Chapter 1
The International Turn
In the early twentieth century, if someone had asked Europeans or Americans to predict where the world was headed, chances were they would have pointed toward internationalism of a new twentieth-century kind. As John Hobson, the British economist, explained, it had become impossible âto trace down those issues which are presented to us as great social issues, political or economic, and to find any solution which is satisfactory that does not present the elements of internationality.â1 For the future American secretary of state Robert Lansing, the nineteenth century belonged to nationality; the driving force of the twentieth century was internationality.2
Those of us fed on a more conventional historical diet might consider these assessments, made only a few years before the outbreak of the worldâs first âtotal war,â misguided. The turn of the twentieth century was after all the apogee of nationalism, an era marked by the invention of new nationalities and nations.3 Nationalism is as commonly named the culprit of the outbreak and violent force of World War I as credited with the legitimation of the principle of nationality in the peace process that brought the war to an end. The apogee of nationalism was simultaneously the apogee of empire, accompanied by the rivalrous militarization of the worldâs empires and acts of state-coordinated violence in the name of national pride, economic necessity, or territorial expansion.4 Given these circumstances, the claims made by Lansing and Hobson begin to make sense only once we parse the historical specificity of their political language and its intended meanings, and assess the extent to which their views of an international turn were shared.
As we will see, the turn-of-the-twentieth-century fascination with the novelty of internationality and the passing of the national reflected the self-consciousness with which an increasingly literate and mobile mainly middle-class public heaped their own ambitions for change onto the material changes in their everyday lives, and how they imagined those lives. Those same material changes were simultaneously opening up national and international public spheres, furnishing new public spaces of national and international congress that allowed for transnational connections and the âcontamination of ideas.â5 Nationalism and internationalism were still likely to be perceived as antithetical or even agonistic: the revolutionary political internationalism of the working class opposed to the liberal nationalist aspirations of Europeâs middle classes. But the concept of a ânew internationalism,â born of the âobjective factsâ of modernity, and out of the same historical processes as nations offered an increasingly attractive political conception of modernity and progress. The first historian of this phenomenon, Christian Langeâa Norwegian parliamentarian and founding member of one of the most significant experiments in the political scoping of internationalism in this period, the Inter-Parliamentary Unionâwent so far as to enthuse that the ideological innovation of the new internationalism was in essence its embrace of the nation.6
This chapter draws the strands of the history of nationalism back into the story of internationalism in the decades that Europeans like to refer to as the Belle Ăpoque. It maps the contours of an international turn marked by the confident pre-World War I narratives of internationality and âobjective internationalismâ and the influential wartime associations that caucused the prospects for international government as a League of Nations. As important, it reconnects this early twentieth-century history of internationalism to the debates about race, empire, and nationalism that were intrinsic to contemporary liberal conceptions of progress and modernity. In all these ways, the history of turn-of-the-twentieth-century new internationalism provides us with the ideological and social backstory to the advent of the league and the UN.
Objective Internationalism at the Turn of the Twentieth Century
If we can trace the truth of the past by attention to principles that were constantly talked about, then the early twentieth century took a self-consciously international turn.7 As contemporaries understood it, the mechanisms of that turn were the new âobjective factsâ of steam, electricity, and trade. Roads and railways, canals and ocean carriers, and telephone, telegraph, cable, wireless, news, and mail services had all transformed economies and provided the opportunities for cooperation and sociability across the political borders of empires and nations. Even more importantly, they provided the infrastructure and motivation for the international institutions and associations devoted to all manner of internationalized political, economic, religious, and humanitarian issues proliferating across the world.8
The novelty of international organizations, their impact on everyday life, and their significance for the future are all the more apparent as the subject matter of contemporary commentaries and investigation. For those who were counting, it was possible to number ten new international organizations for each year of the 1890s and contrast them with the mid-nineteenth century, when there were only five.9 The International Telegraphic Union (1865), the Universal Postal Union (1874), the International Union for Weights and Measures (1875), the International Union of Custom Tariffs (1890), and the International Office for Public Hygiene (1907) all featured on the accumulating and increasingly well-rehearsed listings of the objective facts of internationalism.10 There were the international organizations with distinctive constituencies, such as the still familiar International Olympic Committee (1894), the International Co-operative Alliance (1895), the Universal Esperanto Association (1908). Some international organizations, such as the International Committee for Relief to the Wounded (1863, renamed the International Committee of the Red Cross in 1876), traced their origins back to the nineteenth-century humanitarian societies set up in the wake of the Congress of Vienna. The Young Menâs Christian Association (1844) gathered momentum in the latter decades of the nineteenth century, espousing âChristian principles of social and international conductâ and âthe development of a right public conscience such as shall strengthen all those forces which are working for the promotion of peace and better understanding between classes, nations, and races.â11 Middle-class European women had not always found it easy to access the international societies of the earlier nineteenth century such as the YMCA or the abolitionist movement (the 1840 World Anti-Slavery Conference held in London had actively excluded women). When the opportunities arose, women were quick to organize their own international associations and coordinating bodies, such as the International Council of Women (1888) and the International Woman Suffrage Alliance (1904). By 1910, an international conference and the Brussels-based Office Central des Associations Internationales coordinated the multiple interests of this burgeoning international society, as it was commonly identified.
Many of these international organizations were based in Europe (most popularly Berne, Brussels, Paris, and London); however, they were as remarked on in North and South America, and in the urbanized outposts of empires. Their activities extended into the non-European parts of the world, particularly Japan.12 Some were the instruments of state cooperation, others were the manifestations of individual and social initiatives. As the sheer number of international organizations, their variety, and their functions as settings for transnational sociability, cooperation, and the spread of ideas captured the imaginations of their membership, they became the basis of claims that âobjective internationalismâ had arrived. Regardless of parochialism or vintage, these organizations were construed as evidence of the difference between twentieth-century internationalism and previous nineteenth-century versions.13 From a historical perspective, the articulation of this difference is less evidence of a really-existing internationalism, than of a new self-consciousness of the internationality of everyday life.
A typical product of this self-consciousness was the doctoral thesis on âInternationalism and the international administrative organization,â published in 1910 by a young French political science student in Lyon named Jean Claveirole.14 Claveirole was particularly endeared to the Berne-based Universal Postal Union, an international organization that had liberated postal delivery from incompatible national and local administrative practices and tariffs. The significance of this organization lay not just in the facility with which mail could now be sent but also the new ways of seeing oneself in the world it invited. Claveiroleâs observations of the new age augured by the international administration of postal services entice the twenty-first-century reader into a past as foreign as it is familiar: âWhen I throw a stamped card for 10 centimes into a letter box, to some part of another continent, and it arrives in a few days; when I address a letter to a stranger and I add an âinternational responseâ coupon, exchangeable in every country against a post stamp for the same value; canât I say, even more justly than Socrates, that I am a citizen of the world?â15
For Claveirole, the act of posting a letter demonstrated the realism of the new internationalism, as it drew the individual into an international realm of sociability. As significantly, Claveroile claimed, the effect of the existence of international administrative organizations literally repeated the institutional and sociological processes that had led to the creation of nations such as France itself, albeit on a new international scale.
Before World War I, then, internationality was a word that signified both the existence of international organizations and practices and their social and cultural effects. Like the equally ambiguous ânationalityâ (a term that had worked its way into the majority of European political and legal lexicons only in the latter decades of the nineteenth century), internationality was used to bolster arguments for a particular way of being in the world.16 For John Hobson, internationality meant that âanything happening in the most remote part of the world makes its immediate impression upon the society of nations.â17 It could also imply an international subjectivity, what Hobson would describe as a new kind of âinternational man,â simultaneously national and international.18 Claveiroleâs own fascination with internationality resonated the pervasiveness of nationality.
The Viennese-born Alfred Fried pushed the conceptual relationship between nationality and internationality almost as far as it could go. Born into the simultaneously polyglot and nationalist rhythms of the Habsburg Empire, Fried was an archetypal turn-of-the-century self-identified internationalistâan enthusiast of Esperanto as a universal language and a publisher of journals with pacifist and internationalist leanings. In 1892 (twenty years after the establishment of Germany as a political state), Fried set up the German Peace Society; twenty years later, he created the Verband fĂźr internationale Verständigungâthe Society for International Understanding. He was not only a founder of and subscriber to international organizations, he made it his business to document their existence. The purpose of Friedâs directory, the Annuaire de la vie internationale, for example, was to log the manifestations of objective internationalismâand it remains a useful catalogue of turn-of-the-twentieth-century visions of âinternational life.â19 When in 1908 Fried published his Das Internationale Leben der Gegenwart, âInternational Life Today,â he wrote it as a travel guide to the country known as âdas internationale Land,â a territory imagined through the mapping of intergovernmental treaties and the new Public International Unions.20
There are good reasons why Friedâs map was dotted with public international unions or, as Claveirole preferred, international administrative organizations.21 In the early twentieth century, the organizations that coordinated and regulated the movement of people, things, and diseases across the borders of member political states were attributed a simultaneously political and social influence on internationalism by virtue of their administrative internationality; since then historians have credited these public international unions with the introduction into international relations of ânew themes, new actorsâ and new âinternational norms.â22 The Universal Postal Union was exemplary of these organizations, down to its use of the language of âUnion.â Its shared laws and rules were conceptualized as building administrative links between states and nationally defined practices, and, on that foundation, a future form of international government. It was not only nations as states that were invited into the sphere of international administration. In pursuit of its practical international goal, the United Postal Services included among its founding members a ânon-sovereignâ entity, Egypt.23
Christian Langeâs involvement in the first Inter-Parliamentary Union conference held in Norway in 1899, was as indicative of the governmental dimensions of the new internationalism. The Inter-Parliamentary Union collected together parliamentarians, predominantly from Western and Northern Europe, committed to the development of international rules and laws for cooperation between liberal democracies.24 For Lange, as for many parliamentarians of states designated ânational,â the mutuality of national and international sociological phenomena determined their intrinsic compatibility. Undoubtedly this compatibility was often consummated as a union of political convenience. The historian Madeleine Herren has shown how, regardless of individual motivations, the creation of international administrative organizations suited the purposes of state government agendas, as a âback door to power.â25 The Swiss government, for example, was extremely aware of the symbolic capital that could be accrued from the fact that its political capital Berne was the headquarters of many of these new public international unions. Swiss politicians made strategic use of the impetus of the new internationalism to compensate for what the Swiss federal government lacked in foreign policy initiatives.26 Although the United States exhibited more than enough domestic foreign policy clout, in 1908, Theodore Roosevelt was sufficiently seduced by this new kind of âbackdoorâ power to lure international gatherings away from the European continent onto welcoming American shores.27
In the age of the nation-state, there were many strategic or even pragmatic considerations underlying the recovery of the nationâs compatibility with internationalism. After all, the objective facts of steam, electricity, and trade, like international institutions that enabled an international sociability and allegedly fostered internationality, were the acknowledged framework connecting national communities across otherwise disconnected domestic landscapes. This nationalizing process ...