Building Europe

A History of European Unification

Wilfried Loth

• Publisher: De Gruyter Oldenbourg
• Year: 2015
• Print ISBN: 9783110427776
• eBook ISBN: 9783110424881
• Edition: 1
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: 20th Century History
• Index: History

Wilfried Loth erzählt die Entstehung und Entwicklung der Europäischen Union auf der Grundlage interner Quellen, von der Lancierung des Europarats und des Schuman-Plans bis zur Euro-Krise und zur umkämpften Wahl von Jean-Claude Juncker zum Präsidenten der Europäischen Kommission. Krisen der europäischen Integration wie das Scheitern der Europäischen Verteidigungsgemeinschaft, die "Krise des leeren Stuhls" in der Ära de Gaulle oder die Ablehnung des Verfassungsvertrags in Frankreich und in den Niederlanden werden ebenso beleuchtet wie unzweifelhafte Erfolge: die deutsch-französische Aussöhnung, die Schaffung eines Gemeinsamen Marktes, die zahlreichen Erweiterungen und die Etablierung einer Gemeinschaftswährung. Auf diese Weise wird zum ersten Mal deutlich, welche Antriebskräfte hinter dem europäischen Integrationsprozess stehen und wie er Politik und Gesellschaft in Europa verändert.
"Ein aufklärerisches Werk. Pflichtlektüre für alle, die an der unvollendeten Geschichte Europas (ver-)zweifeln" – Rolf Steininger, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung.
"Das Buch wird zum unabdingbaren Standardwerk" – Jörg Himmelreich, Neue Zürcher Zeitung.

1Foundation Years, 1948–1957

The momentum that the European Movement had developed by the spring of 1948 was especially welcome to the French government. The conviction that a Western European federation was indispensable for reconstruction and for resolution of the German problem had in the meantime gained significant ground there. Jean Monnet, as the head of the French planning commission, wrote from Washington on 18 April 1948 to Prime Minister Robert Schuman, “All my thoughts and all my observations have now led me to a conclusion that has become a deep conviction: The efforts of the countries of Western Europe to rise to the circumstances, to the danger that threatens us, and to the American drive must become a genuinely European effort, which only a federation of the West could accomplish. I understand all the difficulties that stem from such a perspective, but I am convinced that we can save ourselves only by such an endeavor.”59 The creation of a federation seemed all the more urgent when the founding of a West German state was decided on by the Six-Power Conference in London on 7 June 1948, which put France under pressure: If Western European unification did not quickly achieve a supranational quality, the Germans threatened to take up their traditional great-power policy once again. Perhaps they would even ally themselves with the Soviet Union, which held the key to German unity. There was still an opportunity to incorporate the Germans into Europe, as Jean Laloy, political advisor to the French occupation commander in Germany, noted on 30 August 1948, but “One must grasp it quickly; in a year, it will already be too late.”60

The Struggle over the Council of Europe

At the urging of Paul Ramadier and other members of the French government, Foreign Minister Georges Bidault decided to advance the unification project along the lines sketched out by the Hague Congress. At the second session of the Consultative Council of the Brussels Pact on 19 July 1948, he called for summoning a “European Parliamentary Assembly” for an “exchange of views” on the problems of European federation and for the preparation of an economic and monetary union of the Five. This assembly was initially to have a consultative character, as was explained in an instruction from the Quai d’Orsay to the French ambassador in London; after an understanding had been reached on the Europe Project, however, it was soon to receive its own decision-making authority and thereby “constitute the core of a federative organization of Europe.”61 Bidault himself did not really believe that such an ambitious project could be realized; nevertheless, in consideration of the criticism of the London agreements on Germany that had been voiced by his colleagues in the Christian-democratic MRP, he felt it advisable to place himself at the head of the European movement.62

British Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin, who initially had not taken Bidault’s announcements seriously, was anything but enthusiastic about the French foray: Unlike his colleagues at the head of the Labour Party, this former leader of the British Transport and General Workers’ Union did envision the creation of a “close association between” the United Kingdom and the countries of the “Mediterranean and Atlantic fringes of Europe,” one that would serve the economic reconstruction of all participants as well as their security.63 With this perspective, he had promoted the formation of the Brussels Pact with France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg, which was signed on 17 March 1948 and which contained an automatic commitment of support in the event of an attack by a third power in Europe. In his view, however, the expansion of this pact into a “European Union” ought to remain in the hands of the Consultative Council of the pact members, which had been set up for that purpose. As he said of the idea of a parliamentary assembly, “I don’t like it. When you open that Pandora’s box, you will find it full of Trojan horses.”64 It threatened to produce demagogic demands for unification that could not win the acceptance of the British government and would thereby endanger the incorporation of the Western Europeans into an order led by Britain. Beyond that, it naturally offered Winston Churchill an excellent forum from which he could increase his attacks on the inaction of the Labour government in the area of Europe policy. Angry at the extent of irresponsibility displayed by Bidault, Bevin demanded, to begin with, more specific proposals before he agreed to a discussion of the project. Given that Bidault was poorly prepared, Belgian Foreign Minister Paul-Henri Spaak agreed to the call for adjournment: Only in this way was a failure of the unification project due to British opposition prevented right then.

If Bevin thought that with the adjournment the project was dead, he was soon to be disabused of that notion. As early as 29 July, Spaak declared in the Belgian parliament his willingness to advance the proposal among the allied governments if the Coordinating Committee of the European organizations presented more precise suggestions about its composition and tasks. A few days later, Ramadier signaled to committee leaders Duncan Sandys and Józef Retinger that the new French government—to which he himself belonged as minister of state, along with Léon Blum and Pierre-Henri Teitgen as deputy prime ministers, and Paul Reynaud as finance minister—would likewise be ready for such a step. As chairman of the Institutional Committee, which the Coordinating Committee had set up on 29 May, he worked out a proposal together with Sandys and others that envisioned in short order the summoning of a preparatory conference made up of seventy-five representatives sent by the parliaments of the five Brussels Pact countries. On 19 August, the Executive Committee passed this proposal on to all OEEC governments; on 2 September, the French and Belgian governments together called for it to be studied in detail in the Permanent Commission of the Brussels Pact so that a determination could be made at the next session of the Consultative Council.

Bevin initially sought to parry this foray too with delaying tactics. He had a questionnaire presented to the Permanent Commission that demanded exact information as to the competencies of the European Assembly as well as its relationship to the national governments and other international organizations and overseas territories. After the French side had offered more precise details to the effect that the assembly should at first only develop proposals on which the governments would then decide, Bevin presented to Schuman (who had replaced Bidault as foreign minister on 24 July) a counterproposal on 2 October: the idea of a “Council of Europe” that would gather once a year to bring home to the public the intensity of Western European cooperation. Given that there was no further convergence of standpoints, the Consultative Council was only able to decide on a very superficial compromise on 25 October: An eighteen-member Study Committee was created to confer on both proposals until the next session of the Council.

This Study Committee took up its work on 26 November, and the opposing standpoints once again collided. Whereas the French—in order to save at least something of the idea of the representative preparatory conference—sent high-ranking European politicians (Édouard Herriot, Paul Reynaud, François de Menthon, and Léon Blum, who then became ill and was replaced by SFIO General Secretary Guy Mollet), the British put the firm Europe opponent Hugh Dalton at the head of their delegation and other than him sent only civil servants. By 16 December, a subcommittee had finally developed a compromise proposal that was approved in principle by all delegations. A “Council of Europe” consisting of ministers and deciding unanimously, as proposed by the British delegation, was to be combined with a Consultative Assembly, which in accordance with French conceptions was to be sent from the national parliaments and in two fortnight-long sessions per year develop proposals for the governments. The contents of the Assembly’s discussions were to be decided by a two-thirds vote of the Council; further-reaching proposals of the Assembly could be banned with the same Council majority. A permanent secretariat was to support the work of both bodies.

After this preliminary result, Bevin came to the view that a parliamentary assembly was indeed unavoidable if he did not want to risk severely endangering the stabilization of Western Europe. He insisted however that the members of this assembly by appointed by the governments and that they vote en bloc in national delegations. This was significantly too little for his Continental negotiation partners, and so after furious accusations against the British side, the Study Committee dispersed on 20 January without having come to agreement on a common report. Only at the session of the Consultative Council on 27 and 28 January 1949 did Bevin realize that he could no longer lag too far behind the compromise formula that had been found in December. After Schuman had conceded to him that each country could decide for itself on the process for choosing the delegates, he accepted that they would be free in their voting and could also participate in setting the agenda. On this basis, the creation of the new organization was in principle decided. At the same time, there was agreement that Italy, the Scandinavian states, and Ireland should immediately be invited to participate in the project.

There were further negotiations on the details in the Permanent Commission of the Brussels Pact, and beginning on 28 March, representatives of the additional founding members that had been invited also took part. The delegates accepted the British suggestion that the assembly be based in Strasbourg—which to an extent certainly accommodated the ambitions of the French but was also meant to dampen the possible resonance of the new organ from the beginning. In regard to the meeting place of the Council of Ministers, the French sought in vain to have Paris chosen, whereas Bevin insisted on London. Likewise, all of Schuman’s efforts to have the new organization dubbed “European Union” remained fruitless; the name remained open right up to the last moment. At the next meeting of the Consultative Council on 5 May, which definitively decided on the statutes of the new organization, Bevin succeeded in his efforts to have the designation “Council of Europe” now serving for the ensemble of organs. He hoped that over the long term this new organization—even though he had not wanted it—would serve to ensure economic cooperation after the end of assistance from the Marshall Plan and to integrate Germany into the Western community.65

The modest and belated results of the negotiations, as measured against initial hopes, made for a certain disappointment among the Continental Europeans. That could not however keep them from now concentrating all their energy on the rapid development of the new institution. It was especially the Continental Socialists, for whom Britain’s participation in the work of unification was especially close to the heart, who importuned their visibly-hesitant political counterparts across the Channel not to keep their minds closed to the necessity of a supranational “Third Power.” The Socialist Europe Movement (MSEUE), which was now significantly gaining in popularity, joined the European Movement in November of 1948, thereby correcting the tactical error of its decision against the Hague Congress. Leading Socialists participated on an equal footing in the second congress of the European Movement from 25 to 28 February 1949 in Brussels. Decisions on European economic planning and the creation of common institutions for European heavy industry served to push the programmatic statements of the movement significantly to the left and thereby signaled to Labour politicians that there would certainly be a place in the future Europe for their socio-political beliefs. At an international socialist conference in the Dutch city of Baarn in May of 1949, Labour representatives agreed that all Socialist deputies in the future Consultative Assembly would meet with each other.66

Parallel to this, Jean Monnet and his colleagues made efforts in detailed talks to win over British planning experts for an Anglo-French economic union, which was to constitute the centerpiece of the future European community. Given that the British were still interested in developing cooperation with France, Chancellor of Exchequer Stafford Cripps agreed to informal preliminary conversations on the project between Monnet and Sir Edwin Plowden, chairman of the British Economic Planning Board. In talks that took place in late April of 1949 in Monnet’s home, it was the case however that there was hardly any convergence of views; yet, given that Plowden had much sympathy for practical proposals such as exchanging British coal for French agricultural products, the French negotiators came away with the impression that with further exploration of common and reciprocal interests, the British could be won over for common solutions in the end.67

When the first term of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe began on 10 August 1949 in Strasbourg, it could indeed seem that the breakthrough to a supranational Europe was not far off. The national parliaments had sent top-level politicians of their factions, often those who had already been participating in the European Parliamentary Union or the European Movement. Even the British government, which was the only one to make use of the opportunity to appoint delegates itself, decided to send a delegation in which Churchill could play a prominent role. The assembly elected Spaak, who had just left the Belgian government, as its president and then showed sufficient self-confidence to expand its competencies to the greatest extent possible within the provisions of the statute of the Council of Europe. It created a Standing Committee (likewise under the chairmanship of Spaak), which ensured the presence and continuity of the Assembly between its brief terms and which could serve as negotiation leader vis-à-vis the Council of Ministers. It then endowed the six other committees (among them a general “Political Committee”) with the right to meet outside the designated terms. Lastly, it called for the Council of Ministers to refrain from exercising influence over the agenda and to create the office of a deputy general secretary who was to be responsible only to the Assembly.

In terms of content, the assembly cautiously moved toward supra-nationality. Given that Sandys, the EPU, and the MSEUE were working zealously behind the scenes, Churchill made use of the opportunity to inflict upon the Labour deputies a series of defeats in votes taken. They soon withdrew in exasperation, and hence the federalists succeeded in having a goodly portion of their own ideas approved. At the close of their talks on 5 September, the Assembly passed with the required two-thirds majority a declaration from Mackay specifying that “the purpose and goal of the Council of Europe is the creation of a European political authority with limited functions but genuine authority.” The Standing Committee was given the task of dealing in greater detail with the issue of political authority and of bringing about a special session of the Assembly at the beginning of 1950 that was to confer on the results of the Standing Committee’s work. The Political Committee was also to draft a “European Pact” that was to define “the guiding principles of the Council of Europe in political, economic, social, and cultural areas” and was to be “binding for all members and associate members”; the assembly was to decide on this draft during the next regular term. The Council of Ministers was called upon to make the membership of the new West German Federal Republic possible before the next term and to provide for the strengthening of the European consciousness. Beyond that, the deputies developed the draft of a European human rights convention; they charged the Economic Committee with the task of grappling with the Ruhr question and coordinating the coal and steel industries; and they also called for dealing with the issue of a European university during the next term.68

With these decisions and these demands, the assembly certainly went beyond Bevin’s worst fears. He was anyway in the process of correcting his European policy preferences and now saw himself confirmed in the suspicion that the independent Europe that he envisioned was not to be realized with the hot-headed and irresponsible politicians of the Continent. He had already given up the customs union project in September of 1948—in part because he had grown tired of the continuing opposition of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Treasury, and the Commonwealth representatives and in part because the political instability and, as he thought, immaturity of France made an irrevocable linkage between Britain and the Continent seem less and less advisable. More important to him than the creation of a unified European economic area, which would obviously be difficult to harmonize with the interests of the Commonwealth, was the political stabilization of the Western European region, which he saw as being threatened by a combination of internal weaknesses and the pressure of Soviet expansion. It was first of all important that a stable Western German state needed to be created and that European reconstruction be protected by an American security guarantee (which engaged him to the greatest extent up to the time of the Washington agreements on the North Atlantic Pact and the occupation statute for the Federal Republic of Germany, completed on 4 and 8 April 1949, respectively). Great Britain needed to support European integration, but it must not engage itself to the extent that it would not alone remain viable in the event of a collapse of Europe, as he and Cripps wrote in a cabinet presentation in late January of 1949.69

Assessing Bevin’s attitude towards the Council of Europe the American planners aroun...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Halftitle
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• Abbreviations
• Prologue: Churchill’s Congress
• 1 Foundation Years, 1948–1957
• 2 FormativeYears, 1958–1963
• 3 Crises of the Community of the Six, 1963–1969
• 4 Expansion and New Perspectives, 1969–1975
• 5 Consolidation, 1976–1984
• 6 The Era of Development, 1984–1992
• 7 From Maastricht to Nice, 1992–2001
• 8 Constitutional Struggle and Euro Crisis, 2001–2012
• Conclusion: The Future of the Union
• Afterword
• The European Parliament 1979–2014: Party memberships
• The European Parliament 1979–2014: Presidents
• The Presidents of the High Authority and the Commissions
• Sources
• Bibliography
• Index
• Fußnoten