A âVEXED QUESTIONâ
White Union Soldiers on Slavery and Race
Chandra Manning
If anyone had told E. C. Hubbard in January 1861 that he would fight to end slavery, he likely would have laughed or, if in a quarrelsome mood, thrown a punch. By his own admission, he âcame into the service . . . thinking that a negro [was] a parallel case of a dog.â Yet by December 1861, Sergeant Hubbard of the Thirteenth Illinois complained that the Unionâs failure to destroy slavery was prolonging the war, and he, like many of his fellow enlisted soldiers, demanded an end to the institution that they identified as the root of the conflict.1 The first Americans to insist on a connection between emancipation and Union victory were black Americans; the first group of white Americans whose views they changed consisted of Union soldiers serving in the South, who in turn developed into advocates and agents of emancipation. Yet white soldiersâ embrace of emancipation came with limits. Although blacks knew that slavery could not be separated from race, white Union troops initially ignored questions of racial equality or black rights. The fury of the war, Godâs apparent intervention in the July 4 victories at Gettysburg and Vicksburg, and the performance of black soldiers convinced many whites in the Union army that their racial attitudes made them complicit in the sin of slavery and even led some to demand black rights; however, support for the rights of African Americans varied with the course of the war. Together, the advances in and limitations of white Union soldiersâ views on slavery and race help explain the achievements and disappointments of the war and its aftermath.
Although studies of Civil War soldiers abound, no methodical examination of white Union soldiersâ changing views on slavery and race exists. Bell Irvin Wileyâs seminal works, The Life of Billy Yank and âBilly Yank and the Black Folk,â conflated slavery and race and led to the long-standing assumption that Northern racism made soldiers oppose emancipation.2 Later works, including Reid Mitchellâs Civil War Soldiers and James McPhersonâs For Cause and Comrades, depict variations in Union views on slavery and race, but their thematic (rather than chronological) organization makes change over time difficult to track.3 Joseph Glatthaar shows support for emancipation by the end of the war in The March to the Sea and Beyond: Shermanâs Troops in the Savannah and Carolinas Campaign, but Glatthaarâs subject precludes an examination of earlier developments and excludes men not in Shermanâs army.4 Still needed is a systematic examination of white soldiersâ views on slavery and race, with particular attention to change over time and to the role of enlisted men as agents of change who expected to influence the progress of the war.
Drawing conclusions about white Union soldiersâ views on slavery and race presents challenges, because the army consisted of millions of individuals who disagreed with one another on nearly everything. It is not difficult to find an example of a soldier to support virtually any point of view. The task here is not to make a case for harmony but to examine dominant patterns in white Union soldiersâ positions on slavery and race as expressed in the letters and diaries of mainly enlisted men (along with some junior officers) from West and East, immigrant and native born, urban and ruralâsoldiers who came from every Union state and who fought in every theater of the war. In addition, this study draws on approximately 100 camp newspapers created by enlisted soldiers in the field.5
From the outset, black Americans knew that the war had to strike at slavery. A black New Yorker saw the war as ânothing more nor less than perpetual slavery against universal freedom,â which meant that the Union would not win until it âput an everlasting end to negro slavery.â6 Slaves in the South demonstrated the links between Union victory and the end of slavery with their physical presence. Just weeks after Fort Sumter, so many slaves fled to Union lines at Fortress Monroe, Virginia, that General Benjamin Butler had to ask his superiors what to do about âentire familiesâ of slaves. Their arrival in camp signaled that the Union army would have to pay attention to the status and future of African Americans.7
In contrast, white Union soldiersâ views on slavery varied widely at first. Andrew Walker, the son of Irish immigrants, worked as a schoolteacher in the spring of 1861. As soon as he heard about Fort Sumter, he predicted that the North would have the opportunity to âforever set aside Slavery,â and before the year was out, he had enlisted in the Fifty-fifth Illinois to help.8 Others denounced the very idea of a war to end slavery. The Advance Guard, a regimental newspaper written by soldiers of the Seventeenth Illinois, lambasted âthe northern fanaticâ who awaits âthe probable abolition of slavery in the southern States, rubs his hands with delight and rejoices that the day of deliverance has arrived. All the horrors of civil war are of no consequence to him if his darling project is accomplished.â9
For most Union troops, both Walker and the Advance Guard missed the point because the warâs main purpose had less to do with either supporting or opposing abolition than with proving that republican government, established by the founders on the principles of liberty and equality and administered through free and fair elections, could work. A soldier stationed in Virginia maintained that the Union army aimed âto defend the Union of our Revolutionary sires, and protect and perpetuate a Government which the oppressed in every land have looked upon for half a century as the beacon of liberty.â10 The destruction of the Union would turn the idea of government based on liberty and equality into a worldwide laughingstock. As Private Leigh Webber of Kansas put it, âif we fail now, the hope of human rights is extinguished for ages.â11
Despite early emphasis on the Union and republican government, it did not take long for much of the rank and file to echo the Wisconsin soldier who proclaimed, âthe fact that slavery is the sole undeniable cause of this infamous rebellion, that it is a war of, by, and for Slavery, is as plain as the noon-day sun.â12 As men in the ranks saw it, Confederates had seceded to protect slavery from a president who opposed its extension: that made the war about slavery, whether an individual white Northerner liked it or not. If Southerners had not rebelled, a Pennsylvanian insisted, most Northerners would have continued âfollowing their plow, minding their forge, or exerting their talents in the mercantile line,â with thoughts of slavery and war far from their minds.13
At first, consensus on slaveryâs part in starting the war did not translate into agreement over what to do about it. Some men reasoned that if states seceded out of fear for the security of slavery within the Union, the quickest way to bring them back was to demonstrate that slavery was perfectly safe. As one regimental newspaper saw it, once white Southerners realized that the Union posed no threat to slavery, âthey will certainly abandon their hopeless and hell-conceived undertaking.â14 Especially in the border states, which retained both slavery and tenuous ties to the Union, some soldiers considered a hands-off policy the best way to ensure loyalty. âThe Secesh had represented that we were heare to free all their negroes,â Private Edward Dwight remarked from Missouri, but when locals noticed that soldiers did not interfere with slavery, approval of the Union increased.15 Others worried that the practical demands of fighting a war and ending slavery at the same time would be more than the Union could handle. When Lieutenant E. P. Kellogg read that the Wisconsin State Journalâs editor approved of freeing and arming slaves, Kellogg urged caution. The âquestion of the disposal of the negroes after their emancipationâ would be complicated, he noted. Better to âhave but one Gordian Knot at a time. If you give us more we shall have to cut them all, and perhaps cut our fingers if not our throats.â16 Other volunteers opposed emancipation simply because they disliked black people. A member of the First Kansas had his âgorge of contrabandsâ and wanted nothing to do with freeing them, lest former slaves move to Kansas. âOur prairies, rich in promised wealth, have already been converted from a living green, into a sickly ebony hue,â he complained.17
Between August and December 1861 a striking pattern took shape, as soldier after soldier began to insist that because slavery had caused the war, only the destruction of slavery could end the war. âYou have no idea of the changes that have taken place in the minds of the soldiers in the last two months,â one enlisted man from the Midwest declared. Firsthand observations of the South forced men who had once ignored slavery âto face this sum of all evils, and cause of the war,â with the result that âmen of all parties seem unanimous in the belief that to permanently establish the Union, [we must] . . . first wipe [out] the institution of slavery.â In short, âThe rebellion is abolitionizing the whole army.â18 John Boucher agreed: because âit was slavery that caused the war,â only âthe eternal overthrow of slaveryâ could win the war.19 Throughout the ranks, enlisted soldiers reasoned that eliminating the warâs cause would end the rebellion and prevent its recurrence. As a result, they championed the destruction of slavery a full year ahead of the Emancipation Proclamation, well before most civilians or political leaders did.
As enlisted menâs views on emancipation changed, they anticipated corresponding changes in policy. At first, many Union officers ordered strict respect for private property, including slaves, but by late 1861, the rank and file protested. As long as Confederatesâ âniggers [are] returned there is no chance to whip them,â one sergeant grumbled. âThe better course I think would be to confiscate . . . nigger and all.â20 E. C. Hubbard despised General Henry Halleckâs practice of expelling fugitive slaves from camp on the grounds of strategy and humanity. For one thing, it made more sense to Hubbard to use the information that slaves provided than to restore laborers to disloyal owners, but beyond tactical concerns, most runaway slaves would rather risk the open road than return to their masters. âTo expel them from camp is to expel them to starve,â Hubbard shuddered. âUnless this policy is changed the Dept of the Missouri needs a new Commander.â21 In contrast, when General John C. FrĂ©montâs controversial proclamation of August 30, 1861, freed the slaves of secessionist owners, William Dunham reckoned that FrĂ©mont âhas done more for to infuse energy into the Western Division of the service than all others together.â22 When Lincoln revoked FrĂ©montâs proclamation and removed FrĂ©mont from command, many soldiers, such as a Swiss immigrant in the First Minnesota, wondered angrily why the administration had âinterferedâ with an action that âwould soon end this war by removing the cause of it.â23 The Confiscation Acts of 1861 and 1862, which permitted the confiscation of disloyal ownersâ slaves, struck men like Walter Reeder as signs âthat Congress has, at length arrived at the conclusion they had arrived at long since.â24
To be sure, measures such as FrĂ©montâs proclamation and the Confiscation Acts generated what E. P. Kellogg called a âdiversity of opinion.â Kellogg himself opposed FrĂ©montâs measure on the grounds of âpracticability.â25 The timing of the Second Confiscation Act, soon after the Army of the Potomacâs Peninsula Campaign failed to capture Richmond, angered numerous Union soldiers serving in Virginia. Roland Bowen wished the âdamned set of Politicians who are everlastingly fighting about a Damned Nigger or some Generalâ were âall in hell Rolling and Pitching upon the firey coals.â26
Many others continued to oppose emancipation in general, especially as new rounds of recruits who had not yet witnessed the South or slavery enlisted. Massachusetts tinsmith Charles Knapp told his brother, âwee did not come here to fite for niggers and that is all that theay are fiting for now.â27 Henry Bandy made his position equally clear when he exclaimed, âhooraw for the union and not for the nigar.â28
Although hostile attitudes never disappeared entirely, the desire to win the war transcended prejudice without erasing it, leading the bulk of the Un...