Women's Movements in Post-"Arab Spring" North Africa

Fatima Sadiqi, Fatima Sadiqi

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2016
• ISBN:
  9781137506757
• Topic: Scienze sociali
• Subtopic: Studi di genere

Centering on women's movements before, during, and after the revolutions, Women's Movements in Post-"Arab Spring" North Africa highlights the broader sources of authority that affected the emergence of new feminist actors and agents and their impact on the sociopolitical landscapes of the region.

Part One
Contextualizing Women’s Movements in North Africa: Conceptual Issues

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2016

Fatima Sadiqi (ed.)Women’s Movements in Post-“Arab Spring” North AfricaComparative Feminist Studies10.1057/978-1-137-50675-7_2

Begin Abstract

The Center: A Post-revolution Space for Women’s Movements in North Africa: Morocco as an Example

Fatima Sadiqi¹

(1)

Fez, Morocco

Abstract

Using the case of Morocco, this chapter argues for the emergence of the “Center” as an ideological middle-ground space between the increasingly antagonistic paradigms of secularism and Islamism in post-revolution North Africa. Including versions of the two paradigms but also stretching the space to allow for more diversity, the Center is partly created by women’s issues as these have been consistently used as the bone of contention between secularists and Islamists. The main differences between the various hues of conservative and Islamist ideologies relate to women’s “allocated” freedoms. As part and parcel of the demands by civil society and the population at large, women’s issues are becoming more diversified and polyvocal as a variety of actors and agents are increasingly gaining visibility in the public sphere of authority.

End Abstract

Introduction

¹

The “Center” in this chapter refers to an ideological middle-ground space between the increasingly antagonistic paradigms of secularism and Islamism in post-revolution North Africa. Including various versions of the two paradigms but also stretching the space to allow more diversity, the Center was partly created by women’s issues as these have been a consistent bone of contention between secularists and Islamists. As an integral part of the various demands of civil society and the population at large, women’s issues are becoming more diversified and polyvocal as new actors and agents gain visibility in the public sphere of authority.² This diversification is, in turn, being nourished by new values (such as dignity) and new approaches (such as the use of social media and transnational networking). In other words, the Center is both a space for hitherto marginalized voices and a space where women’s demands “converse” with, among other elements, human rights demands and cultural demands.³ It is a new physical (and virtual) site of protest that emerged in Morocco with the February 20 Movement, and it continues even after this movement has been substantially weakened because this space answers a real need at the national public discourse level. Up to the pre-revolution era, national discourse was dominated by secularist-Islamist frontal antagonisms, which in turn were reflected in the increase of tension between women’s rights organizations and Islamists.⁴

In retrospect, struggle over the relationships between gender, religion, and the state in Moroccan politics and academe is not new. Started in the 1940s as an outcome of the clash between nationalism (blended with tradition) and colonialism (constructed as “modernity”), this struggle has been growing since the 1960s, along with post-colonialism, decolonization, Islamism, and increasing demands for democratization. Consequently, the clash between the two poles of secularism and Islamism intensified, especially with the advent of new means of technological communication (social media), resulting in substantial reforms and culminating in a post-reform and post-revolution Center space. In other words, the uprisings changed the culture/politics/experience of the people, and this changed the country.

In an attempt to circumvent the complex nature of the Center as a post-revolution space for women’s rights, this chapter addresses and relates three major issues: (1) the history of the secularist-Islamist dichotomy in Morocco, (2) a comparison of the two ideologies, and (3) the new Center as neither exclusively secular nor exclusively Islamist but diverse, protest-based, and pragmatic.

The Secularist-Islamist Dichotomy

In Morocco, the secularist-Islamist dichotomy has a history of its own. Initially termed a “conservative/modernist” dichotomy, it was born in the 1940s after the French colonizers promulgated the 1930 Berber Dahir (decree), which required Berbers to come under the jurisdiction of French courts. This promulgation transformed the country in an unexpected and unprecedented way by instigating three things: nationalism, the birth of a “Moroccan” identity, and the marginalization of the Berber issue as an “element of discord.” These mighty transformations were in turn accompanied by two trends: a conservative one and a modernist one. While both trends supported nationalism and Moroccan identity, and also the marginalization of the Berber issue as a dividing element, they significantly differed in their reactions to the West and modernity. Conservatives opposed any influence of the West, especially in family and social matters, and modernists viewed the Western aspects of Morocco as progress that did not contradict the Arab-Muslim identity of the country. The dichotomy was then qualified as “conservatives versus modernists.” It was important in this colonial era to construct Moroccan identity as primarily Arab and Muslim. With the advent of independence and state-building, the Arab-Muslim identity became Morocco’s official identity, but the need and desire to keep a window on the West were irresistible. Hence, the type of modernity brought about by the French (e.g., the French system of education and the French lifestyle) appealed to Moroccans, especially the elite. This explains the co-existence of conservatism and modernity from the 1940s onward. This dichotomy was not supplanted by decolonization, and it is being problematized by the so-called Moroccan Spring. But pre-Spring facts are relevant to the understanding of these spectacular and relatively quick transformative shifts.

From the 1970s onward, with rampant political Islam in the background, the conservative-modernist dichotomy developed into a secularist-Islamist one. It is important to note that this new development did not supplant the initial modernist-conservative dichotomy but politicized, and hence polarized, it and rendered it more complex. In other words, Islamists, de facto conservative, claimed a new view of Islam that discarded traditional customs and mores but highlighted nostalgia for the past. These views clashed with those of modernists, de facto secularist, who valued some aspects of tradition but targeted the future. While the conservative-modernist dichotomy is more clearly seen at the social level, the secularist-Islamist dichotomy is more visible in politics and ideology. Consequently, while the former dichotomy is generally accommodated in Moroccans’ behavior and way of life, the latter dichotomy produces clear divergences among Moroccans. For a better understanding of the complexities involved, the relevant categories need to be elucidated to show the affinities between modernists and secularists on the one hand and conservatives and Islamists on the other hand.

Modernists/Secularists

Modernists/secularists share a focus on the present and the future, but the designations do not entail the same representations and meanings in the Moroccan context. Linguistically speaking, ’asri (modern) derives from ’asr (era) and means “of this era.” This concept is general and spans all walks of life from the family through the street to the government. Modernists are generally urban and educated, and, without denying religion, they do not highlight it. The concept of ’ilmani (secularist) mainly spans the public sphere, especially its political and legal aspects.⁵ Like modernists, secularists tend to be educated and urban, but they view religion as more of a private than a public matter. More specifically, as the Moroccan monarch is believed to embody the highest political and religious authority, secularists espouse modernity but stress the separation of religion and politics in the public spheres. This is the reason why, for example, Moroccan secular feminists have always sought to improve, not replace, shari’a (Islamic law). For secular forces, Islamic law is an ancient form of law that works only in religious fields, and they believe that Muslim countries require modern secular laws. Indeed, for secularists, religion should operate only in social life and should not interfere with secular politics; otherwise society will go backward, particularly because the past is internalized as a “glorified era” in Moroccan culture. Furthermore, with compulsory primary education, progress and modernization have been achieved, and this in itself constitutes a great impetus for secular forces. Both modernists and secularists capitalize on women’s education and empowerment to cross the religious barriers set by the conservatives/Islamists.

Modernists/secularists were very instrumental during the state-building phase after Morocco’s independence from France in 1956 and during the decolonization era and have continued to be instrumental in current times. Indeed, at its inception, the state (monarchy and the government) presented itself as “the modernizer” of Morocco. At the heart of this “modernization” project dwelt a combination of urbanization, industrialization, bilingual education (Arabic and French), business, and trade exchanges with Europe, especially France. At the social level, the French style in matters of dress and way of life was widely encouraged. Beyond the state, the modernist intellectual trend that emerged from within the nationalist movement back in the 1940s, led by Hassan Ouazzani, continued to gather momentum, especially among the urban elite. During the decolonization decades that followed independence, the concept of “modernist” lost some of its semantic charge, but it is still a valid progress-linked category. As for the concept of “secularist,” it is gathering momentum and absorbing the modernist concept because secular forces value modernity and progress.⁶

Conservatives/Islamists

In their references, conservatives/Islamists focus on the past more than the present or the future. The term taqlidi (conservative) derives from taqlid (imitation). In the decades that preceded state-building, nationalism and the struggle for independence were the main concerns and conservatism was a way of sustaining the Arab-Muslim identity of the country. However, during the state-building phase, conservatives had to cohabit with modernists without being absorbed into them. It was important at that time to maintain the conservative-modernist dichotomy because Morocco wanted to be both part of the larger Arab Umma (nation) and modern. With the coming of political Islam, globalization, and social media, the schism between conservatives and modernists has widened and become more complex. Consequently, the conservative trend (or part of it) hardened into an Islamist faction after the emergence of political Islam in Morocco. Although Islamists do not constitute a homogeneous group, they all share the use of Islam in politics as a sine qua non condition.

As with modernists/secularists, conservatives/Islamists capitalize on women’s issues in their campaigns and debates. But unlike the former pair, there is a clear difference between conservatives and Islamists in Morocco. This is manifested in the existence of conservative but not Islamist political parties and in the fact that conservative feminists may be secular. The reason is that tradition as a value system spans private and public spaces and governs Moroccans’ lives in no trivial way. While modernists/secularists, and to a certain extent conservatives, view tradition (including the “traditional” language, Berber) as part of a legacy that needs to be promoted, Islamists discard many [or certain] traditions as “wrong interpretations of the Qur’an” and advance a new, homogenizing version of living, practicing, and ruling in the name of Islam.

In politics, modernists tend to support secularists and conservatives tend to support Islamists, although the latter are not necessarily against modernity and some of them may support secularists. This chapter focuses on the secularist-Islamist dichotomy in politics, as it is this dichotomy that both bears on women’s issues and stirs most tension and debate in the post-revolution Center. The best way to appreciate these ideas and their larger ramifications is to compare secularists to Islamists.

A Comparison of Secularists and Islamists

Theoretically speaking, the application of secularism and Islamism varies from country to country in the Arab-Muslim world. Although all Arab-Muslim countries consider Islam a state religion and a legal reference, and therefore part and parcel of politics, religion does not play the same role in every country. The differences were constructed during the state-building phases when each country chose as a frame of reference a specific madhab (Islamic school of jurisprudence) that best fits its political structure.⁷ For example, Morocco chose the Maliki madhab because it acknowledges the religious authority of the ruler and hence is su...