U.S. Army Doctrine

From the American Revolution to the War on Terror

Walter E. Kretchik

• Publisher: University Press of Kansas
• Year: 2014
• Print ISBN:
  9780700632947
• eBook ISBN:
  9780700620463
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Military & Maritime History
• Index: History

From the American Revolution to the global war on terror, U.S. Army doctrine has evolved to regulate the chaos of armed conflict by providing an intellectual basis for organizing, training, equipping, and operating the military. Walter E. Kretchik analyzes the service’s keystone doctrine over three centuries to reveal that the army’s leadership is more forward thinking and adaptive than has been generally believed.

The first comprehensive history of Army doctrine, Kretchik’s book fully explores the principles that have shaped the Army’s approach to warfare. From Regulations For the Order and Discipline of the Troops of the United States in 1779 to modern-day field manuals, it reflects the fashioning of doctrine to incorporate the lessons of past wars and minimize the uncertainty and dangers of battle.

Kretchik traces Army doctrine through four distinct eras: 1779-1904, when guidelines were compiled by single authors or a board of officers in tactical drill manuals; 1905-1944, when the Root Reforms fixed doctrinal responsibility with the General Staff; 1944-1962, the era of multiservice doctrine; and, beginning in 1962, coalition warfare with its emphasis on interagency cooperation. He reveals that doctrine has played a significant role in the Army’s performance throughout its history-although not always to its advantage, as it has often failed to anticipate accurately the nature of the “next war” and still continues to be locked in a debate between advocates of conventional warfare and those who emphasize counterinsurgency approaches.

Each chapter presents individuals who helped define and articulate Army doctrine during each period of its history-including George Washington and Baron von Steuben in the eighteenth century, Emory Upton and Arthur Wagner in the nineteenth, and Elihu Root and William DePuy in the twentieth. Each identifies the “first principles” set down in manuals covering such topics as tactics, operations, and strategy; size, organization, and distribution of forces; and the promise and challenges of technological innovation. Each also presents specific cases that analyze how effectively the Army actually applied a particular era’s doctrine.

Doctrine remains the basis of instruction in the Army school system, ensuring that all officers and enlisted soldiers share a common intellectual framework. This book elucidates that framework for the first time.

CHAPTER ONE

MIMICS AT WAR: TACTICAL DRILL, 1778–1848

I think “Regulations for the Infantry of the United States” will be sufficient.—George Washington to Baron von Steuben, The Writings of George Washington

Since English colonization of North America commenced in the early 1600s, the colonists fought wars in the absence of doctrine. While capable of defeating the indigenous population in local engagements, the colonists’ informal practice was less effective when facing well-drilled, conventional European armies. Having rebelled against Britain in 1775, the American Congress and army leadership needed a tactical doctrine capable of forming a cohesive army from among the diverse state militias.

For two years, informal battlefield practice contributed far more often to defeat than victory. By mid-1777, the Army had been tactically unable to bludgeon their British opponents into acquiescence. By October, the Army leadership’s inability to regulate the Continental Army’s performance in battle had contributed to the British occupation of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, the rebel capital. While many Americans believed their rebellion was doomed, a troubled Major General George Washington withdrew a dispirited Continental Army to Valley Forge, Pennsylvania. As the winter intensified, a bloodied army licked its wounds and struggled to rebuild. Volunteers arrived at an encampment filled with hardship and despair. Despondency permeated not only Washington’s camp but the thirteen states, as well. Civilians and soldiers alike who had supported the rebellion were growing increasingly pessimistic about their future and the coming campaign season of 1778.

Toward an American Army Doctrine

On 8 January 1778, Major General George Washington learned of the pending arrival of Frederich Wilhelm Ludolf Gerhard Augustin von Steuben, an experienced Prussian military officer turned opportunistic mercenary. This news broke at a time when seasoned officers capable of forging an army were in short supply. After writing a letter of welcome to Steuben, Washington admitted to Brigadier General George Weedon, “I can see clearly that instead of having the proper Officers to assist in arranging, training, and fitting the Troops for the field against the next campaign, that we shall be plunged into it as we were last year heels over head without availing ourselves of the advantages which might be derived from our present situation and prospects.” Steuben’s pending arrival notwithstanding, Washington envisioned the forthcoming campaign season to be no better than the previous.¹

Steuben’s advent at Valley Forge on 23 February 1778 provoked mixed reactions from the encampment’s inhabitants. Already present was Thomas-Antoine, Chevalier de Mauduit du Plessis, a veteran of the Battle of Germantown and a respected drill instructor who, perhaps, saw a rival in Steuben. Some, including Colonel Timothy Pickering, distrusted yet another European professional soldier and a Prussian automaton in particular. Familiar with Prussian doctrine, Pickering believed it held no value for American military culture, claiming, “Tis the boast of some that their men are mere machines, but God forbid that my countrymen should ever be thus degraded.” Congress had allowed Steuben access to Washington, so he listened as the Prussian pled his case in French with John Laurens, Washington’s aide, acting as translator. During the course of the conversation, Steuben offered his assistance in any capacity.²

Washington contemplated Steuben’s potential value. Given Prussian Army success on the European continent from 1756 to 1760, having an officer intimate with the inner workings of that army was indeed fortuitous. During early March 1778, in an attempt to rejuvenate an inadequate winter training regimen, Washington decided to appoint Steuben as the Army’s inspector general. This choice spawned immediate complaints from American officers that foreigners were overly ambitious and that Steuben’s appointment denigrated those who had served Washington from the beginning. Officers also voiced that their enlisted soldiers might balk at taking instruction from a foreign drillmaster (although the Frenchman Thomas-Antoine had in all probability provided some drill instruction advice). There was also uncertainty over how Steuben might handle an American army composed of partially trained officers and noncommissioned officers leading a multiethnic rabble of transient Whites (both native and newcomer), African Americans, and Indians. More troubling still was that Major General Thomas Conway already served as the inspector general. But Conway had complained to Horatio Gates that Washington proved to be a weak commander and should be replaced. When the grumblings reached Congress, Washington was irritated enough to seek Conway’s reassignment. In the interim, Steuben acted in Conway’s capacity, without rank. He began to train the Army for a campaign against British conventional forces within a few weeks.³

Through happenstance, Washington had acquired a competent drillmaster from the kingdom that many believed possessed the finest army in the world. On 19 March 1778, the commanding general issued orders directing the Army to obey the acting inspector general and to appoint subinspectors to assist him. Together, Washington and Steuben pursued a common purpose: to prepare the Continental Army at Valley Forge to fight a conventional war. Given that informal practice methods had been embedded within American military culture as early as Jamestown, the complexity of this undertaking was colossal. As it was, the Army was barely functional, incapable of even marching to the same cadence between regiments. In battle, soldiers could not shift from line to column formation or vice versa with any sense of order. Tactical diversity had proven to be a recipe for disaster when facing British Army precision on the battlefield. Now, Washington had a Prussian officer skillful enough to train the Army to fight conventionally along a common European standard.⁴

Steuben soon discovered that imposing Prussian or British doctrine upon the Army was feasible but unsuitable. American soldiers were far more individualistic than their European or Atlantic counterparts. The ranks constituted a cross section of Colonial America reflecting varying degrees of education and views of service. Collectively, the assembled multitude loathed physical punishment and pointless maneuvers; training required a delicate balance between Prussian discipline, British procedures, and American attitudes. Most troops were familiar with the 1764 British manual of arms, but Steuben nonetheless confiscated a potpourri of well-worn foreign military literature because “each Colonel exercised his regiment according to his own ideas or to those of any military author that might have fallen into his hands.” In sum, Steuben had to sort out the accumulated chaos of over 160 years of informal American warfighting practice that had culminated in a hollow force lacking the homogeneity needed to win a war. To succeed, Steuben had to consider diversity while in search of unity. More important, he had to create a military system simple enough for a mob to understand its nuances and perform each task perfectly. And he had to do so in a matter of weeks during winter.⁵

George Washington and Baron von Steuben (The Granger Collection, New York)

Imposing a system of order on the Continental Army began with training the members to discard their individual regimental procedures so they could become a cohesive conventional force. With Washington’s permission, Steuben created a model company composed of 50 Virginians and 100 additional men from the various states. On 19 March 1778, Steuben personally schooled the soldiers to stand at attention properly and march to 75 steps per minute at slow tempo and 120 steps for double time. Speaking through translators in German and French (enriched with English profanities), he taught the soldiers to advance in columns of four instead of single file, thereby making formations compact and able to bring more firepower to bear more quickly on the battlefield. Troops learned how to shift from column into line and back again, insight from Prussian, British, and Guibert’s French Army doctrine. Drawing upon American skill with the musket, Steuben added bayonet training and included defensive procedures such as how to form a hollow square to defend against cavalry or other attacks. Colonel Alexander Scammell of New Hampshire remarked that it was a lark “to see a gentleman dismissed with a lieutenant general’s commission from the Prussian monarch condescend, with a grace peculiar to himself, to take under his direction a squad of ten or twelve men in capacity of a drill sergeant.” Steuben’s passion earned the American’s admiration and respect, for “he has undertaken the discipline of the Army and shows himself to be a perfect master of it, not only in grand maneuvers, but in every minutia.” Slowly, a disciplined army formed by mimicking British and Prussian standards with a bit of French tactical procedure thrown in, all leavened by American sensitivities.⁶

After several days of drill, Washington notified his subordinate commanders that new regulations were forthcoming. To produce the commanding general’s long-desired drill manual, Steuben turned to four officers to act as deputy inspectors general while he devised a suitable text. Unable to write in English, Steuben composed in German and at times in French, then passed his notes on for translation. The manual was “composed in good German, translated into bad French, put into good French by Captain Fleury, then translated into poor English by Captain Walker.” Steuben wrote each lesson several days in advance of implementation while his deputies transcribed the translated documents and passed the copies along to the brigades and regiments.⁷

Even as the drill manual took form, Washington ordered all brigade and regimental commanders to comply with the new instructions, stating that “establishing a uniform system of useful maneuvers and regularity of discipline must be obvious; the deficiency of our Army in these respects must be equally so.” In response, Continental Army officers and noncommissioned officers from brigade and regiment down through company level observed the model company drill twice each day with Steuben and his assistants explaining each lesson. By following the concept of “training the trainer,” unit leaders learned firsthand what needed to be accomplished and then instructed their own troops in what they had been taught.⁸

Steuben’s manual combined military philosophy with an individual- and unit-training system. The publication contained standardized procedures for an infantry-dominated force, for the Continental Army was overwhelmingly composed of infantrymen. The Army now had a standardized method for how to give, receive, and implement orders and to organize and maneuver units small and large. Basic training began with the individual soldier’s manual of arms and individual drill movements before progressing to larger formations. Philosophical directives were included in an effort to tutor officers, regimental commanders, majors, adjutants, and quartermasters concerning their responsibilities. For example, instructions “for the Captain” prescribed that an officer “cannot be too careful of the company the state has committed to his charge,” an appeal to duty and the obligations accompanying commissioning and command. In deference to the American soldier, officers were to attend to their health, discipline, arms, clothes, and other necessities so they could foster cohesion and respect. As American regiments were understrength, Steuben directed them to merge into two full battalions during training. A Continental regiment now contained two battalions, each consisting of 486 soldiers divided into 9 companies of 54 individuals each.⁹

By April 1778, the Continental Army had undergone a miraculous transformation. With Washington’s monitoring and approval along the way, Steuben wrote the first training manual applicable for any conventional multicolonial American army operating in North America. He created the American Army training model: explanation followed by demonstration and then practical exercise. He also achieved the recognition he had long sought. In response to Steuben’s efforts, Washington sent a glowing report to Congress on 30 April. On 5 May 1778, Congress responded by appointing Steuben as a major general with pay of $165 per month. American troops at Valley Forge now had a unified conventional standard and were soon ready to begin the summer campaign season.¹⁰

Given subsequent events at Monmouth Court House, New Jersey, on 28 June 1778, there is little doubt that Steuben’s manual dramatically altered the performance of the Continental line. On a hot and humid day, the Army marched into battle, executed complex maneuvers with precision, and engaged a crack force under the command of Lieutenant General Sir Henry Clinton. Although the battle was a tactical draw, the American line had held. The war soon ended in the northern colonies.¹¹

While Steuben’s manual was a success and Washington had ordered the Army to use it, government approval was still forthcoming. Absent congressional authorization, the manual could not be considered doctrine, but it was well on its way toward that end. After taking a field command in 1778, Steuben continued to expand and revise his work well into early 1779 in an effort to create a publication that not only made sense to the Army but was also capable of securing congressional endorsement. Washington shared this goal. His position as commanding general allowed him to take an active role in reading the drafts and modifying them as he deemed necessary. His letter to Steuben of 26 February 1779 reflects that personal involvement and is partially reproduced here:

my remarks on the first part, the Remainder shall follow as soon as other affairs of equal importance will permit. I very much approve the conciseness of the work, founded on your general principle of rejecting every thing superfluous; though perhaps it would not be amiss in a work of instruction, to be more minute and particular in some parts. One precaution is rendered necessary by your writing in a foreign tongue, which is to have the whole revised and prepared for the press by some person who will give it perspicuity and correctness of diction, without deviating from the appropriated terms and language of the Military Science. These points cannot be too closely attended to, in Regulations which are to receive the sanction of Congress and are designed for the general Government of the Army.

Later, on 11 March 1779, Washington again edited the manual before notifying Congress of his willingness to submit it for their “public sanction, that the regulations may be carried into execution as soon as possible.”¹²

The First Doctrine and Its Outcome

On 29 March 1779, Congress approved Steuben’s Regulations for the Order and Discipline of the Troops of the United States, Part 1. In authorizing its immediate use for the Army as a whole, Congress announced the birth of the first American Army doctrine. It also indirectly began the decline of informal practice in the sense that the Army was ordered to adopt certain standardized procedures, at least regarding conventional tactical warfare. Steuben’s efforts had produced the first keystone manual of “invariable rules, for the order and discipline of the troops, especially for the purpose of introducing an uniformity in their formation and manoeuvres, and in the service of the camp.” On 12 April 1779, Washington ordered the Army to comply immediately with the congressionally approved Regulations. At least 3,000 copies were printed with a blue cover (thus the colloquial term Blue Book). Although the manual was intended for use by all regiments, the war ended before that goal was attained.¹³

The government-approved 1779 Regulations enabled the military leadership to regulate the Army’s behavior tactically and systematically. It also enabled the Continentals to fight effectively alongside the conventionally trained French Army. Although the doctrine had not discussed the nuances of coalition warfare, the American procedures were familiar enough to the skilled European professional eye. When the Yorktown campaign concluded in the fall of 1782, Commanding General Jean Baptiste Donatien de Vimeur, Count of Rochambeau, commented to Washington: “You must have formed an alliance with the King of Prussia; these troops are Prussians.” Baron Ludwig von Closen, a Prussian officer under French employ, further observed, “It is incredible that soldiers composed of men of every age, even children of fifteen, of whites and blacks, almost naked, unpaid, and rather poorly fed, can march so well and withstand fire so steadfastly.” Even so, the congressional order that the Regulations be used by all the troops of the United States was problematic, for the manual discussed infantry units alone. It did not address artillery, engineers, and other service specialties such as cavalry. Enforcing its contents was also troublesome, for although copies were widely distributed, not all American Regulars were trained under the Regulations owing to a variety of reasons such as continued personnel turnover. Various state militia units received copies, but training was spotty and highly dependent upon the whims of local government officials and commanders.¹⁴

In approving the Regulations, Congress had legitimatized the conventional form of war that the Army had fo...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• Acknowledgments
• Abbreviations
• Chronology of U.S. Army Keystone Doctrinal Manuals
• Introduction: U.S. Army Doctrine in Historical Perspective
• 1 Mimics at War: Tactical Drill, 1778–1848
• 2 From French Drill to Teutonic Initiative: Infantry Tactics and Regulations, 1855–1905
• 3 Doctrine for Army Operations: From Field Service Regulations to Field Manual 100-5, 1905–1945
• 4 Cold War Doctrine: From Army Operations to Multinational and Multiservice Operations, 1945–1991
• 5 Doctrine for a Post–Cold War World: Multinational and Multiservice Operations, 1991–2008
• Conclusion: Regulating Chaos
• Notes
• Selected Bibliography
• Index
• Back Cover