APEC and the Rise of China

Lok Sang Ho, John Wong

• Publisher: WSPC
• Year: 2011
• eBook ISBN: 9789814462532
• Topic: Biological Sciences
• Subtopic: Science General
• Index: Biological Sciences

Intra-regional trade has been rising rapidly, especially after China's accession to the WTO in 2001. China's economy is expanding rapidly, and has already passed Japan in 2010 to become the world's second largest economy. It is clearly producing a huge impact on the world economy, and particularly on ASEAN countries. This is the appropriate time to take stock: what has APEC achieved so far? How is China's rapid growth shaping the course of economic integration and cooperation in the region? What is the future of APEC? This book is based on papers presented by scholars with expertise in the Asia Pacific region at a conference on “APEC at 20 and the Rise of China” organized by the APEC Centre of Lingnan University on 26–27 February 2010, and includes additional invited papers.

Contents:

• APEC and the Rise of China: An Introduction (L S Ho & J Wong)
• Overview of Issues:
  • Designing Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (C-P Chung)
  • Rebalancing Relations between East Asian and trans-Pacific Institutions: Evolving Regional Architectural Features (Z-Y Pang)
• Role of China:
  • Will China Become an Engine of Growth for the Region? (Y-P Huang)
  • China's Economic Rise and Regional Trade (R Leal-Arcas)
  • The Role of China in Asia-Pacific Trade Framework in the Context of APEC (E K-K Yeoh et al.)
• Monetary Integration and the Reform of the Reminbi:
  • Towards an Effective (More or Less) Monetary Union in Asia (L S Ho)
  • On the Reform of RMB Exchange Rate: A Middle Ground Solution (B Zhang & X-P Hua)
• The Future of APEC:
  • Continuing the APEC Agenda and the Evolving Regional Institutional Architecture in the Context of an Emerging Asia (K G Tan & S W Chiang)

Readership: Researchers and policy makers on APEC and China related issues; students in business, economics, and political science interested in regional issues.
Keywords:APEC;China;Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation;Intra-Regional Trade among APEC Countries;Economic Integration and CooperationReview:0

1

APEC and the Rise of China: an Introduction

Lok Sang Ho

Lingnan University

John Wong

East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore

THE APEC PROCESS

APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation) was created in 1989 by 12 members as a loose consultative forum, with no organisation structure and with only a limited programme for some broad sectoral cooperation. The original long-term concept was the formation of the Asia-Pacific Community, which was initially advocated by Australia’s former Prime Minister Bob Hawke and Japan’s former Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira. Prior to this, the informal academic forum PAFTAD (Pacific Trade and Development), the independent Pacific business network PBEC (Pacific Basin Economic Council), and the tripartite organisation PECC (Pacific Economic Cooperation Council) had laid down some broad cooperative framework and helped drive and shape the official APEC process. The APEC process can facilitate regional cooperation largely because the annual gathering of APEC leaders provides a useful and convenient platform for members to exchange views and share ideas, and it also promotes various forms of bilateral and multilateral cooperation.

In November 2009, as the APEC leaders gathered in Singapore to celebrate its 20th birthday, the organisation had 21 economies as members. When APEC was first formed in 1989, its average tariff rate in the group of 12 was 16.9%. By 2004, it went down to 5.5%. In 1989, APEC’s share of the world’s exports was 58%. By 2008, its exports constituted 67% of the world’s total (44% of the world trade). APEC today comprises 2.7 billion population or 40% of the world’s total, and accounts for 55% of the world’s total GDP in PPP (purchasing power parity) terms. APEC is politically and economically a formidable grouping indeed.

To speed up economic cooperation, the 1994 Bogor Declaration was a breakthrough as it set free and open trade and investment as the most important goal for APEC. Developed APEC economies were committed to eliminating obstacles to trade and investment by 2010, and developing APEC economies by 2020. Subsequently, various programmes or action plans such as the Osaka Action Agenda, Manila Action Plan, Shanghai Accord, Busan Roadmap had all provided further commitments to realising such goals. In the liberalisation and facilitation of trade and investment, APEC is supposed to follow the guiding principles of “comprehensiveness” (i.e. policy dialogues can target all forms of trade and investment barriers) and “open regionalism”.

In terms of substantive economic cooperation, however, APEC has so far delivered very few tangible results and its overall pace of trade liberalisation process has achieved preciously little. This is partly due to its enormous diversity (in terms of geography, culture, political ideology as well as stages of economic development) and partly because of its emphasis on consensus and voluntarism for policy implementation — many agreements made within APEC are of non-binding nature. Operationally, when it comes to serious economic coopertion, its programmes are often frustrated by the so-called “spaghetti bowl effect”, i.e. getting disrupted by numerous bilateral and sub-regional Free Trade Agreements (FTAs)/Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) that are already in existence in the region. APEC is, therefore, facing the challenge of how to reduce the negative interaction from the multilayers of FTAs/EPAs in the region.

Not surprisingly, APEC in recent years had run into a kind of “identity crisis” as well as “credibility crisis”, particularly towards the end of the Bush Administration, which was quite luke-warm towards APEC activities. Though President Obama showed renewed US interest in APEC, the outbreak of the global financial crisis had soon diverted the attention of APEC leaders from regional cooperation to their own economic woes at home. After all, APEC as a loose grouping is simply not equipped to deal with global economic crises. If anything, the economic crisis had actually led to more trade protectionism and more serious global economic imbalances on the part of many members, which are not conducive to trade liberalisation and economic cooperation.

In fact, the global financial crisis had brought about considerable uncertainty to APEC’s ongoing economic cooperation process, thereby further widening the gap between APEC’s aspirations and their achievability. Worse still, the global economic crisis has also aggravated APEC’s “identity crisis”. It is understood that any progress towards economic cooperation will depend on the complete economic recovery of its members. And then what? Is there new direction for APEC? What will be the focus of its next phase of cooperation: security, climate change or others? Who will be the main driver?

THE RISE OF CHINA

Thanks to its success in economic reform and the open-door policy, China’s economy has achieved spectacular growth at 9.7% for the period of 1978–2009. With its nominal GDP totaling about US$4.9 billion at the end of 2009 and continued strong growth in 2010, China has overtaken Japan as the world’s second largest economy — though China has long been the world’s second largest economy in PPP (purchasing power parity) terms. In 2009, China overtook Germany as the world’s leading exporting country. Globally and regionally, China has been a top trade partner (No. 1 or No. 2) with many major economies. For years, China has also been the world’s most favourite destination for foreign direct investment (FDI). Over 90% of the Fortune’s 500 have set up business in China. On account of its persistent “twin surpluses” — surplus in both current and capital accounts, China’s foreign exchange reserves in early 2010 swelled to US$2.45 trillion as the world’s largest holding. In fact, China for many years has been capital surplus economy, with its outward FDI rapidly rising — US$48 billion in 2009. The economic rise of China along with its farreaching global and regional impact in terms of trade and investment is indeed unmistakable.

Of even greater importance is the fact that China suffered the least during this global financial crisis as it ended 2009 with a hefty 8.7% growth, compared to negative rates of growth for most industrial economies. China had also led the global economy in recovery, pulling many regional economies out of their recession. Is China destined to play a more important and pivotal role in the future APEC process?

In 1991, APEC scored a great political feat as it successfully admitted to the grouping the “three components” of China — the “People’s Republic of China” on the Mainland, Taiwan (officially, “Chinese Taipei”) and Hong Kong (officially, “Hong Kong, China”). From the outset, China was keen to be part of the APEC process, not just because this facilitated China’s accession to the WTO but also, some 60–70% of China’s trade and FDI stemmed from the APEC region — 8 or 9 of China’s top 10 trade partners are APEC members. This explains why China has all along actively participated in APEC’s various activities. At the same time, China has been keeping a rather low profile and behaving cooperatively in various APEC negotiations.

However, it seems quite clear that China’s role and function in APEC is about to shift in the post-financial-crisis years ahead. First, the rapid rise of China’s economy along with its extensive external outreaches has enabled China to play the critical role of an important engine of economic growth for a great number of APEC member economies. Indeed, China has for years followed a trade pattern whereby it consistently incurs trade deficits with its Asian neighbours by importing (machinery and equipment, and high tech parts and components from Japan, Korea and Taiwan; and raw materials and natural resources from the Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN) and Australia, etc) from them more than China exports to these economies. In this way, China’s neighbours have been making use of China’s huge domestic market as a source of their own economic growth.

Second, thanks to its export-oriented pattern of economic growth, China has become a strong integrating force in the region. It is well known that almost 60% of China’s trade is made up of processing trade. China has to import before it can export. Before exporting a massive amount of finished manufactured products to the world over, China has to import all sorts of parts and components as well as natural resource products from its Asia-Pacific neighbours. China is a critical link for all the major international supply chains. In other words, China is crucial in numerous regional and global production networks. China’s economic growth, therefore, also serves as a catalyst for the market-driven form of economic integration.

In terms of institutional arrangements, China has also been instrumental in promoting the “formal” process of regional economic integration in East Asia. The China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement, as the first ASEAN plus one initiative of its kind, went into effect in 2010. China’s economic relations with its ASEAN neighbours to its south have thus been expanding rapidly, and China is now ASEAN’s third largest trade partner. In Northeast Asia, China has already established very strong trade and investment links with Japan and South Korea (China being their No. 1 trade partner). Taking advantage of its warmer relations with Japan, China is recently very keen to strengthen existing tripartite cooperation arrangements with Japan and South Korea. In the middle, China has gone on seven rounds of supplementary agreements of Closer Economic Partnership Arrangements (CEPA) with Hong Kong and Macau, and is presently pursuing similar arrangements with Taiwan, know as ECFA (Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement).

In short, APEC’s East Asian member economies, which are neighbouring China, have been drawn increasingly closer towards China either by informal market forces or by formal cooperation arrangements. So far, China has yet to establish any formal economic cooperation arrangements with North American economies and Australia. But China has already established very strong economic symbiosis with these advanced economies through an extensive web of trade, investment and finance. China is therefore set to play a pivotal role in re-vitalising the future APEC process.

In geo-political terms, however, the picture is more complicated. China’s political and economic relations with individual APEC members are still riddled with problems and misconceptions. Several chapters in this book, particularly that by Pang and that by Leal-Arcas, highlight some of the difficult geo-political issues that are accompanying the rise of China, the former from a mainlander’s perspective, the latter from a western perspective. Each demonstrates the big gap between expectations and reality — a theme noted by Chung and others as well. Some of China’s neighbours, as well as its distant ally and adversary — the United States, still view the rise of China with apprehension. The greater integration of China into the APEC economy will also not be an easy and smooth process. Politically and economically, the USA is still a predominant power in the region for the foreseeable future. Japan’s economic presence also remains very strong. For its greater and smoother economic involvement in APEC, China needs to cultivate good relations with both USA and Japan — hence the importance of the APEC’s “G3”. In short, China’s more active participation in the future APEC process will pose a big challenge to China as much as to other APEC members.

Two of the key themes that come out from this collection is that China is now really an economic giant. It is not only “the factory of the world”, but is fast moving into the role of “the importer of the last resort”. As Huang started his chapter, “On January 1, 2005, Chicagobased journalist Sara Bongiorni made a New Year’s resolution: not to buy any made-in-China products for a year. The Bongiorni family experienced an eventful year finding consumer goods that are not made in China, from candles for birthday cakes to shoes for sport activities. Sometimes they were able to find goods made in Japan or Korea or even the US, but prices were 20–50% higher. Even worse, they could not tell if these products contained any parts made in China (Bongiorni 2007).” This shows how much the world depends on China for its needs. But China has also emerged as the strongest importer when all the other markets weaken. Today American households are in need of rebuilding their asset base and are increasing their savings. It is generally recognised that the US will therefore import less relative to the earlier projected trajectory in the years to come. Huang acknowledged that the sustained growth of the Chinese economy at nearly 10% per year is possible, but may require a serious effort on the part of the Chinese authorities to reform its factor markets and in particular to render true costs more transparent, and thus to reconstruct incentives so that China’s economic growth can be more sustainable. Against the background of a rapidly growing China, Yeoh, Yoo and Liong examined the new intra-regional trade relations within the Asia Pacific region, and particularly within the ASEAN+1 nations, noting that “China has started forming FTAs with many Asian nations and is in the process of playing an even more important role in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA)”. The authors noted that the Asia-Pacific region, unlike the EU and America, have always lacked a strong leadership. APEC, which was formed more than 20 years ago, is an attempt to promote economic partnership within the region under one leadership, so far without much success. The stakes are high and China has an important part to play in promoting mutually beneficial trade relations within the region.

Another theme that comes out from this volume, one that is echoed just recently by an article in China Daily ( June 17, 2010) by Jin Bosong, research fellow and vice-director of the Department of Chinese Trade Research at the Chinese Academy of International Trade and Economic Cooperation, is that China should play a bigger role in global affairs and particularly global economic affairs. According to Leal-Arcas, “China should therefore play a more prominent multilateral role, not only at the WTO, but also at the IMF and the World Bank as well as in international economic governance”. According to Leal-Arcas, China meets all the three criteria that Fred Bergsten listed to be required of a global power. He cited Robert Zoellick and Justin Lin, the President and The Chief Economist of the World Bank respectively, in arguing that China and the US must cooperate and become the engine for the G20, “Without a strong G-2, the G-20 will disappoint”. In recent years, China indeed has become much more vocal about international issues. Zhou Xiaochuan’s March 23, 2009 essay on the website of the People’s Bank of China is a case in point, as he called for the replacement of the US dollar as the dominant world currency by an alternative “international reserve currency that is disconnected from individual nations and is able to remain stable in the long run”.

One key subject related to China as an importer is the RMB exchange rate. As is widely known, the RMB has come under tremendous pressures to appreciate, and in July 2005 China did allow the RMB–US exchange rate to gradually appreciate relative to the US dollar. But the pace of appreciation was regarded as grossly inadequate. Views among economists fall into opposite camps. At one extreme, Nobel Laureate Paul Krugman argued in New York Times that the RMB should appreciate significantly, saying that China was hurting the recovery of the world economy by not appreciating its currency fast enough. At the other extreme, Robert Mundell, another Nobel Laureate, along with Justin Lin, warned against rapid RMB appreciation, saying that this would not help the US to promote its exports, but would hurt American interests. The experience of Japan does lend credence to the latter view, as Japan lost its role as an engine of growth for Asian economies and as a major importer. Its stagnant economy has already added many more “lost years” to the “lost decade”.

Reflecting these divergent views are two contributions in this volume. One, by Zhang, argued in favour of a 10% appreciation against the US dollar under a scheme that he called “a middle ground solution”. The other, by Ho, argued in favour of the RMB pegging against a basket of currencies each weighted by their respective GDP’s (lagged two years), saying this would increase the flexibility of the exchange rate without risk of destabilizing the system. He argued that many of the other Asian economies may also find a similar regime for their own currencies beneficial as well. This proposal is similar to that made by some Japanese scholars, and is pertinent to the subject of integration in that by pegging to such a basket individually, the currencies that do so will effectively become a currency block, with mutual exchange rates stabilised. He argued that the exchange rate for each currency vis-à-vis this basket should be pitched at such a level that is consistent with internal balance i.e., balanced fiscal budget at full employment. On the other hand, Zhang argues that the one-off 10% RMB appreciation against the US dollar should go hand in hand with an annual ±3% band against the US dollar, and that now is a very good time for implementing the tradeoff solution to the RMB exchange rate reform.

APEC was born in 1989, and more than two decades has gone since. The fact is that it is still alive, and that countries are still waiting to join the club. According to Shiro Armstrong, writing in East Asia Forum ( June 2, 2008), “India is on the doorstep, wanting to join APEC and there is potential for leverage to be used positively to reach an agreement with India (‘come into line with APEC developing countries on Doha and we’ll let you in our club’). It was American frustration at Indian posture in the Doha negotiations that kept the door closed to India in Sydney last September (i.e. 2007)”. Logic suggests that an organisation should not survive if its members do not find it serving a useful purpose, and that it cannot be dysfunctional when others still seek membership. As Chung pointed out, APEC adopted an “evolutionary approach” of being a loose forum, “where ...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Title
• Copyright
• Foreword
• Contents
• List of Contributors
• 1 APEC and the Rise of China: an Introduction
• Part I. Overview of Issues
• Part II. Role of China
• Part III. Monetary Integration and the Reform of the Renminbi
• Part IV. The Future of APEC
• Index