Omaha Beach

A Flawed Victory

Adrian R. Lewis

• Publisher: The University of North Carolina Press
• Year: 2003
• Print ISBN: 9780807854693, 9780807826096
• eBook ISBN: 9780807862582
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Military & Maritime History
• Index: History

The Allied victory at Omaha Beach was a costly one. A direct infantry assault against a defense that was years in the making, undertaken in daylight following a mere thirty-minute bombardment, the attack had neither the advantage of tactical surprise nor that of overwhelming firepower. American forces were forced to improvise under enemy fire, and although they were ultimately victorious, they suffered devastating casualties.

Why did the Allies embark on an attack with so many disadvantages? Making extensive use of primary sources, Adrian Lewis traces the development of the doctrine behind the plan for the invasion of Normandy to explain why the battles for the beaches were fought as they were.

Although blame for the Omaha Beach disaster has traditionally been placed on tactical leaders at the battle site, Lewis argues that the real responsibility lay at the higher levels of operations and strategy planning. Ignoring lessons learned in the Mediterranean and Pacific theaters, British and American military leaders employed a hybrid doctrine of amphibious warfare at Normandy, one that failed to maximize the advantages of either British or U.S. doctrine. Had Allied forces at the other landing sites faced German forces of the quality and quantity of those at Omaha Beach, Lewis says, they too would have suffered heavy casualties and faced the prospect of defeat.

1 THE BATTLE FOR OMAHA BEACH

If you are doing what is right, never mind whether you are freezing with cold or beside a good fire; heavy-eyed, or fresh from a sound sleep; reviled or applauded; in the act of dying, or about some other piece of business. (For even dying is part of the business of life; and there too no more is required of us than “to see the moment’s work well done.”)

—Marcus Aurelius

On 5 June 1944 at 1400 hours, General Norman Cota, who was in charge of a provisional brigade headquarters that was to serve as the advanced headquarters for the 29th ID, addressed his men:

This is different from any of the other exercises that you’ve had so far. The little discrepancies that we tried to correct on Slapton Sands [an amphibious training center] are going to be magnified and are going to give way to incidents that you might at first view as chaotic. The air and naval bombardment and the artillery support are reassuring. But you’re going to find confusion. The landing craft aren’t going in on schedule and people are going to be landed in the wrong place. Some won’t be landed at all. The enemy will try, and will have some success, in preventing our gaining “lodgement.” But we must improvise, carry on, not lose our heads.¹

General Cota’s men were among the few soldiers who received a fair assessment of the coming battle. Cota forecast that naval gunfire would miss its targets, the aerial bombardment would be ineffective, and the beaches would be “fouled-up.” However, even Cota’s D Day prediction fell far short of reality. One participant later recalled thinking: “This time we have failed! Nothing has moved from the beach and soon, over the bluff, will come the Germans. They’ll come swarming down on us.”² According to historian Gordon Harrison: “To the German officer in command of the fortifications at Pointe et Raz de la Percee it looked in these first hours as though the invasion had been stopped on the beaches. He noted that the Americans were lying on the shore seeking cover behind obstacles, that ten tanks and a ‘great many other vehicles’ were burning. The fire of his own positions and the artillery, he thought, had been excellent, causing heavy losses. He could see the wounded and dead lying on the sand.”³ The initial impression of many American and German soldiers was that the assault at Omaha Beach had failed. And, in fact, the plan for the conduct of the battle had failed.

• • •

Between two and three o’clock on the morning of 6 June 1944, the Allied invasion fleets arrived off the coast of Normandy. The sixteen transport ships carrying the assault forces took up station in the transport area and immediately commenced landing operations. Admiral John Lesslie Hall commanded the amphibious assault from his headquarters ship, the USS Ancon. Aboard with him were Generals Leonard T. Gerow, commander of the V Corps, and Clarence R. Huebner, commander of the 1st ID, and their staffs. The soldiers of the 1st and 29th IDs were aboard the HMS Empire Anvil, HMSEmpire Javelin, USSCharles Carroll, USSHenrico, USSSamuel Chase, and USSThomas Jefferson. The transport area at Omaha Beach was ten to eleven miles offshore, out of range of enemy artillery. The sea was rough. The 18-knot winds and 3-knot tides produced waves three to four feet high, some reportedly even as high as six feet. The waves made boarding the small landing craft, via the weblike scramble net, a difficult and dangerous task. Soldiers had to time their jump into the smaller craft with the rise and fall of the craft. A mistake in timing could result in serious injury. One soldier misjudged his jump, fell twelve feet, and was knocked unconscious; others received less severe injuries. Heavy, awkward equipment and weapons were loaded over the side of the ships. In the craft, soldiers checked their gear and took up their positions. Some LCVPs (landing craft, vehicle, personnel) hung from the side of the transport ships and were loaded before they were lowered into the water. Once loaded, the LCVPs moved to a designated assembly area and circled until all of the boats in a division were present. In order to land one RCT, 81 LCVPs, 64 DUKWs (2½-ton amphibian trucks), and numerous other landing craft were required.

In an effort to maximize the utilization of space on the landing craft and thereby limit the number of craft required for an assault company, a new organization based on the capacity of the LCVP was put into effect. This organization violated the principle of unit integrity. Major General (retired) Albert H. Smith, who was the executive officer for the 1st Battalion, 16th Infantry, on 6 June 1944 described the new organization: “To defeat German concrete fortifications it was decided that each assault rifle company would be organized in 5 assault sections, instead of three rifle platoons and one weapons platoon. Each section—totaling 1 officer, and 29 men—would include rifle teams, a wire cutting team, bazooka team, flame thrower team, BAR [Browning automatic rifle] team, 60-mm mortar team and demolition team.” ⁴

Landing craft were loaded in a specified order, with small-unit leaders at the front of the boat in order to exit first to lead the way. The assault teams were arranged in the following order:

1. Five-man rifle teams carrying M-1s and ninety-six rounds of ammunition each

2. Four-man bangalore and wire-cutting teams carrying M-1s

3. Two-man automatic rifle teams, one man carrying a BAR and the other a carbine rifle; two teams per boat

4. Two-man bazooka teams carrying one bazooka each; two teams per boat

5. Four-man mortar teams carrying one 60 mm mortar and fifteen to twenty mortar rounds

6. Two-man flamethrower teams carrying one flamethrower each

7. Five-man demolition teams carrying satchels of TNT and bangalore torpedoes

Some boats also had medics on board. They exited before the platoon sergeant or a senior noncommissioned officer (NCO), who was the last man to leave to insure that everyone else had disembarked. General Huebner and his subordinate commanders concluded that the new boat organization was unsatisfactory. They believed that unit integrity enhanced combat effectiveness and was more important than the efficient use of boat space: “Craft must be tactically loaded despite the fact that some space is not used. The assault team based upon craft capacity is impractical. All planning should be built around normal infantry units, squad, platoon, company, battalion and combat team.”⁵

Soldiers wore assault jackets with built-in packs. Each man carried his weapon, a life preserver, a gas mask, five grenades, a half-pound block of TNT, six rations, canteens, an entrenching tool, a first-aid kit, a knife, and whatever special equipment his job required. Soldiers’ clothing was treated with a chemical to protect troops against gas attacks. Soldiers also carried comfort items such as cartons of cigarettes and extra socks and various other nonessential items. When fully loaded, each soldier carried between sixty and ninety pounds, depending on the type of weapon and ammunition. Soldiers carried too much. This heavy load diminished soldiers’ ability to cross the beach under fire.⁶

Allied Assault Routes. From Gordon Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack, U.S. Army in World War II (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1951).

Final Overlord Plan. From Gordon Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack, U.S. Army in World War II (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1951).

Soldiers were soaked to the skin even before their landing craft started for the shore. The dampness and the chill in the air caused men to grow numb in their fingers and hands. The ship-to-shore movement took two to three hours, depending on where a ship was anchored. In transit, a few craft were swamped and sank. Soldiers in these boats discarded their weapons and equipment and swam as best they could until they were picked up by other craft. The rough sea, cramped quarters, and long ride caused seasickness. Many regretted having eaten the heavy breakfast of bacon and eggs aboard the transport ships. Soldiers were given pills for seasickness, but many did not take them because they caused drowsiness. Seasickness sapped the energy of many soldiers, draining the combat power of the assault force.

As the sun rose, starting at 0558, soldiers could see the outline of large ships in the distance, and the feeling of being alone in a small craft on a big ocean was somewhat diminished. When the battleships and cruisers started firing on the German defenses, the thought that everything was going to be all right entered the minds of some soldiers, particularly those who had never conducted an amphibious assault. As the boats continued toward the shore, some passed the crews of DD tanks swimming for their lives. The high waves proved to be too much for the flimsy canvas shrouds that made it possible for the tanks to float. Many of the tanks took on water and sank. Of the thirty-two DD tanks of the 741st Tank Battalion that were to support the 16th RCT, only five reached the shore; the rest sank to the bottom of the Channel.

While still en route, some soldiers caught a glimpse of American heavy and medium daylight bombers. The sky was overcast and the cloud ceiling was suspended between 2,000 and 3,000 feet high, but breaks in the coverage occasionally revealed American air power. The bombers flying above the clouds at an altitude of 11,000 feet used radar to determine their bomb release time, and because of the proximity to friendly troops, they added an extra margin of safety to their calculations.

Invasion Plan, Omaha Beach

Ten to fifteen minutes before landing, soldiers watched a rocket attack. Thousands of rockets arched into the sky toward the beaches. Because of the high seas and the inability to accurately determine distance and adjust fire, most of the rockets missed their targets. This show was nevertheless impressive and boosted the spirits of the wet, seasick soldiers. But as the beach came into view, soldiers started to realize that something was wrong. The air and naval bombardment had failed to destroy or even neutralize the German defenses. The various arrays of obstacles and wire were clearly visible. The enemy was not stunned or disorganized; fortifications were not broken. There were no ready-made fighting positions produced by bombs, and in the 16th RCT’s sector, there was little tank support. The concept for the conduct of the battle—which called for air and sea power to produce the combat power needed to overcome the initial defenses, tanks to provide overwatch and suppressing fire, and infantry to cover the breaching operations of the engineers—fell apart in the first instance. It was immediately evident that the plans of the generals to win the battle with strategic and operational resources had failed. The psychological implications of this cannot be fully comprehended by those of us who were not there. Experienced soldiers probably cursed the planners and leaders of the invasion. Green soldiers were probably confused and uncertain as to what was going on. All were shocked to some degree by the discrepancy between the vision articulated to them and the event transpiring before them.⁷ Nothing was as they were told it would be.

Five to six hundred yards from the shore, the assault force began receiving small arms, mortar, antitank gun, artillery, and machine gun fire. Some landing craft received direct hits and sank. Those men still alive went into the sea and swam as best they could. German machine gunners found their range, zeroed in on the ramps of the landing craft, and fired patterns that killed or wounded the first four to five men down the ramps. Converging fire from multiple automatic weapons produced heavy casualties. Some soldiers jumped overboard to avoid this murderous fire and in the process lost much of their equipment. Small-unit leaders suffered inordinately high casualties because under the new boat section organization, they were the first off. According to one account from the 116th Infantry:

About seventy-five yards from the beach the ramp was dropped, and the enemy automatic fire then beat a tattoo all over the boat front. Capt. Ettore Zappacosta, the Company Commander, jumped from the boat and got ten yards through the water. Pfc. Robert Sales saw him hit in the leg and shoulder. He...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• OMAHA BEACH
• Copyright Page
• Dedication
• CONTENTS
• ILLUSTRATIONS
• ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
• ABBREVIATIONS
• Epigraph
• INTRODUCTION
• 1 THE BATTLE FOR OMAHA BEACH
• 2 AMPHIBIOUS DOCTRINE THE BRITISH AND AMERICAN VISIONS
• 3 JOINT AND COMBINED AMPHIBIOUS DOCTRINE
• 4 THE BRITISH VISION FOR THE INVASION OF EUROPE
• 5 THE MONTGOMERY PLAN
• 6 THE AMERICAN VISION FOR THE INVASION OF EUROPE
• 7 OBSTACLE AND MINEFIELD CLEARANCE PLAN
• 8 THE JOINT FIRE PLAN
• 9 THE 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION’S BATTLE PLAN
• EPILOGUE: THE QUESTION OF AMERICAN MILITARY SKILL
• NOTES
• SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
• INDEX