Europeanizing Social Democracy?

The Rise of the Party of European Socialists

Simon Lightfoot

• Publisher: Taylor & Francis
• Year: 2005
• eBook ISBN: 9781134276462
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: International Relations
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Presenting a detailed explanation of party politics in the European Union, this new book uses the Party of European Socialists (PES) as a key case study, and tests the relevance of existing theoretical work on the meaning, significance, and prospects for realising other 'Europarties'.

This analysis operates from the assumption that the PES's main goal is to influence the outcome of EU public policy, rather than the more traditional party goals of vote maximisation or office seeking. Secondly, by subjecting the PES to careful scrutiny in two specific policy areas (employment and environment) and for specific treaties (in particular the Treaty of Amsterdam), it tests the PES's ability to construct policy to influence actual policy outcomes. Finally, it shows that whilst the PES was able to play a role in co-ordinating policy amongst the member parties since its formation in 1992, its influence has been exaggerated and the strength of the factors that limit its effectiveness have been underestimated. It argues that domestic policy imperatives and ideological differences between the member parties have hindered the development of the PES, thereby advancing our knowledge of Europarties and contributing to the literature on the Europeanization of political parties.

This book will be of great interest to students and scholars of the European Union and party politics in general.

1 Theoretical perspectives

How to understand Europarties

A Europarty can be defined as an institutionalized form of party organization at the EU level that has seen a partial transfer of sovereignty from national member parties (see Johansson and Zervalis, 2002). Europarties are made up of national parties from a particular famille spirituelle and can be said to have reached the co-operation stage of Niedermayer's model in which transnational interaction takes place permanently and is embedded in a permanent transnational organization (in Dietz, 2000). There are five main Europarties that operate at the EU level, made up of national parties from a particular famille spirituelle. The three most influential are the PES, the European Liberal, Democrat and Reform Party (ELDR) and the European People's Party (EPP), with the European Federation of Green Parties (EFGP) and Democratic Party of the Peoples of Europe-European Free Alliance (DPPE-EFA) playing a lesser role.¹ Niedermayer offers a model against which the organizational development of these Europarties can be examined. This model differentiates between three stages of transnational interaction: the contact stage, the cooperation stage and the integration stage. It appears that all five Europarties have moved beyond the contact stage and to differing degrees reached the co-operation stage, at which transnational co-operation is permanent and is accompanied by a permanent organization (in Dietz, 2000: 202).

Despite the fact that ‘the study of parties at the European level remains poor in political science (Delwit et al., 2004, p. 7), there is an academic debate about how we can understand Europarties. This chapter examines previous attempts at theorizing about Europarties and identifies two basic positions. One regards Europarties as weak organizations in comparison with their national counterparts, in as much as they do not fight elections or seek to place candidates in public office. The second position holds that the PES is more accurately understood as a policy-seeking party. Accordingly, supporters of this position argue that the PES plays an important role in influencing policy at the EU level and is, at the very least, a nascent political party. The chapter examines evidence from the Maastricht Treaty to support these claims. It then sets out and justifies the methodological framework for the book and goes on to outline how the central argument of the book – that the PES should be examined as a policy-seeking party – will be analysed.

Theorizing about Europarties

The PES calls itself a party and has all the accoutrements of a political party: a leader, a secretariat, a bureau and a logo. Importantly, after its formation in 1992, analyses of Europarties began to appear in works on political parties, sparked to a large extent by the so-called ‘party article’ in the Maastricht Treaty, with Prof Deschouwer, Vrijie Universiteit Brussels even suggesting that because Europarties were included as part of the Katz and Mair (1992, 1994) research project on party organization, there was some minimal definition among academics that said that Europarties should be seen to some extent as parties (interview, Brussels, 4 March 1996). The aim of this section is to review the existing literature in order to highlight how we can theorize about Europarties.

Newman has highlighted that there is a ‘sceptic’ strand within the literature that has argued that transnational programmes and statements had ‘little more than declaratory value and have been irrelevant for action-guiding purposes’ (Newman, 1996, p. 5). The most prominent sceptic, Bardi (1992, 1994), concluded that while the Europarties had become stronger since their formation, the obstacles to the transnationalization of the European party system appeared stronger than the incentives (Bardi, 1994, p. 370). This view was taken up by Pedersen (1996), as well as Marsh and Norris, who concluded that Europarties ‘cannot be regarded as “parties” in the traditional sense, rather as loose coalitions of national parties’ (Marsh and Norris, 1997, p. 155).

However, Newman noted that there also existed another strand of literature, which he identified as ‘transnationalist’. According to this school of thought, parties have been forced to develop ‘deeper interactions with like-minded parties elsewhere as the EU becomes a more significant actor and the powers of the nation state are diminished’ (Newman, 1996, p. 5). Newman argues that transnationalists are on strong ground in a number of ways. First, the expanding policy competence of the EU means that domestic political forces must, to an extent, co-operate with each other to influence policy. Indeed, it is estimated that between 60 and 70 per cent of environmental legislation implemented in member states originates in the EU. Second, Newman argues that weakening national economic autonomy forces social democrats to actively explore new opportunity structures.

Two ‘transnationalists’ in particular – Hix (1993, 1995c, 1996) and Ladrech (1993, 1999, 2000) – have challenged the existing ‘sceptical’ orthodoxy about Europarties, arguing that it concentrated too heavily upon the vote-maximizing and office-seeking roles played by political parties in the nation state, roles that are not open at the EU level. To get a more accurate picture of the powers of these Europarties, they argue, they must be placed in the political context of the EU. If they pursue a coherent policy strategy in the European arena, these organizations can be seen as parties. This is supported by Jansen, who argues that the wholesale transfer of notions of national political parties and political systems to the European Union level leads to false conclusions being drawn about Europarties (see Jansen, 2001, p. 20).

The PES as a vote-seeking party

The concentration on the vote-seeking role of political parties can be found in much of the ‘sceptic’ literature. For example, Reif and Niedermayer argued that:

As long as European elections do not, in practice, designate a European government or at least an Assembly which has real say in EU legislation, we do not see much hope for political parties at the European level playing … their essential role in democracy.

(Reif and Niedermayer, 1987, p. 167)

Vote-seeking is one of three models of competitive party behaviour and forms part of most major definitions of political parties. However, it is hard to apply models of vote-seeking to the PES, as European elections are seen as ‘second order national contests’ (Bardi, 1996, p. 111). The main reason for this is that European elections do not, in practice, designate an executive at the EU level. Clearly the increasing powers of the EP with regard to the investiture of a new Commission appear to question this analysis, as was seen in 2004 when the EP threatened to veto all the proposed new commissioners, which resulted in the withdrawal of Italy's controversial nominee Roco Buttliglione as Justice Commissioner. However, the composition of the main legislative body, the Council, is unaffected by the outcome of European elections as electorates only have the power to eject from office individual members of the Council via national elections.

The result is that European elections are fought mainly by national parties on national issues and are more likely to resemble beauty contests on the state of the party that won the first-order election (Pedersen, 1996, p. 38; Lord, 1998, p. 35). They therefore tend to reflect the domestic political situation and reflect the popularity or otherwise of national governments, where the ‘put the boot in’ tendency can impact upon the standing of the governing party (J. Smith, 1999, pp. 134–5). It is clear, therefore, that, as the ‘transnationalists’ argued, viewing the PES and other Europarties via the lens of vote-seeking produces an inaccurate picture of the functions they can perform at the EU level.

Another aspect of many ideal types of parties is the assumption that they will try to gain popular support for their project (LaPalombara and Weiner, 1966; Sartori, 1976). This can be seen as supporting the vote-seeking model, as the central method of judging popular support is via election results. The total vote for PES member parties in European elections could be taken as a good indicator of popular support. However, as was argued above, the PES has had no direct link to the electorate. If members of the national parties are unaware of their membership of the PES, then the European electorate at large can hardly be expected to know of the existence of this Europarty, even if some national parties, such as the Portuguese Socialists, have campaigned on the PES label. The fact that the electorates have been largely unaware of the existence of the PES makes it difficult to argue that the PES was able to strive consciously for popular support.

The rejection of the vote-seeking model does not deny the role the PES could play in generating popular support during Euro-referenda, which have been suggested as an attempt to reduce the EU's democratic deficit. As there is no EU government to throw out, it has been suggested that there should be more opportunities for direct democracy. The most common scheme proposed is that citizens should have the opportunity to vote not just for Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) but also for a series of ‘legislative initiatives’ (see Hix, 1999a, p. 184–5). The role played by parties such as the PES could be to generate support for initiatives that reflected their policy orientations, such as a more social Europe. However, as Euro-referenda would bypass national parties, it seems unlikely that national parties would support their introduction. If the problems associated with achieving a uniform European electoral system are anything to go by, Euro-referenda are a long way off.

The PES as an office-seeking party

The sceptic literature also uses the question of public office to challenge claims that Europarties are indeed parties. Almost all the ‘ideal type’ models of political parties include some mention of seeking public office, and to some it is the raison d’être of a political party (see Weber, 1948; Sartori, 1976). Hix and Lord have argued that political parties at the EU level are increasingly behaving like national political parties by trying to install representatives into public office (Hix and Lord, 1997, pp. 211–13). The main problem for any analysis of the PES in these terms, however, is that the major elected offices are available only to representatives from national parties. The PES cannot control those representatives who obtain positions of power, as candidate selection remains the sole preserve of the national parties (Pedersen, 1996, p. 24). However, in this respect the PES is not much different from the majority of national parties, for which candidate selection is the preserve of local conventions and not the national party. The major difference is that, once selected, they stand as candidates for that party. Candidates at the European level view their first loyalty, in the majority of cases, to national parties, which causes problems for any analysis of the PES as an office-seeking party.

Europarties as policy-seeking parties

Transnationalists argue that to ascribe only an electoral or office-seeking role to Europarties, as many sceptics do, is to ignore the impact that the political system has on parties. The fact that European elections do not designate an executive means that they are seen as second-order elections. Therefore to focus solely on the electoral function performed by Euro-parties, as vote-seeking models of party behaviour do, would not provide a true reflection of the functions it can perform – nor would the use of office-seeking models, as the main offices at the EU level are assigned to representatives of the nation state. To understand the role the PES can play at the EU level involves adopting models of policy-seeking party behaviour.

Policy-seeking is often seen as a secondary goal for most parties, and it is argued that policy construction takes place merely as a means of winning votes and office (Ström, 1990). However, there is broad support within the political science literature for Weber's argument that parties can ‘only exist within an organisation, in order to influence its policy or gain control of it’ (Weber, 1948, p. 285, italics in the original). Policy-seeking parties therefore aim to maximize their effect on public policy. This view of parties is backed up by Gaffney, who argued that political parties compete or co-operate with one another to influence (at least) the political process (Gaffney, 1996, p. 3). Indeed, some argue that seeking to influence policy is not a substitute for elected office but a primary goal in its own right (Hix, 1995b, p. 6). This view is not the standard interpretation, in which policy pursuit is presented as a supplement to, not a substitute for, office seeking, with parties therefore seeking office, at least in part, for instrumental reasons, as a means toward policy influence (Müller and Ström, 1999, p. 8).

The evidence in the literature that Europarties can be seen as policy-seeking parties is based upon two premises: the ability to create common policies for the EU and the ability to influence the outcome of EU policy-making. Thomassen and Schmitt examine the extent to which Europarties take distinctive positions on relevant political issue dimensions (Thomassen and Schmitt, 1999, p. 133), while Hix and Lord highlight the role of Europarties in helping to influence policy via IGCs and European Council meetings (Hix and Lord, 1997, p. 194). The policy role is also outlined by Ladrech, who argues that while elections are important for national political parties, European elections ‘do not directly impact or make a significant difference in EU policy-making’ (Ladrech, 1996, p. 10). Instead he argues that:

If we consider that EU policy-making operates in a manner somewhat different from national models, then these actors [Europarties] may be engaged in activities, and thus have a specific relevance, missed by a national paradigm employing conventional definitions of the functions of political parties.

(Ladrech, 1998b, p. 57)

It is argued that the positions adopted by the Europarties are most clearly defined in those policy areas that strongly conform to left/right conflicts (Hix, 1995c, p. 538; Thomassen and Schmitt, 1999, p. 147). In this there is the economic conflict (the dirigiste–laissez-faire dimension) and the socio-political conflict (the libertarian-authoritarian dimension). By identifying a number of important policy areas, such as social policy, economic and social cohesion, human and civil rights, and the environment, Hix showed how the positions taken by each Europarty corresponded with these dimensional conflicts. Hix argued that these positions could, therefore, be seen as distinctive party programmes (Hix, 1995c). The fact that the PES attempted to pursue these policies in European Council meetings and IGCs provided Hix with evidence to show that the PES had influenced policy in the EU (Hix, 1995b). The structure of the EU makes the European Council the main agenda-setting body. Therefore, the PES concentrates its activites on co-ordinating the policy positions of party leader prior to these meetings – a task that has no parallel in national politics (Hix and Lord, 1997, p. 20).

Initial evidence of a policy-seeking role for the Europarties came from the influence of the EPP over both the Single European Act (SEA) and the Treaty on European Union (TEU) (Maastricht Treaty). Johansson argues that a Christian Democratic coalition was able to influence the direction of the SEA (see Johansson, 2002a). He develops this by arguing that in the run-up to the TEU, the EPP was in a stronger position to influence the EU agenda, as centre-right parties were in government in a majority of EU states (Johansson, 2002b).² One clear element of EPP influence was in the nature and content of the convergence criteria for EMU. The response to this from some parts of the socialist family was to propose convergence criteria based on social indicators such as unemployment levels rather than what they saw as the narrow economic criteria proposed by the EPP. The fact that it was ‘economic’ convergence criteria rather than ‘social’ ones that were introduced leads to the conclusion that the EPP was able to play a role in influencing the outcome of the TEU – and can thus be seen as a policy-seeking party (Johansson, 2002b). The number of centre-right parties in government around the time of the IGCs in 1990 and 1991 that led to the Maastricht Treaty (Treaty on European Union) meant that these parties had the most power over the EU agenda and that the socialists were reduced to reacting to an agenda set mainly by the EPP. However, it is crucial to consider the role played by the socialist governments of the time, notably those of France and Spain. Both François Mitterrand, French Socialist President, 1981–95 and Felipe Gonzalez, Spanish Socialist Prime Minister, 1982–96 agreed to the Maastricht Treaty, despite the fact that it contradicted statements on this issue released by the other socialist leaders just prior to the summit (Newman, 1997, pp. 31–2). In this case it was clear that both the internal and external problems highlighted above were evidenced during the TEU negotiations.

The Brussels (1993) and the Essen (1994) summits also provide evidence to support the policy-seeking claims of the transnationalists. Both summits dealt with the reaction to Delors’ White Paper on ‘Growth, Competitiveness and Employment’, a report with many similarities to the Larsson Report, setting out a PES employment policy (see Aust, 2004). (The Larson Report is covered in more detail in Chapter 3.) As members of Delors’ cabinet were involved in helping to draft the Larsson PES Report, Ladrech argued that ‘one can assume a cross-flow of ideas and information’ (Ladrech, 1999, p. 104). With ten PES leaders in attendance at the Brussels Council, it was assumed that the interventionist measures proposed by the PES would be adopted. The reality was that, although the Council adopted the Commission White Paper, most of the proposals the Council adopted were free market in nature, suggesting that these important decisions had been mainly influenced by the centre-right agenda rather than the PES one (Hix and Lord, 1997, p. 193). Importantly, Hix and Lord highlight the similarities between the British Conservative government's submission on the Commission White Paper and the final outcome. The power of the veto meant that the centre-right was in a stronger position to influence the outcome of the summit.

In Essen the agenda focused on the implementation of the employment initiative and macroeconomic co-ordination for EMU. The outcome of the summit was another disappointment for the PES, with the main PES provisions being ignored (Hix and Lord, 1997, p. 194) as a result of the centre-right bloc of the EPP, ELDR and non-attached parties of the right working more closely together to influence policy outcomes. At both the Brussels and Essen summits, PES member parties were in opposition in both Britain and Germany, while in France the member party had recently suffered defeat in the Parliamentary elections. The fact that the socialist presence was weak in the ‘Big Three’ EU states at the time helped reduce the influence of the PES. These examples support the claims of the transnationalists that the Europarties can be seen as policy-seeking parties, because although the PES was unable to influence the EU policy agenda, the EPP was. It was the fact that PES parties were in a minority in the European Council that prevented the PES influencing the agenda, a common problem for national parties in opposition. These examples also support the connection – highlighted earlier – between obtaining office and influencing policy.

The PES, though, was in a better position than it...

Table of contents

• Front Cover
• Europeanizing Social Democracy?
• Routledge Advances in European Politics
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Dedication
• Contents
• List of tables
• Acknowledgements
• List of abbreviations
• Introduction
• 1. Theoretical perspectives: how to understand Europarties
• 2. Historical context: from the First International to the PES
• 3. The social democratic policy area: PES employment policy
• 4. The PES and the development of socialist environment policy
• 5. A success story? PES influence over the outcomes of the Treaty of Amsterdam
• 6. PES influence on the EU agenda since Amsterdam
• Conclusion: the PES and the Europeanization of social democracy
• Appendix: full member, associate and observer parties of the PES
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Index