Traditional economic thinking relates preferences to a statement about well-being. An agent who expresses a particular choice is considered to be maximizing their own subjective āutilityā or welfare. Every decision or choice is considered an expression of preference and in the ārevealed preferenceā framework (Samuelson, 1938), choice and preference are synonymous. While revealed choices are ultimately the dependent variable for classical economics, understanding the neurobiology of preferences necessitates that we entertain a range of mechanisms by which human choices are generated, expressed and influenced.
The Neuroscience of Decision-Making
The neuroscience of choice and preference dates back to the nineteenth century, with the emergence of the idea of functional specialization as a fundamental organizational principle of the brain. While phrenologists attributed behavioral characteristics to the contours of the scalp (Gall & Spurzheim, 1818), the observation of specific and consistent behavioral deficits following localized brain damage led to the development of neurology as a medical speciality (Broca, 1865; Jackson, 1873). The tradition of inferring function from structural and electrophysiological perturbations has remained powerful, enabling a mapping of both primary sensory and motor systems (Penfield & Boldrey, 1937), complex cognitive processes such as language (Head, 1920; Ojemann, 1978), memory (Scoville & Milner, 1957) and, more recently, a mapping of areas important in decision-making, strategy selection and learning (Bechara, Damasio, Damasio & Anderson, 1994; Shallice & Burgess, 1991).
The early twentieth century heralded the birth of behavioral psychology, pioneered by the classic findings of Pavlov, Skinner, Tolman, Hull and others (Schultz & Schultz, 2007). This tradition provided insights into core processes mediating learning and choice, but was restricted in scope by the primitive methods available to study concurrent neurobiological activity during decision-making. In the 1960s, Olds and colleagues produced a startling finding that stimulation of specific brain loci in animals imbued behavior with apparent hedonic value. For example, self-stimulation experiments in rats showed they were disposed to compulsively press a lever to the exclusion of other hedonic behavioral options. Thus, a dramatic form of preference could be driven by electrical stimulation of the ratsā subcortical dopaminergic structures (Olds & Milner, 1954).
A refinement in neuroscientific techniques in the 1980s saw the emergence of single-unit recording methodologies. These revealed that activity of individual neurons in early visual areas could predict trial-by-trial choices of an animal in a random-dot motion discrimination experiment (Parker & Newsome, 1998). Such an approach provided the first direct link between neural activity at a single unit level and the expression of choice behavior. Subsequent studies have asked more sophisticated questions about the construction of value and choice in an economic framework. A key example is a report showing that a region of parietal cortex called LIP, expressed activity that correlated with the reward magnitude and probability (expected value) associated with an upcoming action (Platt & Glimcher, 1999).
The development of neuroimaging techniques, in particular functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), has meant that questions related to choice and preference can now be addressed non-invasively in humans. Early neuroimaging studies of financial decision-making dissected out regions involved in processing monetary gain and loss (Elliott, Friston & Dolan, 2000; Thut, Schultz, Roelcke et al., 1997), as well as brain activation related to anticipation versus receipt of reward (Breiter, Aharon, Kahneman et al., 2001). More sophisticated studies have borrowed economically-inspired models of behavior to seek out a brain representation of key decision variables. Notable examples include a demonstration brain activity that tracks a Pascalian idea of a value representation constructed from a combination of amount and probability (Dreher, Kohn & Berman, 2006; Knutson, Taylor, Kaufman et al., 2005), to financial and ecological concepts of risk and uncertainty (Christopoulos, Tobler, Bossaerts et al., 2009; Mohr, Biele & Heekeren, 2010; Preuschoff, Bossaerts & Quartz, 2006), and the idea that anticipated temporal delay reduces the value of rewards (Kable & Glimcher, 2007; Pine, Seymour, Roiser et al., 2009).
The Nature of Preferences
Preferences can be thought of as biologically determined traits (Eysenck, 1990; Ebstein, 2006), but in reality they are dynamic and flexible, and indeed often inconsistent. The idea of preference is broad and diverse, encompassing a liking for different goods, a favoring of reward over punishment through to preferences for specific components of a decision (ādecision variablesā). The latter can encompass risk preference, impulsivity (the preference for delayed versus immediate goods) and social preferences (āother-regardingā preferences, altruism and fairness). Whether such preferences are convenient theoretical artefacts for classifying individual choice, or whether they relate to intrinsic biological processes and inter-individual differences is the subject of intense and wide-ranging programs of research. This breadth is evident in a facility to draw on human and animal psychology, neurobiology, economics, ecology and computational science, though a source of confusion can be each disciplineās different terminology, theory, experimental technique and hypothetical assumptions that color the literature. There are many excel...