1
IBN KHALDĆȘNâS THEORY OF DEVELOPMENT AND DECLINE1
Ibn KhaldĆ«nâs entire model is condensed to a substantial extent, though not fully, in the following advice extended by him to the sovereign:
1. The strength of the sovereign (al-mulk) does not materialize except through the implementation of the SharÄ«Êżah2âŠ;
2. The SharÄ«Êżah cannot be implemented except by the sovereign (al-mulk);
3. The sovereign cannot gain strength except through the people (al-rijÄl);
4. The people cannot be sustained except by wealth (al-mÄl);
5. Wealth cannot be acquired except through development (al-ÊżimÄrah);
6. Development can not be attained except through justice (al-Êżadl);
7. Justice is the criterion (al-mÄ«zÄn) by which God will evaluate mankind, and
8. The sovereign is charged with the responsibility of actualizing justice (Muqaddimah (M): p. 39; Rosenthalâs translation (R): Volume 1, p. 80).3
The entire Muqaddimah is an elaboration upon this advice, which consists of, in Ibn KhaldĆ«nâs own words: âeight wise principles (kalimÄt áž„ikamiyyah) of political wisdom, each one dovetailed with the other for mutual strength, in such a circular manner that the beginning or the end is indistinguishableâ (M: p. 403; R: I, p. 82).
The strength of this model lies in its multidisciplinary and dynamic character. It is multidisciplinary because it links all important socio-economic and political variables, including the sovereign or political authority (G), beliefs and rules of behaviour or the SharÄ«Êżah (S), people (N), wealth or stock of resources (W), development (g), and justice (j), in a circular and interdependent manner, each influencing the others and, in turn, being influenced by them.4
Since the operation of this cycle takes place through a chain reaction over a long period of three generations, or almost 120 years, circular causation as well as dynamism is introduced into the whole analysis. This helps explain how political moral, institutional, social, economic, demographic, and historical factors interact with each other over a long period of time to lead to the development and decline, or the rise and fall, of a state or civilization.
In a long term analysis of this kind, there is no ceteris paribus clause because none of the variables is assumed to remain constant. One of the variables acts as the trigger mechanism.5 If the other sectors of society react in the same direction as the trigger mechanism, the decay will gain momentum through an interrelated chain reaction such that it becomes difficult, over time, to identify the cause from the effect. If the other sectors do not react in the same direction, then the decay in one sector may not spread to the others and either the decaying sector may be reformed over time or the decline of the civilization may be much slower.
The role of the human being (N)
The centre of Ibn KhaldĆ«nâs analysis is the human being6 because the rise and fall of civilizations is closely dependent on the well-being or misery of the people. This is, in turn, dependent not just on economic variables but also on the closely interrelated role of moral, institutional, psychological, political, social, and demographic factors through a process of circular causation extending over a long period of history (M: pp. 39 and 287; R: I, p. 80 and II, p. 105). This emphasis on the human being is in keeping with the QurâÄnic verses quoted in the Introduction, which state that, âGod does not change the condition of a people until they change their own inner selvesâ (13:11), and that âCorruption has appeared everywhere because of what people have doneâ (30:41, italics added). These two verses along with many others emphasize the role of human beings themselves in their rise and fall. This is why all Godâs Messengers (including Abraham, Moses, Jesus and Muáž„ammad) came to this world to reform human beings and the institutions that affect their behaviour.7
The role of development (g) and justice (j)
If human beings are the centre of analysis, then development and justice become the most crucial links in the chain of causation. Development is essential because unless there is a perceptible improvement in the well-being of the people, they will not be motivated to do their best (M: p. 287; R: II, p. 109). Moreover, in the absence of development, the inflow of scholars, artisans, labour and capital that need to take place from other societies to boost development further may not take place (M: pp. 362-3; R: II, pp. 271-6). This too may make it difficult to sustain development and may ultimately lead to a decline (M: p. 359; R: II, p. 270).
Development in Ibn KhaldĆ«nâs model does not refer merely to economic growth (M: p. 39 and pp. 347-49; R: I, p. 39 and II, pp. 243-49). It encompasses all-round human development such that each variable enriches the others (G, S, N, W, j, and g) and is in turn enriched by them, contributing thereby to the true well-being or happiness of people and ensuring not only the survival but also the civilizationâs rise. Economic development cannot be brought about by economic forces alone in isolation of the non-economic and spiritual forces of society. It needs moral, social, political and demographic support. If this support is not available, economic development may not be triggered, and if it is available, it may not, however, be sustainable.
Development is, however, not possible without justice. Justice, like development, though is also not conceived by him in a narrow economic sense but rather in the more comprehensive sense of justice in all spheres of human life. Ibn KhaldĆ«n clearly states: âDo not think that injustice consists in only taking money or property from its owner without compensation or cause, even though this is what is commonly understood. Injustice is more comprehensive than this. Anyone who confiscates the property of someone else or who forces him to work for him, or presses an unjustifiable claim against him, or imposes on him a duty not required by the SharÄ«Êżah, has committed an injustice. Collection of unjustified taxes is also injustice; transgression on anotherâs property or taking it away by force or theft constitutes injustice; denying other people their rights is also injusticeâ (M: p. 288; R: II, pp. 106-7). âOne of the greatest injustices and the most destructive of development is the unjustifiable imposition of tasks on people and subjecting them to forced labourâ (M: p. 289; R: II, pp. 108-9). Justice is considered so crucial by Ibn KhaldĆ«n for development that he entitled a whole section as âInjustice Triggers the Destruction of Civilizationâ (M: pp. 286-90; R: II, pp. 103-111). This is why justice and development are juxtaposed in the above diagram. âThe extent to which property rights are infringed determines the extent to which the incentive to earn and acquire it goesâŠIf the incentive is gone, they refrain from earningâ (M: p. 286, R: II, p. 103). This adversely affects peopleâs efficiency, innovativeness, entrepreneurship, drive and other qualities, ultimately leading to societyâs disintegration and decline.
Justice in this comprehensive sense leads to the development and strengthening of ÊżaáčŁabiyyah, which has variously been translated as âsocial solidarityâ, âgroup feelingâ or âsocial cohesionâ. Justice promotes social solidarity by ensuring the fulfillment of mutual obligations and an equitable sharing of the fruits of development, and thereby, the well-being of all. This helps create mutual trust and cooperation, without which it is not possible to promote division of labour and specialization, which are necessary for the accelerated development of any economy (M: 41-43; R: I, 89-92). The absence of justice tends to generate discontent among people, dishearten them, and adversely affect their solidarity. This, in turn, not only adversely affects their motive to work but also saps their efficiency, entrepreneurial drive and other good qualities needed for development, ultimately leading to societyâs disintegration and decline.
The crucial role that trust plays in development is now being rightly emphasized by economists8 and has become a part of âconventional wisdomâ or âembeddednessâ. Ibn KhaldĆ«n used the word ÊżaáčŁabiyyah for what is, to a great extent, currently referred to as âsocial capitalâ or âsocial infrastructureâ.9 However, some scholars have raised objections against the use of the word âcapitalâ for something that is abstract and cannot be possessed, like the physical capital of individuals.10 Therefore, Ibn KhaldĆ«nâs use of the expression ÊżaáčŁabiyyah or âsocial solidarityâ seems to be a better alternative.
The role of institutions (S) and the government (G)
Justice, however, necessitates certain rules of behaviour called institutions in Institutional Economics and moral values in religious worldviews. They are the standards by which people interact with, and fulfill their obligations towards, each other (M: pp. 157-58; R: I, pp. 319-21). All societies have such rules based on their own worldview. The primary basis of these rules in a Muslim society is the SharÄ«Êżah. âDivine Laws command the doing of good and prohibit the doing of what is evil and destructiveâ (M: p. 304; R: II, p. 142). They are, therefore, according to Ibn KhaldĆ«n, âfor the good of human beings and serve their interestsâ (M: p. 143; R: I, p. 292). Their Divine origin carries the potential to help promote their willing acceptance and compliance and to serve as a powerful cement for holding a large group together (M: pp. 151-52; R: I, pp. 305-8 and 319-22). This can help curb socially harmful behaviour, ensure justice, and enhance solidarity and mutual trust among people, thereby promoting development.
The SharÄ«Êżah cannot, however, play a meaningful role unless it is implemented fairly and impartially (M: pp. 39 and 43; R: I, p. 80 and pp. 91-92). The SharÄ«Êżah can only give rules of behaviour, it cannot itself enforce them. It is the responsibility of the political authority to ensure compliance through incentives and deterrents (M: pp. 127-28; R: I, pp. 262-63). The Prophet (pbuh) clearly recognized this by saying: âGod restrains through the sultan (sovereign) more than what he restrains through the QurâÄn.â11 For Ibn KhaldĆ«n, political authority has the same relationship to a civilization as form has to matter (M: pp. 371 and 376; R: II, pp. 291 and 300). âIt is not possible to conceive of political authority without civilization and of civilization without political authorityâ (M: p. 376; R: II, p. 300). However, Ibn KhaldĆ«n clearly emphasizes âgood rulership is equivalent to gentlenessâ (M: p. 188; R: I, p. 383). âIf the ruler is tyrannical and harsh in punishments⊠the people become fearful and depressed and seek to protect themselves by means of lies, ruses and deception. This becomes their characte...