US-Israeli Relations in a New Era

Issues and Challenges after 9/11

Eytan Gilboa, Efraim Inbar, Eytan Gilboa, Efraim Inbar

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2008
• eBook ISBN: 9781134022502
• Edition: 1
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Military & Maritime History
• Index: History

This book examines in depth the fundamental problems, factors and issues in current US-Israeli relations, which will have implications both for the Middle East and for world peace and prosperity.

The US and Israel have established an exceptional relationship, which has significant effects on events and processes in the entire Middle East. Israel depends on the US for military hardware, for support against hostile international organizations, and for economic and financial aid. In turn, it is viewed by the US as a strong and reliable ally, and the US has adopted strategic concepts that for decades have governed Israel's national security, such as pre-emptive strikes and counter-terrorist strategies. However, politicians and scholars have accused Israel and pro-Israeli organizations of exerting too much influence on US policy in the Middle East. Here, a collection of international experts present original research and findings on a wide variety of critical bilateral and regional issues in American-Israeli relations, approaching the topics from both theoretical and practical angles.

Part I
The strategic landscape

1
US management of Middle East war and peace

Between defensive realism and offensive liberalism

Benjamin Miller

How does the US manage regional conflicts and their escalation to wars? In responding to this question, four management types can be derived. The objectives can focus on either the regional balance of power (BOP)¹ or the domestic character of the regional states. The means can be either a unilateral approach or a multilateral one. These management types can approximate theoretical International Relations (IR) approaches. In general, realists focus on the regional balance of power,² while liberals focus on the domestic character of the state.³ Furthermore, the defensive approach, either realist or liberal, uses multilateral means, while the offensive approach uses unilateral means. Thus, four management types emerge – offensive realism, defensive realism, offensive liberalism, and defensive liberalism (see Table 1.1).

It should be noted that this theoretical framework refers to either a senior superpower in a bipolar or a multipolar world, or a hegemon in a unipolar world. Both terms are used alternately.

Logic of the management pattern: variations in the balance of threat

What is the best explanation for the variations in systemic management? The distribution of capabilities in the international system is a key factor. Yet, to the extent there is a variation in management under the same power distribution, it somewhat weakens the explanatory strength of this factor. Thus, I choose to focus on the balance of threat as the leading cause, in two senses:

1. Regional Perspective: What is the nature of the regional threat posed to the international system? Here I will make a key distinction between threats derived from the regional balance of power and threats coming from domestic/transborder sources. Such sources can be derived from rogue regimes, or from a certain ideological orientation or movement that leads to revolutions or instability.
2. International Perspective: To what extent do the great powers see each other as the major threat or see a third party, i.e. the regional threat (elaborated above), as a common threat that surpasses the threat they pose to each other? The answer to this inquiry will substantially depend on whether the great power threat perception is shared or divergent.

Table 1.1 How (liberal) great powers manage regional conflict and war: four approaches

The nature of the regional threat and the objectives of its management

A threat originating in the regional balance of power will create a realist objective, focused on the regional balance of power, whereas a domestic/trans-border threat will result in a liberal objective, which is, managing the domestic regime. Threat perception related to the balance of power is more likely when states in the region are strong states, institutionally speaking, and at least some of them are revisionist, but they are rational actors in the sense that they calculate cost-benefit considerations. Under these conditions, realist approaches to management are especially appealing. In contrast, liberal approaches will tend to be selected by liberal great powers when radical ideologies are promoted by non-state actors in weak or failed states.

The greatest threat at present will determine the means used in managing the regional threat. When the greatest threat is posed to the senior power by another great power, such as in a bipolar system, an offensive, unilateral approach is more likely, especially in case of a threat to the balance of power. The unilateral approach prevails as long as the system is bipolar and the threat concerns balance of power, regardless of international-level policies intended to ease the tension between the two poles. A policy such as détente might in”uence the international level, yet it does not have a decisive effect on the great power regional policy. In the case of a unipolar system, a shared threat perception (between the great powers) will lead to a defensive, multilateral approach, while a divergent threat perception will lead to an offensive, unilateral approach of the senior power. Though the four possible management patterns are comprehensive and distinct, and the elements of each one of them are cohesively interrelated, for the purpose of clarity and parsimony, the relations between the variables can be simplified in Figure 1.1.

The combined effect of variations in the two independent variables can explain which school would be the best in describing the key patterns of the systemic management of regional wars by the hegemon/senior power, as articulated in the propositions of Table 1.2.

1	The Regional Perspective
	Independent variable: nature of regional threat	→	Dependent variable: objectives of management
2	The International Perspective
	Independent variable: the greatest threat/level of great power conflict	→	Dependent variable: means of management

Figure 1.1 Management pattern rational.

Both causality and the characteristics of the various management patterns are elaborated below, where I suggest under what conditions each of the approaches will be dominant and what will be its key manifestations.

Offensive realism⁴

The great powers pose a threat to each other and state military power is the major regional threat. The expectations of offensive realism will be approximated under these conditions. As the great powers see each other as the biggest threat to themselves, it is a competitive system in which they will tend to pursue a unilateral avenue rather than collaboration. They will do it both because of mistrust and a desire for unilateral achievements at the expense of the other great power(s), aiming to reach dominance and to exclude the other powers from the regional management. They will try to maximize these achievements by affecting the regional balance of power, each power enhancing the power of its client.

Table 1.2 The balance of systemic and regional threat

Defensive realism

A common threat to all the great powers is present in the region. This threat poses a greater threat than the threat they pose to each other. This regional threat is related to state military power, especially a revisionist regional power which seeks regional hegemony. Under a common threat related to the balance of power, we should expect the patterns associated with defensive realism to prevail. The great powers will cooperate against the shared threat and will focus on suppressing and defeating the hegemonic ambitions of the revisionist regional state by military means.⁵

Offensive liberalism

The regional threat is related to ideology and domestic regime more than to the balance of military power. However, this threat is seen as a serious one which justifies military action only by some of the great powers, while others see the unilateral action of those powers as posing a greater threat to them than the regional threat itself. Under these conditions, offensive liberalism is likely to be pursued by the hegemon, if the hegemonic power is liberal and if it seems that the regional threat is posed by ideology and the nature of the regimes involved. This offensive liberal approach will be directed toward regime change in the region and is likely to be opposed by other powers, who do not share this threat perception. They will try to balance the hegemon, at least by ‘soft balancing’; if the hegemon is too powerful by ‘hard balancing.’⁶ This approach can be employed since both the hegemon and the regional threat do not present a substantially direct threat to the other great powers’ key security interests such as their independence and territorial integrity.

Defensive liberalism

The great powers pose a low threat to each other while there is a common threat posed to all of them from the region. This threat is related to domestic or trans-border instability and ideology rather than to state military power in the regional balance of power. Under the conditions of a common domestic threat perception, shared by the powers, especially when it has trans-border implications in the region, we should expect the systemic powers to follow the logic of defensive liberalism. Facing a common regional threat imposed by weak state structures or trans-border instability, they will prefer the multilateral road to a unilateral one, focusing on state building. Thus, preferred strategies would include reinforcement of government and military institutions, economic aid and political reforms, strengthening of democratic institutions, peacekeeping and conflict resolution – regionally and domestically.⁷ The underlying logic is that domestic stability brings about regional and international stability. Stable states deter not only civil wars but also foreign intervention, while unstable states attract regional intervention. Foreign intervention can be either out of fear that the instability will produce regional security threats and thus encourage preemptive intervention by others or because of quest for gains. Thus, the international focus should be on building the state institutions and thus producing regional stability, rather than on building the state’s military power for deterrence and balancing purposes.

US management: from the Yom Kippur War to the Second Lebanon War

Over the last 30 years the patterns of US management have varied considerably. In general, the US willingness to play the role of the hegemon in the Middle East stems from its interest in the vast oil resources there, generating a desire to maintain good relations with the Arab states. This conflicts with America’s political, ideological, and moral commitment to Israel’s security (some analysts also underline the high strategic value of Israel for US interests).⁸ The United States tries to reconcile this conflict of interest by advancing the Arab–Israeli peace process, an interest much more important following the 1973 War due to both the severe crisis with the Soviet Union (see below) and the Arab oil embargo.⁹

However, the promotion of the peace process by the US depends on the systemic and regional balances of threat. This chapter reviews four empirical cases, in two of them the offensive, unilateral means dominated, while in two other cases, the US chose to undertake defensive, multilateral avenues. In two cases realism guided the behavior of the powers with a focus on managing the regional balance of power, while liberal/domestic elements were the key goals in the other two.

The major explanation for these changes in strategy is the changing nature of the threat in the region and whether it is shared by the other great powers. We can divide the post-World War II period into four distinctive periods:

1. During bipolarity and the Cold War (1946–90), the only key threat was the other great power – the Soviet Union and its allies in the region. This led to an offensive realist approach during the Yom Kippur War in 1973 and in the post-war diplomacy.
2. In the post-Cold War era (1991–2001), revisionist regional powers emerged, a threat which was shared by the other great powers. This type of threat led to a defensive realist strategy during the 1991 Gulf War.
3. Post-September 11, 2001, the US, but not the other powers, perceived the key threat to be the lack of democracy in the Middle East, which resulted in the emergence of terrorist networks and supporting rogue states which are armed with weapons of mass destruction (WMD). This led to an offensive liberal strategy during the Iraq War of 2003.
4. In the post-Iraq War era, the major powers shared the US threat perception that emanated from the failed state besieged by radical Islamists. This led to a defensive liberal approach during the Second Lebanon War of 2006.

Although a low-threat environment can potentially lead to US isolationism, this has not been the case thus far in the post-World War II era. This is due to the combination of high US interests in the Middle East and the continuous presence of various types of threat to these interests in the region.

The 1973 War: unilateral management of the balance of power

The Yom Kippur War began on 6 October 1973, when Egyptian and Syrian forces attacked Israel, highlighting the stormy relations between Isra...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Biographies
• Introduction
• PART I The strategic landscape
• PART II Domestic sources
• PART III Foreign policy issues
• PART IV Multi-lateral dimensions
• PART V Looking ahead