RUTH BADER GINSBURG, ASSOCIATE JUSTICE, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
What follows are materials assembled from Justice Ginsburgâs confirmation proceedings and her service on the Supreme Court of the United States. This section begins with the testimony of Justice Ginsburgâs friend and longtime co-author, then-Berkeley Law Dean Herma Hill Kay, before the Senate Judiciary Committee during Justice Ginsburgâs 1993 confirmation proceedings. Kay chronicles Justice Ginsburgâs exceptional career as a scholar and advocate and testifies that â[i]n Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the President has offered the country a Justice worthy of the title.â
Next, Justice Ginsburg has chosen her four favorite opinions that she wrote during her time on the Supreme Court: her decision on behalf of the Court in United States v. Virginia, 518 U. S. 515, 550 (1996) (the Virginia Military Institute, or VMI case), and her dissents in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U. S. 618 (2007), Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U. S. 529 (2013), and Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U. S. 682 (2014).
In the Herma Hill Kay Memorial Lecture conversation reproduced in the first section, Justice Ginsburg was reluctant to name a favorite opinion. âThatâs a little like asking about my four grandchildren, two step-grandchildren, one great-grandchild, which one do I love the most?â All the same, she did reference and discuss her opinions in VMI and Ledbetter. She adds here two additional dissents drawn from her twenty-seven years of service on the Supreme Court. Also included are the statements Justice Ginsburg read from the bench when the Court announced the decisions in the four cases. It is rare for a dissenting justice to read a summary of their opinion from the bench, so Justice Ginsburgâs decision to do so in these cases is significant, revealing she believed her colleagues in the relevant majorities had not just erred, but, as she writes in her Shelby County dissent, âerr[ed] egregiously.â Justice Ginsburg once said in an interview when asked about her dissents, âI will not live to see what becomes of them, but I remain hopeful.â
ON THE NOMINATION OF RUTH BADER GINSBURG, TO BE ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
HEARINGS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, UNITED STATES SENATE, ONE HUNDRED THIRD CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION (JULY 1993)
Prepared Statement of Herma Hill Kay
Senator Biden, Members of the Judiciary Committee, it gives me great pleasure to be here and participate in your deliberations as you prepare to recommend to the Senate the advice it should give President Clinton on his nomination of Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg to the United States Supreme Court.
President Clintonâs choice of Judge Ginsburg is wise and inspired, sound and practical. In Judge Ginsburg, the President has found a constitutional scholar who knows from her own experience what it means to be excluded despite outstanding credentials solely because of sex. In the early 1970s, she brought that experienceâand her flawless logicâto the bar of the United States Supreme Court, where she will soon take her seat. In case after case, she hammered home the point that for the law to assign pre-existing roles to women and men is limiting to both sexes and forbidden by the equal protection clause. It is a point thatâat present, twenty years laterâmany regard as self-evident. But the High Court seemed unable to grasp that point before Ginsburgâs advocacy, instead taking as its starting position the belief that a legislative distinction drawn on the basis of sex was a rational classification that passed constitutional muster.
Ruth Bader Ginsburgâs strategy of written and oral advocacy to help the nine men then sitting on the Supreme Court understand the irrationality of sex-based distinctions was one of patient instruction. She chose cases in which the lawâs unequal treatment of men and women was evident and the consequent need for a broader interpretation of the equal protection clause clearly established and readily accepted. The result is that her cases are now constitutional classics: Reed v. Reed, 1971: A mother can administer a deceased childâs estate as capably as a father. Frontiero v. Richardson, 1973: A servicewomanâs Air Force pay earns the same fringe benefits for her âdependentâ spouse that a servicemanâs pay provides for his âdependentâ spouse. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 1975: A widowed father is entitled to the same insurance benefits available to a widowed mother to help him care for his infant son after his wifeâs death. Califano v. Goldfarb, 1977: A deceased wifeâs earned income provides the same survivorâs benefits to her widowed husband that a deceased husbandâs widow would receive.
These are some of the legal propositions that Judge Ginsburg established as an advocate, and she used them to help the Court forge a new understanding of the equal protection of the laws. It was Ruth Bader Ginsburgâs voice, raised in oral argument before the United States Supreme Court, that opened new opportunities for the women of this country. She was in the forefront of the creation of legal precedents that advocates who followed her have used, time and time again, to build a strong edifice against discrimination that now protects many groups. She left her enduring mark on the Constitution even before taking her place on the Supreme Court.
I speak today not only as an academic observer of Judge Ginsburgâs work, but also as her co-author and friend. I have had the privilege of working with her on our casebook on Sex-Based Discrimination, published in 1974. She and I are both among the first twenty full-time women law professors in the country. We continue to serve together on the Council of the American Law Institute. From those vantage-points, I can say that hers is a courageous intellect, and that she is as steadfast and loyal a colleague and friend as anyone could wish. Her standards are exacting: she produces the best and most precise work and she expects the same from others. As this confirmation process has shown the nation, she thinks deeply and chooses her words with care. But I can tell you that her compassion is as deep as her mind is brilliant. In Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the President has offered the country a Justice worthy of the title. I urge this Committee to recommend that the Senate give its enthusiastic consent to her appointment to the United States Supreme Court.
UNITED STATES V. VIRGINIA (1996)
In the decision that follows, United States v. Virginia, the Supreme Court confronted the argument that the admissions policy of the Virginia Military Institute (VMI) excluding female applicants violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Founded in 1839, VMIâs mission is to produce âcitizen-soldiersâ prepared for leadership in civilian life and in military service. When the United States government sued the Commonwealth of Virginia challenging the exclusionary admissions policy, the State proposed creating the Virginia Womenâs Institute for Leadership, a parallel program for women chartered with the same mission to produce âcitizen-soldiers.â
In her opinion on behalf of the Court, Justice Ginsburg writes that the case asks the Court to decide âwhether the Commonwealth can constitutionally deny to women who have the will and capacity, the training and attendant opportunities that VMI uniquely affords.â Holding the admissions policy to be constitutionally problematic, Justice Ginsburg invokes the standard announced by the Court in Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U. S. 718 (1982), to conclude that Virginia had failed to demonstrate an âexceedingly persuasive justificationâ for its exclusionary policy. Her opinion likewise holds that Virginiaâs proposed new institution for female cadets could not offer the same opportunities or benefits of VMIâs unique and storied program. Finally, Justice Ginsburg observes, âThere is no reason to believe that the admission of women capable of all the activities required of VMI cadets would destroy the Institute rather than enhance its capacity to serve the âmore perfect Union.â â
Although he did not sign on to her opinion, Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist concurred in the judgment, agreeing with the Courtâs holding. This left Justice Antonin Scalia as the lone dissenter. In Justice Scaliaâs view, the Court had raised the level of scrutiny applied to gender classifications beyond what the Courtâs earlier precedents supported. Further, he believed that VMI had demonstrated that its âall-male compositionâ was âessential to th[e] institutionâs character.â Justice Ginsburgâs responses to the dissent may be found in her opinion for the Court.
The statement Justice Ginsburg read from the bench on the day the Court announced the VMI decision, along with her opinion for the Court, follow.
UNITED STATES V. VIRGINIA, NO. 94-1941
VIRGINIA V. UNITED STATES, NO. 94-2107
BENCH ANNOUNCEMENT
Supreme Court of the United States (June 26, 1996)
This case concerns an incomparable military college, the Virginia Military Institute (VMI), the sole single-sex school among Virginiaâs public institutions of higher learning. Since its founding in 1839, VMI has produced civilian and military leaders for the Commonwealth and the Nation. The schoolâs unique program and unparalleled record as a leadership training ground has led some women to seek admission. The United States, on behalf of women capable of all the activities required of VMI cadets, instituted this lawsuit in 1990, maintaining that under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U. S. Constitution, Virginia may not reserve exclusively to men the educational opportunities that VMI, and no other Virginia school, affords.
The case has had a long history in court. In the first round, the District Court ruled against the United States, reasoning that the all-male VMI served the Stateâs policy of affording diverse educational programs. The Fourth Circuit vacated that judgment, concluding that a diversity policy serving to âfavor one genderâ did not constitute equal protection.
In the second round, the lower courts considered, and found satisfactory, the remedy Virginia proposed: a program for women, called the Virginia Womenâs Institute for Leadership (VMIL) at a private womenâs college, Mary Baldwin College. A VWIL degree, the Fourth Circuit said, would not carry the historical benefit and prestige of a VMI degree, and the two programs differed markedly in methodologyâVMIâs is rigorously âadversative,â VWILâs would be âcooperative.â But overall, the lower courts concluded, the schools were âsufficiently comparableâ to meet the demand of equal protection.
We reverse that determination. Our reasoning centers on the essence of the complaint of the United States, and on facts that are undisputed: Some women, at least, can meet the physical standards VMI imposes on men, are capable of all the activities required of VMI cadets, prefer VMIâs methodology over VWILâs, could be educated using VMIâs methodology, and would want to attend VMI if they had the chance.
With recruitment, the District ...