26). In other words, complexity thinking is transphenomenal (requires awareness of phenomena at different levels of organization), transdisciplinary (requires border crossing between theoretical frames) and interdiscursive (requires an awareness of how discourses intersect, overlap and interlace) (Davis, 2008; Davis & Phelps, 2005).
While acknowledging that the field of complexity is difficult to define, even to the point of questioning if it is a field, a starting point is to have a shared set of meanings of concepts and ideas that are frequently referred to. The following discussion provides an overview of some of the key themes that have the most frequent uptake in the educational literature, namely complex systems, emergence and adaptation.
Complex systems
A general starting point is that complexity generally exists in situations in which a large number of agents are connected and interacting with each other in dynamic ways (Mason, 2008). An agent is understood as something that takes part in an interaction of a system and is itself subsequently changed: a person, a society, a molecule, a plant, a nerve cell, a physical education student, a teacher, etc. The behaviour of these systems is said to be complex because the relationships between multiple elements give rise to emergent qualities that cannot be reduced to the sum of their constituent parts or to a central agent responsible for overall control of the system (Byrne, 2005; Cilliers, 1998). As a property of the system, complexity is situated between order and disorder. That is, complex systems are neither predictable nor regular in the way that they act. However, neither are they random or chaotic. Complex systems tend to display features of both dimensions, sometimes displaying highly-patterned and ordered features while simultaneously being surprising and unpredictable (Morrison, 2008).
Complexity is not always a feature of systems with many interconnected elements. Simple and complicated systems are also composed of multiple components but can be characterized as closed systems capable of decomposing to their individual parts and whose workings follow predictable and precise rules (Cilliers, 2000). In other words, complicated systems may have many component parts, but each component relates to the others in fixed and clearly defined ways. Each component is inert and not dynamic or adaptive. The modern computer is an example of a highly-complicated system that has many interdependent parts that can be taken apart and reassembled. The way it works can be confusing for a novice, but the expert technician can understand the range of parts required and the rules determining the way the parts relate. In this sense, simple and complicated systems are conceptualized as mechanical in the way they function, giving them the ability to behave in predictable ways. This means that something like a computer or car works the same way each time it starts.
By contrast, complex systems are self-organizing and adaptive forms constituted through a large number of nonlinear, dynamic interactions. Complex systems, such as brains, classes of students or economies, are characterized by patterns of relationships that exist within each system as a whole. When the system is taken apart, either physically or theoretically, it is this relational aspect that is destroyed and this subsequently prevents an understanding of the systemâs dynamics and properties (Byrne, 2005). In complex systems the individual components are self-organizing, adaptive agents in their own right, while interdependent with those with which they are connected. The individual components, while displaying a unity at one level, are themselves complex systems at a different scale (often referred to as the nestedness of self-similar systems).
Davis and Sumara (2006) provide a useful summary of qualities that must be manifest for a system to exhibit complexity:
⢠Self-organizedâcomplex systems/unities spontaneously arise as the actions of autonomous agents come to be interlinked and co-dependent;
⢠Bottom-up emergentâcomplex unities manifest properties that exceed the summed traits and capacities of individual agents, but these transcendent qualities and abilities do not depend on central organizers or overarching governing structures;
⢠Short-range relationshipsâmost of the information within a complex system is exchanged between close neighbours, meaning that the systemâs coherence depends mostly on agentsâ immediate interdependencies, not on centralized control or top-down administration;
⢠Nested structure (or scale-free networks)âcomplex unities are often composed of and often comprise other unities that might be properly identified as complexâthat is, as giving rise to new patterns and activities and new rules of behaviour;
⢠Ambiguously-boundedâcomplex forms are open in the sense that they continuously exchange matter and energy with their surroundings (and so judgments about their edges may require certain arbitrary impositions and necessary ignorance);
⢠Organizationally-closedâcomplex forms are closed in the sense that the...