Power in Contemporary Politics

Theories, Practices, Globalizations

Henri Goverde, Philip G Cerny, Mark Haugaard, Howard H Lentner, Henri Goverde, Philip G Cerny, Mark Haugaard, Howard H Lentner

• Publisher: SAGE Publications Ltd
• Year: 2000
• Print ISBN: 9780761966777, 9780761966760
• eBook ISBN: 9781446234501
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Social Sciences
• Subtopic: Sociology
• Index: Social Sciences

This major book provides an up-to-date and state-of-the-art overview of the contemporary theory and practice of the most central concept in political science: power.

The concept of political power is introduced within a three-part framework: contemporary theories of power; applications of power processes and practices; and the implications of modern power flows across the globe today.

The book explores the many structures of power in the contemporary world from theories of its construction and use, to its operation in policy networks, and its wider exercise at different levels in the political process, from the local to the global.

Amongst the many themes explored are the reproduction and the legitimization of power, the dynamics of resistance and coercion, the concepts of private and public power, and the impact of globalization processes and subsequent shifting power arrangements.

Combining diverse perspectives and different tools of analysis, this book represents the most comprehensive treatment of political power published in the last fifteen years. It will be essential reading for academics and students alike across political science, international studies and political sociology.

I THEORIES

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Since the publication of Lukes’s Power (1974) there has been a change of emphasis in the analysis of power. This is most obvious if we look at the authors and concepts associated with power today, as compared to then. At present references to Foucault and Nietzsche, and terms such as ‘discourse’ and ‘practices’, are inextricably tied to the concept of power. In the 1960s and 1970s references to Gramsci and Marx, and to terms such as ideology and class consciousness, abounded.¹ This move is not symptomatic of a new fashion for certain authors or concepts but, rather, a manifestation of a deeper shift in social theory.

From the Second World War up to the late 1970s, the analysis of power tended to be divided between Marxist-derived social theories and consensual perspectives based upon either Parsonian functionalism (Parsons, 1963) or (less frequently) Blau’s exchange theory (Blau, 1964). In contemporary analysis, the concerns of the Marxists have remained important (power as domination still counts) but they have been retheorized within a different concept of social order. Ironically, while the consensual theorists’ view of social order has fallen into disfavor, their view of power has resurfaced in current perceptions of social order.²

At a broad level, one of the crucial transformations which has taken place is that social theorists no longer make any normative foundational claims for their theories. Even in the most analytical (and, consequently, least prescriptive) Marxism there was always an implicit claim to the effect that the Marxist author in question enjoyed privileged access to certain absolute truths concerning what constitutes a good society. This foundational normative claim was based not only upon normative principles (privileged insights into what is right and wrong) but upon a scientific insight into a meta-narrative concerning the sociology of history. In that context, scientific meant foundational – absolutely true. The shift away from foundationalism and metanarrative is, of course, not unique to social theory. Even if we do not accept Lyotard’s (1986) characterization of this social phenomenon as a move from modernity to postmodernity but prefer to think, as Beck (1992) or Giddens (1991) do, in terms of a maturing of modernity,³ this shift is part of a wider phenomenon which characterizes a larger aspect of social life as a whole.⁴

In social theory this shift contributed not only to a redefinition of the parameters of what constitutes good practice but also changed social theory into a more self-reflective discipline. When Lukes wrote Power (1974), the relationship between power and knowledge was one in which power was perceived as corrupting knowledge. Knowledge which was corrupted by power was considered the opposite of truth. The task of the critical social theorist was to unmask these types of distortions using the sword of truth and metanarrative – the real interests of the proletariat (truth) and the historical inevitability of class struggle (metanarrative). This, of course, presupposes that the social theorist has a privileged position based upon ‘the truth’ and an understanding of social processes which others participated in but were unaware of. Lukes’s third dimension of power is typical in this regard. The third dimension of power is a highly effective manifestation of power whereby those over whom power is exercised do not understand their ‘real’ or ‘true’ interests and, simultaneously, find themselves enmeshed in a historical process, inherited from the past, which is contrary to their ‘real’ interests.

While claims to truth and metanarrative gradually ran into disfavor during the 1980s, social theorists still concern themselves with explaining power as domination. Theorists are still interested in understanding how power relations are sustained over time but, now, the analysis has a self-reflexive aspect. Authors such as Clegg (1989) reflect upon Marxist and functionalist claims to truth and the manner in which these claims were sustained by the local social orders of the recent past. As a consequence, the problem of social order is to understand the creation and reproduction of specific discourses.

A discourse is a local social order which allows one to say certain things but prevents others from being said. A discourse is not a meta narrative, in the sense that, for instance, feudalism, capitalism, socialism or communism are part of some prescripted historical evolution or, to take two other examples, there are deep structures which determine social life (Lévi-Strauss), or there are systems with specific needs (Parsons). Rather than focusing on social forces which go on behind people’s backs (as metanarrative analysis presupposes), social order is theorized in terms of the construction of meaning. Understanding social order involves understanding how individuals create and recreate meanings when they engage in social practices. These meanings form parameters within which agents can give expression to themselves. These are not simply the meanings of specific objects or things: the issues are much wider than that. Significantly, they include the creation of the meaning of self by understanding the construction of ontology, or ways of being.

Power makes the reproduction of certain meanings possible and precludes others. To use the jargon of those working within the Foucauldian tradition, it defines ‘conditions of possibility’. Within discourse, power facilitates certain modes of thought and militates against others. Within this theoretical context, claims to truth are inextricably tied to strategies of power that facilitate and preclude certain modes of expression and being. Truth facilitates while its shadow, untruth, precludes the production of meaning.

Within this analysis, Marxism itself became theorized as part of a set of conditions of possibility which facilitated self-expression based upon class but, equally effectively, delegitimated ontologies of self-expression based upon excluded categories, such as sexuality and lifestyle. As a consequence of this change in orientation, social theory became tied to the rise of new social movements, or more precisely, the need to theorize them.

In Foucault’s work we find a careful documentation of how discourses are formed and transformed. He used history to enable us to understand how it is that we have come to be the way we are – our ontologies. In this context the object of social theory, as social critique, rests not upon either a claim to truth or exposing falsity but rather in showing how discourse shapes the conditions of possibility within social life. Within this paradigm the claims to truth made by others are interpreted as a strategy of power which enables those who have truth on their side to speak, but renders mute those who do not.⁵ As argued by Laclau and Mouffe (1985), truth becomes a way of giving discursive fixity and, in this way defining the possibilities of debate (see Clegg, Chapter 3).

In Foucault’s thought power does not simply preclude, it does not simply say no, but facilitates certain modes of expression at the expense of others. Acknowledging that power not only precludes but also enables draws upon the vision of power (but not the social theory) of those who, like Parsons, argued that power is not simply ‘power over’ but, also, ‘power to’. Discourse does not simply preclude certain modes of expression; rather, its effectiveness lies precisely in the fact that it simultaneously facilitates modes of expression other than those which are excluded.

While the work of Giddens and Foucault appear dissimilar in theoretical orientation, the theory of structuration and high modernity⁶ can be analyzed as part of a similar paradigmatic shift in social theory. The theory of structuration is an explicit rejection of the type of metadiscourse associated with Marxism, structuralism and functionalism. Under the influence of Heidegger, it is an explicitly ontological theory which concerns itself with the being of social order. As the basic units of social order, structures exist through social practices. Social structures are available to social actors both as facilitators of social action and as constrainers of social action. Just as discourses do, structures constitute part of the conditions of possibility of social practices. To use Giddens’s terminology, structures are both enabling and constraining. The enabling aspect of social structure is ‘power to’, as capacity for action (the consensual image of power). This capacity for action, ‘power to’, can also be exercised to dominate others and, hence, can be exercised ‘over’ others. Central to Giddens’s theorization of contemporary society (high modernity) is the idea that in contemporary society one of the key problems for individuals is the constitution of self. In previous, more traditionally minded societies, a sense of self was given (you are born a wife or worker) whereas as today the constitution of self is an essentially reflexive project. In other words, the constitution of self is a key problematic, just as it was for Foucault. While noting this convergence it has, of course, to be acknowledged that a key difference between the two is their particular use of their own local language games and Giddens’s tendency to take the constraints upon conditions of possibility less seriously than Foucault.⁷

In normative political theory, this emphasis upon the conditions of possibility and the constitution of self has strong resonances with Aristotelian and civic republican political thought. In the Aristotelian world view all living things have a telos which constitutes both their final end and their essence. To take a simple example, the telos of an acorn is to be an oak. ‘Oakness’ is both what makes an acorn grow and its true essence. Translated into normative theory, Aristotle’s assertion that ‘man’⁸ is naturally a political animal is a statement to the effect that man’s telos is fully realized in a political society. Only in a polis does he realize his true essence.

Within civic republicanism, the idea of a natural political telos became part of the project of political theory. Building upon this, for civic republicans a key objective of political association is to facilitate the development of human potential through the creation of a political arena which nurtures the human essence.

A key thinker in this tradition is Arendt. She argued that power should be considered not purely conflictually but, rather, as a capacity for action which individuals gain by membership of a social system (Arendt, 1970). Her analysis shows strong parallels with Parsons’s concept of power but nevertheless there are fundamental differences. Arendt’s view of power is not tied to functionalism but, rather, is inextricably bound up with her normative project.

At the time of her work, the field of power analysis was dominated by the three-dimensional power debate and the consensual position of Parsons. As a consequence Arendt’s analysis of power did not receive the prominence that it might have at the time of publication (1970).⁹ However, the Aristotelian and, consequent, ontological emphasis of her work has made her view of power particularly pertinent to the concerns of contemporary power theorists. The idea of discourses (Foucault) or structures (Giddens) shaping the conditions of possibility for human development is ideally tailored to her normative project and her concept of power is compatible with contemporary views.

While these convergences have been noted by many, Goehler’s analysis (Chapter 1) is the first theorization of power to use them to construct a single comprehensive view of power. He argues that there are in fact two forms of power: ‘transitive’ and ‘intransitive’ power. Transitive power is ‘power over’ and is the form of power that Lukes dealt with in Power (1974). Intransitive power, on the other hand, is ‘power to’ and is theorized in terms of a coupling of Arendtian and Foucauldian views of power. The latter is accomplished by making use of insights from a number of sources in contemporary social theory, including Bourdieu and Luhmann. This theorization allows Goehler to show how all power (transitive and intransitive) presupposes the construction of social order based upon a consensus on norms and practices.

In Chapter 2, Haugaard looks at the whole issue of ideology and legitimacy. In the analysis of ideology he shows that the type of phenomenon which interested power theorists, such as Lukes, when they wrote about ‘false’ consciousness, has not gone away. What has changed are the theoretical premises of contemporary social theory. Consistent with the latter, Haugaard argues that we should think not in terms of ‘true’ and ‘false’ consciousness but, rather, in terms of levels of consciousness. With regard to legitimacy Haugaard takes a step further than contemporary debates concerning inclusion and exclusion of meaning. He analyzes the exact process whereby certain meanings and ontologies are legitimated and others delegitimated.

The whole issue of ideology and legitimacy (as examined by Haugaard) and the normative basis of intransitive power (Goehler) is linked to the issue of authority. In Chapter 3 Clegg analyzes the conflictual side of authority and the manner in which symbols and meanings are given an authoritative basis through the construction of a fixity of meanings. Clegg looks at the whole issue of the resistance to meaning and the strategies open to actors wishing to contest dominant discourses. This builds upon, and contributes to, Foucauldian analysis, the contributions of Laclau and Mouffe and, indeed, also his own theorization of circuits of power (Clegg, 1989).

If we look at these three chapters together and compare them to the state of the art at the time of Lukes’s Power (1974) we can see certain continuities and discontinuities. On the one hand, on the continuous side, the perception that power is both conflictual and consensual is still present. However, on the other hand, on the discontinuous side, we see that there is a convergent focus upon the problem of social order as a problem of meaning and ontology. While it is undeniably the case that Goehler, Clegg and Haugaard view social order differently, and that each places slightly different emphasis upon the conflictual and consensual aspects of power, there is not the same radical incompatibility of perspectives as there was between, for instance, Parsons and Lukes. As stated in the general introduction, there will never be one theory of power, and nor should we wish for one, but this convergent theorization gives us new conceptual tools which enable us to understand contemporary transformations of social order with a higher degree of sophistication than was previously possible.

NOTES

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1 This discontinuity is less noticeable in the analytical tradition of political theory. Authors such as Brian Barry (1991), Dowding (1991; 1996), Morriss (1987) and Wrong (1988) have generally continued with their focused analysis of the use of the word ‘power’ and its relationship to issues of democratic theory. This continuity is in part a consequence of the fact that their concerns are highly specific and, as a consequence, they have a certain legitimate leeway to have a relatively self-contained language game. However, in a few instances it is also (unfortunately) a consequence of the lack of dialogue between ‘analytical’ and ‘continental’ philosophy – in the eyes of analytical philosophers Foucault and Nietzsche would be continental.

2 Neither structural functionalism nor exchange theory has much currency in contemporary social theory.

3 Both authors hold that modernity was, from its very inception, anti-foundational. As argued by Kant, reason does not accept any form of authority and, according to Giddens and Beck, both foundationalism and metanarrative are a form of authority in the sense that both are an externally imposed constraint upon reason. As such, they perform the same functions as authority by, in effect, stating ‘thus far and no further’. Consequently, the rejection of metanarrative and foundationalism can be theorized as implicit in the logic of modernity as a continuation of the Enlightenment project.

4 How wide this social phenomenon is has to be open to debate. It could be argued that both postmodernity and high modernity are not part of a generalized worldwide phenomenon but, rather, confined to the social milieux of a fairly confined (Western in origin) globalizing intellectual elite. Because these intellectuals tend to associate with one another on a global scale they mistakenly believe that everyone else thinks as they do. Of course, they are aware of the existence of so-called Muslim and Christian fundamentalists, but either they are theorized away as ‘irrational reactionary forces’, or the issue is sidestepped by focusing on the dialogue between postmodernists and high modernists and those opposing views which have certain post/high modernity characteristics – even if one party is neither ‘post’ nor ‘high’ modern.

5 For an overview of Foucault’s analysis, see Haugaard (1997a: 41–97).

6 The Constitution of Society (1984) is Giddens’s fullest statement of structuration theory and The Consequences of Modernity (1991) is a good starting point for understanding his theory of modernity. Haugaard (1997a: 98–115) gives a short summary of Giddens’s theory of power and structuration.

7 Given Giddens’s appreciation of constraint in the theory of structuration, this would appear to be an inconsistency.

8 The gendered usage is deliberate, Aristotle excluded women – a position which contemporary political theorists working in this tradition would reject.

9 Habermas did engage with it seven years later (Habermas, 1977).

1	Constitution and Use of Power
	Gerhard Goehler

TOWARDS A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR CONCEPTUALIZING POWER

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Any attempt to grasp the concept of power opens a variety of different and most controversial meanings. One of those oppositions in conceptualizing power is Max Weber’s view on the one hand and Hannah Arendt’s on the other. To start with these two not only illustrates again the difficulty of clearly understanding one of the most familiar characteristics of our society, bu...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Title
• Copyright
• Dedication
• Contents
• List of contributors
• List of tables and figures
• Preface
• General Introduction: Power in Contemporary Politics
• I THEORIES Introduction to Part I Mark Haugaard
• II PRACTICES Introduction to Part II Henri Goverde
• III GLOBALIZATIONS Introduction to Part III Philip G. Cerny
• Epilogue
• References
• Index