The Sino-Soviet Split
eBook - PDF

The Sino-Soviet Split

Cold War in the Communist World

  1. 400 pages
  2. English
  3. PDF
  4. Available on iOS & Android
eBook - PDF

The Sino-Soviet Split

Cold War in the Communist World

About this book

A decade after the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China established their formidable alliance in 1950, escalating public disagreements between them broke the international communist movement apart. In The Sino-Soviet Split, Lorenz Lüthi tells the story of this rupture, which became one of the defining events of the Cold War. Identifying the primary role of disputes over Marxist-Leninist ideology, Lüthi traces their devastating impact in sowing conflict between the two nations in the areas of economic development, party relations, and foreign policy. The source of this estrangement was Mao Zedong's ideological radicalization at a time when Soviet leaders, mainly Nikita Khrushchev, became committed to more pragmatic domestic and foreign policies.


Using a wide array of archival and documentary sources from three continents, Lüthi presents a richly detailed account of Sino-Soviet political relations in the 1950s and 1960s. He explores how Sino-Soviet relations were linked to Chinese domestic politics and to Mao's struggles with internal political rivals. Furthermore, Lüthi argues, the Sino-Soviet split had far-reaching consequences for the socialist camp and its connections to the nonaligned movement, the global Cold War, and the Vietnam War.



The Sino-Soviet Split provides a meticulous and cogent analysis of a major political fallout between two global powers, opening new areas of research for anyone interested in the history of international relations in the socialist world.

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Historical 
Background, 
1921–1955 
• 
45
these 
turbulences 
led 
to 
the 
emergence 
and 
eventually 
the 
consolidation 
of 
more 
independent 
party 
around 
Mao 
Zedong. 
Once 
the 
CCP 
was 
on 
the 
verge 
of 
establishing 
political 
power 
in 
all 
of 
China 
in 
the 
late 
1940s, 
it 
was 
confronted 
with 
the 
question 
of 
how 
to 
position 
the 
soon-to-be-
founded 
PRC. 
The 
alliance 
with 
the 
USSR 
was 
designed 
to 
reestablish 
China 
as 
world 
power, 
but 
it 
also 
made 
the 
PRC 
part 
of 
the 
socialist 
camp. 
As 
result, 
New 
China 
faced 
series 
of 
security 
problems 
with 
which 
its 
predecessor 
had 
not 
been 
confronted. 
The 
first 
years 
of 
the 
alli-
ance 
witnessed 
success 
in 
economic 
cooperation 
and, 
after 
Stalin’s 
death, 
also 
in 
international 
politics. 
But 
Khrushchev 
was 
not 
able 
to 
remove 
completely 
the 
negative 
aura 
of 
his 
predecessor’s 
legacy. 
Chinese 
memo-
ries 
of 
Stalin’s 
Janus-faced 
policies 
during 
the 
Korean 
War 
and 
his 
insis-
tence 
on 
unequal 
treaties 
were 
difficult 
to 
dispel. 
All 
of 
this, 
however, 
cannot
explain 
the 
sharp 
ideological 
antagonism 
that 
would 
undermine 
and 
eventually 
ruin 
the 
alliance 
by 
1966. 
It 
was 
only 
Mao’s 
ideological 
radicalization, 
still 
inchoate 
in 
1955, 
and 
Khrushchev’s 
de-Stalinization 
in 
early 
1956, 
the 
subject 
of 
the 
following 
chapter, 
that 
set 
train 
of 
events 
into 
motion 
which 
eventually 
undermined 
the 
alliance.

Table of contents

  1. Cover
  2. Contents
  3. Maps
  4. Acknowledgments
  5. Abbreviations and Terms
  6. Transliteration and Diacritical Marks
  7. Introduction
  8. CHAPTER ONE: Historical Background, 1921–1955
  9. CHAPTER TWO: The Collapse of Socialist Unity, 1956–1957
  10. CHAPTER THREE: Mao's Challenges, 1958
  11. CHAPTER FOUR: Visible Cracks, 1959
  12. CHAPTER FIVE: World Revolution and the Collapse of Economic Relations, 1960
  13. CHAPTER SIX: Ambiguous Truce, 1961–1962
  14. CHAPTER SEVEN: Mao Resurgent, 1962–1963
  15. CHAPTER EIGHT: The American Factor, 1962–1963
  16. CHAPTER NINE: Khrushchev's Fall and the Collapse of Party Relations, 1963–1966
  17. CHAPTER TEN: Vietnam and the Collapse of the Military Alliance, 1964–1966
  18. Conclusion
  19. Essay on the Sources
  20. Index