Mussolini's Propaganda Abroad

Subversion in the Mediterranean and the Middle East, 1935-1940

Manuela Williams

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2006
• Print ISBN: 9780415650342
• eBook ISBN: 9781134244409
• Edition: 1
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Military & Maritime History
• Index: History

This is the first major study in English of Fascist Italy's overseas propaganda. Using rare Italian and French captured documents, this is also the first investigation into the relationship between Mussolini's regime and Arab nationalist movements

This new account covers propaganda and subversive activities engineered by the Italian government in the Mediterranean and the Middle East from 1935 until 1940, when Italy entered the war. It assesses the nature of the challenge brought by the Fascist regime to British security and colonial interests in the region.

Fascist propaganda, in particular in the Arab Middle East, must be regarded as an expression of Mussolini's foreign policy and his attempts to build an Italian empire that would stretch beyond the Mediterranean, gaining control over the exits, Gibraltar and Suez, which were in the hands of the British and the French.

The activities of individual agents and organizations are carefully reconstructed and analyzed to highlight the seemingly contradictory objectives of the Italian government: on the one hand, Rome was courting the Arab nationalist movements in Egypt and Palestine, which were seeking the support of external forces capable of providing political, financial and military backing needed to overthrow foreign rulers; on the other, the regime was promoting further territorial expansion in Africa. These aspects build into an excellent picture of this fascinating period of modern history.

This book will be of great interest to all students and scholars of politics, media, Italian history and propaganda.

Part I
THE INTERWAR PERIOD

1
THE CHALLENGE OF NATIONALISM

Restructuring the British empire

The predominant contention of the existing literature is that, in the interwar period, the place of Africa and Asia in international politics was rather marginal. Asia and Africa as perceived by western colonial powers, and their place within the imperial policies implemented by Britain during the interwar years, have been the subject of several studies. These have focused on devolution of European colonial responsibilities and the search for an international post-colonial world order. Aside from the ‘Far Eastern Question’, the non-European world seems to have achieved little impact on the global system. In Britain in particular much attention was devoted to problems and dynamics affecting the imperial structure – and in particular India – but this was often perceived as divorced from current international affairs. With respect to the Middle East, between 1922 and 1935, British policy-makers were confident that imperial interests were secure from internal and external threats; they concentrated, therefore, ‘on the mechanics of management’.¹ This relative neglect of Africa and Asia by statesmen and diplomatic scholars has been attributed to more pressing concerns about the stability of the European political scene. The challenge brought by the rise of new revisionist powers, fascist Italy and Nazi Germany, as well as the Soviet Union, prompted calls to redefine the relationship between the great powers, and to build a more peaceful international order regulated by the League of Nations and still dominated by European political and economic priorities. Thus, most colonial territories and dependencies in Africa and Asia remained confined within the European imperial system and very few of the crises which erupted in the colonial world attracted the attention of international diplomacy.² Furthermore, some historians acknowledge that within the vast landscape of imperial history production the Middle East has for a long time played the role of the poor relation. While the heart of the formal empire, and especially India and tropical Africa, have so far received a great deal of attention, imperial historians have often been wary of applying those categories devised for the study of imperialism to examine political, social and economic dynamics in the post-Ottoman Middle East. For the Middle East appeared as a badly assorted group of culturally diverse, economically peripheral and politically ill-defined territorial entities, bound to Britain by more or less formal agreements and treaties. At the crossroads between Europe and the East, during the first two decades of the twentieth century the Middle East had gradually acquired importance as a vital passage to the other half of the empire, but its distinctive geo-political features would prove traditional colonial practices totally inadequate. The acquisition of a position of influence in the Middle East required the British imperial machinery to depart from its established administrative path and explore new avenues of co-operation in a region that ‘was no remote protectorate to be governed on a shoestring and garrisoned with a corporal’s guard of local levies’.³

At the end of the First World War, the geo-strategic position of Britain as a colonial power was still dominant, while its political predominance in the overseas territories and economic activity at the metropolitan centre began to show signs of fatigue. The British empire stretched from Canada as far as New Zealand, including most of the East African territories, a great part of the Middle East and the Indian subcontinent. At the peace conference in Versailles, Britain and its allies were left with the legacy of the German colonies and the break-up of the Ottoman empire. For Britain and France in particular, the opportunity of colonial expansion was irresistible. Most of the former German colonies were taken over by countries of the British Commonwealth under mandates from the League of Nations: Australia was then given the administration of part of New Guinea, New Zealand was responsible for Samoa and South Africa for German South-West Africa. Britain, finally, was given Tanganyika and obtained the Mandate over Palestine, Iraq and Transjordan, former dependencies of the Ottoman empire. In fact, as early as 1916 Britain and France had reached a secret understanding over the partition of the Ottoman empire after the war. Under the terms of the Sykes–Picot agreement, the Middle East was divided into spheres of influence: Britain would gain Palestine, Transjordan, Iraq and much of the Persian Gulf, an area where the British government had sent an expeditionary force from India.⁴ Together with the pre-existing protectorates of Egypt, Cyprus and Aden, the new mandates had created a ‘belt of influence’ between the Mediterranean and India. France also benefited from the dismemberment of the Ottoman empire by acquiring control over Syria and Lebanon.

The creation of a mandate system following the 1919 peace settlements was regarded as a compromise between the idealist and anti-imperialist commitments of the American presidency and the desire of Britain and France to retain control over those territories acquired during the war. According to some historians, in 1920 the decision of the US Congress not to ratify the Treaty of Versailles or to join the League of Nations provided the European colonial powers with ample scope to strengthen the authority of the Mandatory administrations in the Middle East and Africa. Under the system implemented in the early 1920s, the Mandatory powers, Britain and France, were not allowed to annex the territories assigned, but were granted almost unlimited administrative authority over them. Conversely, the League of Nations’ rights of supervision were reduced to a bare minimum.⁵ Although not officially part of the empire, the British Mandates would be subjected to Britain’s political, economic and military control. Keen to transform its colonial relations into more informal partnerships, the British government appeared broadly content with the outcome of postwar territorial settlements.

The fragmented colonial administrative structure, however, was not capable of coping with territorial enlargement or providing a unified approach to imperial policy. After the First World War, the scale and scope of British responsibilities across the Middle East were not matched by an adequate system that would efficiently co-ordinate the formulation of central and imperial policies, and their implementation at regional levels. The division of responsibilities within the British government which followed postwar settlements further exacerbated existing problems of jurisdiction, overlapping administrative authority and conflicting interests. The break-up of the Middle East into areas administered by different ministries – Foreign Office, Colonial Office, India Office and War Office – and by a plethora of governmental departments and sub-agencies considerably undermined the effectiveness and consistency of Britain’s political control. Furthermore, tensions at the heart of the imperial machinery between the government in London and the government of India made the reorganisation of the administrative apparatus all the more arduous. The rapid rise and demise of ad hoc committees that would deal with Middle Eastern affairs added nothing but confusion and greater opportunities for interdepartmental bickering.⁶

In 1921 the establishment of a Middle Eastern Department within the Colonial Office was considered a necessary step to improve the cumbersome system that had allowed inter-departmental duplication of functions, and to reconcile Mandatory obligations with requirements of imperial control. The new department would be responsible for the Mandated territories and Arabia, while the Foreign Office retained control over Egypt – whose transfer to the Colonial Office would have amounted to an official annexation to the British empire – Aden, Turkey and Syria.⁷ The fundamental divergences between Foreign Office and Colonial Office became more evident in 1937 following the recommendations of the Peel Royal Commission which called for a partition of the Palestinian Mandate. This disagreement found its origins in the different ways the two departments had evolved and operated. Arab demands and concerns often met with a sympathetic response from the Foreign Office which had in time developed closer and more formalised relations with Arab and Muslim states. Conversely, the Colonial Office, whose dealings embraced both Zionists and Palestinian Arabs, was less inclined to consider the issue of Arab unity as central to any decision concerning Britain’s policy towards Palestine and the Middle East in general.⁸ The reorganisation of Britain’s colonial administration did not solve the long-term problem of overlapping responsibilities between departments whose political and commercial interests lay in some of the most strategically and economically valuable Middle Eastern states. The struggle for political control over the Middle East and, in particular the Gulf states reignited towards the end of the 1920s and persisted until well after the Second World War. The divergent perspectives and agendas set by the imperial authorities in London and the government of India resulted in a confrontation between the Foreign Office and the Indian authorities, both eager to increase and strengthen their operations in the Persian Gulf, an area of great significance for the expansion of strategic air routes and the exploitation of inestimable oil resources.⁹

Despite the reinforcement and extension of British control, before spring 1939 the Mediterranean and the Middle East did not constitute a priority in British strategic plans. Moreover, the three services had come to perceive the defence of the region in different terms. The Middle East appeared almost neglected within the army conception of global strategy; the navy considered the whole area as a strategic centre that would allow the fleet to move from west to east, a fast passage to Singapore where ultimately Britain’s naval interests rested. Finally the air force, which in the 1920s had been involved in the ‘aerial policing’ of the Middle Eastern territories and Mandates, gradually shifted its commitments to Europe in response to the growing size and power of the German Luftwaffe. Under these circumstances, by 1935 none of the three services was engaged in planning for the defence of the Mediterranean in case of war. Before the outbreak of the Abyssinian war, the Suez Canal was the only area included in imperial defence plans; within British imperial strategy, the Mediterranean was still considered a ‘subordinate communication system whose role was to enhance British security in areas distant from the taming influence of the main fleet’.¹⁰ Beyond the temporary exclusion of the Mediterranean and the Middle East from the military and strategic set of priorities lay economic and political factors. British-controlled territories east of Suez were regarded as far more valuable than the Mediterranean and Near East in terms of investments, trade and markets and as a source of raw materials. Middle Eastern oil represented only 20 per cent of British total petroleum imports against the 50 per cent coming from Venezuela, the United States and the Dutch West Indies.

Although apparently strong and consolidated, the British empire had already begun an important phase of descent. The first signs of a serious fracture in the internal cohesion of empire came from India and Egypt. In 1916, the British rulers of India were facing the increasing discontent of Indian nationalists. The situation rapidly took a turn for the worse and the British government had to act to counter the spreading Muslim and Hindu agitation. In these circumstances, the Viceroy of India, Lord Chelmsford, urged the government in London to issue a declaration about the political future of India. The declaration was announced in Parliament after long discussions on 20 August 1917 and provided for an ‘increasing association of Indians in every branch of the administration and the gradual development of self-governing institutions with a view to the progressive realisation of responsible government in India as an integral part of the British Empire’.¹¹ In 1918, the new reform proposals put forward by the Secretary of State for India, Edwin Montagu, recommended further progress towards ‘responsible government’ in the provinces for matters including education, public health and agriculture, while the British governors retained control over the most important areas of finance, law and order.

The ambiguity of terms like ‘responsible government’, which was by no means to be considered the equivalent of full independence, led to additional complications. The recommendations of the Montagu–Chelmsford Report were embodied in the Government of India Act of 1919; Indian nationalists, who had hoped for radical changes in the constitution in order to acknowledge the right of India to self-determination, were bitterly disappointed. Under the India Act, a ‘dyarchical’ system of government was created: governmental departments were divided into two categories, one ‘reserved’ for officials responsible to the British administration and the other ‘transferred’ into the hands of Indian ministries. At the centre there would be a representative body with a bicameral central legislature, but the Viceroy and his council, to which three Indian members were to be appointed, still retained the executive. In the end, the power of the Viceroy was limited only by the fact that he was now asked to consult the legislative assembly, whose majority was constituted by elected Indians. The outcome of this complex process of renovation was that half of the provincial government became responsible to the legislative council and the other half was accountable to the governor.¹² However, inaugurated in 1921, this system allowed Indians to hold office in the provinces for the first time. In the long term, the structure put into place by the India Act was not as efficient as it was meant to be: it resulted in ‘an inherently unstable dyarchy. It was unstable because the proper division of functions between the centre and the provinces would always be arguable; in fact, a tug-of-war ensued that ended by eroding the authority of the Government of India’.¹³ The shift towards more indirect rule, and in some cases even informal administration, was intended to revitalise the empire, but in fact introduced significant structural problems.

Until the end of the First World War, British dominance in Egypt had appeared stable and permanent. Egypt had been regarded for a long time as a point of extreme strategic importance due to the Suez Canal, a precious communications route, in the belief that the country that retained influence in the region between the Nile and Persia would control the transit to India. The British troops had arrived in Egypt in August 1882; the Egyptian territory was at the time an autonomous province of the Ottoman empire, following the successful struggle waged by Mehemet Ali, the founder of the dynasty that ruled Egypt until the 1952 revolution, against the central government in Costantinople. As British interests in Egypt developed, the government in London had two alternatives: either to annex Egypt to the British empire or to declare it a protectorate. As the debate went further, annexation came to be perceived as destabilising and counterproductive, for it would endanger the basis of Anglo-Egyptian collaboration. Hence the institution of a protectorate was announced in Egypt in December 1914.

However, as in India, the economic, political and military pressure of the First World War exacerbated existing disquiet among the Egyptians. Under war conditions, the British government tightened its control over the Egyptian administration while Egyptian nationalists, whose aspirations had been frustrated by the establishment of the British protectorate, were pushing to obtain self-government for Egypt. Wartime strategic plans induced the British to turn Egypt into a vast base for military operations in the Mediterranean; the imposition of restrictions and economic burdens fell heavily upon the fellahin and even the old-established privileges and immunities were crushed as a result of the closer control Britain was exerting in Egypt. The drastic measures adopted were resented among the notables and in the towns, whereas in the countryside price inflation and the unpopular system of conscription were sources of further friction.

The end of the war opened a phase of unrest and political struggle that only ceased in 1922 when the protectorate over Egypt was unilaterally abolished. Already in 1918, a group of Egyptian politicians had called for a ‘programme of complete autonomy’ for Egypt, where the British government would only retain control over the debt administration and the facilities of the Suez Canal. Agitation among the politicians at the top increased when Sir William Brunyate, the Judicial Adviser, drafted a series of proposals to reform the administrative system in Egypt. Under the new scheme, the Capitulations (a source of foreign extra-territorial privileges) were to be abolished and a bicameral legislature would be created to include an upper house where the major...

Table of contents

• STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE SERIES
• CONTENTS
• ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
• ABBREVIATIONS
• INTRODUCTION
• Part I THE INTERWAR PERIOD
• Part II PALESTINE AND THE RADICALISATION OF ARAB STRUGGLE
• Part III ITALIAN PROPAGANDA IN EGYPT
• Part IV DEFENDING THE EMPIRE
• NOTES
• BIBLIOGRAPHY
• INDEX